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Abstract of Study 
This study raises two key questions about the Child Poverty Action Group 
between 1965 and 1974. Firstly, it seeks to offer an explanation as to why the 
Child Poverty Action Group was formed at this time. Secondly, it draws on the 
empirical evidence set out in this study to ascertain how effective CPAG was as a 
group during the period; both at drawing attention to the problem of family 
poverty and at persuading the government of the practicalities of its solution. In 
answering both these questions the study uses the framework of the theoretical 
literature. This theoretical framework is used to structure and interrogate the 
empirical evidence, which is drawn from archival, interview and published 
sources. 
The study argues that the origins of the Child Poverty Action Group can be 
attributed to a number of factors converging at this time and that the rediscovery 
of poverty acted as a catalyst for the formation of the group. 
The study concludes that the Child Poverty Action Group was effective as a 
catalyst, which forced the government to take action about the problem of family 
poverty. The group was not consistently successful in persuading the government 
of that its solution was the optimal solution but gradually the solution became 
mainstream. It argues that the Child Poverty Action Group played an important 
role. 
The study aims to be both a detailed historical examination of the Child Poverty 
Action Group, as an organisation and a case study of an influential pressure group 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is fourfold. Its first objective is to justify the need for 
this study. It will do this by reviewing the literature already available on Child 
Poverty Action Group (CPAG) and other pressure groups and explaining why 
there is a need for a further study. The second purpose of this chapter is to map 
out the structure of the rest of the thesis. A third role is the explanation of the 
methodologies used to make the most effective use of the primary and secondary 
materials available. Finally, a fourth section summarises the main objectives of 
CPAG and gives a theoretical and historical background to these objectives. 
1.1 The Need for this Study 
The 1960s saw the formation of a large number of single-issue pressure groups 
focusing on social policy issues. Yet despite this fact the literature on such groups 
is scant. There is an ever expanding literature on pressure group theory but few 
detailed case studies. A major exception is Penn's thesis of the Sirenians and the 
Simon Community (Penn 1996). There have however been shorter accounts of 
Shelter (Frost and Henderson 1975) and the Disablement Income Group (DIG) 
(Frost 1975). The other accounts of post war social policy pressure groups have 
either been personal accounts such as those on the Claimants Unions (CUs) 
(Jordan 1973, Gould and Kenyon 1972) or descriptive histories such as Brasnett's 
account of the Citizens' Advice Bureaux (CABx) (1969). In the wider field of 
social policy, but dealing with issues that are the concern of the Home Office, 
there has been a greater output of work. There have been studies on issues such as 
prison reform groups and capital punishment (Ryan 1978, Tuttle 1961), race 
(Heineman 1972) and sexual liberation' (Weeks 1990, Hindell and Simms 1971, 
Grey 1975). Also there has been a growing literature on environmental groups 
(Kimber and Richardson 1974) and a healthy literature on the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND) (Taylor and Pritchard 1980, Mattausch 1989). 
CPAG is the best researched of all the 1960s social policy single issue pressure 
groups. It has already attracted three detailed studies (Worsfold 1971, McCarthy 
I The author means by this the movements to liberalise abortion, male homosexuality and divorce. 
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1981 and 1986). In addition, there have been brief accounts of its origins (Banting 
1979, Lowe 1995) and an "inside story" of CPAG by a former director (Field 
1982). There are two good reasons for a further study of CPAG. Firstly, this study 
capitalises on a wealth of previously unavailable material and is firmly rooted in a 
theoretical framework. This has not been achieved satisfactorily by other studies. 
Secondly, CPAG is a good example of a 1960s pressure group. This is because it 
had one main aim throughout the period and interacted with a large number of 
institutions. 
McCarthy's 1981 and 1986 accounts are strong on CPAG's relationship with the 
trades unions. It was on this topic that the former concentrated. However the 
studies suffer from McCarthy's narrow use of archives. The PRO records were 
still closed, but the ignoring of the other archives like Crossman's papers and the 
Conservative Party's archive is less easily explained. In addition, the pool of 
interviewees was rather too narrow and homogenous. Finally, although pressure 
group theory is used in the 1986 study, there is no attempt to comment on the 
effectiveness of CPAG's strategies or to give a comprehensive account of why it 
was formed. 
Worsfold's unfinished PhD thesis (1971) is extremely detailed; this is its strength 
and its weakness. Although the detail is useful and the study contains original 
survey material, it does make it hard for the reader to distinguish between 
important and lesser events and activities. Another shortcoming of the study is 
that there is virtually no use of pressure group theory to structure arguments 
The insider account by a former director, Frank Field, is invaluable for 
understanding the story of the CPAG from Field's point of view and for gathering 
evidence about the strategies and methods that CPAG deployed. However the 
account is a memoir rather than an accurate study. The Banting account 
concentrates more on the issue of family poverty in the 1960s and therefore the 
reference to CPAG is brief. Lowe (1995) and Kelly (forthcoming) are both 
summaries of an aspect of CPAG's early history which introduce seminars at 
which CPAG and other witnesses of the period discussed, respectively, the issues 
around the formation of CPAG and its 1970 campaign against the Labour 
government's record. In addition, Wilson (1986) wrote a short article that 
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corrected some of the factual mistakes made by Briggs (1984) in his account of 
the founding of CPAG in his history of Toynbee Hall. 
This study is therefore necessary to collate all the previous evidence about CPAG 
and give it a firm theoretical basis. The study draws on pressure group and 
political theory to provide a framework in which the CPAG is examined. 
Therefore, not only is this an accurate history of the CPAG (as far as the records 
permit) but a case study into how a pressure group of the 1960s and 1970s 
operated and its significance to the political debate and agenda. An advantage 
which the author has over McCarthy and Worsfold is that she is acting as a 
historian looking at the events twenty-seven years later of which she has no 
personal memory. ' On the other hand for Worsfold and McCarthy the potential 
pool of interviewees was larger and their memories fresher. 
1.2 Structure of the Rest of the Thesis 
Chapter two introduces the theoretical framework, which underpins this study. 
The explanations of pressure group theory, offered in section one, explain the 
rationale for concentrating on CPAG's relationship with certain institutions in this 
study. The second section summarises the main theories for explaining the 
emergence of pressure groups. These theories are then examined in the light of the 
empirical evidence. The third section offers a model for measuring effectiveness. 
It is this model that provides the basis for addressing the main question posed by 
this study: how effective was CPAG? 
Chapter three discusses the main catalyst for the formation of CPAG, the 
rediscovery of poverty. The discussion is not limited to Britain but draws on 
evidence from Europe and the USA. The second half of this chapter is not only a 
chronology of the first year and a half of CPAG but also an examination of its 
origins in light of the theories discussed in chapter 2.2. 
Chapter four is a comprehensive examination of the tensions within CPAG itself. 
The internal structure of the group was important not only for the determining 
strategy but also for providing stability and funding. Chapter five is a hybrid 
2 J. B. Worsfold was an active member of York CPAG. Therefore he may have been more sympathetic to 
CPAG's cause than a more neutral observer. 
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chapter, which combines an examination of the internal dynamics of CPAG's 
welfare rights strategy with the strategy's effectiveness at furthering CPAG's 
goals. 
Chapters six to nine concentrate on examining CPAG's ability to influence various 
institutions. In chapter six the attention fixes on the government and its agencies. 
In chapter seven the political parties and Parliament are the focus. Chapter eight 
discusses CPAG's relationship with the media and makes some comments about 
the effect on public opinion. Chapter nine looks at the relationship CPAG had 
with the trade unions and other pressure groups. Finally chapter ten draws on the 
theoretical framework of chapter 2.3 in order to examine the effectiveness of 
CPAG. 
1.3 The Methodology 
1.3.1 The Approach 
The primary objective of this study is to produce an authoritative history of the 
CPAG in its first ten years. Its secondary purpose is to provide a useful case study 
for political scientists interested in the evolving nature of pressure groups. As the 
study has both of these purposes it draws both on the methodologies of social 
science and history. 
The difference between social science methodology and historical methodology is 
the relationship between theoretical frameworks and evidence. Social science 
studies are explicitly structured by theoretical constructs (Stanford 1994 p. 63). 
The social scientist uses these often-conflicting theories to make sense of his 
evidence. Even when the facts cannot be explained by the existing theories, the 
social scientist's mind is opened to possible other explanations (Stanford 1994 
p. 96-7). Traditionally, history has used empirical evidence to stimulate and 
answer questions of why things happened (Tosh 1991 p. 114-6, Stanford 1994 
p. 197-204). However historians do bring with them a number of implicit 
assumptions and values of which they must be aware (Stanford 1994 p. 96-7). 
However in practice the two approaches can overlap. Historians, for example, can 
use concepts and frameworks developed in social science to help understand the 
historical facts of which they strive to make sense. 
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The main focus of the study is an analysis of the empirical evidence through a 
search for underlying factors to explain why CPAG took a course of action and 
estimate its effectiveness. Hence it is in the historical tradition. However, a 
thorough reading of the available literature on pressure group theory made this 
analysis fuller in four main ways. Firstly, the theoretical literature mapped out the 
possible routes of influence that a pressure group was likely to use. This facilitated 
the selection of institutions to be studied and the division of the study. Secondly, 
the theoretical literature categorised pressure groups and formulates pure models 
of various types. This not only gave the author the language with which to 
describe CPAG, but also a pure model with which to compare the empirical 
evidence. Thirdly, the theoretical literature offered a number of competing 
theories about the origin of pressure groups against which CPAG's origins were 
compared. This exercise allowed the author to consider a number of possible 
causes. Finally, the theoretical literature offered guidance on how to define and 
measure effectiveness. 
1.3.2 The Gathering of Evidence 
There are four main types of historical evidence: the natural evidence of the 
environment; the evidence of how humans have shaped their environment and the 
artefacts that they have left; communicative evidence in the form of documents 
and oral testimony; the processive evidence in which a known conclusion can give 
clues as to the processes (Stanford 1994 p. 160-1). The contemporary nature of this 
study has meant that the evidence has been drawn exclusively from 
communicative evidence, both documentary and oral. However, the very fact that 
CPAG survived beyond 1974 as an organisation allows the historian to tentatively 
deduce either that it was still trying to achieve its goals and thus had not been 
fully successful before 1974 or that it had new goals. 
Historians make two main distinctions between types of communicative evidence. 
Firstly, they differentiate between secondary sources, a retrospective study of the 
events, and primary sources, which are contemporary evidence to the period under 
study (Stanford 1994 p. 142). However, in reality evidence does not fit into such 
clear categories (Stanford 1994 p. 142, Tosh 1991 p. 32). Archival evidence can be 
categorised with relatively little controversy as primary. However, although the 
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interviewees are witnesses to the events, the fact that they took place over thirty 
years later means that they are an account of a contemporary rather than a 
contemporary account. Secondly, there is a difference between hard and soft 
evidence (Stanford 1994 p. 145-6), the former being quantitative' and the latter 
being qualitative. Although this study occasionally uses hard evidence, most is 
soft and is dependent on interpretation. It is important to recognise that although 
the author of a document may have had one purpose, his/her audiences may 
interpret it differently. The author of this study is detached from the period and 
culture under study. Therefore, her interpretation is likely to be different again 
(Stanford 1994 p. 146). It is impossible to counter this completely. The only way 
the author has been able to temper this flaw is by gathering evidence from primary 
and secondary sources and evaluating it accordingly. 
1.3.2.1 The Archival Evidence 
Archival evidence has formed the bulk of this study. The papers of the CPAG 
from this time have been lost. However the combined papers of Professor Peter 
Townsend, 4 Dr. Harriet Wilson, ' Professor Veit Wilson6 and David Bull' have 
filled some of this gap. However, it would be naive to believe that they are 
complete. Indeed much of the correspondence found in the Public Record Office 
(PRO) was not in the CPAG files. This was because the Executive Committee 
members who kept their papers would not have been given a copy of every letter 
that was sent. Most of the communication between staff members has also been 
lost. 
In order to understand what was happening inside government at this time, the 
author examined government papers at the PRO. The most relevant papers to this 
study were those of the DHSS, SBC and their predecessors, the Prime Minister, 
and the Treasury. Although it has not been unknown for public papers to be 
tampered with and certainly most of the routine papers have been destroyed, in 
general the public records contain most of the important documents of this time. 
3 Quantitative evidence is generally not completely reliable. When surveys are taken the representativeness 
of the sampling can alter results considerably, as can the measures used. 
4 Chair from 1969-1989. 
5 Founder member and honorary secretary throughout period 
6 Founder member and Executive Committee member throughout the period. 
7 Member of the Executive Committee from 1967 and active in Manchester and Bristol branches. 
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Some meetings between politicians were informal and left no record. Crossman, 
for example, talks in his diaries of people meeting in private homes in the 
evenings. A serious limitation of the PRO records to this study is the thirty-year 
rule. In addition to the papers available at the PRO, there are the Crossman papers 
at Warwick University. These are mostly the advisory papers which Brian Abel 
Smith, Crossman's advisor, produced. Some of these papers are not in the PRO. 
Both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party have archives. The 
Conservative Party's is well organised and most of the papers of the Research 
Department were available for the whole period, although understandably the 
Conservative Research Department was most active during the period of Labour 
government and just before the 1974 election. The only identifiable omission was 
that no record had been kept of the proceedings of the Parliamentary backbench 
committees. The Labour Party's archive is less complete and none of the records 
of the Research Department other than its memoranda are available. Only the 
proceedings of the National Executive Committee, the main policy making 
committee of the Labour Party, and its sub-committees: the Home Policy Sub- 
Committee and the Social Policy Sub-Committee are available to researchers. The 
Social Policy Sub-Committee was itself disbanded between 1968 and 1971, 
leaving a gap. In addition the author looked at the Trades Union Ccongress 
records which are complete for the whole period. 
In the case of all these archives, the usefulness of all the materials varies. Letters, 
memoranda and discussion papers in all the archives tend to be rich with 
information. The minutes of meetings are invaluable for understanding the main 
topics of discussion at Cabinet, at CPAG, at the General Council of Trades Unions 
Congress (TUC) and party sub-committee meetings. However, the minutes only 
record decisions with scant regard to the different views aired. They do not give 
any flavour of the heated debate that might have taken place. 
A major source of information both to understanding the debates of the time (Tosh 
1991 p. 37) and to evaluating CPAG's success at using publicity machinery is the 
press. Of course by the 1960s and 1970s there was a multitude of different 
national and local newspapers. Selecting a number of national newspapers and 
comparing them with CPAG press releases, as well as using the Times and Neit 
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Society indices, the author was able to manage her use the press, of which the 
volume would have otherwise have been unmanageable. 
The Crossman Diaries are a rich source of information on the Labour 
governments. As Lord President and later Secretary of State for the Social 
Services, Crossman's descriptions of events enrich the Cabinet minutes. In 
addition his frank views are invaluable for understanding his part in the 
relationship between CPAG and the government. The publicly available version 
of the diary has been edited but the author was able to gain access to the originals. 
However the diaries even in their original state are not a neutral account of events. 
The diaries are a personal and one-sided account (Morgan 1987 p. 24, Pimlott 
1987 p. 26, Ennals 1987 p. 27), which omit important details in which Crossman 
had little interest or knowledge (Jay 1987 p. 27, Powell 1987 p. 29). Crossman's 
views on the role of Cabinet and on the neutrality of civil servants have been 
criticised by a number of commentators (Godber 1987 p. 28, Jones 1987 p. 25 
Powell 1987 p. 29). The diaries can be used in conjunction with the archival 
evidence and with oral testimony from other witnesses (see below 1.3.2.2). 
There were four other primary documentary sources used in this study. Firstly, the 
conference reports of the political parties and the TUC. These give transcripts of 
the speeches made. These are useful for discovering what issues were important to 
conference. However informal meetings, conversations and activities at 
conference are not recorded. Also the debates at conference are the conclusion of a 
complicated procedure of resolutions and motions, which go through a number of 
filters between proposal and being debated at conference. These processes are 
only evident from some archival material and from oral evidence. Secondly, 
Hansard is invaluable as a record of Parliamentary debates and discussions. 
Thirdly, the published reports of the National Assisstance Board/Supplementary 
Benefit Commission (NAB/SBC) for the period were used. However, these 
reports tend to be bland statements or quantitative evidence. The more full reports 
of the SBC did not reappear until 1975. Finally, the appendices of the Worsfold 
study are a source of statistical and documentary evidence. 
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1.3.2.2 Oral Testimony 
There is a large amount of documentary evidence on which to base this study. 
However, the continued closure of the records of the Conservative administration 
at the time this study was written means that any evidence about how CPAG 
worked with the government must be gleaned from the other archival evidence 
and from oral testimony. 
There are a number of advantages and disadvantages of using oral testimony. 
Certainly, oral evidence is not only crucial for situations as above when the public 
records are closed but also for gaining information on informal meetings and 
contacts which are not recorded. It also can shed light on personalities in informal 
relationships (Seldon and Pappworth 1983 p. 38,40), as well as the practical 
division of influence within the various organisations. Oral evidence can also put 
events in a long-term perspective (Seldon and Pappworth 1983 p. 40). Documents 
can be deceptive as to the importance of certain issues and events. Written record 
of important things may be missing and a number of well-written documents can 
lead the historian to over-estimate the importance of an issue or an event. The oral 
testimony of a number of people can help to ameliorate this problem. The author 
also sought the views of "witnesses" about CPAG, as just one aspect of her quest 
to evaluate its effectiveness. Finally, the physical visiting of witnesses can lead to 
important documentary sources in private hands (Seldon and Pappworth 1983 
p. 46). This was certainly the experience of the author of this study, who received 
documentary evidence from six witnesses. 
There are a number of problems with oral testimony. Firstly, as in the case of this 
study, the interview can be many years later and memory can be unreliable 
(Seldon and Pappworth 1983 p. 17). The witness now has the benefit of hindsight 
and may have been influenced by subsequent reading on the events, indeed "the 
voice of the past is inescapably the voice of the present too" (Tosh 1991 p. 214). 
Seldon and Pappworth argue that interviewees are usually more reliable at 
commenting on a unique or routine events (1983 p. 18). There is also the problem 
that some people consciously rewrite history. This is not as common as suggested 
by critics of oral history (Seldon and Pappworth 1983 p. 19). Yet all witness 
statements can be compared to other testimonies and documentary evidence and 
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evaluations can be made about the likely reliability of the witness. The same is 
true for misrepresentation through oversimplification, vindictiveness and 
superficiality (Seldon and Pappworth 1983 p. 19-21). Oral evidence is most 
effectively used as a complement to archival evidence. It is particularly useful 
when the records are still closed. However, oral evidence (particularly thirty years 
after the events), is only as reliable as the memory affected by hindsight. 
The author of this study interviewed fourteen witnesses who were involved with 
or observed CPAG (see appendix K). However, over thirty years had lapsed and a 
number of potential witnesses had died and others had become untraceable. It was 
possible to interview most of the key figures in CPAG at this time, but not all. 
Most of the politicians were no longer available but this was remedied by 
speaking to a then junior Conservative Minister and the private secretary to both 
Crossman and Joseph. Other civil servants were able to describe not only events 
and therefore clarify some of the issues prompted by the records but reflect on the 
informal relationships and continuity between governments. 
It would have been interesting to have spoken to more people from the 
Conservative Party at that time. The reasons for not doing so were twofold. 
Firstly, a number were invited to a witness seminar (reported in Kelly 
forthcoming), but were unable to attend. Secondly, it was felt that given 
interviews were very time consuming it was important to only interview key 
persons at the time. The Conservative Party's view was covered by the interview 
with Lord Dean, the interviews with civil servants and the detailed records in the 
Conservative Party archive. 
A number of people involved in CPAG at the time have subsequently become 
important figures in public life. However, it was important to restrict the 
interviews to those who were pivotal at the time. On the other hand, a few people, 
such as Sean Creighton and Audrey Harvey, would have been important 
interviewees but were not possible to trace or had died. 
Each witness was a specialist in a different aspect of the study; therefore questions 
were tailored for individual interviews with just the questions on effectiveness 
being asked at each interview. The interviewee was allowed to diverge from the 
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question, especially if this was yielding information. This is consistent with the 
advice of Seldon and Pappworth (1983 p. 82). Although there is debate in the 
literature as to the best location for an interview (Seldon and Pappworth 1983 
p. 65, Oppenheim 1992 p. 69, Dexter 1970 p. 47), the author found that when 
interviewing the priority was to allow the witness to choose the location most 
convenient for him or her. Finally, there is some debate about whether interviews 
should be noted or recorded (Seldon and Pappworth 1983 p. 69-71). All but two 
the interviews in this study were recorded. This was because the author found that 
recording an interview not only allowed a more natural dialogue between the 
interviewee and herself but also ensured that there was a reliable record. 
1.4 The Policy, Social and Economic Background of the Period 
1965-74 
CPAG did not work in a vacuum it was influenced, helped and restricted by the 
social, economic and political environment in which it worked. The purpose of 
this section is to explore CPAG's main policy issues and give them a social, 
economic and political context. The fundamental criterion for measuring 
effectiveness has to be what was actually possible at the time, this sub-section is 
important for the later evaluation of CPAG. The first part concentrates on the 
main issue for CPAG, child poverty. The second section looks at some of the 
wider issues about which CPAG campaigned. 
1.4.1 The Policy Options for Relieving Family Poverty 
Once family poverty did achieve political importance, both Harold Wilson's 
Labour government (1964-70) and Edward Heath's Conservative government 
(1970-74) had a number of options from which to select a solution. There were 
four main factors, which led to family poverty. Large families were most at risk of 
falling into poverty (MSS 1967a p. 20). This was because even a reasonable wage 
was stretched when it had to provide for seven people or more. However most 
families in poverty were smaller families of less than three children (MSS 1967a 
p. 20), they were forced into poverty by the very low wages that they could earn. 
Thirdly, there were growing numbers of one-parent families, especially in the later 
1960s and early 1970s (Kiernan et al 1998 p. 50). Most of this group was not 
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covered by National Insurance (NI) and therefore reliant on National Assisstance 
Supplementary Benefit (NA/SB). The final reason was that in some areas, 
especially London, rents were very high and as a fixed cost reduced the resources 
the family had for other expenditure. 
One of the key features of family poverty at this time was that it was very much a 
problem of those in work. Unemployment, although increasing at this time, was 
historically very low. Studies showed that a large number of families in poverty 
relied on wages as their main source of income (Abel-Smith and Townsend 1965 
p. 41). If the poverty of workers' families was to be alleviated either wages had to 
be raised for the lowest paid or they had to be supplemented to allow for the size 
of the family whilst the father was in work, as they were when he was out of work. 
The former could be done by either the introduction of a minimum wage or an 
adjustment to the incomes policy. The latter could be achieved through higher 
family allowances, a negative income tax or a means tested supplement. 
1.4.1.1 The Minimum wage 
The main justifications for a minimum wage were that as some wages were 
extremely low, even higher family allowances could not bring the family to the 
SB level (Field and Townsend 1970 p. 14). There were three main problems with 
the minimum wage. Firstly, it would not help larger families enough (CAB 
134/2586, PRO). In addition there would still be no improvement in the horizontal 
equity between families and the childless. Secondly, there was a fear that a 
minimum wage could cause unemployment and price less productive workers 
such as the unskilled and disabled out of the labour market (Le Grand and 
Robinson 1984 p. 253, Cmnd 4649 p. 182). The costs to industry would not be 
restricted to the simple increase in low wages. Higher paid workers would move 
to re-establish their differentials. This would increase the cost to industry by an 
even greater amount. Although these costs may be absorbed by the industry it is 
far more likely that prices would increase and thus cause inflation (Cmnd 4649 
p. 182, Le Grand and Robinson 1984 p. 254). Hence, the third problem was that the 
real value of the increases would be eroded by the price inflation and any 
temporary increase in the low paid worker's situation in relation to other workers 
would be eroded by the re-establishing of differentials. Thus although absolute 
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poverty could temporarily be alleviated, relative poverty would remain. A Labour 
Cabinet Committee investigating the possibility of the national minimum wage in 
1968 concluded therefore that social security benefits would be more effective at 
tackling poverty (CAB 134/2586, PRO) 
1.4.1.2 Adjusting the Incomes Policy 
The Prices and Incomes Policy from 1965 controlled the amount of prices and 
wage increases. As the problem of family poverty became more apparent, one 
solution would be to allow the lowest paid workers higher pay increases than their 
colleagues as the TUC advocated (Hughes 1968 p. 14). However there were two 
problems with this strategy. Firstly, trades unions had established differentials for 
different skills. If the lowest paid were given higher pay increases these 
differentials would erode and more skilled and experienced workers would earn 
little more than their unskilled colleagues. Hence allowing the lowest paid higher 
increases would cause trade union resentment and could undermine the Prices and 
Incomes policy (Brittan 1971 p. 406-7). Secondly, as with the minimum wage, 
giving all workers a pay increase did not solve the problem of absolute family 
poverty, as all workers regardless of their family responsibilities would gain the 
same amount. It was also far more expensive than selectively raising family 
allowances ((68) 50 CAB 129/135, PRO). 
1.4.1.3 Family Allowances 
The Beveridge blue print for the welfare state made three assumptions that 
underpinned the social insurance scheme: the comprehensive and universal health 
service, the maintenance of full employment and the payment of family 
allowances from general taxation for all children excluding the first. Beveridge 
argued that as social insurance and social security benefits allowed extra for 
dependants, a family man could gain more whilst out of work than whilst in work. 
Family allowances would adjust wages to family responsibilities and thus 
maintain incentives to work. Beveridge also advocated family allowances as a 
way of increasing the birth rate (Cmd 6404 1942 p. 42 1). This was of real concern 
in the 1930s and 1940s (Land 1975 p. 171). Although in Parliament the 
introduction of family allowances was mostly linked to the Beveridge arguments 
20 
about want and work incentives, in the media the link was made between the 
declining birth rate and family allowances. The Royal Commission on Population 
published in 1949 suggested the increase of family allowances to encourage the 
birth rate (Land 1975 p. 222-4). 
Family allowances were never introduced at the 8 shilling rate Beveridge 
suggested. Instead in 1945 they were introduced at 5 shillings. The smaller 
amount was justified by the benefits that children would receive in kind namely 
school milk and meals. ' In 1951, a three-child family gained only 7% of the 
average manual wage in family allowances. The relative value declined to 6% by 
1961 despite two small increases in the 1950s to offset the loss of food subsidies. 
By 1966 the allowances were worth only 4% (Banting 1979 p. 46) . There was a 
general hostility to family allowances in the 1950s. When asked where 
government expenditure should be cut family allowances were the favourite target 
after defence. 43% of people wanted to spend less on family allowances and only 
23% wanted to spend more. The comparable figures for pensions are 6% and 81 % 
(Gallup 1976 p. 290 and 295). There were three reasons why family allowances 
seemed less relevant to the majority of the population. Firstly, the link between 
family allowances and increasing the birth rate was unfortunate as the baby booms 
gave rise to fears that Britain was over-populated (Cmnd 5258 1973 p. 47). 
Secondly, as more married women went out to work the feminist arguments for an 
independent income for the mother became less relevant (Land 1975 p. 229). 
Thirdly, as the tax threshold fell, the more regularly increased child tax 
allowances were enjoyed by more voters. In addition there was no pressure on the 
government to help families. 
However, by the mid-1960s family allowances were being discussed at Cabinet 
level again. Universal family allowances were a simple benefit, which had a one 
hundred percent take-up, caused no stigma to the recipients and had no 
disincentive effects. The help was concentrated on families with children. 
However, they were expensive to raise universally. Even to raise family 
allowances by 7 shillings for all children but the first would have cost E160 
million (Lord President CAB 128/42 c(67)27). To raise family allowances to 
8 Milk was provided universally until 1968. However meals were only ever offered on a means tested basis, 
although they were subsidised for all children until the 1970s. 
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between 18 shillings and 32 shillings, 6 pence (depending on the age and birth- 
position of the child) in 1967 would have cost £680-700 million (CPAG 1967 
p. iv). This was a considerable amount of money for governments trying to cut 
public expenditure. Given the unpopularity of family allowances there was little 
political will to spend these sums. Another disadvantage of family allowances was 
that they did not target resources at the poorest. There was little support in 1960s 
Britain (unlike France) for a policy, which supported families per se. This was 
true for the government, the political establishment (such as the parties and the 
trades unions) and CPAG itself (see chapter 4.2.3.3). The emphasis was on 
tackling poverty. The cost of family allowances could be reduced by either only 
giving them to certain children in the family (first children were already excluded 
and this could have been taken further to exempt second children) or by only 
giving them to poorer families. 
The justification for limiting family allowances rises to either the third, the fourth 
or the fifth (depending on the plan) and subsequent children was that as large 
families were more likely to be below the poverty line than small families, it was a 
way of tackling some of the worst poverty. However there were more small 
families below the poverty line than large families (MSS 1967 p. 11). In addition, 
given the hostility to large, poor families, any move to favour them at the expense 
of smaller families would have been unpopular. 
The second option of a selective increase according to income could be managed 
in one of two ways. The first way was for a means tested supplement to family 
allowances (see below 1.4.1.5) while the second was for the family allowance to 
be increased and the child tax allowance to be reduced or abolished if the increase 
in family allowances was substantial. The simplest way in which this could be 
achieved was through "give and take", a simple reduction of child tax allowance 
and increase of family allowances. However the problem was that the 
qualifications for child tax allowance and family allowances were different. Most 
importantly family allowances were only payable until the child had reached 
his/her sixteenth year. Child tax allowance was payable until the child left full 
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time education. The residential requirements were also different. 9 Claw-back. 
developed in 1967 by Professor Nicholas Kaldor1°, eliminated these problems. It 
reduced the general tax allowances of all tax-payers whose wives were receiving 
family allowances. Thus the anomaly was avoided although the direct link 
between child tax allowance and family allowances was severed. 
There were two problems with claw-back (and the same was true for "give and 
take"). Firstly, it lowered the tax threshold and therefore increased the work of the 
Inland Revenue. Secondly and of more importance to the government, it 
redistributed money from the husband's pay packet to his wife's family 
allowances: the so-called wallet to the purse. This was likely to cause resentment 
amongst men who noticed the cut in their pay packet but did not notice the 
increase in their wives' family allowances. 
1.4.1.4 Negative Income Tax (NIT) 
NIT was originally developed by the New Right economist Milton Friedman in 
the USA in 1962 (Le Grand and Robinson 1984 p. 248). The idea was developed 
in Britain not only by the Conservatives" but also by the Left. Labour's Minimum 
Income Guarantee, a plan to give pensioners a minimum income based on their 
completion of a tax form announced in Labour's 1964 manifesto, was a form of 
NIT (Labour Party 1964 p. 16). A fledgling CPAG put forward NIT proposals in 
June 1965 (see chapter 3.2.1). The main principle that underpinned all NIT 
schemes was that all tax-payers would receive flat rate tax allowances according 
to their responsibilities. These would be set against tax and those earning more 
than their allowances would pay tax, whilst those earning less would have a 
positive credit added to their wage packet (Le Grand and Robinson 1984 p. 249). 
9These affected far less people. However a person whose children lived abroad would be entitled to child tax 
allowance but not family allowances for them. Likewise a person who had not established six months 
residency in the UK would be a similar situation. 
10 An economic advisor to the Chancellor of the Exchequer who developed a variant of give and take called 
claw-back. 
The idea of NIT in the form of social dividends had independently been developed by Lady Rhvs Williams 
as early as 1942. This scheme would give all members of society a flat rate social dividend or allowance 
(according to responsibility) and then tax all other income (Le Grand and Robinson 1984 p. 249). 
11 The idea of NIT in the form of social dividends had independently been developed by Lady Rhys 
Williams as early as 1942. This scheme would give all members of society a flat rate social dividend or 
allowance (according to responsibility, ) and then tax all other income (Le Grand and Robinson 1984 p. 249). 
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There were three main reasons why various forms of NIT became the Holy Grail 
of social policy in the 1960s and 1970s. Firstly, the automatic nature of MT 
would eradicate the stigma of applying for social security benefits and would 
ensure full take up (Le Grand and Robinson 1984 p. 251, Webb 1975 p. 425). 
Secondly, NIT would not have as great a disincentive effect to increase earnings 
as means tested benefits (Le Grand and Robinson 1984 p. 251). 12 Thirdly, NIT was 
selective. Labour was as keen as the Conservatives in the 1960s to portray itself as 
selective in tackling poverty. In addition, the neatness of one system for taxation 
and social security rather than two, it was hoped, would make administrative 
savings (Le Grand and Robinson 1984 p. 251). 
The main disadvantages of NIT were administrative and cost. Firstly, tax return 
forms asked no questions about the cost of housing and the capital, although this 
information would have to be attained to make the system fair and effective. 
Secondly, as many people never filled in tax return forms the Inland Revenue had 
to find ways to ensure that everyone filled in one. Thirdly, tax forms were 
completed annually and the poor needed help on a far more regular basis (Lapping 
1970 p. 146). The self-employed are difficult to include because they are not part 
of the PAYE scheme. Also, on cost grounds, unless the credits are to be raised to 
levels which would require very high taxation even for middle earners, the very 
poor have to be excluded or still rely for a sizeable part of their income on means 
tested benefits (Le Grand and Robinson 1984 p. 252). If the credits are paid 
through the wage packet then there will be a move from the purse to the wallet as 
child credits replace family allowances and are paid to the father. 
1.4.1.5 Means Tested Allowances 
Part of the popularity of the Beveridge report was its rejection of the means test in 
favour of an universalist system. The degradation associated with the household 
means test of the 1930s and the resentment caused (Bradshaw and Deacon 1983 
p. 5-29) as well as memories of the Poor Law meant that there was resentment to 
means testing in the post war period. 
12 There is a greater disincentive with NIT than universal benefits. This is because as earnings rise, the 
allowance decreases (Le Grand and Robinson 1984 p. 250). 
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The backlash against universalism started in 1950 with the One Nation Group of 
Conservatives, which included Heath, Macleod and Powell. Macleod and Powell 
famously asked not why "should a means test be applied to a social service? " but 
"why should any social service be provided without a test of need? " (. Macleod and 
Powell 1952 p. 5). In 1955, the campaign for more selectivity was given an 
"independent voice" with the formation of the Institute of Economic Affairs 
(IEA). Ideally, most of the selectivists were in favour of the non-stigmatising 
approach of a negative income tax. However, that was a long-term policy option. 
In the 1960s there were two types of means tested benefit on the table designed to 
help families with children: a housing benefit for families designed to ease the 
problem of high rents and a means tested supplement to wages based on the 
number of children in the family. There were two advantages of means tested 
benefits: They were cheap and targeted the poorest. 
However, there were two drawbacks of means tested benefits. The most obvious 
was the problem of take up. No means tested benefit, except university grants, 
approached 100% take up and few managed the 80% take up of school meals. 
Even the Conservative government's huge publicity boosts for their means tested 
supplement to wages, resulted in a take up of less than 60% rather than the 
government's hoped for 85% for Family Income Supplement (FIS) (Timmins 
1995 p. 283-4). The whole benefits system was becoming a jungle. The idea of a 
housing allowance would have added to the confusing array of housing benefits 
that included rent rebates, rate rebates and the payment of rent by the SBC. 
The second problem was the poverty trap. The problem with concentrating 
benefits on the poor is that as they increase their earnings, their entitlement to 
means tested benefits decrease. Thus a family might be worse off with a small 
increase in earnings if its entitlements to means tested benefits stopped. In practice 
the cut off points for means tested benefits were staggered. Thus FIS had a 50% 
taper. Field and Piachaud pointed out in The Poverty Trap that an increase in 1970 
for a single person from £ 16.50 per week to £20 per week would leave her £2.50 
net better off. The same increase for a married man with one child would leave 
him 90p net better off (Field 1982 p. 106). Such little net benefit discouraged the 
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low paid from increasing their earnings. On the other side of the coin, means 
tested supplements to wages were accused of holding down wages. 
1.4.2 Other CPAG Campaigning Issues 
The key strategy for CPAG was to persuade the government to raise family 
allowances. This was the key to easing family poverty. However, throughout the 
period 1965 to 1974 it also raised a multitude of issues, all of which had some link 
to family poverty. In 1966, Tony Lynes used his role as secretary of CPAG to 
draw attention to the wage stop (see chapters 6.4). The wage stop meant that a 
family could not receive more in social security than it had received whilst in 
work. Although it was challenged by MPs on both sides of the House throughout 
the period, it was accepted by both the Labour and Conservative governments at 
this time as undesirable that a man should receive more whilst on benefit than at 
work (Webb 1975 p. 455). 
As social security benefits increased and the earnings of lower paid failed to keep 
up with those of the higher paid (Hughes 1968 p. 12-13, Cmnd 4649 p. 182), the 
problem of the wage stop became worse (see appendix B). A minimum wage 
would have eased the wage stop. However as most of the people affected had 
larger families, to make the wage stop obsolete, a minimum wage would have had 
to have been set at an intolerably high level for the economy. CPAG's solution 
was higher family allowances. This option would raise the income of families in 
work and alleviate the wage stop. Thus CPAG rightly identified that the wage stop 
was a symptom of family poverty of those families in work as well as out of work. 
What actually did ease the wage stop was the introduction of means tested 
benefits such as FIS and Housing Benefit in the 1970s which supported low- 
earning working families (Beltram interview). 
A recurrent theme for CPAG was tackling the stigma linked to benefits and 
specifically making benefits a right rather than dependent on the discretion of the 
NAB (see chapter 5). After its plans for a Minimum Income Guarantee «- ere 
thwarted by administrative problems, the Labour government moved in this 
direction. The 1966 Social Security Act made the new Ministry of Social Security 
(MSS) responsible not only for contributory benefits but also the non-contributory 
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benefits. At a local level the offices were supposed to merge. The NAB was 
renamed the SBC and became more under the control of the Minister. Discretion 
was reduced with the new long-term addition (LTA), for recipients dependent on 
SB for more than a year, replacing a multitude of discretionary benefits. The Act 
itself emphasised that SB was a right of all citizens. The benefit for pensioners 
could not be reduced in any circumstances (Webb 1975 p. 457-8). The re-branding 
itself was intended to remove some of the stigma. 
Although the change in name and the emphasis on rights were important 
developments (Webb 1975 p. 458), the Act did not change as much as it promised. 
The NI and NAB offices found it difficult to merge, for the simple reason SB 
clients required means tests whilst NI ones did not, it proved impossible to deal 
with both groups in one office (Lapping 1970 p. 152). In addition the ambience of 
the SBC Offices did nothing to make the clients feel like clients with rights. 
Instead, many had no lavatories and the chairs were screwed to the floor because 
of the fear of damage and assault to officers (Lapping 1970 p. 152, Timmins 1995 
p. 229). Harold Wilson's boasts that "hundreds of thousands of the least well off 
members of the community now claimed their rights" were supported by figures 
showing 365,000 more claimants in a year (Timmins 1995 p. 228). However the 
economist Atkinson estimated that the rise in the rates meant that between a half 
and a third of these extra claimants were newly entitled claimants because of the 
higher scale (Webb 1975 p. 466-7). The Act did replace the word assistance with 
rights but did not go far enough for groups like CPAG. Chapter five evaluates 
CPAG's attempts to use the tribunal system and courts to reinforce claimants' 
rights. CPAG's influence over the SBC is analysed in chapter 6.4. 
CPAG became involved in a number of unemployment related issues. Ironically, 
it was Labour's attempt to soften the blow of unemployment with the earnings- 
related unemployment benefit in 1966 that introduced the wage stop into 
contributory benefits. In order to maintain work incentives there was a ceiling of 
85% of earnings on the benefit (Hill 1995 p. 67, Glennerster 1995 p. 106). CPAG 
was thus able to use this fact to emphasise that the income of many working 
families was so low that even the contributory benefits had to be capped whilst 
they were unemployed. The answer again was to raise the income of families in 
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work through family allowances. Under pressure from the tabloids about the 
problem of "scroungers", Labour was keen to show that although generous to the 
deserving poor it could be tough on "scroungers". Thus to CPAG's dismay an 
entitlement campaign in 1968 was accompanied by moves to force people into 
work. A four-week rule for single, unskilled men and three months for married 
and skilled men was introduced. This rule meant that subject to appeal, all rights 
to SB were cut off after this amount of time in areas where there were jobs 
available (Lynes 1968 p. 2). In October 1968 111,000 men were given a four week 
and 8,000 a three month warning (Hansard vol. 798 p. 20). Thus, under Labour 
policy did not always move in the direction CPAG wanted. One criterion of 
CPAG's effectiveness will be its ability to prevent legislation moving in an 
adverse direction as well as promoting favourable legislation. 
A particular cause celebre of CPAG was the cohabitation rule, particularly by the 
early 1970s. The cohabitation rule rested on the widely accepted belief that the 
unmarried couple should not be more generously treated than the married 
(Kiernan et al 1998 p. 173-5, Hansard vol. 836 p. 1894). The family orientated 
slant of the system, which awarded benefits to the head of the household (i. e. the 
man) for his whole family, meant that if a woman was living with a man as his 
wife then he was paid benefits for the whole household. The problem was deciding 
when a woman was cohabiting. There was no legal definition for this and too 
often the definition rested on the sexual relationship between the couple rather 
than any evidence that they were living as a de facto married couple. Thus chapter 
five looks at CPAG's attempts to get a definition through the courts. However 
cohabitation was just one issue facing a growing group of single mothers in the 
1960s and 1970s (Kiernan et al 1998 p. 164). Widows were entitled to generous NI 
benefits but the majority of single mothers who were divorcees and never-married 
mothers were dependent long term on SB (Kiernan et al 1998 p. 167). The thorny 
question was referred to the Finer Committee, where it stayed until 1974. 
The issue of free school dinners was an early cause for CPAG. The stigmatising 
practices of many schools in allocating meals to their poorer students were 
exposed by CPAG and the government reacted by encouraging parents to claim 
their free school meals in 1967. Free welfare foods for pre-school children had a 
28 
take up of 4% for non-SB recipients, something CPAG periodically highlighted 
from the mid-1960s (Field 1971 p. 11). For children over the school leaving age 
the only provision remained a local authority benefit. This was despite Labour's 
promise to help children staying at school after the age of sixteen with higher, 
graduated family allowances (Labour 1964 p. 14). By 1973, the welfare rights 
work had drawn local CPAGs' attention to the wider issue of education costs. 
Technology and sports lessons demanded materials for which parents had to pay 
and school uniforms could be expensive and were not fully compensated by local 
authority discretionary grants (Bristol CPAG 1973). Universal school milk was to 
CPAG's dismay, first the target of Labour and later Conservative cuts (Hill 1995 
p. 89). 
CPAG protested against the Labour government's decision to reintroduce 
prescription charges as an expenditure cutting measure in 1967 (Hill 1995 p. 82). 
However Labour's emphasis on the temporary nature of the charges muted the 
anger to a degree and it was the Conservatives' plans to relate costs to the price of 
the drug, which provoked more anger. In the field of family planning both Labour 
and the Conservatives moved towards freer choice for all couples. Labour 
liberalised the provision of contraception in 1967 and abortion in 1969. The 
Conservatives made the oral contraceptive pill free on the National Health Service 
in 1972. Although individual members of CPAG may have applauded these 
moves, the national body stayed silent on the family planning debate, ever aware 
that the greater choice prejudiced feelings against large families further and that 
limiting families should not be supported as a method of reducing family poverty 
(Lynes 1965 p. 435). 
Although housing had its own pressure group in Shelter, CPAG did became 
involved in the debate of how the poor should be helped with their housing costs. 
It was on this issue that both CPAG and Labour were hampered by their own 
deeply held ideologies. Local authority housing was supported by £288 million in 
subsidies from central and local government in 1966-7.13 These subsidies reduced 
the rents of local authority tenants and were thus not means tested. However, 
many of the poorest tenants were forced to live in privately rented accommodation 
13 This figure is obtained by adding the total current expenditure costs to the local authorities of local 
authority housing and the subsidies that they received from Central go ernment(Lowe 1999 p. 24fl). 
29 
E :. ý (OL 
4 AARY 
as some local authorities had residential qualifications and did not even consider 
some groups such as lone mothers as households in their own right (Lapping 1970 
p. 171, Kiernan et al 1998 p. 220-1). Labour tried to patch up the system by 
introducing its fair rents legislation to prevent exorbitant rents, introducing relief 
on property based local authority taxes (rate rebates) and encouraging local 
authorities to introduce schemes to help poorer local authority tenants with their 
rents. However rate rebates had a low take-up rate, not least because many of the 
poorest families did not know that they paid rates as part of their rent (Field 1970 
p. 13 ). 
The Conservatives' Housing Finance Act in 1972 removed the subsidy from local 
authority housing and paid means tested housing benefits to tenants and 
householders alike. CPAG protested at the rise in local authority tenants' rents and 
the aggravation of the poverty trap but it was this legislation which helped some 
of the poorest private tenants (Hill 1995 p. 99). CPAG remained critical of the 
huge subsidies pumped into owner-occupation by both parties throughout the 
period. Some £328 million was given in tax relief on mortgages in 1971-2; local 
authority housing was at that time attracting subsidies from local and central 
government of £570 millions. However, the Conservatives wishing to build a 
property-owning democracy, for which the Conservatives would be the natural 
party, and Labour mindful of working class enthusiasm for owning a home both 
continued to support this sector. 
Thus although family allowances and the direct relief of child poverty was the 
main thrust of CPAG's campaign there were a number of other issues on which 
CPAG campaigned. All of these issues affected poor families and all were due to 
the fact that the family had too low an income in order to provide for the 
minimum life style acceptable in 1960s and 1970s Britain. In evaluating whether 
CPAG was effective in achieving its main goal, the impact of these other issues 
will be evaluated in two ways. Firstly, some of the issues such as the wage stop 
were direct symptoms of the problems of working low-income families; thus this 
study will evaluate how they were presented by CPAG. Secondly, other issues 
such as the cohabitation rule and the use of discretionary benefits were related but 
separate issues. This study will not only have to evaluate how they were furthered 
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per se, but also whether campaigning for some issues furthered or hindered the 
campaign for better family allowances. 
1.4.3 Economic Performance 
1.4.3.1 The Economic Context 
A pressure group has to try and persuade the government to adopt policies which 
will further its aims (see chapter 2.1). If the policy change involves extra 
expenditure, which the abolition of poverty almost inevitably does, the pressure 
group does not just have to persuade the government of the desirability of its 
proposals but also its ability to afford them. If the economy is strong then the 
government will be easier to persuade of this fact. Neither the Labour nor the 
Conservative governments presided over a strong economy. Labour spent the first 
three years of its rule fighting a losing battle of supporting the over-valued pound 
against devaluation. Finally, in November 1967, it accepted the inevitable 
devaluation after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) refused to prop up the 
currency further. The unpleasant short term effects of devaluation, which Labour 
had been trying to avoid, were higher prices and thus inflationary pressures 
needed to be dealt with. Hence, the government raised SB and family allowances 
to protect the poorest in exchange for unions not pushing for inflationary wage 
increases. Devaluation did, however, bring the balance of payments back into 
balance (Lapping 1970 p. 46-9). Labour bequeathed its Conservative successors a 
much stronger economy than they had inherited in 1964. 
Labour's plans for office had been based on a rate of growth of 4% per annum. 
The historically high 2.5% per annum between 1964 and 196914 was disappointing 
and led to the abandonment of the plan (Lapping 1970 p. 42). The disappointing 
growth rate meant that not everything in the plan could be achieved without 
increasing the government's share of GDP through higher taxes. Not only would 
significantly higher taxes be unpopular politically but they could also damage 
investment. The government was pushed into cuts in public expenditure, 
14 There was an average growth rate of 2.8% per annum in GDP between 1948 and 1973. This should be 
compared with 2.2'o between 1924 and 1937. However the economy grew 3.1 °o between 1960 and 1964 
and 3.0% 1969 to 1973 (Lowe 1999 p. 69). 
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especially during the economic turndown of 1967. Thus any new policy which 
meant an increase in expenditure was unlikely to be favoured. 
The Conservatives were committed to cutting public expenditure to allow them to 
cut income taxes. The mini-budget of October 1970 slashed public expenditure. 
Growth between 1969-1973 increased at 3% per annum, slightly higher than 
preceding years but still not enough to allow either the cutting of income taxes 
whilst leaving the welfare state intact or the increasing of public expenditure. 
Labour was rocked by large numbers of unofficial strikes during its time of office. 
Proposals to make these illegal (under the title of In Place of Strife) were put 
forward by Barbara Castle in 1968. However trade union opposition meant that 
Labour had to abandon the plans (Lapping 1970 p. 52). The Conservatives revived 
these proposals in 1971 as the Industrial Relations Act. The result was a souring 
of relations with the TUC and an unprecedented number of strikes. Essential 
groups of workers such as dockers, gas workers, power workers, miners and 
others repeatedly went on strike (Ball 1996 p. 391-405). The Miners' strike in 
1973-4 reduced the country to a three-day week of work. It was generally thought 
during the 1950s that there should be no price increases at all (Lowe 1999 p. 70). 
However some inflation was inevitable when the government was committed to 
full employment which created a tight labour market and thus pressure on wages. 
Inflation was 5.4% per annum between 1964 and 1972, far higher than the 3.7% 
per annum average between 1951 and 1963. It was the first OPEC oil crisis of 
1972 that forced inflation to double figures, reaching 16.1% in 1973-4 (Lowe 
1999 p. 70). 
Theoretically, there are two main ways of relieving inflationary pressures. The 
first is through deflating the economy. It would mean reducing growth in the 
economy, thus reducing the amount of consumption and employment. This would 
weaken wage demands and general demand in the economy and thus inflation. 
The second method was to allow growth to continue and to continue to guarantee 
full employment, but at the same time impose a Prices and Incomes Policy on 
both sides of industry. In return for companies restraining price increases on their 
goods and services, trade unions would restrict their wage demands. Both Wilson 
and Heath honoured the post war commitment to full employment and opted for 
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the second option (Lapping 1970 p. 38-40, Timmins 1995 p. 307. Lowe 1996 
p. 194). The oil crisis did mean however that public expenditure had to be reigned 
in. The Department of Health and Social Security lost £ 111 million, Education 
lost £182 million (Timmins 1995 p. 308). The Conservatives were not just cutting 
public expenditure for ideological reasons but after 1971 out of economic 
necessity. It was against this background of disappointing economic growth, 
creeping and later spiralling inflation and general economic difficulties that CPAG 
was asking for an increase in family allowances. 
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2. Chapter Two: Theoretical Perspectives 
In order to analyse the early development of CPAG it is essential to make use of 
pressure group theory. This identifies important issues in relation to the origins, 
nature and tactics and effectiveness of such groups. This chapter is divided into 
three main sections. The first section is a summary of the literature available on 
pressure group theory. It is the concepts described in this section that provide the 
theoretical framework on which this study draws. The second section concentrates 
specifically on the origins of pressure groups. It examines the theoretical 
explanations available and matches them against empirical evidence. The final 
section outlines some established models of effectiveness and raises the questions, 
which will define effectiveness throughout the study. 
2.1 Pressure Group Theory 
2.1.1 Support 
Most authors differentiate between groups working for a vested interest and those 
that are working for a cause. The former are termed representational or sectional 
groups and the latter promotional or cause groups. 15 A representational group 
speaks for its clientele and covers a large spectrum. At one end are the large, 
producer, professional and business organisations, which Finer categorises as 
having a strong central organisation and concentrating on the executive (Whiteley 
and Winyard 1987 p. 86); many of these can threaten and deploy sanctions against 
the government (Grant 1995 p. 140). At the other end of the spectrum there are 
groups consisting of citizens trying to further their own interests such as the CUs 
or the Prisoners' Wives and Families Organisation (PWFO), which consist of 
marginalised groups in society. Despite the huge gulf between these groups in 
15 "Sectional" and "cause" groups are the terms used by Grant (1995). Representational and promotional are 
used by Whiteley and Winyard (1987). However Alderman (1984) differentiates between sectional groups 
that are interested in a certain section of the community (hence under this definition the National Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, CPAG and DIG are all sectional) and cause groups that are defined as 
having general propositions for society as a whole. Some examples given are the British Maritime League, 
which campaigned to tight naval cuts, the Anti-Apartheid movement and the Society for the Protection of the 
Unborn Child (Alderman 1984 p. 41-43). The main problem with this analysis is that although there are some 
groups which straddle the normal promotional ! representative border in general it is best perhaps to 
differentiate between groups that speak for a constituency and try to represent as many of that constituency as 
possible (i. e. representative groups) and groups that are often small and made up of sympathetic but 
uninvolved people (i. e. promotional groups). It is because of possible confusion between different uses of the 
terms "sectional" and "cause" that this study has adopted the terms "representational" and "promotional". 
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terms of power, resources and acceptability (see below), it is legitimate to argue 
that all these groups represent and are open to a certain section of society. 
The other type of pressure group is the promotional pressure group, which speaks 
on behalf of a clientele (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 86). This kind of group is 
composed of people sharing a similar set of values (Potter 1961 p. 25) and is open 
to anyone who accepts their beliefs and principles (Stewart as quoted in Jordan 
and Richardson 1987 p. 19). These groups can operate within a political party like 
the Fabian Society or be non-partisan like the CPAG or Abortion Law Reform 
Association (ALRA). They can be long-standing and multi-purpose or short-term 
and single issue (Hall et al. 1975 p. 92). They tend to deal with issues that require a 
wider debate in the country. Most of the demands of these groups require changes 
in legislation and/or a significant appreciation in government expenditure (Jordan 
and Richardson 1987 p. 21). 
Not all groups fit neatly into the categories of representational and promotional. 
Some like DIG and Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD) consisted 
both of the section of society affected and sympathisers, although CARD moved 
towards a purely representational group during the 1960s (Heineman 1972). 
Therefore, it would be more accurate to think of representational and promotional 
groups as being on a continuum. CPAG, as a pressure group, however, was firmly 
on the promotional end of the continuum (see chapters 3 and 4). 
2.1.2 Aims 
The second main divide is between pressure groups that concentrate on providing 
services for their members or their client group and those lobbying for change. 16 
However many lobbying groups provide services and many service groups 
occasionally lobby. Once again, therefore, a continuum of pure lobbying to pure 
service groups with most groups in between is a more useful way of 
conceptualising them (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 26). Most primarily service 
groups lobby government because the problem with which they deal needs the 
government's intervention. Lobbying groups offer services for three main 
reasons. 
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A general reason is to secure and maintain support by offering a number of 
benefits. According to Salisbury" there is a distinction between the group's 
entrepreneur and its members or customers. The entrepreneur invests in a set of 
benefits that s/he then offers to the potential members at a price. i. e. joining the 
group (Salisbury 1969 p. 1). The benefits may be material, in that they are 
"tangible rewards of goods or services" (Salisbury 1969 p. 15) or solidary and 
"derive 
... 
from the acts of association and include such rewards as socialising, 
congeniality ... and conviviality" (Clark and Wilson as quoted in Salisbury 1969 
p. 16). Expressive rewards are those that "give expression to the interests or values 
of a person or a group" (Salisbury 1969 p. 16). The balance he argues must be 
maintained between the benefits for the members and the "profit" of the 
entrepreneur (Salisbury 1969 p. 1). The profit may either be economic or have 
sufficient expressive value to warrant the continuation of the group. A group is 
most likely to be strong and gain members during affluent periods and lose 
members during non-affluent periods. The entrepreneur will take account of this 
and offer incentives to members in "quiet times". 
One would expect that people join a promotional group because they believe in 
the aims of the group. However people join groups for a variety of reasons and 
expect a number of things from them. There are obviously expressive benefits to 
be obtained from a promotional group such as legislative victory. These benefits 
cannot be measured in material terms but give the member a sense of satisfaction. 
There are also often solidary benefits from socialising at meetings. '8 In addition 
most promotional groups also offer material benefits. The benefit is often merely a 
newsletter or journal which updates the member on the group's activities and is 
important in maintaining the members' interest Affluent times for a promotional 
group may be related to the economic situation but are more likely to be related to 
the general interest in the issue at that time. 
16 Grant has a similar typology which he terms primary (i. e. lobbying groups) and secondary (i. e. sere ice 
groups) (Grant 1995 p. 10-11). 
17 Salisbury conclusions are based on his "exchange theory of interest groups" his work on agricultural 
groups in the nineteenth century. 
18 Grant (1995 p. 10) quotes from Jordan, Maloney and McLaughlin the example of the Aberdeen branch of 
the United Nations Association. The official poster stated "Join the UN and put the world back together 
again. " The local branch had added "Drink wine! Meet new people! " . -A classic case of the mixing of 
expressive and solidary benefits. 
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A second reason for offering services is to procure information and data on their 
key issues and activities. Hence CPAG and the Low Pay Unit provided advice 
services to their client groups and fed the information gathered back into their 
lobbying work. A final reason, which is only applicable to groups reliant on 
grants, is that grants for pioneering service work are often more forthcoming than 
grants for less tangible lobbying work. 
2.1.3 Status and Strategy 
A third divide between pressure groups is their relationship with the government. 
Whiteley and Winyard differentiate between status and strategy. A group can be 
acceptable or unacceptable. It may be unacceptable to the government and 
Whitehall either for technical reasons (lack of political sophistication) or for 
political reasons (their belief that the government and political system cannot 
effect change) (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 31-2). In terms of strategy, a group 
can be focused solely on Whitehall or it can use a variety of institutions in what 
they term an open strategy (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 32). 
Grant, however, does not distinguish between the strategy and status of groups. 
Instead he offers a continuum which distinguishes between different types of 
insider and outsider groups. This is useful because two groups defined as insider 
by Whiteley and Winyard may have very different levels of contact with the 
government and Whitehall. The Grant model is summarised below (Grant 1995 
p. 20): 
37 
Fig. ]: Typography of Pressure Groups 
Insider Prisoner Rely on the government for funding, staff and 
Groups accommodation. 
Low-Profile Insider Work mostly within Whitehall. 
High Profile Insider Still close to the government but seeking also to cultivate 
public opinion to reinforce dialogue with the government. 
Outsider Potential Insider Have the capacity to become insider groups. 
Groups 
Outsider Groups by Do not have the political sophistication to be insider groups 
Necessity although they may desire it. 
Ideological outsider Reject the existing political system believing that no 
Groups meaningful change can be achieved through it. 
A variation on the idea of acceptability and unacceptability is the concept of 
policy communities first developed by Richardson and Jordan (1979). Different 
departments have their own client groups that are stable (Richardson and Jordan 
1979 p. 44, Grant 1995 p. 35). Richardson and Jordan argued that far from 
increasing democracy these groups exclude the general public from any influence 
on policy (Richardson and Jordan 1979 p. 174). However Jordan has more recently 
concluded that as the threshold for entry onto Whitehall consultation lists is low, 
most groups who wish insider status can achieve it (Jordan et al 1992 in Grant 
1995 p. 21). Yet Grant draws attention to the fact that although the threshold to 
entry might be low for the peripheral groups that are sent circulars, the thresholds 
for the inner circle of the policy community are much higher (Grant 1995 p. 21). 
The strategy of pressure groups depends on where they lie on the Grant 
continuum. However, for high profile insider groups and outsider groups there are 
a large number of other institutions to target. The amount of importance attached 
to the various target institutions (or targets as Whiteley and Winyard refer to 
them) is different for each type of group. The government and Whitehall are 
obvious targets for all insider groups. For low profile groups they are the only 
targets. Within Whitehall there are two power structures: the political power 
structure of ministers and the administrative power structure of civil servants. A 
professional or industry group will probably talk to civil servants, the nature of its 
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goals being of little interest to the public (Grant 1995 p. 14). However a 
promotional group will probably wish to talk to ministers. Firstly. this is for the 
benefit of the pressure group's members, who want to see the group having 
contact with those in power and for a higher profile in the press (Grant 1995 p. 61- 
2). Secondly, as promotional groups are concerned with a cause that may well be 
controversial, it is important to speak with the Minister who will have to take the 
political lead and support policy through Cabinet and Parliament. 
Membership of a policy community can be very useful. Pressure groups in a 
policy community are able to gain information on policy before the proposals are 
published in a green or white paper. 19 It is at this stage easier to persuade the 
Minister to change his/her plans, than when they are in the public domain (Grant 
1995 p. 57). High profile groups, through choice, and outsider groups, through 
necessity, lobby a range of other targets: Parliament, the media, other pressure 
groups, the TUC and Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the courts, political 
parties and local government (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 88 and Grant 1995 
pp. 66-97). 
2.2 The Origins of Pressure Groups 
2.2.1 Theoretical Models 
When discussing why and how pressure groups operated in the 1960s it is 
imperative to ask why they formed in the first place. What kinds of social, 
economic and political developments made it necessary or appropriate for such 
groups to form? This section will summarise and examine the relevant models put 
forward by various authorities. The models that are to be discussed are: the "Beer- 
Eckstein" model, the "Bentley-Truman" model and the "Almond-Powell" model, 2° 
and "group replacement". 
19 Green papers have been used since the 1970s to outline the government's plans on a certain issue, often 
with several alternatives. Interested parties are encouraged to produce evidence and arguments in favour of or 
against certain alternatives. White papers are a clearer declaration of the government's intentions and 
although there is still some room for consultation, it is not as great as with a green paper. 
20These names are the ones adopted by Whiteley and Winyard (1987). Salisbury (1969) discusses all the 
same groups, except the Beer Eckstein model. However he uses different names. Whiteley and Winyard also 
include Salisbury's model of an "exchange theory of interests", but that has been discussed earlier in this 
chapter. 
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2.2.1.1 The Beer-Eckstein Model 
Beer argues that "each party when seeking power must bid for the votes of many 
of the same customer groups and when in power must bargain with most of the 
same producer groups.... Together they have worked to promote a certain 
convergence of the party programs (sic), lessening the ideological distance 
between Socialist and Conservative. With ideological contours fading, a new 
group politics appeared as a more and more prominent feature of the political 
scene" (Beer 1982 p. 407-408). As a result, politics had become less about 
fundamental ideological differences and more about technical details and more 
centred on Whitehall than Westminster. The government therefore needed the help 
of certain producer groups to help it administer the system. This theory is not very 
useful for understanding why promotional groups such as the CPAG were formed. 
The government does not need the help of these groups to implement policy, 
although it might rely on them for specialist information. However Beer's 
observations that political consensus led to the formation of pressure groups can 
be elaborated upon. 
The period after the Second World War up to the middle of the 1970s was marked 
by the commitment of successive governments to full employment. This had been 
a key assumption of the Beveridge report but most importantly both parties 
considered that a return to the mass unemployment of the 1930s would be an 
electoral disaster. This strengthened the Trade Union Movement, leading also to a 
stronger assertion of employers' interests and the setting up of the CBI. By 1965, 
these strong interest groups as well as multiple other business, professional and 
workers' interests forced the political parties to temper their own beliefs and 
values in order to work with them. The fact that different governments had to 
work with the same interest groups in order to deliver policy actually contributed 
to the post war consensus. The scramble for floating voters also pushed both main 
political parties to the centre of the political spectrum and this isolated the 
extremes of both Left and Right from the parties proper. There were differences 
within the main parties as well as between them (Gladstone 1995 p. 14). 
It is suggested that groups such as the CPAG developed because the members felt 
that the Labour Party would avoid even moderate vertical redistribution of income 
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and wealth unless it was pressured. More extreme were groups such as the CU-,;, 
whose demands for a considerable reorganisation of society had little chance in a 
middle class-friendly Labour Party. The authors of the May Day Manifesto in 
1968 certainly believed this to be the case and argued that to stop the Left 
splintering into single cause groups there would have to be a realignment on the 
Left (Tiratsoo 1993 p. 165). On the Right similar trends can be traced with the 
setting up of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) in 1955. As the 
Conservatives broadly supported the welfare state and Keynesian control of the 
economy, those committed to the market became more isolated and moved to 
groups outside the Conservative Party. 
This model does beg the question of whether there ever really was a consensus 
between the two major political parties in the period from the Second World War 
until the 1970s. Whiteside argues that the reason why the Conservatives were said 
not to have "unpicked" the welfare state is because the definition of the welfare 
state was formed with hindsight (Whiteside 1996 p. 84-5). She argues that Labour 
would have forged a long-term link between the welfare state and official wage 
guidelines (Whiteside 1996 p. 93), controlling the prices of food and housing, in 
return for trade union co-operation in restricting wage demands (Whiteside 1996 
p. 87-8). The Conservatives rejected this for freer markets in wages and their 
separation from benefits. (Whiteside 1996 p. 94-6). However, Labour reduced food 
subsidies and the Conservatives remained committed to full employment 
(Whiteside 1996 p. 86). There were obviously clear differences between Labour 
and the Conservatives on the important issues of the welfare state and full 
employment but these were a matter of degree not principle. 
2.2.1.2 The Bentley-Truman Model 
The Bentley-Truman model advances the argument that pressure groups are 
caused by some disturbance in the social and political equilibrium. According to 
its main advocate, Truman, there are not only organised groups in society but also 
latent groups. When there is a disruption to the social equilibrium, those latent 
groups that are affected will organise "to restore a viable balance" (Salisbury 1969 
p. 5). The disturbance could be something as dramatic as a war, demographic 
change, a change in society's values, technological innovation or industrialisation 
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(Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 39-40, Salisbury 1969 p. 5). The development of 
new organisations should then occur in "waves" as the break in the equilibrium 
causes latent groups to emerge (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 48, Salisbury 1969 
p. 5). 
A similar thesis is that advanced by Hall et al (1975). They identify "crises" which 
can force a government to act on an issue. However whether a issue becomes a 
"crisis" is dependent on other factors (Hall et al 1975 p. 492-3). The first is timing. 
If the "crisis" occurs near a general election or if there is widespread interest in 
and information about the "crisis" act, then there will be more pressure on the 
government to act (Hall et al 1975 p. 494). In addition, if there is an established 
pressure group to force attention onto the issue, action is more likely to occur 
(Hall et al 1975 p. 495). 
This observation of Hall et al is explained by the Down's Issue Attention Cycle 
(McCarthy 1986) and Sinfield's Poverty Research Cycle (Sinfield 1968). There 
are slight differences in emphasis between the two. Sinfield is more confident than 
Downs that some temporary concession will be made by the government. 
However essentially the important message of both is that the attention an issue 
attracts is only temporary: 
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Fig. 2: The Issue Cycle 
Problem has been 




(Sinfield 1968 p. 2). Or 
the costs of the issue are 
considered too great and 
the issue fades from the 
public attention 
Pre-problem stage. Only a 
limited number of activists 
argue that there is a problem 
(Sinfield 1968 p. 2, McCarthy 
1986 p. 100) N", 
N 
The debate gains attention and 
there is widespread discussion of 
the problem (Sinfield 1968 p. 2, 
McCarthy 1986 p. 101). Hall et al 
identify "crises" which force the 
government to act they suggest 
that the timing and whether there 
are established pressure groups 
are important factors 
Costs of action become apparent 
(McCarthy 1986 p. 101). Thus 
arguments against action are advanced. 
Either these succeed or something is 
done to quell the debate (Sinfield 1968 
p. 3). Thus a "crisis" or disturbance 
especially if at a sensitive time will raise 
the profile of the problem. It will either 
be saved or rejected. 
2.2.1.3 The Almond-Powell Model 
x 
The third model offered is called the proliferation hypothesis by Salisbury. This 
derives from structural-functionalism and its main proponents are Almond and 
Powell. As society modernises and undergoes "processes of economic and 
technological change, and acquires the social and attitudinal concomitants of these 
processes, both the orientations and the means of action which lead to higher 
levels of political interest articulation will emerge. " (Almond and Powell p. 96-97). 
Therefore, society's modernisation will create more differentiation in the labour 
market and politics. Thus as unorganised interests are perceived to be weaker than 
organised ones, most groups will organise. (Salisbury 1969 p. 4) In short, the 
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reason for group development is to be found in the underlying developments of a 
modernising society. 
2.2.1.4 Group Replacement 
The final suggestion for explaining why groups form is group replacement. This 
suggests that sometimes groups that are interested in an issue cannot pursue it 
openly. This may be due to the fact that they are themselves a prisoner group or 
that political activities would bring disrepute to the group (such as in the case of 
religious groups). Instead a new group is formed to take control of the political 
activities. This situation will be discussed in relation to the CPAG in the next 
chapter. It is also worth pointing out that both Action For World Development 
(AWD) and Shelter were set up as a coalition of other groups, which in both cases 
contained church groups (Young 1975 p. 26-7, Frost and Henderson 1975 p. 59). 
AWD proved to be so political that it had to convert from being a charity to being 
a Trust (Young 1975 p. 27). Certainly some of the groups that had set up AWD, 
such as the Catholic Institute For International Relations, Christian Aid and 
Oxfam (to name but a few), could not have been so overtly political. 
2.2.2 Explaining Group Formation In The 1960s 
How appropriate are the above theories to groups which were formed in the mid 
1960s and after? As this thesis is particularly concerned with social policy single 
issue pressure groups this question is answered by reference to them. However 
because of the dearth of a detailed literature on social policy pressure groups, 
references, where relevant, are also made to groups outside social policy. This 
section finally discusses how the new pressure groups of the 1960s were different 
to those that had preceded them and ask how the older pressure groups changed. 
In the 1960s, there was an exodus from the Labour Party. Individual membership 
of the Labour Party grew rapidly after the Second World War and by 1952 had 
reached a peak of over one million individual members. Apart from a rise in 1963- 
4, which was natural in an election year, the membership of the Labour Party 
declined through the 1950s and 1960s. (See appendix C). This development did 
not go unnoticed at the time. In a 1970 Fabian pamphlet, Tony Benn argued that 
the Labour Party was losing support from many of those who would have once 
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been its members but were now involved in various groups. He argued that "the 
majority, being the expression of human values against oppression by authority 
and the system of centralised power would be natural allies if we could only 
discover the right sort of relationship with them ... each side 
has its own part to 
play in the process of socialist construction" (Benn 1970 p. 9). Therefore Benn 
recognised that potential and traditional Labour supporters were becoming active 
outside of the Party and this was a fact that the Labour Party would have to 
accept. Similar ideas were expressed at the 1972 Labour Party Conference 
(Labour Party 1972 p. 309). One activist argued that he left the Labour Party in 
1964 because there was not "much power or significance in individual 
membership any longer. " He went on to say that the "working class commitment 
to social change didn't dry up or get diverted into hedonistic self-interest. It 
simply changed form. " According to him, the new voluntary action was "less 
about `flag days' and the home visiting of the poor by the leisured religious 
wealthy. It [wa]s more and more about self organisation and mutual aid" (Warpole 
1981 p. 199). 
So had the socialist support that once had been channelled into the Labour Party 
shifted to the new voluntary organisations, as politically active people began to 
take more direct action? Was this the reason for the drop in individual 
membership? Certainly, the Labour Party had been the vehicle for socialist 
aspirations since the beginning of the century. In 1964 active members worked for 
a Labour victory believing that a Labour government would be the answer to the 
"thirteen wasted years 21i of Conservative rule. However, a lot of the new pressure 
groups were on the political Left. In many cases the campaigners combined their 
work for the pressure group with their support for the Labour Party (or in some 
cases one of the other main or minor political parties). CPAG and Shelter were 
disappointed that the new Labour government had not placed the poor and those 
in slums as their top priority. 22 
Thus, a shift from using the political party system to using pressure groups to 
achieve political goals is therefore detectable. It is important here to stress that the 
21 A gibe made by the Labour Party in 1984 about that period (Hill 1995 p. 61) 
221t should be stressed that not all the supporters of the social policy pressure groups of the 1960s w ere 
Labour supporters, CPAG attracted support from a number of Conservative front bench \lPs. 
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change was really only in the social policy sector, where new lobbying groups 
such as the CPAG, DIG and Shelter emerged in the 1960s. In the area of "moral 
policy" such as abortion, homosexuality and death penalty the main thrust of the 
debate for change had for many years come from single issue pressure groups 
because these issues were always ones of conscience rather than party politics. 
Moreover, this shift away from political parties and established organisations was 
not confined to Britain. Inglehart argues that it was common all over Western 
Europe and North America. He argues that in America from the mid 1960s that 
there was a shift in the younger and better educated from what he terms elite- 
directed groups like trade unions or political parties that have established 
hierarchies to more ad hoc single issue elite-challenging groups (Inglehart 1977 
p. 299-301). 
There was also the emergence of new and the re-emergence of old issues at this 
time. Poverty was rediscovered (see chapter 3.1). The problems of homelessness 
and slum housing were rediscovered. The television film Cathy Come Home, in 
November 1966, focused attention on the problems of families finding suitable 
accommodation. Demographic change meant that the absolute numbers and 
relative proportion in the population of the elderly and disabled increased 
throughout the post war period. Likewise changes in moral values meant that there 
were growing numbers of single mothers. The disabled and single mothers had 
been bequeathed of benefits by the Beveridge welfare state that helped them not 
on the basis of need but on the circumstances, which had led to their situation. 23 
At the same time there was a development of professions potentially interested in 
the problems of socially excluded groups. Professional, paid social workers were 
not an innovation of the post war period. Social workers had been trained since 
the end of the nineteenth century and some were paid (Younghusband 1981 
p. 14,19,22). However, there were two important changes that occurred after the 
war. Firstly, although until the 1960s the child care departments of many local 
authorities were still staffed by untrained social workers, trained social workers 
started to be employed in large numbers (Younghusband 1981 p. 26, Gladstone 
23The disabled had been left with a lottery of benefits. Whilst those disabled in war or industry wk ere entitled 
to pensions, the civilian disabled had to rely on NA. In the case of single mothers the Beveridge welfare state 
provided for widows but not for divorcees and unmarried mothers who were forced to rely on N. A. 
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1995 p. 39) and much larger numbers were trained during the 1960s 
(Younghusband 1981 p. 33) The second change was that social work training 
became more generic. In 1967 more generic social workers were trained in Further 
Education colleges than specialists (Cmnd 3707 p. 337). Training for social 
workers became more important as they strove to be recognised as a profession, 
the local authorities wanted professions to protect their reputation of high 
standards and the clients demanded that the social worker was trained (McDougall 
1957 p. 14). It was in the 1960s that social work as a profession was officially 
separated from ancillary care work (Younghusband 1981 p. 27). Thus social work 
as a profession grew in the 1950s and 1960s 
The Robbins Report on higher education recommended a 59% expansion of 
higher education. This was far exceeded. Between 1962-3 and 1967-8 the number 
of students in full time higher education increased by more than in the past 
twenty-five years (Lapping 1970 p. 178). Higher education did not just expand. 
The social science departments grew and by 1969-70, the social science faculties 
of universities were attracting a fifth of all students (CSO 1971 p. 122). This 
expansion in higher education meant that there was a need for more academics. In 
addition the new universities such as Essex had specialist Departments of 
Sociology. The older universities during the 1960s followed this example. Thus 
during the 1960s there were increasingly more academics and particularly social 
science academics. 
A significant development was the rise in the number of social workers and social 
administration academics during this period. If the Almond-Powell thesis is 
correct then these groups would organise in order to protect their sectional 
interests. This they did. However these were also two groups that worked with the 
disadvantaged. Therefore, a minority of both groups organised to work on behalf 
of their client groups in promotional groups. Three quarters of those involved in 
CPAG during its first year were from one of these two groups (see appendix D). 
The division of labour produced groups of which a minority of members would 
act as promoters of their clients' interests. 
However the church too was interested in social issues. It was a number of church 
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were involved in the campaign to decriminalise homosexuality (Grey 1975 p. 45). 
The Society of Friends' Social and Economic Affairs Committee was also 
important in the setting up of the CPAG (see 3.2). It is difficult to say that the 
churches became more involved in social problems in the post war period but the 
churches believed that the government had a responsibility to its citizens and 
therefore set up pressure groups like Shelter to campaign on their behalf. 
Thus as predicted by the revised Beer-Eckstein model the shifting of both the 
main political parties to the centre in the 1950s and 1960s, alienating the extreme 
wings of the main parties. At the same time the expansion of social science 
academia and social work meant that there were professional groups interested in 
the socially excluded. However a minority of both groups also organised into 
groups to promote the case of their clients. These two underlying developments 
meant that when there was a disturbance in the social equilibrium such as the 
rediscovery of poverty, the latent groups were motivated into action. 
Single issue pressure groups were not an invention of the 1960s. For example, the 
ALBA had grown up in the 1930s and the Howard League and the Anti Corn Law 
League were products of the nineteenth century. In the 1930s the National 
Spinsters Pension Association (NSPA) and the National Federation of Old Age 
Pensioners Associations (NFOAPA) emerged as large, democratic, 
representational groups demanding universal pensions. 24 Yet they remained 
outsider groups mostly because their demands were unrealistic (Macnicol 1999a 
p. 316,317,322). The Family Endowment Society (FESoc) formed in 1917 to 
campaign for family allowances was promotional and its supporters were experts. 
It was able to enter the policy community and had influential supporters. 25 Yet 
FESoc was reliant on its founder for leadership and funding, making the group 
fundamentally unstable (Macnicol 1980 p. 26). A pressure group, hoping for 
success, will temper its demands for different audiences and ensure that they are 
realistic. FESoc, although "committed to the principle of direct provision for the 
family", was not committed to any "specific scheme" (Land 1975 p. 166). 
24 The NSPA could claim in 1938 140,000 members. The NFOAPA claimed (doubtfully) two million in 
1940 (Macnicol 1999 p. 312 and 319). This should be compared to CPAG which had 2050 members on 
September 25 1971 (Director's Report September 1971, CPAG Minutes file 5, box 65). In 1970 between 
5,000 and 6,500 were branch members of DIG and 1,300 were individual members (Frost 1975 p. 87). 
25 Beveridge, the architect of the Beveridge report, and Keynes, the economist (during the Second World 
War he was advisor to the Chancellor of the Exchequer) supported FESoc. 
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However many of the strategies used by CPAG and other 1960s groups had been 
used before by other groups. 26 
2.3 Measuring the Effectiveness of CPA G: A Theoretical Model 
2.3.1 What is Effectiveness and How Can it be Measured? 
A civil servant told the researchers, Whiteley and Winyard, that in his view CPAG 
was a very effective pressure group (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 126). However 
before accepting this as an evaluation of CPAG's performance, it is reasonable to 
ask on what criteria this conclusion was founded. The dictionary defines 
something as effective "if it produces the results that it is intended to" (Procter 
1995 p. 443). Therefore if CPAG achieved everything that they had set out to 
achieve, then it was wholly effective. Yet CPAG might not achieve everything it 
wished to but instead have met some of its goals or made significant progress. To 
what extent was it then effective? CPAG's objectives might have changed over 
time and new issues have become important to the group. This section lays out a 
framework for evaluating CPAG at two levels: efficiency and effectiveness. 
CPAG will be assessed as to how efficiently it used the resources available to it 
(see section 2.3.2), how successful it was perceived to be in the various areas of its 
work and finally how effectively it was able to achieve its own goals. 
Most pressure group analyses have steered away from the question of 
effectiveness. 27 Whiteley and Winyard's study was the first to construct a model 
of pressure group effectiveness (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 125-135). This 
was later adapted and used by Grant (1995 p. 131-147). The model looks at three 
(four in Grant) main aspects of pressure group structure and activity: the social, 
political and economic environment; the internal resources and structure of the 
group and the strategies of the group. Grant adds a fourth category, which he calls 
domain organisation. Another relevant model is that put forward by Hall et al 
(1975). This model based on a large number of case studies examines the success 
of issues28 and offers a number of concepts with which to evaluate the likely 
success of an issue (Hall et al 1975 p. 475-507). 
26 For a fuller discussion of this topic see Kelly (2000) 
27 E. g. Pym 1974, Kimber and Richardson 1974, Alderman 1984, Frost 1975, Ryan 1978. 
28 An umbrella term used by them to refer to problems, which could be tackled by the government. 
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These models however do not construct a framework for directly assessing 
effectiveness but efficiency. The models allow the social scientist to audit the 
resources available to the pressure group and evaluate how efficiently it was able 
to use those resources. Assessments as to the success and effectiveness of the 
pressure group are enriched by this analysis, which allows the success of the 
group to be compared with the resources available to it. The available efficiency 
models are combined below in 2.3.2 into one efficiency model. 
2.3.2 Efficiency 
2.3.2.1 The Political, Social and Economic Environment 
2.3.2.1.1 The Political Environment 
Politically there are five core points. Firstly, the culture and interaction of the 
basic legislative, administrative and judicial systems means that there is a 
fundamental political structure in which the pressure group has to work long term 
(Whitely and Winyard 1987 p. 127). Sometimes there are radical changes at this 
level. However for the most part real changes in the culture of the institutions are 
evolutionary. Secondly, the party in power can matter. Although the ideological 
politics of Thatcherism was yet to arrive, there were ideological differences 
between the parties' priorities (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 125, Grant 1995 
p. 146). How did the change of government from Labour to Conservative affect 
CPAG's campaign? The size of the government's majority in the Commons is 
also of importance. Between 1964-1966 Harold Wilson had a tiny majority and 
his ability to push controversial legislation through the Commons was hampered. 
After 1966 both the Wilson and Heath governments had safe majorities. Thirdly, 
the competing claims on the government from other pressure groups may or may 
not have favoured CPAG. Fourthly, CPAG had to convince the government that 
the issue was one with which it was legitimate for it to become involved (Hall et 
al 1975 p. 475-7). Finally, it was up to CPAG to prove that its solutions were 
feasible in terms of financial, time and staff resources (Hall et al 1975 p. 479-483). 
Were CPAG able to make their policies feasible? 
?. 3.7.1.2 Social 
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Highly relevant to the political strategy is public opinion (politicians are always 
worried in a democracy about their popularity with voters). How close a group is 
to the prevalent culture norms of the society in which it operates affects its success 
with the media and its position on the insider/outsider continuum. This issue is 
discussed further in chapter 8.2. Whiteley and Winyard point out that an attractive 
clientele group and cause is an important political resource in itself (Whiteley and 
Winyard 1987 p. 131). The government will make its own assessment of the issue 
being advanced by the pressure groups. Issues, which attract widespread approval 
will add to the government's stock of support, those with widespread disapproval 
will have the opposite effect. However the situation is complicated by the fact that 
only a small proportion of those potentially affected will make their views known. 
Thus what is relevant is what the government perceives to be the weight of public 
opinion. Finally sheer numbers do not necessarily affect the government's 
fortunes. Instead the views of those that if disaffected will vote for the Opposition 
and in some cases those in marginal constituencies weigh heavier in the 
government's calculations (Hall et al 1975 p. 484). 
2.3.2.1.3 Economic 
The economic environment is crucial. What a government would like to do and 
what it can do given the economic circumstances are two very different realities 
(Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 126). As chapter 1.4.3 described throughout the 
Labour and Conservative administrations there were severe economic problems. 
To what degree was CPAG able to adapt its policies to the economic situation? 
2.3.2.2 Strategies 
The strategies adopted by a group are dependent on where it lies in Grant's 
pressure group continuum (see chapter 2.1.3). Whereas a low profile insider group 
will concentrate its energies on Whitehall, a high profile insider group will utilise 
a larger number of targets. Outsider groups will make little use of Whitehall. The 
reason for the choice of strategy is dependent on three main factors. Firstly, the 
issue itself can influence the strategies taken. Some issues need a wide political 
debate, others are more technical and attract little Parliamentary or public interest. 
The same pressure group might adopt a high profile for some issues and a lower 
profile one for other issues. Was this the case for CPAG? Secondly, the support 
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of the group and its ideology will determine whether a group is able to muster the 
expertise to become a valuable member of the policy community, whether it has 
populist appeal or whether it stands aloof from Whitehall. The issue itself and how 
it was presented was important to the success of CPAG's campaign. Hall et al 
argue that a policy has to be feasible in terms of resources, it should also increase 
the support for the government of key electoral, Parliamentary, industrial groups 
(Hall et al 1975 p. 479-485) 
2.3.2.3 Internal Factors 
There are four main areas in which internal factors are relevant. Firstly, the 
internal structure of the group is important. There are advantages and 
disadvantages of choosing a democratic or authoritarian system (Grant 1995 
p. 135-6). Did CPAG adopt the most effective structure for its group? In addition, 
there is the question of how closely the structure on paper corresponds with that in 
reality. Secondly, not only must a promotional group like CPAG attract members, 
it must also hold on to them. The price of joining and leaving the group is low and 
thus turnover can be high (Grant 1995 p. 137). Was this the case for CPAG and if 
so did it affect CPAG's efficiency and thus effectiveness? 
Thirdly, there are the political resources of the group. As a promotional group 
builds its reputation on its information the quality of its research and information 
is crucial (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 131). The prestige of the members and 
staff of the group is an advantage to a pressure group wishing to sell its 
arguments. The activism and commitment of ordinary members are an asset 
(Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 132). The group's ability to work with other 
groups may either be an advantage or it may divert resources from the richer 
group and damage its carefully constructed reputation (Whiteley and Winyard 
1987 p. 133). In addition an issue may be better promoted on its own or linked 
with other issues (Hall et al 1975 p. 486-9). 
Fourthly, although a rich group is not necessarily more effective, all groups need 
finance. The ability of the group to attract funding from various different sources, 
hence not making it too dependent on any one source, is important to its sustained 
success. It has been argued that to be effective a group needs between six and 
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eight members of staff (Buksti and Johanson 1979 p. 209-10). However, there is a 
case for quality as well as quantity of staff (Grant 1995 p. 139) 
2.3.2.4 Domain Organisation 
In relation to cause groups, Grant's category of domain organisation consists of 
two different strands of how a group organises itself. Firstly, there is the issue of 
how much the group must compete with other similar groups for members, 
finance and attention (Grant 1995 p. 132). Yet whereas a sectional group will be in 
competition with rivals for membership, for cause groups there is a great deal of 
overlapping membership. 73.5% of Amnesty International and 65.8% of Friends 
of the Earth members belong to another cause group. The costs of multiple group 
membership are low and the amount of activity expected small. Secondly, a group 
has to make a decision as to whether it is to be promotional or representational. 
Certainly, this decision is dependent on how the group formed but a group of 
radicals has to make a decision as to whether they are going to speak on behalf of 
the client group or if they are going to organise the client group. 
2.3.3 Evaluating Effectiveness 
The model above measures how efficiently CPAG used the resources available to 
it. This section offers a framework in which the effectiveness of CPAG is 
evaluated. Effectiveness will be assessed in two different ways. Firstly, the extent 
to which CPAG was able to achieve the objectives it set itself, especially those it 
saw as a priority. Secondly, the extent to which CPAG was perceived to be 
effective by those in power. There will be a summary, which brings together these 
different measures of efficiency and effectiveness. 
The evaluation of the extent to which CPAG was able to achieve its objectives can 
be measured at two levels. Effectiveness should be seen very much as operating at 
two levels. Hall at al argue "it is more difficult to show convincingly that one 
solution is markedly superior to another than to shame governments into taking 
some action by the revelation of intolerable conditions" (Hall et al 1975 p. 505). A 
group might be able to show at one level that there is a problem and persuade the 
government that there is a problem, which deserves its attention. However, it is 
yet another achievement to persuade the government not only that there is a 
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problem, deserving of it attention, but also the solution offered by the group will 
be the most efficient and effective way of dealing with that problem. Thus, this 
study will evaluate effectiveness at both these levels. 
The analysis is made more difficult because of two fundamental problems 
associated with firstly, the way in which evidence is recorded and available and 
secondly, the nature of policy-making itself. There is a deficiency of clear 
information about how decisions are taken and what was the actual influence of 
the pressure group. This study was more fortunate than previous studies on CPAG 
because the government records are available until 1969 and there is a wealth of 
information in other archives. However, this does not mean that it is possible to 
identify which decisions were due to CPAG influence. If CPAG was really 
successful, its arguments should have been internalised by the civil servants and 
politicians and treated as their own ideas. Also minutes of meetings leave little 
information about debates in which CPAG ideas may have been mentioned. 
Discussion between policy-makers sometimes happened in private and thus no 
records were kept. Part of this deficiency in the documentary information (and 
even more so for the period when the documents are still closed), can be filled 
with oral testimony from policy-makers and CPAG staff and members. 
Political analysts agree that policy-making is a multi-faceted process which 
involves many different actors. Decisions are usually the result of pressure from 
more than one source. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that it was exclusively 
because of CPAG that family allowances were raised. As Hollis points out 
"positive legislation... is likely to have a pedigree of its own, independent of 
pressure from without" (Hollis 1974 p. 24). Thus, it is not possible to attribute a 
success purely to CPAG as CPAG will only have been one pressure amongst 
several. This means that ultimately any assessment of success based on these 
criteria can only be an informed judgement. 
Whiteley and Winyard attempted to by-pass the problem of measuring 
effectiveness by using the views of a number of pressure group staff, activists and 
policy-makers. As their study was a comparative study of the whole poverty 
lobby, they compared the evaluations of effectiveness with the types of pressure 
groups. From this they deduced that promotional groups were more effective than 
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representative, acceptable more effective than unacceptable and that open groups 
were more effective than focused (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 128-135). 
However, Whitely and Winyard were uncritical of the pressure group respondents' 
claims of successes. The PWFO took the credit for the provisions of travel grants 
for prisoners' wives (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 115). However, the role of 
CPAG, particularly under Tony Lynes, in pushing for this change cannot be 
discounted (see chapter 6.4). This method does have the problem of pushing the 
difficulty of untangling influences in a multi-faceted policy-making process onto 
the respondents. At the time of Whiteley and Winyard's research many of the 
respondents were still in the same or similar jobs. They therefore had an incentive 
to suggest that their groups were effective. As with all oral testimony problems of 
hindsight affect the views expressed. 
However, the views of witnesses do add another dimension to the evaluation of 
effectiveness and success. The profile of a pressure group is greatly enhanced by 
reputation. If CPAG was thought of as an important group by those in power then 
this added to its ability to apply pressure on the government or on the institutions 
which it thought would be able to pressure government. Thus, this method is used 
as the second measure of effectiveness. 
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3 Chapter Three: The Origins of the CPAG. 
The CPAG was a product of the society of which it was part. It grew out of 
number of influences that were both political and social. It was also formed by a 
nucleus of committed and interested people. This chapter will ask two key 
questions. Firstly, if the rediscovery of poverty did act as the catalyst for the 
formation of CPAG, why was poverty rediscovered at this time? Secondly, how 
can the theories of the origins of pressure groups outlined in 2.2.1 be used 
specifically to construct an explanation of the origins of CPAG? 
3.1 The Emergence of the Issue of Family Poverty 
3.1.1 The Abolition of Poverty? 
The general mood in Britain after the Second World War was that the broad 
adoption of the Beveridge plan and the establishment of the new welfare state29 
had consigned poverty to the history books. The Labour government in 1950 
certainly believed that it had solved "want" with its policies. "Labour has 
honoured the pledge that it made in 1945 to make social security the birthright of 
every citizen. Today destitution has been banished" (Labour Party 1950 p8). he 
Labour Party's boasts were corroborated by Rowntree and Lavers' survey of York 
in 1950. In contrast to Rowntree's two previous surveys of 1899 and 1936, they 
found the level of poverty to be negligible. Only 1.7% of the population or 4.6% 
of households in York were in poverty and over two thirds of them were elderly 
households (Rowntree 1951 p. 31 and 35). In contrast, in 1936 Rowntree had 
found that 17.7% population were in poverty: a third (32.8%) of this number due 
to low wages, another 28.6% due to unemployment. The 1950 findings seemed to 
confirm that poverty amongst those of working age had been abolished. The 
"rediscovery of poverty" was to shatter these illusions and bring poverty back on 
to the political agenda. 
Throughout the developed world it had been assumed that poverty had been 
abolished. In America, the richest country in the world, President Eisenhower 
29 The definition of the welfare state varies from author to author. However all accounts would 
agree that the new free comprehensive system of education, the National Health Service, social 
security and social services made up the core services. Also crucial to the definition of the welfare 
state at this time were full employment and taxation policy. 
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assured Americans that poverty was a thing of the past and this was given 
academic respectability by Galbraith, an economist, who argued that poverty was 
now only a minority problem (Trattner 1979 p. 247). The New York Times in 1950 
asked what philanthropists should spend their money on now that poverty had 
been abolished (Murray 1984 p. 4). The Left was subdued by McCarthyism. Social 
work, striving to be a recognised profession, concentrated on "scientific" rather 
than the structural causes of poverty, which were more sensitive (Trattner 1979 
p. 248). In other European countries there was a belief that poverty had been 
eradicated. In France the one national organisation30 allocating funds to combat 
poverty made it known in 1964 that poverty had been eliminated in France and all 
further funding for research was wasted. The American sociologist Alvin Schorr 
found little awareness of the problems of large families and the old in France in 
1965 (Sinfield 1968 p. 37). In West Germany there was hardly a publication in 
which the word poverty was mentioned (Münke 1967 p. 1). This was also true for 
other countries (Sinfield 1968 p. 35-53). 
3.1.2 Why Did the Rediscovery of Poverty Take Place at This Time? 
There are three main reasons why poverty was rediscovered at this time. The first 
turns the question on its head and ask why was poverty ever thought to have been 
abolished (Sinfield 1974 p. 7-8). The second argues that poverty was rediscovered 
because it was redefined. The third is that at first a small number of researchers in 
various countries brought the problem, usually with a catalyst, to the attention of 
the public. 
3.1.2.1 Why Was It Believed that Poverty Had Been Abolished? 
Poverty was an accepted fact throughout the first half of the twentieth century in 
Europe. Thus the real question that should be asked is why there was so little 
interest in the problem after the war? Families had been split up by the war, the 
bombing and cessation of building made many families homeless and there was a 
general shortage of food and essential supplies. Yet in America and Europe there 
was little discussion of poverty. According to Sinfield (1974) there were six 
reasons common to most European countries which explain why attention was 
30 The Union Nationale des Caisses d Allocations Familiales which was an organisation of the 
French government 
57 
distracted from the problem of poverty in the early post war years. Firstly. high 
unemployment and poverty had been so closely linked in the inter-war years, that 
the disappearance of the former as a problem meant that the problem of poverty 
was also assumed to have been solved. Secondly, the expansion of social services 
and greater number of state benefits in the European countries were accepted as 
evidence of the state meeting the poor's material needs. Thirdly, the general rise of 
living standards and the forced rise of benefits in money terms in an era of 
inflation disguised the inadequacy of many of the benefits. Fourthly, the euphoria 
of reconstruction and advance from the thirties, as well as certain national 
achievements e. g. the UK's welfare state, the German economic miracle and the 
USA's deregulation gave the impression that inequality and poverty had withered 
away. Fifthly, the cold war itself distracted the attention of politicians, as did 
decolonisation in Britain and France. Finally, the most obvious poverty was 
blamed on individual failings, i. e. the problem family (Sinfield 1974 p. 7-8). 
Contrary to Rowntree's results and Labour's boasts in Britain, families not sharing 
in post war affluence could be found in every British city (Macnicol 1999b p. 72). 
In a society where "want" had supposedly been eradicated, the individual was 
blamed. This led to the discourse on the problem family, the family whom post- 
war affluence had not reached. 31 The main characteristic of the problem family 
was said to be the emotional immaturity of the parents, who were said to transfer 
their problems to an authority figure. However, at the same time they were said to 
resent authority with infantile defiance (Bodman 1958-9 p. 10232). In a period of 
full employment33 the problem family frequently had a full time working, male 
breadwinner34 (Bodman 1958-9 p. 102). Illegitimacy was not a sign of a problem 
family either although high fertility (no definition was given) was a characteristic, 
31 The two groups most involved in researching and helping problem families were the now much 
more reformist Eugenics Society and the Family Service Units (FSU) which had developed from 
the Pacifist Service Units which had given all families practical help during the war. The emphasis 
was on casework uncluttered by grand theory (Macnicol 1998 p. 12). 
32 Bodman was writing in the social work journal Case Conference in the late 1950s. What is 
interesting is that he is writing in the main professional journal for social workers and not a 
publication of the Eugenics Society. This would suggest the great acceptability of these beliefs at 
this time to the social work profession. 
33 Charles Murray. the leading proponent of the Underclass theory since the 1980s argues that the 
main indicators of an underclass are illegitimacy, unemployment and crime (Murray 1996 p. 28) 
34 He would most likely be in a low paid job however and Bodman argues that he was likely to 
have a job such as a lorry driver so that his contact with the family would be minimal (Bodman 
1958-9 p. 102). 
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as well as sexual promiscuity, marital problems, misspending and the sub- 
normality of the mother. However the factor that the researchers appeared to be 
most preoccupied with was domestic squalor (Macnicol 1999b p. 81-83). Similar 
constructs emerged in other countries, usually referred to as the culture of poverty 
(Galbraith 1979 p. 249, Sinfield 1968 p. 50-2). 
The scientific validity of the definition of the problem family was already under 
strain in Britain by the 1950s. Two sociologists, Baldamus and Timms, showed 
that problem families expressed belief in the same values, beliefs and orientations 
as the rest of society, although this was qualified by arguing that the assertions 
were merely nominative (Baldamus and Timms 1955 p. 323). However the fact 
that problem families shared the wider society's values and beliefs threw doubt on 
the whole definition. Even Carl Blacker35 agreed that it was difficult to define the 
problem family (Macnicol 1999b p. 88-90). The methodologies used by the 
researchers of problem families also came under attack. Irvine attacked the 
eugenist Carl Blacker's methodology in the classic study Problem families: Five 
Enquiries (1952) as early as 1954 and other researchers such as Donnison were 
also looking at the problem families debate in a new light (Macnicol 1999b p. 88- 
90). Hence, although the scapegoat of the problem family was not to disappear 
completely (Lister 1996), its legitimacy was thrown into question. 
3.1.2.2 The Redefinition of Poverty 
A crucial reason for the rediscovery of poverty must be its redefinition at this 
time. Rowntree at the turn of the century had essentially attempted to scientifically 
define a minimum standard of poverty related to physical subsistence needs, with 
his primary poverty standard. Academics have debated whether Rowntree used 
relative measures or not (Veit Wilson 1986,1994, Harris 1998). Although there 
can be little argument that Rowntree's scale was dynamic to a degree, 36 relative to 
wages Rowntree's scale actually declined from 1936 to 1950 (Abel-Smith and 
Townsend 1965 p. 15). The idea that the poor should share in the rising prosperity 
35 Secretary of the Eugenics Society 
36 There can be little doubt that Rowntree's 1918 Human Needs of Labour and 1936 scales were 
far more generous than the 1899 scale. The 1950 scale was more generous again. Yet Rowntree 
and Lavers themselves say in regard to the personal sundries allowance that the 1950 allowance 
of 6/8 would not buy as much as the 1936 allowance of 3'4 did then (Roýwwntree and Lavers- 1951 
p. 24). Therefore in real terms there was a decline in this component. 
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of the post war era gathered pace (Townsend 1954, Townsend 1962. Abel Smith 
and Townsend 1965). Wilson in her 1964 study noted that those seeking help 
from the National Assistance Board "... may not look as ragged as they did a 
generation ago; but compared to the general prosperity of the average family the 
lives lived by people who are dependent on National Assistance allowances are 
full of strain and anxiety. In other words poverty is a relative concept" (Wilson 
1964 p. 6). 37 This relative definition of poverty was to be further developed by 
Townsend (1979 p. 50-3) amongst others. It was not just academics that accepted 
this. Crosland agreed that what are luxuries soon become necessities in the 
affluent society (Crosland 1957, p. 286), Beveridge argued that what is the poverty 
line changes over time (Beveridge 1942 p. 27). In 1959, the Conservatives 
promised that those on NA would "have a share in the country's increasing 
prosperity" (Conservative Party 1959 p. 3). Therefore a relative approach to 
poverty gradually became the accepted definition of poverty despite the 
annoyance of some civil servants (Stacpoole and Beltram in Kelly forthcoming, 
Runcorn to Sargent38 30.12.65, AST 31/27 PRO). 
3.1.2.3 The Rediscovery of Poverty 
The rediscovery of poverty by a small number of academics and social workers 
was cumulative. In 1954, Townsend questioned the legitimacy of Rowntree's 
methodology (Townsend 1954). The consensus was strained further when studies 
showed that several minority groups such as the elderly, widows, fatherless 
families were living in poverty. (Townsend 1957, Marris 1957 Wedderburn 1962. 
Marris 1959, Wynn 1964). There was also the start of some investigations into the 
adequacy of benefits. A study in Bristol showed that long term dependency on 
benefits meant relative and absolute poverty (Shaw 1958). Tony Lynes39 
demonstrated that the both NA and National Insurance (NI) benefits had not risen 
in line with the cost of living as defined by his low income index, thus 
demonstrating that the poor had not had their share of rising national prosperity. 
37 Interestingly, and contrary to how Abel-Smith and Townsend would argue in The Poor and 
The Poorest, she argued that Rowntree himself recognised this. His scales became more generous 
over time to adapt to the new standards of living (p. 7-8). The argument whether Rowntree was 
relativist or not has continued to the present day (Veit Wilson 1986, Harris 1998). 
38 Secretary to the NAB 
39 One of the so called Titmice, a group of academics around Richard Titmuss who were heavily 
involved in researching poverty and inequality in the welfare state. 
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(Lynes 1962). The Society of Friends' Social and Economic Affairs Committee 
(SEAC), in a pamphlet argued that family poverty, defined relatively (see below 
for discussion) was still a major problem (Wilson 1964 p. 4-6) and that higher 
family allowances and wages were needed to tackle the problem, (`Filson 1964 
p. 21-22) not social casework (Wilson 1964 p. 18-19). At the same time a 
nutritional study showed that large families had declining nutritional standards 
(Lambert 1964, as quoted in Lynes 1965). 
One of the most influential publications in this rediscovery of poverty was 
Casualties of the Welfare State written by CAB worker, who had worked in 
London's East End. In this Fabian tract, Audrey Harvey pointed to those left 
behind in the period of rising affluence. "... Such people are not representative of 
the working class in general, and although they are certainly to be counted in 
millions, they form only a small minority of the working class as a whole. " 
(Harvey 1960 p. 1). The pamphlet described the client-unfriendly nature of the 
NAB offices (Harvey 1960 p. 3), the stigma attached to claimants (Harvey 1960 
p. 8), the loopholes in the NI law (Harvey 1960 p. 5) and the fallacy of the belief 
that the welfare state was only created to help the poor (Harvey 1960 p. 4). It also 
spoke of the lack of council housing and the appalling state of much of the 
accommodation for the poor. In conclusion, the pamphlet argued for more 
humanity in NA and a change in social attitudes. Also for poverty to be 
recognised as a problem which needed cash and practical help for those affected, 
not merely casework and "amateur psychiatry" (Harvey 1960 p. 3); a snub to the 
eugenics inspired attempts to treat poverty as an individual failing. It was the 
system that needed to change not the clients of welfare. The pamphlet was made 
all the more effective by its detailed case study of one family. 
If these studies had begun to show that want had yet to be conquered, it was the 
monograph The Poor and the Poorest that was to herald fully the rediscovery of 
poverty. This short study, the first of what was to be a long line to be based on the 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES), showed in dry statistics that not only had 7.90 o 
(10.1% of households) of the population in 1953/4 been below 140% of the basic 
NA plus rent but that by 1960 this had increased to 14.2% of the population 
(17.9% of households) (Abel-Smith and Townsend 1965 p. 38 and p. 40). It was 
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not just the elderly that were suffering; in 1953/4 8.2% of children were living in 
families below 140% of NA level and by 1960 it had increased to 17° ö (Abel- 
Smith and Townsend 1965 p. 32 and p. 41). More shocking «- as the fact that 
poverty did not just affect certain minorities, it affected the family with a working 
head. In 1953/4 nearly a third of those below 140% NA relied on full time wages, 
by 1960 41% of those below this figure relied primarily on earnings (Abel-Smith 
and Townsend 1965 p. 38 and p. 41). By 1960 a sixth of children were under this 
level. Although The Poor and the Poorest was published in December 1965, some 
of the findings had already been published in the British Journal of Sociology 
(Townsend 1962). 
The study was not without its critics. The Economist wrote a very critical review 
of the monograph, critical enough for Townsend to write to Abel-Smith asking 
whether he thought it was worth replying (letter 13.166 file 1 box 69). The main 
argument that The Economist was making was that Abel-Smith and Townsend's 
definition of poverty was too generous and was detracting attention away from the 
really poor below the NA line (The Economist 1.1.66 p. 29). The NAB was 
unhappy because the poverty line fixed on NA would mean that whenever benefits 
were raised the numbers in poverty would increase (Veit Wilson 1999 p. 120). 
Also there was criticism of where they had obtained the figure of 140%. The 
answer was to be found in Townsend's 1962 article and was the average actual 
expenditure of people on NA (Townsend 1962 p. 214). There were other criticisms 
that could be made of the study. The figures for 1953/4 were based on 
expenditure, which is normally over-estimated and the figures for 1960 on 
income, which is normally under-estimated. 40 When the numbers in poverty were 
calculated using expenditure for 1960, the percentage dropped to 12.4% of the 
population, (Abel-Smith and Townsend 1965 p. 57-9) still a shocking statistic. In 
addition when poverty in 1953/4 was measured on the Rowntree scale, 4.1 % of 
the population were in poverty (Abel-Smith and Townsend 1965 p. 36), still two 
and half times as great as Rowntree but far lower than using the 140% of NA 
measure. Much of the increase in poverty was due to its redefinition. However. 
whatever the criticisms of The Poor and The Poorest, it was the important catalyst 
40 In 1953'4 they used FES expenditure estimations as that were the most accurately collected 
data. In 1960 they were advised to use FES income estimations. 
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for bringing the attention of the government and the media to the problem of 
family poverty. 
This rediscovery of poverty in Britain was not unique by any means (Sinfield 
1968 p. 1 and 34, European Social Development Programme (ESDP) p. 3). In 
America the factors for the rediscovery of poverty fell into place in the 1950s and 
1960s. The forced migration of rural blacks to the city ghettos as a result of the 
mechanisation of agriculture, along with the civil rights movement made poverty 
more visible and socially dangerous (Trattner 1979 p. 250). In addition, a growing 
number of social workers became concerned and two Democrat senators began to 
investigate low income families (Galbraith 1979 p. 249). Harrington's The Other 
America (Harrington 1962), which discussed the problems of a substantial 
minority in the age of affluence, forced poverty back onto the political agenda. 
In Europe, too, poverty began to be rediscovered, at first by a few academics such 
as Winke and Blume in Germany, de la Gorce in France and Aubert in Norway 
(Sinfield 1968 p. 35-54). Although, it never used the word poverty, even 
communist Czechoslovakia began to research those on low incomes in 1960 
(Sinfield 1968 p. 35). Yet in 1969 the ESDP of the United Nations on Socially 
Deprived Families found that in 1967-9 only in France, Great Britain4l and 
Israe142 were there broad empirical studies of family poverty (ESDP 1972 p. 29- 
30). However, in 1967 two international conferences on poverty and allowances 
for children were held in Britain and USA. 43 These allowed researchers to share 
ideas and information. 
It would be wrong to suggest that the government itself was not becoming more 
aware of the problem of poverty. The concern about pensioner poverty in the 
Rowntree report had been followed up by the government in the Phillips report of 
1954. There had been pension reforms advocated by Labour in 1957 and enacted 
41 The ESDP report refers to the Circumstances of Families study of 1967, which only looked at 
two children or more families and therefore excluded many one parent families in poverty. 
42 The Israeli study was confined to the Jewish population, this of course excluded the 
Palestinians and any other non-Jewish groups (ESDP 1972 p. 10). 
43 The International Seminar on Poverty held at the University of Essex in 1967 and arranged by 
some CPAG members (acting in their academic roles) and the International Conference on 
Children's Allowances in New York, see Burns, E. M. (1974 reprint edition first 1968) Children's 
allowances and The Economic Welfare of Children: The Report of a Conference. Citizen', 
Committee For Children, New York, USA. 
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the Conservatives in 1959. The NAB had also conducted two secret reports on the 
adequacy of both children's and adults' NA rates. Both reports were completed 
before the CPAG was established (Veit Wilson 1999 p. 123-131). Veit Wilson 
suggests the impetus behind these reports came from the new Secretary of the 
NAB, Donald Sargent, who believed that a new Labour government would wish 
to do something about the scale rates and wanted the information ready (Veit 
Wilson 1999 p. 117). 44 Veit Wilson's research correlated with evidence from the 
NAB/SBC annual reports confirms that the NAB did know about family poverty 
and was concerned about rates in the 1950s and 1960s (Veit Wilson 1999 p. 117). 
There had been pressure on the government before the CPAG. A former civil 
servant recalls that "the Titmice45 had been nibbling away for years, there had 
been a constant barrage of attack" (Beltram quoted in Veit Wilson 1999 p. 119). 
Yet the government or the NAB never published a report on family poverty until 
the 1967 publication of Circumstances of Families. 
Poverty was rediscovered for three reasons. Firstly, the dismissing as a "problem" 
of anyone who did not share in the rising prosperity of the post war world was 
gradually discredited in Britain and other countries. Secondly, poverty was 
redefined in Britain not only by researchers such as Townsend but also by 
politicians. Thirdly, small numbers of dissenters did question the supposition that 
poverty had been abolished. Their research began to prove that based on their 
definitions of poverty, the number of poor was large and increasing. These 
researchers were also clever at publicising their research. Harrington's The Other 
America, de la Gorce's La France Pauvre and Abel-Smith and Townsend's The 
Poor and the Poorest were influential because they were well publicised. This 
brought poverty to the attention of the government and the public. 
3.2 Early Period: 5 March 1965-1St August 1966 
This section deals with CPAG's early period. That is from March 5 1965 when the 
first meeting took place to August 1 1966 when the first full time member of staff 
took his post. Lowe in his introduction to the 1993 witness seminar splits CPAG's 
44 For a further explanation of the events see John Veit Wilson, Playing u Political Game? Civil 
Servants and the Adequacy of National Assistance in Lowe 1998 p. 12. 
45 A name given to those who worked with Titmuss at the LSE. Veit Wilson included under this 
title Professor Abel-Smith, Professor Peter Townsend, Professor David Donnison and Tony Lvnes 
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early history into three periods. The first lasted from the first meeting (March 5 
1965) to the appointment of Tony Lynes46 as first full time secretary (August 1 
1966). The second dealt with the period up until Herbison's resignation (July 
1967) and the third until Lynes resignation (November 1968) (Lowe 1995 p. 606- 
7). McCarthy has a chapter dealing with the period until Herbison's resignation in 
1967 (McCarthy 1986, chapter three). Like Lowe this study defines the early 
period as the time from the first meeting to the appointment of a full time 
secretary. This is because it was during this period that CPAG established itself as 
a pressure group but was restricted by the fact that there was no full time member 
of staff able to co-ordinate and develop the group's activities. 
The first meeting of the group that was to call itself the CPAG took place on 
March 5 1965 at Toynbee Hall. Harriet Wilson, 47 a lecturer at the University of 
Wales and a member of the Social and economic Affairs Committee of the 
Society of Friends (SEAC) invited a number of people working with the poor or 
involved in poverty research to a meeting. In her invitation she said that the SEAC 
was especially concerned with the neglect of family allowances in the new 
government's proposals for increases in benefits and allowances (Wilson 1986 
p1361). At the meeting Brian Abel-Smith48 gave a paper on the findings that 
would be later published as The Poor and The Poorest. Although accounts by 
Field and Briggs and MacCartney claim that the choice of family poverty was a 
last minute decision (Field 1982 p. 23, Briggs and MacCartney 1984 p. 168), the 
SEAC had been working on poverty for some time (Wilson 1986 p. 1361-2, 
Wilson 1982 p. 31). 
After the meeting, there was a general consensus that something needed to be 
done about the problems of family poverty. A month later there was a second 
meeting at Fred Philp's49 Family Service Unit (FSU) office. 50 Thirteen people 
were present and there were four apologies (EC minutes 5.4.65, file 1 box 65, 
(Veit Wilson 1999 p. 119). 
46 See appendix A for biography 
47 See appendix A for biography 
48 See appendix A for biography 
49 See appendix A for biography 
50 The FSU was a voluntary social work organisation, which concentrated on case work methods 
to help "problem families". The organisation developed out of the Pacifist Service units, which 
had assisted bombing victims during the war. 
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PTA). It was at this meeting that it was decided that a memorandum should be 
sent to Douglas Houghton, the Social Services Overlord in the Cabinet. 
However, there is also a clue to the members' perceived choices about how the 
group should develop. There was a suggestion that they should make a 
representation "to the government asking for financial help for a body which 
would investigate the problem of poverty and make recommendations on the 
subject to government departments. " The name "Advisory Council for The 
Alleviation of Poverty was suggested" (EC minutes 5.4.65 box 65 file 1, PTA). 
The memorandum at this time could have been used either as "evidence offered to 
some relevant government Committee of Enquiry or as a basis of an approach to 
the Minister for financial help" (EC minutes 5.4.65, box 65 file 1, PTA). This was 
only a suggestion but the implications, if had been accepted, would have been 
great for the CPAG. The result would have been that the CPAG became what 
Grant terms a prisoner group (see chapter 2.1.3). In other words, if the CPAG had 
become reliant on government funding, it would have been seriously restricted in 
what campaigning it could do, because any criticism of government would have 
seriously damaged its insider strategy and put its funding in peril. 
The suggestion was never acted upon and even at this early stage it was agreed 
that there should be contact with the media (EC minutes 5.4.65, box 65 file 1, 
PTA). Yet, there was an emphasis on acceptability. In May, it was proudly 
recorded that a meeting at the House of Commons had given the group easy 
access to the Minister, although at the same meeting they discussed giving a copy 
of the memorandum to the press (EC minutes 7.5.65 box 65 file 1, PTA). Even in 
Autumn 1965, when Brian Abel Smith and Peter Townsend5l were considering 
possible names for the group, the title "Committee for the Alleviation of Poverty", 
which sounds monotonously like a government committee, was still on the list. 
However, also on the list were far more pro-active names such as Child Poverty 
Action Group, Protect Children from Poverty, Help to Poor Children and 
Campaign to Abolish Poverty (draft of Christmas memorandum autumn 1965 (? ), 
File 1, Box 65, PTA). 
The memorandum to Douglas Houghton was sent on the June 30. Houghton was 
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the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Social Services Overlord (see 
chapter 6.1.2). The memorandum defined people in poverty as those below the 
standard of basic NA rates plus rent. It brought attention to the fact that the 
Minister of Labour estimated that somewhere between 50,000 and 150,000 
families lived on less than the basic NA due to low wages. Multiplied by the 
Minister's estimate that each family averaged more than three children, the CPAG 
argued that the numbers were something like 150,000 to 450,000 children living 
at less than NA level (Memorandum of the "Family Poverty Group", JVWP p. 2). 
The memorandum went on to say that there was a need to increase the income of 
families, both when the head of household was in and out of work. However, at 
the same time it was important not to diminish the work ethic and not to give 
encouragement to increases in family size. This would be best achieved by 
increasing family allowances or by modifying child tax allowances in the favour 
of poorer families (ibid. p. 3). Practically, the group suggested a more positive 
view on family planning and even delaying family allowances from the first year 
or two of the child's life to delay any benefits of having a child (ibid. p. 3). 
The group then suggested two solutions to the problem of child poverty. The first 
is accredited to John Veit-Wilson52 and suggested abolishing Child Tax 
Allowances and instead increasing family allowances to twenty five shillings for 
the second child onwards and thirty five shillings to any child over 16 years. In 
addition, first children would be entitled for the first time to family allowances of 
ten shillings. The figures showed that this would help the lowest wage earners 
most and particularly those with more than two children. It would only have 
seriously adversely affected the average family (those on eighteen pounds a 
week), if it had only one child. The well off family on thirty pounds a week would 
lose. The scheme would therefore have been vertically redistributive, although it 
would have had negative effects on horizontal equity. It would have redistributed 
at all income levels from the male wage earner to the housewife (ibid. p. 4). 
The alternative was a negative income tax, which had been calculated by Tony 
Lynes. This proposed that the child tax allowance was paid as an allowance to 
those below the income tax level calculated on the standard rate of tax. This 
51 See appendix A for biography 
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would also give aid to the poorest with more than two children. In addition, the 
CPAG advocated that family allowances should be maintained and raised to ten 
shillings for all children. 53 However, it was not especially verticall. ' 
redistributive, even the well off, thirty pounds a week family benefited. Therefore 
it actually increased horizontal equity for families at all income levels. The 
increase in the resources to families was to go to the wage earner, which did not 
mean that the whole family would benefit. As this scheme would be costly the 
group advocated using money from NI contributions, although keeping family 
allowances a non-contributory benefit. This should be the case, the group argued, 
because the "future wealth of the nation depends on the health and welfare of the 
child population" (ibid. p. 5). 
By July the group was discussing a letter to the Prime Minister signed by 
influential people (as well as another copy of the June memorandum) and a press 
conference. They also drew up a list of possible targets for the CPAG's 
propaganda. These included even at this early stage the media ranging from broad 
sheets of all political persuasions to the tabloids and also the specialist 
professional journals. All three political parties and the Bow Group and Fabian 
Society were listed. They also considered the Trade Unions, Local Authorities, 
other pressure groups, university social science departments, other educational 
establishments dealing with social science subjects and MPs (EC agenda, 15.7.65, 
file 1, box 65, PTA). Therefore despite the fact that they were close to the Labour 
Party, they were targeting even at this early stage nearly all the possible targets for 
pressure groups that Whiteley and Winyard list in their analysis (see chapter 
2.1). 54 
The next action of the group was to approach a selection of influential people and 
ask them to support an appeal to the Prime Minister. There was some discussion 
as to the definition of influential people. Whether this should mean, as Fred Philip 
wanted, twenty prominent people or, as Peter Townsend wanted, fifty leading 
figures in the field of social science (letter from Harriet Wilson to John Veit- 
52 See appendix A for biography 
53 Family Allowances at that time were 8 shillings for the second child, 10 shilling-, for the third 
and others and nothing for the first. 
54 Whiteley and \Vinyard suggest that a pressure group can target the government both locally 
and nationally, the media, political parties, trade Unions and the CBI, other pressure groups, 
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Wilson 14.7.65, JVWP). In the end, there were some forty-five signatories and not 
all of them were linked either to the health or social services sector or were 
involved in social science research (letter to the Prime Minister 22.12.65, file 1. 
box 65, PTA). On December 22 1965, the letter was presented to the Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson, who spoke to the group for ten minutes but made no 
promises and merely referred to Houghton's review of the Social Services. The 
meeting and the letter were reported in The Times, the Guardian and the 
Telegraph and mentioned in other papers. Both the BBC and ITV mentioned the 
group in Nine O'Clock news bulletins, the latter had with an interview with Brian 
Abel-Smith. Independent Television followed the broadcast with a programme on 
family poverty that contained an interview with Peter Townsend. In his letter to 
those supporters, who had signed the letter to the Prime Minister, the chair (Fred 
Philp) said that the letter, press conference and media coverage were considered to 
be fairly successful alerting public attention to the problem (letter to supporters 
27.1.66, file 1, box 65, PTA). The press were given information on December 23 
on the publication date of The Poor and The Poorest at a general press conference 
at Toynbee Hall, although the "serious" press had been given information the 
previous day (EC minutes 3.12.65, file 1, box 65, PTA). After the Christmas letter 
and press conference, the CPAG kept itself in the public arena. Fred Philp wrote 
to a selection of newspapers and Peter Townsend to the New Statesman and the 
Guardian asking for subscribers and new members (EC minutes 7.1.66 file 1, box 
65, PTA). It was reported that Townsend's letter to Guardian had attracted a 
hundred enquiries (EC minutes 4.2.66 file 1, box 65, PTA). 
Meanwhile the group itself had been developing towards becoming a permanent, 
legal entity. In October the title Child Poverty Action Group was accepted as a 
name for the group and Annalies Becker was asked to act as secretary (EC 
minutes 29.10.65, file 1, box 65, PTA). Unfortunately, this was a short lived 
arrangement as soon after, Annalies Becker went to hospital and Harriet Wilson 
had to take over her duties (EC minutes, 3.12.65, file 1 box 65, PTA). At the same 
meeting, Fred Philp became the chairman, on a temporary basis. It was also at this 
meeting that the members agreed that the group should remain in being after the 
appeal to the Prime Minister. It was also agreed that CPAG should have a formal 
parliament and the legal system. On this early list it is only the legal system that they do not target 
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constitution which would allow it to raise money and have some permanent staff 
(if only part time) and continue to publicise the problem of poverty (EC minutes. 
29.10.65, file 1, box 65, PTA). Maisie Birmingham went to the Guildhall library 
to find a suitable constitution. She chose the shortest, "which happened to be for a 
footpath society in Yorkshire. The group merely substituted Child Poverty for 
footpaths that was all" (Letter from Walter Birmingham to Harriet Wilson 22-11- 
93, HWP). The constitution was approved by members on the February 4 and 
accepted it at the first AGM on March 23 (EC minutes 4.2.66 and 23.3.66, file 1, 
box 65, PTA). It was at this AGM that the first elected committee took its posts. 
The elected committee (EC) was basically the same as the committee that had 
been running the CPAG for the last year. In his article for Contemporary Record, 
Professor Lowe talks of three main groups founding the CPAG: LSE academics, 
non-LSE academics and social workers (Lowe 1995 p. 608). Fred Philp elaborates 
on this during the Witness Seminar and says that many of the social workers were 
social work managers (Lowe and Nicholson 1995 p. 616). The people who were 
involved in the CPAG in its first year support Lowe's theory. Appendix D shows 
that just over a third of them were involved in social work, just over a third in 
academia and the rest were from a variety of backgrounds. The Committee of 
twelve people elected (and co-opted) in March, demonstrated an equal balance 
between the social work profession and academia. The variety of backgrounds is 
somewhat narrower with the two miscellaneous being a social worker turned 
pressure group worker and a settlement leader. Although only two of the 
academics were from the LSE (where much of the rediscovery of poverty work 
had been based), a number of the others had links with it. There was also a 
balance between social work managers and actual social workers. 
It was in early 1966 that the CPAG employed its first staff member. It had 
advertised in The Friend for a secretary but had no success (EC minutes 3.12.65, 
file 1, box 65, PTA). By January, however it employed Daphne Batty from a 
choice of four applicants (EC minutes, 7.1.66, file 1, box 65, PTA). However by 
the end of January, the CPAG was looking for a new secretary and even asked 
those who had signed the Christmas letter to the Prime Minister if they knew 
anyone suitable. For example, "a married graduate with appropriate training" who 
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would work for "a small and uncertain part-time salary" (letter from Fred Philp 
27.1.66, file 1, box 65, PTA). It is a reflection of the time that highly educated 
women were willing to accept such a position and give groups like the CPAG 
such good value for their investment. However the energy needed to establish a 
pressure group was not possible for a part-timer. The new secretary Gillian 
Holroyde had other responsibilities. The members resented the fact that the 
appointment of a secretary had made little difference to the pace of CPAG's 
activities. Tensions developed and Holroyde resigned (EC minutes 1.6.66 file 1, 
box 65, PTA). 
The histories of the CPAG have commented on the slow pace of development 
during this first year. The appointment of the first part-time secretary and the 
opening of a bank account took until January 1966 and the constitution was not 
formally adopted until March 1966 at the first AGM. There was a certain belief 
that it would all be over by Christmas and that the group was short term. However 
this is not an uncommon belief amongst pressure groups of this type (Potter 1961 
p. 36). Even if it was believed that it would be over by Christmas, it is clear from 
the minutes that by the autumn of 1965, there was a realisation that the aims were 
going to take longer. The CPAG did agree to become a permanent, formal group 
in October 1965 and from then there were preparations for acquiring legal status. 
There is some evidence that for some members there was always a good chance 
that the group would have a longer life than the memorandum to Douglas 
Houghton. The idea that the CPAG should ask the government for funds to advise 
it on poverty would have resulted in a permanent group, although very unlike the 
CPAG that did develop. In addition, Harriet Wilson remembered at the witness 
seminar that even before the first meeting, she had written to Birmingham to say 
that she had "been thinking if this [was] going to grow into an interest group, 
which might give a little more permanence" (Lowe and Nicholson 1995 p. 615). 
However, although perhaps at first there was a belief among some members that 
this would be a relatively short educational exercise with a sympathetic 
government, it became obvious within six months that the group would have to be 
more permanent. 
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3.3 The Emergence of the CPAG 
The previous chapter discussed the general empirical factors that led to the 
formation of pressure groups (see chapter 2.2.2). This section will look at the 
CPAG specifically. The growth in the number of predominately left wing groups 
does correspond chronologically with the decline in individual membership of the 
Labour Party. However it is argued in the previous chapter that for many activists 
membership of the Labour Party and more direct action through single issue 
pressure groups was complementary. 
Certainly there was some disappointment within the CPAG at the Labour 
government's lethargy over family poverty. Harriet Wilson mentions that one of 
the reasons why she called the first meeting of the Child Poverty Action Group 
was the failure of the new Labour government to mention poor families in the 
1964 Queen's speech (Wilson 1986 p. 1361). Yet at the same time there was not a 
sense of hostility. There was instead still a strong belief that Labour would listen 
to them and ameliorate the problem, once it knew its scale (Veit Wilson 
interview). The belief that the Labour government was essentially on the same 
side as CPAG in the fight against poverty explains the early hopes resting on the 
Houghton memorandum in June 1965. Although CPAG quickly realised that it 
would take more than memoranda to influence the Labour government, the 
relationship remained fairly good until 1970. 
Chapter 2.2.2. offers the professionalisation of social workers and the expansion 
of higher education, particularly the social sciences, as factors which led to new, 
expert groups in society willing to work on behalf of the poor. The composition of 
CPAG's committee when it was established and during its first couple of years 
was dominated by these groups (see appendices D and E. 3.1). Hence it is highly 
plausible as the research and work of these groups exposed them to the problem of 
poverty, a minority sought to channel their energies into alleviating the problem. 
Many would have been and were active in other ways. Harvey was heavily 
involved in the CABx. Wilson devoted her energies to a play-group for deprived 
children and the Quaker's SEAC. Townsend, Abel-Smith and Lynes were 
involved in Labour Party policy-making. What CPAG did was channel the 
energies of the newly expanding groups into pressure group activity. 
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3.3.1 CPAG and Group Replacement 
Attention had been paid to the problem of family poverty before the meeting of 
March 1965. In January 1965, Richard Titmuss, the Chair of Social 
Administration at the LSE and mentor of Abel-Smith, Townsend and Lynes sent a 
memorandum to Houghton on behalf of a group who were concerned with the 
"problem of aid for children and .... 
had particularly in mind the need of large 
families on low incomes" (Titmuss to Houghton 19.1.65, file 1, box 65, PTA). 
The memorandum rejected the idea of abolishing child tax allowances to pay 
higher family allowances as this would hit the average family, and therefore 
"could not be introduced in one operation, if at all" (Titmuss memorandum 
19.1.65, file 1, box 65, PTA p. 4). Instead it favoured a negative income tax which 
would direct payments to those families with an income too low to "use up" all 
their tax allowances. As this measure would be expensive, it was proposed that 
child tax allowances were abolished for surtax payers (Titmuss memorandum 
19.1.65, file 1, box 65, PTA p. 7). The group of concerned people mentioned was 
highly likely to have been an ad hoc group of academics and civil servants. The 
meeting of March 1965 was arranged by Wilson, who had recently written for 
SEAC a book on the problems of family poverty. The SEAC had been interested 
in the topic for some time. 
However neither the ad hoc group of academics and civil servants nor the SEAC 
could conduct a high profile campaign for more help for families in poverty. Civil 
servants are forbidden from actively joining political campaigns. Thus the group 
mentioned by Titmuss was a prisoner group (see chapter 2.1.3). The members of 
the group were unable to identify themselves and as the group was only ad hoc it 
was unable to raise funds or establish a membership. The SEAC was a religious 
organisation. Richard Allen, a Quaker and the chair of the March 5 meeting, 
argues that "it was right for the Society [SEAC] to have brought the concerned 
together, but it was not right for [the SEAC], as a small, religious body. to 
undertake the political operations which would obviously be needed to achieve the 
group's objective" (Allen 1984 p. 766). The SEAC was also a tiny organisation that 
had insufficient funds for its work. It could not simply afford to shoulder the 
responsibility for the CPAG (Veit Wilson interview). CPAG was not unique as a 
pressure group descended from a Quaker background. Multi-Racial Britain was 
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established by a member of the Society of Friends Race Relations Committee in 
1964. However, in this case the Society of Friends were not so directly involved 
(Heineman 1972 p. 16-7). 
CPAG replaced both these groups, because they were both limited in the methods 
they could use. The SEAC had an obligation to the religious community to which 
it belonged not to become openly involved in the political arena. The informal 
groups of Tony Lynes were imprisoned by their membership, who were unable to 
become publicly involved in politics. Therefore CPAG enabled the members to 
take a more public and open stance in the political arena. This should not however 
give the impression that the CPAG replaced these groups completely. It merely 
replaced them in the public argument about tackling family poverty. The Titmice 
academics continued to meet civil servants and the SEAC continued to investigate 
social and economic problems. 
3.4 Conclusion 
It was the rediscovery of poverty that provided the catalyst for a group of social 
workers and academics to decide on March 5 1965 that they needed to meet again 
and do something about the problems facing low-income families with children. 
However the catalyst only led to a group being formed because the potential 
activists had been produced by recent developments in the division of labour. The 
activists who might have previously seen the Labour Party as the proper channel 
for raising their concerns now believed that there was a need for an external 
pressure on the Party. Although CPAG was not the first group to become 
interested in the problem of family poverty, neither the SEAC nor the informal 
grouping around Tony Lynes were able to conduct a high profile campaign. 
The origins of the group were to have an impact on its future development. The 
fact that the group was founded by social workers and academics sympathetic to 
the Labour Party shaped the approach the group was to take in the next five years 
in its approach to the government. However, the early members also made the 
conscious choice to use the media and follow a high profile approach. The 
inactivity of the group after Christmas 1965 confirmed to members that not only 
must CPAG became a formal group which could raise money but also must 
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employ staff who could support the members' decisions. The early appointments 
were only part-time and given the large amount of work needed to establish the 
group and provide clerical support for the membership were unsuccessful. It 
became apparent that the group needed at least one full-time member of staff with 
the relevant knowledge. 
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4 Chapter Four: The Internal Dynamics of the Child Poverty 
Action Group 
The internal structure and politics of a pressure group plays an important part in 
determining its effectiveness. A stable group, which attracts a membership rich in 
quality if not quantity, has sufficient financial resources and clear goals, will have 
a much better chance of success. This chapter is divided into two main sections. 
The first section is a narrative, which discusses the evolving structure of CPAG 
and the people involved. The second section examines the tensions within CPAG. 
These tensions at times led to heated debates between the people involved in 
CPAG whether they were involved at an EC, staff or local level. These debates 
were concerned both with the structure of CPAG itself and with the strategies and 
goals that CPAG was following. Why did these tensions emerge? How were they 
solved? The conclusion draws on the themes of compromise and tension to 
discuss the effectiveness of the internal structure and strategies of CPAG. 
4.1 Narrative 
4.1.1 The Structure 
When Tony Lynes became the secretary of CPAG in August 1966, he reported to 
a twelve strong EC, many of whom he knew personally and professionally. The 
structure of CPAG was uncomplicated. By the end of that year, CPAG had 
already expanded to include 454 members. Although the majority were passive 
members, they would still need some attention if their support was to be 
maintained. Eight years later, the structure, in which Frank Field worked as 
director, " was very different (see appendix E. 1). A number of local branches had 
been established and in 1970, they were given their own representative body, the 
Branches Council (BC). The autonomous Legal Department and Citizens' Rights 
Office (CRO) were established in 1969 and 1970 respectively. 
55 The secretary and director had the same job. There are two probable reasons why the name changed. 
Firstly, there were so many people called secretary. There was the honorary secretary, the secretary (Lynes), 
the membership secretary (briefly), clerical secretaries. Thus for clarity the name was changed. Secondly, 
Shelter called Des Wilson the director as did other groups. The title director may ha%e been considered more 
attractive to potential recruits. 
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The pinnacle of power was theoretically the EC. It was to the EC that the 
secretary/director reported on a monthly basis. The EC was elected at the AGM, 
however a clause in the constitution also allowed the EC to co-opt members who 
could offer a certain expertise to the group. The structure became more 
complicated in 1969/70 with the establishment of the Legal Department, the CRO 
and the BC. The first two broadened the scope of CPAG's activity into the legal 
field as well as providing extra information about the effectiveness of the social 
security system in practice. They were each separately funded by the Joseph 
Rowntree Trust for their first three years. Although the Legal Department was 
founded first, it increasingly became absorbed by the CRO in all but name. The 
head of the CRO (and until 1971, the head of the Legal Department) reported 
directly to the EC (see chapter 5.2). The BC co-ordinated the work of the large 
number of branches that had sprung up all over the country. Each branch had the 
right to send a representative to its quarterly meeting. If a branch had more than 
fifty members it could send another representative for each extra fifty members. 
The BC also had the right to elect six representatives for the EC. 
4.1.2 The EC 
The EC can be divided into four groups for the period: a core group of founders 
and early members, co-optees, core branch members and other branch members 
(see appendix E. 2). The first group reflected CPAG's origins. It was a mixed 
group of social work professionals and social administration academics. Thus the 
academic expertise was tempered by the practical experience of the social 
workers. The chair and to an extent the treasurer, Walter Birmingham, were from 
a social work background. The honorary secretary, Harriet Wilson, was an 
academic. The general shift of the EC from 1969 towards an academic dominated 
group was mirrored by the change in chair as Philp was replaced by Townsend in 
July 1969 (see appendix E. 3). 
However, the change in chair was not only significant because of the difference in 
the occupational backgrounds of the two men. Philp was very much a facilitator. 
He allowed the meetings to make decisions and kept in close contact with the 
honorary secretary, Wilson56 (HWP), and with Townsend. Thus Philp saw his role 
56 The honorary secretary was essentially the deputy chair in her duties and position. 
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very much as co-ordinating the EC and seeking advice from key members. In 
contrast Townsend was concerned with giving direction to the EC. He worked 
closely with Field, the new director. Together they led strategies such as the Poor 
get Poorer Under Labour campaign (see chapter 6.3.1). In this case, the EC was 
consulted but not included in the early preparation work. Wilson, who had had a 
good relationship with Philp, had a less central role with Townsend and Field at 
the helm. Walter Birmingham's role, the first treasurer, went from being very 
active in the early months became less influential even under Philp's chairship, his 
successor Trevor Bell made little impact on the direction of the group. Yet, Gary 
Runciman, who became treasurer in 1972, added to the group's profile. A quiet, 
academic he was respected by the EC for his well-reasoned contributions. In 
addition, his position as a hereditary lord meant that he had good contacts with the 
House of Lords (Field interview). Abel-Smith was in the early period an important 
figure on the EC. The test case strategy and the establishing of the Legal 
Department were his initiative, sparked by his growing academic interest in legal 
matters. 57 However his appointment as Crossman's advisor in late 1968 meant that 
he left CPAG. 
The co-option clause of the constitution was used in 1967 to introduce a variety of 
experts to the EC. Beti Jones, a social worker was co-opted because of her direct 
experience with the poor. More significantly, Des Wilson and Father Eammon 
Casey, the director and chair of Shelter, were co-opted. There were already 
pressure group workers on the EC from the National Council of Women and the 
National Association for Mental Health, however no links with these 
organisations had been formed. Although Father Casey had too many other 
commitments to attend meetings, Des Wilson58 became an active member of the 
EC until 1969. Wilson was a charismatic New Zealander. A brilliant public 
relations strategist, he had made Shelter a household name. In short he had a 
populist appeal that CPAG by 1968 was lacking (Philp to EC 30.11.68, file 2, box 
65, PTA). However Des Wilson parted company with CPAG after the aborted 
merger attempt (see below 4.2.1.1). CPAG failed to co-opt more "alternative 
experts". Instead, with the exception of Sir John Walley, a former Deputy Private 
57 He was a co-author with R. Stevens in 1967 on the publication Lawyers and the Courts and in 1968 with 
R. Brooke In Search of Justice. 
58 For a biography see appendix .A 
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Secretary to the MPNI, all the co-optees were academics. Some of these 
academics like Tony Atkinson, an economics professor at Essex, were prestigious 
in their field. 
The third group were the core branch members. At first a representative from each 
branch was co-opted onto the EC, hence the introduction of Rosemary Vear from 
Merseyside, David Bull from Manchester59 and lain Jordan of the Scottish Poverty 
Action Group (SPAG). All were academics but Jordan was also heavily involved 
in the Labour Party and pushed the issue of the wage stop at the 1967 Labour 
Conference (see chapter 7.1. ). After the BC had been introduced, four of its six 
representatives were constantly re-elected between 1970 and 1974, thus only two 
of the seats changed hands regularly. This core of four were all young social 
science academics from the provinces. However, whereas Jonathan Bradshaw60, 
David Bull and Tony Rees61 were committed to the branches, Veit Wilson was 
more sceptical about the effectiveness of branches. Veit Wilson had been a 
founder members of CPAG and was protective of its expert basis. On this issue he 
was particularly out-spoken and was a main player in the debates about CPAG's 
structure in 1972 (see below 4.2. ). Given his close links with some of the key 
members of the core group62 and his long experience on the EC, his views were 
taken seriously. As the core group started to leave CPAG, it was this core branch 
group and after 1970 the co-optees that began to take their places. 
The final group was the least powerful. The non-core branch members only held 
office for a year and therefore were not sufficiently acquainted with the EC to 
carry much influence. Before 1973 most of this group were non-academics. It was 
the holders of the office in 1972, Sean Creighton63 and John Ward both welfare 
and community action workers, that tried to alter the structure of the EC to reverse 
the academic dominance and to make it more democratic (see below 4.2. ). 
This shift towards academic dominance during the period can be partly explained 
by the fact that more non-academics left CPAG in the period before 1970 than 
59 For a biography see appendix A 
60 For a biography see appendix A 
61 For a biography see appendix A 
62 Wilson is his mother and he had worked for a period in Townsend's department at Essex. 
63 Creighton was a welfare rights worker, member of the Patients' Association as well as the chair of 
Wandsworth branch. 
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academics, the main reason is that the new core branch and co-opted EC members 
after 1970 were nearly all academics. An explanation for the first was that 
academics were more able to visit London on a monthly basis to attend meetings 
than people from other occupations. ` Therefore the core branch members were 
rarely seriously contested in BC elections by non-academics. 65 The reason for the 
near exclusive co-option of academics was a result of academic dominance. When 
considering experts to be co-opted, academics were likely to think of those with 
which they were acquainted. The expertise and prominence of many of the 
academics on the EC were advantageous to CPAG as an expert pressure group. 
However there was always a danger that CPAG would lose touch with the poor 
completely and lose the potential input of other experts with skills in public 
relations and valuable contacts. The first danger was lessened by CPAG's 
involvement at a local level in welfare rights work, which did keep the EC in 
touch with the poor. However the loss of Des Wilson66, a public relations expert, 
and the failure to attract representatives of the trades union movement was a 
serious problem for CPAG in developing appeal to a wider audience. 
4.1.3 The Staff 
The number of staff employed by CPAG increased considerably during the period. 
In August 1966 there was just one member of staff Tony Lynes. He was 
supplemented by a secretary in November. By 1974 there were seven permanent 
members of staff plus a number of administrative staff (see appendix E. 4). One of 
the reasons for the increase in staff was the diversification of CPAG. The Legal 
Department and CRO meant the employment of a full time lawyer, a research 
officer., an interviewer, a director and administrative staff. Therefore, until 1972, 
when the deputy director was employed, the director was managing the same 
lobby work as well as having to co-ordinate with the CRO and Legal Department 
(in difficult circumstances see below 4.1.3.2. ). Coupled with the work of co- 
ordinating the branches, his workload increased during this period. It was the 
64 often professional reasons for going to London could be scheduled to fit with meeting dates. 
65 When in the 1972 BC election seven people stood. It was agreed that all seven could become EC 
members. 
66 Des Wilson, the director of Shelter, resigned from the EC after the Shelter merger deal fell through (see 
below 4.2.1). 
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engagement of the deputy director (with responsibility for branches) that lightened 
it and allowed him more time for lobbying. 
4.1.3.1 The Secretary/Director 
Lynes was an academic. His academic research position with Titmuss prior to July 
1965 had not only given him a rigorous academic training but also meant that he 
had worked closely with Townsend and Abel-Smith. He was sympathetic with the 
Titmuss view on the social division of welfare. According to this view there were 
three systems of welfare, the benefits in cash and kind, tax reliefs and government 
tax relief to occupational benefits should be considered as a whole (Titmuss 1976 
p. 44-52). In addition, Lynes' training as an accountant meant that he was trained 
in the taxation system. Lynes had contacts within the government and Whitehall. 
He was a member of the Labour Party's Social Policy Sub-Committee from 1965 
(see chapter 7.1). Thus, he knew Judith Hart before she became Minister for 
Social Security in 1967. He also knew other key Labour Party figures like 
Crossman. His secondment at the MPNI had introduced him to the relevant civil 
servants and Herbison, Hart's predecessor. 
The Fabian approach to campaigning assumes that persuasive, rational arguments 
are enough to trigger and win a political debate (Clarke et al 1987 p. 50). It was 
this approach that led CPAG to produce the original memorandum to Houghton in 
1965. Neither Lynes or CPAG were naive enough to believe that this would be 
enough in December 1965, hence the publicity campaign that accompanied The 
Poor and the Poorest and the second memorandum. Certainly, when campaigning 
Lynes mastered the media and used a number of publicity tactics (see chapter 6.2). 
Yet, Lynes believed that accurate and well-argued memoranda were the key to 
success (Lynes in Kelly forthcoming). 
Field was the deputy head of department at a further education college. He was a 
Labour member of Hounslow Council in London. When he was interviewed for 
the job at CPAG he admitted that his knowledge of poverty was scant (Field 1982 
p. 29). Yet his dynamism, organisation and journalistic skills convinced CPAG 
that he would make a good director. However Field never had Lynes' extensive 
knowledge of the taxation and benefits systems nor contacts in the Labour 
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hierarchy. Although the change in direction which resulted in the Poor Get 
Poorer Under Labour campaign was triggered by circumstances as much as 
personality, it is highly unlikely that Lynes would have followed such a policy 
(Lynes interview). Despite being an outsider from the national CPAG, Field 
worked well with Townsend and the two of them gave CPAG a decisive 
leadership. 
4.1.3.2 The Other Staff 
The responsibilities of the CRO and Legal Department staff will be discussed in 
chapter 5.2. Apart from administrative staff, the other main staff member in 
CPAG was the deputy director. In 1972, Jane Streather67, a young academic, was 
selected from a list of candidates. Half of her job was to be responsible for the 
branches, the other half was to assist Field. The relationship between her and Field 
was not easy (Streather interview) and they did not co-operate on any 
publications. Apart from Audrey Harvey68, who was the first director of the CRO, 
the main characteristic of all the policy staff (both CPAG and CRO/Legal 
Department) was youthfulness. All were in their twenties and thirties (Streather, 
Bull, interviews). Stuart Weir, 69 the former director of the CRO, describes them as 
"an exceptionally talented group of people" (Weir interview). This is born out by 
the fact that many of them went on to have successful careers. 7° They were 
enthusiastic and hard-working. However they did lack experience. For most of 
them this was their first job in pressure group activity. Although that meant that 
the group could pay them relatively low wages, it also meant that they took 
several years to reach their peak performance (Townsend interview). 
4.1.4 The Mass Membership of the CPAG. 
At first mass membership was considered to be necessary in order to finance the 
CPAG (Fred Philp to supporters" 27.1.66 file 1, box 65, PTA) and a target of 
3,000 was suggested in 1966 (minutes 3.8.66, file 1, box 65, PTA). This target had 
67 For a biography see appendix A 
68 For a biography see appendix A 
69 For a biography see appendix A 
70 Field became a Labour MP and was a key non-cabinet minister in charge of welfare reform in the 1997 
Labour Government. Streather moved to become the director of National Council for Single Woman and her 
Dependants in 1975, Lister became the director of CPAG in 1979. Several of the lawyers went on to have 
successful law careers. 
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still not been reached by 1973 (see appendix E. 5.1). From March 1966 it was 
possible to join for the sum of £1 per annum, a not insignificant sum in 1966. In 
order to boost and maintain membership, CPAG launched Poverty as a material 
benefit. The production of pamphlets from 1969 onwards led to a second tier of 
membership at £2 per annum in 1970 (Newsletter 1, Feb. 1970, file 4, box 65, 
PTA). In addition members of local branches usually paid on average a local 
subscription of five shillings per annum in 1968 (Rosemary Vear 1968 p. 1). 
Membership of CPAG was, therefore, not at a negligible expense, despite the 
benefits. Yet the minimum revenue from membership barely paid the expenses. 
By 1971, the cost of the memberships' entitlement of Poverty and CPAG's 
pamphlets72 was £2,304". The minimum income from members was £2,650 (EC 
minutes 25.9.71, file 5, box 65, PTA). Therefore the CPAG could make as little as 
£346 from its membership. However, in practice all subscriptions amounted to 
E5484(197 1), 74 over twice as much. Some subscribers did not expect literature in 
return and others paid more than the minimum amount. 
In 1972, as membership numbers increased at a snail's pace (see appendix E. 5.2. ), 
Veit Wilson questioned the conventional wisdom that CPAG needed a large 
membership. He argued that CPAG was not dependent on its supporters 
financially, although he conceded that this situation might eventually change. He 
made two proposals. Firstly, he suggested that the subscriptions to CPAG from 
members should be the full economic rate and all branch members should be 
required to contribute to national CPAG (Veit Wilson 1972 p. 6). Secondly, the 
subscribers should be renamed supporters and encouraged to play only a 
supportive role (Veit Wilson p. 5). Creighton responded that an elitist EC would 
mean a debate about poverty, "which may be totally irrelevant to the real needs of 
the poor and this would be compounded by higher membership fees" (Creighton 
1972 p. 1). 
There were three main reasons why members were important to CPAG. Firstly, on 
pure financial grounds, CPAG did need its membership subscriptions. It is true 
71 As in those people who signed the Christmas letter to Harold Wilson 
72 Sent to 29% of the membership who paid the £2 two tier membership 
73 Including the distribution costs 
74 Many paid more than the £1 or £2. 
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that subscription was not the most important source of revenue, but it became 
increasingly important and was more reliable than grants and donations. Secondly. 
members with voting rights did bring new ideas to the BC and to a lesser extent 
the EC, a need which Veit Wilson recognised (Veit Wilson 1972 p. 5). Thirdly, the 
circulation of Poverty and the pamphlets to the membership spread CPAG's ideas. 
Academic members used their CPAG materials for teaching purposes (Bull and 
Bradshaw interviews). 
Whether higher membership fees and the removal of voting rights would have 
affected CPAG's membership is pure speculation. From the scant material 
available, it is clear that CPAG's general membership tended to be professional 
social-workers75, academics and to a lesser extent other professionals (Worsfield 
1971 p. 342 and 344). Higher membership fees would not have been intolerable, 
but as there was most likely a large overlap with other promotional groups (such 
as Shelter), those prioritising the other group may have let their CPAG 
subscription lapse. This may have seriously dented CPAG's membership. The loss 
of voting rights would have had a minimal effect given that they were rarely used. 
4.1.5 The Development of Branches 
4.1.5.1 The Physical and Social Geography of Branches 
Between 1966 and 1973 there were sixty-four branches of the CPAG. Although 
the London area had about a third of these branches, they were (at different times) 
spread across the United Kingdom, with a large number being found in the North 
and Midlands. Wales was very under-represented and both its branches were in 
the South. Northern Ireland and Scotland had their own autonomous organisations 
(see appendix E. 6.1. ). From 1971 London's branches were served by a London 
Poverty Action Group, a forum for the discussion of London wide policy and 
action. 
The branches grew fast; by 1968 there were fourteen branches and by 1970, there 
were twenty-three. The early branches were concentrated in the provinces, with 
only three in the London area before 1970. By 1970, the BC was necessary to co- 
75 A large number were housewives, but at closer examination, a large percentage of these were social 
workers on career break. 
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ordinate policy and action across the UK but also to allow branches representation 
on the EC. It was impossible to co-opt twenty-three branch representatives onto 
the EC. 76 In January 1971 there were reportedly forty active branches (Worsfold 
1971, p. 334) and by the end of that year fifty (Director's report December 1971, 
file 5, box 65, PTA). However, there was a huge gap between the number of 
branches claimed and the number that were active and in contact with the national 
office. In reality, by the end of 1972, there were twenty-one branches that the 
deputy secretary judged to be still active. Of these three were "one-man shows" 
and little had been heard of three more (BC papers 15.12.72, JVWP). " This 
corroborates Field's assertion that at any one time there were between fifteen and 
twenty active branches (Field 1982 p. 51). There was also a steady turn over of 
active branches. As old branches became inactive new branches were formed. 
The distribution across the country also altered. By 1972, the majority of branches 
were in the South and East of the country, including a number of strong groups in 
the North East. In comparison the Celtic fringe was still very poorly served. 
Finlayson remarked that branches of CPAG were to be found not necessarily in 
areas of poverty but in university towns (Finlayson 1994 p. 152). If all CPAG 
branches are taken into account, then this conclusion is not tenable. Two thirds of 
all CPAG branches were not to be found in University towns or areas. However, 
setting up a CPAG branch was relatively simple; maintaining it over the longer 
term was more difficult. Of those groups that had by the end of 1972 lasted for 
more than two years, three quarters were university-based. In contrast, of those 
groups lasting less than a year four-fifths were non-university (see appendix 
E. 6.2). 
There were two main reasons why CPAG branches should be strongest in the 
university towns. Firstly, academics and students were not only more likely than 
the general public to have heard of CPAG but also to sympathise with what was 
nationally an academic-dominated pressure group. Hence the potential 
membership was larger. Secondly, it was a matter of time. Academics had then 
more flexible timetables and the branch work could be incorporated into academic 
76 Apart from the unwieldiness of the EC meetings it would have been impossible due to the lack of space in 
Macklin Street. 
77 The one man shows were Newton Abbot, Stirling and Southend and the branches of which not much had 
been heard were Hackney, Manchester and South Hants. 
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work (Wilson 1971 p. 1, Bull2 interview). Students helped with projects and 
welfare rights stalls (Bull to Graves, 29.4.73 DBP, Bull, interview). In addition, 
social administration academics had considerable expertise in the field which 
others had to acquire (Wilson 1971 p. 1). 
Like the national body, local branches of CPAG were promotional groups. Hence, 
they were to be found, "when and where well educated middle class people with a 
sense of social commitment ... voiced concern over the problem of poverty and 
[were] prepared to do something about it" (Worsfold 1971 p. 330). Thus, there was 
only a coincidental relationship between areas of high poverty and CPAG 
branches. Certainly some university based branches were in areas and cities with 
high poverty levels. Yet, in depressed South Wales, there were no active branches 
by 1972, although Royal Tunbridge Wells had a thriving local branch. 
4.1.5.2 Branch Membership 
Information on the numbers involved in branches, and members' occupational 
background and political persuasion is scant for the whole period 1966-1974. The 
main source of information is Worsfold's study of 1970. However this study is 
limited. Firstly, Worsfold was only able to gain information from ten branches out 
of a possible twenty four. 78 The ten were unrepresentative because all were based 
on universities and half were in the North East of England. Secondly, it only 
provides information about branches, their membership and their activities before 
1970. However, given the lack of information, it does at least give some insight 
into the types of people CPAG attracted. 
Branches varied a great deal in size. Whereas Merseyside had 26579 members on 
its books by 1968-9 (Merseyside CPAG Annual report 1968-9) and Manchester 
112, South Hants only claimed a membership of 23 (Worsfold 1971 p. 34580). The 
mean membership of a branch for 1969 was 63 (Worsfold 1971 p. 345). However 
is it likely that a sizeable proportion of members in each branch had not paid and 
78 Five were not circulated with the questionnaire because three were in the process of closing and two were 
new. However nine branches never returned the questionnaire. Worsfold said that ? all the questionnaires 
varied in their thoroughness (Worsfold 1971 p. 333). He also includes Islington as a branch although it is 
only a welfare rights organisation until 1973. 
79 Although only 105 were active and only 67 had paid up. Therefore the true figure was probably between 
60 and 100. 
80 Figures for 1969 
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were not active (Merseyside CPAG Annual report 1968-9, `'ear 1968, Bull 
1970a). ß' 
CPAG branches were promotional. They attracted middle-class members working 
on behalf of the poor. However in 1969, the largest group in the branches were 
social workers, with academics coming second (see E. 6.3). Thus, although social 
workers were dwindling on the EC, they were still strongest in the branches. 
There are three other observations that can be made about CPAG branch members 
in 1968/9 from Worsfold's non-representative sample. Firstly, branch chairs and 
secretaries were fairly young. The mean age for a chair in 1968 was 29 years and 
in 1969 35 years, the mean ages for secretaries were 30 and 29 years respectively 
(Worsfold 1971 p. 342-3). Of course the number of students in university-based 
branches would have lowered the mean age. The housewives and social workers 
may well have been slightly older. Yet the overall impression is of branches 
attracting a large number of relatively young people. 
Second is the role of women in the branches. Given that housewives accounted for 
16% of Worsfold's sample of branch members in 1969 and social workers, 
another female dominated group for 36%, it is likely that over half of all CPAG 
branch members at that time were women (see E. 6.3). The chairs of the branches 
were mostly male in 1968 and 1969, but the secretaries were mostly female. 
However, although men were taking the most prestigious posts, they were not the 
most active and powerful. Worsfold notes that it was the secretary who 
communicated with the national office (Worsfold 1971 p. 343). As the link she 
was the one with the most information. Certainly in the early days women played 
an important role in the local branches. Finally, branch members overwhelmingly 
(85%) supported the Labour Party. The 3% who supported the left wing of the 
Conservative Party was matched by Marxists and Communists (Worsfold 1971 
p. 342). This correlates with what is known about the EC's political allegiances. 
There is no evidence to confirm whether these trends continued into the 1970s. 
Branches often complained of insufficient active members to carry out activities. 82 
81 From Merseyside's figures from 1968-9. It appears that 40% of its 265 members were "active" (they give 
no definition) but only 25% were actually up to date with subscriptions (Merseyside CPAG Annual Report 
1968-9, DBP). 
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Bristol, an university based branch, contained a large number of academics on its 
committee. However, other branches like Wandsworth attracted mostly 
community and welfare workers. Bristol's minutes show that women continued to 
be well represented on the committee. The fact that there was a large enough 
overlap between CPAG branches and the Labour Party to ensure CPAG 
resolutions on the Labour Party conference agenda83 suggests that there was still a 
strong presence of Labour supporters in the branches. 
4.1.5.3 The Activities of Branches 
Not all branches saw it as their role to provide the central organisation with 
funding. A proposal for branches to contribute towards a part time or full time 
organiser was defeated in the BC. Yet a motion for the EC to discuss the 
possibility of appointing one was carried (BC Minutes 16.5.71, JVWP). Of those 
branches that agreed that they should contribute, a third made it clear that they 
were not prepared to indulge in fund-raising (CPAG 1971). The branches were 
therefore not directly a major source of revenue for the central organisation. 
However, members attracted to the solidary benefits of the branches may have 
also joined at a national level. In addition as well as attracting national members 
for CPAG, they were also an important source of "new blood" for the EC 
(Streather interview). 
The branches had an important role in generating publicity at a local level for 
CPAG (Vear 1968 p. 1). Branches were successful in obtaining television and 
newspaper publicity for the issue of poverty and for their work in the area 
(Bradshaw, Bull, Veit Wilson interviews). Manchester, York and Bristol were 
particularly successful at getting television coverage and most branches could get 
articles in the local newspaper (see chapter 8.5) 
The branches' third role was to educate certain influential sections of the 
population about CPAG and family poverty. There were two main ways in which 
this could be achieved. Firstly, the branch could try and persuade other groups to 
affiliate. Secondly, it could speak to other groups. In achieving the former, CPAG 
82 Even in 1970 York CPAG had too few volunteers with too little time to do a survey on low income 
earners. 
83 See chapter 7.1 for a full explanation of this strategy. 
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were not very successful. Worsfold's survey showed that branches in 1970 had a 
mean of 1.4 groups affiliated to them and half of his sample had no formal 
affiliations. Other pressure groups, Councils of Social Service (CSS) and local 
Labour Party groups were the most common affiliates (Worsfold 1971 p. 338). 
Only Manchester managed to persuade a trades council to affiliate (Manchester 
CPAG Dec. 1968 newsletter, DBP). 84 Later some branches had strong links with 
CUs and Tenants Unions. 85 Forming links with other voluntary organisations was 
useful in preventing too much of an overlap in work as well as a sharing of 
resources. Yet to associate too closely with another group could be dangerous as 
its activities would reflect on CPAG (see chapter 9.2). Links with the Labour 
Party were a double sided sword. Although the Labour Party offered links to the 
local MP and councillors, it also gave the impression that CPAG was a left wing 
group and this was likely to damage its reputation as non-partisan. 
A more informal and more casual way of educating other groups was for branches 
to have a speakers' panel which could offer talks to interested groups. There was a 
positive response for CPAG speakers. Merseyside in 1968-9 spoke to twenty 
groups "covering a wide social range" (Merseyside CPAG Annual report 1968-9, 
DBP p. 4). Manchester spoke to fifty-five groups in 1968. Just under a third of 
them were political groups but two thirds of them were Labour Party groups. 
Manchester branch realised that it was unbalanced and hoped to try and rectify 
this (Manchester CPAG annual report 1968 DBP p. 3). Despite Manchester's 1968 
success in talking to trades unions. In general, trades unions and councils were not 
that interested in CPAG speakers (Bull and Bradshaw interviews). 86 Although a 
variety of groups asked for speakers, the majority were students, social work and 
other voluntary groups. 87 Therefore often CPAG branches were in effect preaching 
to the converted. 
CPAG branches had variable relationships with their local SBC offices. Whereas 
Manchester had a very good relationship, Bristol never did (Bull interviews). 
Relationships could also be either tense with the local authorities or productive as 
84 He lists the local Labour Party, Councils of Social Service, Community Relations Councils, BAS\V, 
Shelter and Pre-school Playgroup Associations. 
85 York first attempted to form a CU in 1970 (Bradshaw interview). Wandsworth also formed a CU and had 
good links to the local tenants union. Cambridge also had good relations with local CUs. 
86 Only the Manchester 1968 Annual report mentions trades unions. 
87 Manchester CPAG Annuals report 1968 p. 3, Bristol newsletter 2 October 1971 p. 5 
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was the case in Manchester (Bull 1970 p. 5-7). In addition, some branches built up 
a relationship with their local MP. Alf Morris was willing to ask questions for 
Manchester CPAG in Parliament (see chapter 7.2.2. ) and Bristol had a good 
relationship with Tony Benn MP (Bull to Benn c. Feb. 1973, DBP). Local SBCs, 
had a certain amount of discretion regarding benefits, a good relationship could 
greatly assist SB claimants in an area. Local authorities were responsible for most 
educational and housing benefits. Therefore persuading the local authority to use 
permissive legislation and be generous in its payments could also have a large 
impact on the poor's living standards. In addition, local authorities acted as 
pressure groups on the government, as did the local SBCs on the central body. 
Hence, forging a constructive alliance at a local level could have an indirect 
impact at a national level as MPs were the link to Parliament. 
Branches carried out surveys on issues such as the availability of claim forms at 
post offices, the workings of optical, dental exemptions, educational benefits and 
surveys of levels of poverty in certain areas. A large number of branches 
undertook these surveys (see appendix E. 6.4). Merseyside undertook in 1968 and 
again in 1970 larger surveys of poverty and people's knowledge of welfare rights 
(Merseyside CPAG 1970). Overall university based branches were more 
successful in their completion of surveys because of members' experience and the 
availability of students with time. 88 CPAG had few staff and it was not possible 
for them to carry out a great deal of research and surveys. The branches' survey 
and research work gave the CPAG new evidence about local case studies and 
through national surveys like the family allowance survey of 197289, a more 
national picture. 
A thorough and well-publicised report on the failings of a local authority benefits 
could excite the media: local and national. The best case study is Bristol CPAG's 
1973 report on school uniform grants, a much neglected part of the local 
authorities' duties. Bristol undertook a large survey, at the local authority's 
request, after highlighting in the Sunday Mirror and the local press the cases of 
two local families whose children suffered stigma because of their lack of a 
88 Sometimes as part of academics projects 
89 Undertaken at the request of Streather, the deputy director, in 1972, to gauge the nationally the views that 
mothers of various social classes held about family allowances. 
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suitable school uniform (Bull to Graves90 29.4.73 DBP). Despite some restrictions 
on talking to teachers, the report was an overwhelming success in terms of 
publicity. The story appeared in the eight main national papers, in the two main 
Bristol local papers and thirteen other local papers spread all across England and 
Wales (DBP). 9' Within Bristol, there was something of a backlash in the local 
paper as CPAG was unwilling to divulge information about its informants (Bristol 
Evening Post 27.4.73 p. 1,28.4.73). However, after deliberations on the report by 
the council it was broadly accepted that there was a problem (Bristol Evening Post 
17.10.73). Tyneside branch made a similar study as the basis for a programme on 
the issue on Tyne and Tees TV (30/7/73 DBP). Cardiff branch, through a few 
local enquiries, was able to give local examples to the Cardiff Western Mail 
(19.4.73, DBP). 
4.1.6 Finance 
A promotional group, concentrating its efforts on lobbying the government, need 
not have considerable financial backing to be successful. The expertise on 
CPAG's EC cost nothing. Many of CPAG's arguments were based on research 
undertaken by members and others in their academic roles. The army of branch 
members undertook specific research projects for no remuneration and welfare 
rights work at a local level had negligible financial costs. However the 
intermittent nature of CPAG's activity before Tony Lynes was employed is proof 
that full time staff were necessary (see chapter 3.2). As CPAG moved into the 
welfare rights field the necessary funding needed was greater; lawyers, researchers 
and interviewers had to be employed (see chapter 5.2). 
Compared to other pressure groups like Shelter, which by the late 1960s had a 
turn over of several million pounds (Wilson interview), CPAG was a shoestring 
organisation throughout the period (see appendix E. 7.1. ). However it managed to 
balance its books (at least for CPAG and the Legal Department) and increase its 
revenue considerably during the period. A tiny income of £3,683 in 1965/6 was 
increased by some 750% to £27,988 in 1973. This meant that it could remain a 
viable independent group, something that had not looked possible in 1968, when 
90 Bill Graves was the Labour leader of Bristol City Council. 
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CPAG had almost agreed to a take-over by Shelter (see belo«'). Although the 
CRO was in debt until 1973, CPAG and the Legal Department managed to 
produce surpluses. In 1973, a large increase in revenue from grants, subscriptions 
and literature sales gave CPAG an income far in excess of its expenditure for the 
first time. 
The income did not only grow but its sources changed. Until 1969 grants and 
donations were the most important source of income for CPAG (see appendix 
E. 7.2). These grants came from a variety of sources. One of the most important 
was the Joseph Rowntree Trust, which helped fund CPAG for its first year and 
later gave a total of £30,000 over three years to the Legal Department and CRO. It 
was only because of this funding that the two organisations were possible. The 
secretary's salary for the first year was underwritten by the Sembal Trust. 
Individuals were also important through their trusts. Lord Sainsbury made several 
donations of £500 during the first few years of CPAG. His support continued 
through to the 1970s when he underwrote the costs of a deputy director. Lord 
Sainsbury's interest was encouraged by his friend Harriet Wilson. Sir Keith 
Joseph92 was also a donor. In 1970, his company Bovis was approached by CPAG 
and agreed to pay for premises for the group between £500 and £600 per year for 
at least three years (EC minutes 18.4.70 and Bovis to Field 1.4.70, file 4, box 65, 
PTA). Joseph's interest stemmed from his concern about child poverty and his 
belief that research was necessary (Halcrow 1989 p. 52 and 83). 
However as CPAG grew, although grants and donations remained important, 
subscriptions grew in importance. In 1971, they were more important than grants. 
Even when the amount secured in grants increased considerably in 1972 and 1973, 
subscriptions still accounted for a third of income. Subscriptions were not just 
important for the actual revenue that they generated but also because it was a more 
stable and long term source of revenue than grants and donations which could not 
be guaranteed in the long term. The other source of income that grew in 
importance was that from the sales of literature. The amount generated tripled 
between 1971 and 1972 and accounted for a fifth of income in 1972. Thus 
91 Mr. Bull had commissioned a professional "cuttings" company to supply him with articles from all the 
British Press. It is likely therefore that practically all the available cuttings have been preserr ed. 
92 The Conservative NIP and later Secretary of State for the Social Sere ices in Heath's Government (1970-4) 
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although the literature was produced with the primary purpose of educating the 
public about the issues (or in the case of the welfare benefits guide, informing of 
rights), it became increasingly an important source of revenue for the campaigning 
activities (Townsend interview). 
Despite the early hope that branches would provide funding for national CPAG 
(Vear 1968 p. 1), only two percent of income in 1972 and three percent in 19733 
being provided by them. Streather had been employed to spend half her time 
servicing the branches but the total income from the branches in 1972 only paid 
for 17% to 18% of her branch time. The £50 per annum for national CPAG 
promised by the branches in 1972 (BC Minutes 17/18.2.73, JVWP) was only paid 
by a minority of branches. 
Salaries consumed the lion's share of the expenditure. This was understandable 
for a group, for which human capital was its greatest asset. However, between 
1972 and 1973 a gap between expenditure and salary costs is discernible (see 
appendix E. 7.4). This was because other costs such as publicity and printing were 
also increasing as literature sales increased. Office and travel expenses may also 
have increased as more staff had to be accommodated. 
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4.2 Tensions 
The developing structure, membership and strategies of CPAG as well as the 
changing external environment sparked tensions on the EC. These tensions can be 
divided into two main groups: those due to the internal structure and those 
concerned with fundamental goals. This section uses the theme of compromise to 
examine how the tensions were resolved and whether this led to the optimal 
outcome. It examines how the structure of CPAG ensured that certain goals were 
advanced at the expense of others. The success of the welfare rights strategy and 
therefore the CRO and Legal Department are discussed in chapter 5. Therefore 
this section will concentrate on contribution of the composition of the national 
CPAG and the activities of the local branches to the development of CPAG as a 
pressure group. 
4.2.1 The Structure of CPAG 
4.2.1.1 The Proposed "Merger" With Shelter 
In 1968, Des Wilson proposed a merger between CPAG and Shelter. There were 
in fact two proposals. The first was a limited suggestion for a joint journal of the 
two groups, for which Shelter would pay the larger share (Des Wilson to Lynes c. 
December 1968, file 3, box 65, PTA). The second built upon this suggestion and 
argued for Shelter and CPAG to partially merge. It was proposed that Shelter 
would set up a Shelter Anti-Poverty Group, which would be run by a Shelter 
Poverty researcher and funded totally by Shelter. It would essentially take over the 
national CPAG's role. Although, CPAG would continue to exist it would be 
merely as a co-ordinator for the local groups. The director of Shelter would have 
control over public statements (see appendix E. 8). What is most striking about the 
latter proposal was the lack of friction that it caused within the EC, except from 
the resignation of Des Wilson. 
Philp recommended the merger to the EC. His reasons were four-fold. As the 
government's interest waned in the field of family poverty, at least in public (see 
chapter 6.2.2), Philp believed there was a need to reach a wider audience. CPAG 
had to admit that "in some respects it had not achieved as much as it would have 
wished". He argued that the CPAG had tended to concentrate its education 
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efforts" on a small section of the community which is knowledgeable. socially 
conscious and influential - ministers, government departments. universities and 
social workers". He argued that although this might produce "rapid action" it was 
"precarious" without educating the broader public because ministers are 
frightened to take action if it is misunderstood by their own supporters (Philp 
memo, 30.11.68, file 2, box 65, PTA p. 1). 93 Philip's answer was that the CPAG 
should give its attention firstly to rising public awareness of family poverty and 
support for the measures to ease the problem. The merger with the populist Shelter 
would give CPAG the resources with which to reach the wider audience. 
Another reason was the time that CPAG devoted to fund-raising, administration 
and local groups. CPAG's raison d'etre was to produce, through the analysis of 
research, the facts and policy statements needed by those engaged in the 
propaganda and education of public opinion. The merger with Shelter would free 
the EC to discuss the policy issues (Philp memo, 30.11.68, file 2, box 65, PTA p. 2 
and 4). In addition Philp and Des Wilson argued that Shelter and CPAG not only 
had the same aims but were dealing with the same people (Philp 30.11.68, file 2, 
box 65, PTA p. 2 and Des Wilson interview). They were both smallish groups, 
calling on the same resources for support and each setting up separate 
administrative structures. The duplication was wasteful and even harmful to the 
causes served. Closer association could prevent this (Philp memo, 30.11.68, file 2, 
box 65, Essex p. 2, Des Wilson interview). However, the crucial reason was 
finance. In 1968, CPAG was in the red. There were serious doubts that charitable 
trusts would continue in their support for much longer94(Philp 30.11.68, file 2, box 
65, PTA p. 3) and that CPAG could continue to survive on its own (Veit Wilson 
interview). 
This view was countered on the EC by Townsend and Harvey. After devoting 
three years to the development of CPAG as a pressure group they were loath to 
see it lose its independence and identity (Townsend, Philp and Veit Wilson 
interviews). They also raised two more practical objections. CPAG was an expert 
pressure group, the main reason why Shelter was interested was that it would be 
93 Here he was referring to clawback which caused anger amongst men whose wage packets shrunk as their 
wives' family allowances increased. 
94 Trusts like the Rounder charitable trust made it clear to CPAG that their funding was only prime pumping 
for new organisations to help them start and then it was up to the group to find its own income. 
95 
able to obtain the academic eminence of CPAG easily (Des Wilson interview). 
There was a fear that the down-side to populist appeal would be the tarnishing of 
the expert reputation (Des Wilson interview, EC minutes 17.1.69, file 3. box 65. 
PTA95). There was also some concern that homelessness and bad housing was one 
problem and family poverty another. Although the same people might have been 
affected by both, the two issues belonged to two different policy communities. 
Thus there was a belief that the two groups might actually achieve more 
individually than together (Philp interview). 
Despite the seriousness of the decision, it raised very little controversy. The EC 
minutes lack note of lengthy discussion. The crux of the matter was that no-one 
was particularly enthusiastic about the merger. The main concern was the 
finances, which it was hoped would improve. There was simply a belief on the EC 
that although the advantages were very real, the loss of independence was too 
great a price to pay (Veit Wilson interview). Thus what should have been a 
contentious issue was resolved with only the loss of Des Wilson. Given the later 
improvement in CPAG's finances, it may have been the right decision for CPAG. 
Yet, an expert policy committee did have to spend its time on administrative 
issues and CPAG was not able to begin to appeal to a populist audience until the 
1970s (see chapter 8). Given that the hypothetical alternative is impossible to 
construct, it would be futile to make judgements about whether or not CPAG 
made the right decision. What is important for the development of CPAG was that 
it was able to take such an important decision without internal strife. 
4.2.1.2 The Role of Democracy in CPA G 
The complicated internal structure that CPAG developed gave it the veneer of 
democracy. However this democracy was largely illusionary, with few contested 
elections and a large number of co-options. Whilst CPAG was a small group with 
few branches, practically all members with an active interest and a willingness to 
make frequent trips to London could get on the EC. However, by 1972 the group 
had grown. Some non-academics such as Sean Creighton and John Ward wanted 
to move CPAG towards being more of a welfare rights service orientated group. 
95 The debates absence from the minutes means that grounds for refusal are not documented. This reason 
was actually raised in response to the limited proposal of the 
joint journal. 
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In order to achieve this they needed to break the academic self-renewing 
oligarchy's (made up of the core, co-optee and core branch groups) hold on the 
EC. Thus they started to push the subject of democracy onto the BC's agenda. 
Central to their argument was their desire to see the EC to operate as a forum for 
representatives from various regions of the country. They also wanted a better 
balance between academics and non-academics. 
Veit Wilson argued that CPAG should not be democratic, as it was not an 
organisation which represented the views of a section of the population. Instead it 
was an expert lobbying organisation which used academic research and evidence 
to promote solutions to policy makers. EC members represented expertise not 
constituencies (Veit Wilson 1972 p. 1-3). For Veit Wilson, CPAG's "material 
[wa]s the best expert evidence and not an aggregation of attitudes ... 
" In an 
analogy with a football team, he argued that CPAG was playing in the big league 
and just as it would be absurd for the supporters club to elect or dictate to the 
team, so was it for the CPAG. He argued that subscribers should be renamed 
supporters and play a supportive role with their "purses, voices and legs" (Veit 
Wilson 1972 p. 5). For him, "a self-perpetuating expert oligarchy" was preferable 
to an elected EC of people "representing local bourgeois interests of mere warm- 
hearted uninformed concern for the poor" which would lead to the "political 
emasculation of CPAG" (Veit Wilson 1972 p. 5) An open EC would lead to the 
possibility of take-over, something echoed by Townsend a year later (Townsend 
to Creighton 13.8.73, box 69, PTA). 
The pro-democracy camp were incensed by this attack. Sean Creighton argued 
that an "elite" EC would be too distant from the real needs of the poor (Creighton 
1972, file 6, box 65, PTA p. 1). Creighton, supported by Ward, wanted a very 
different structure to CPAG for ideological and tactical reasons. In their opinion, 
CPAG's EC should be composed of representatives from different regions (each 
region having a representative on the EC). There should also be six national 
members of the EC who would be voted for by postal vote. The academic 
monopoly on the EC would be broken in two ways. Firstly, there would be a limit 
to the number of academics and social administrators allowed on the committee. 
Secondly, there would be an election of three members at the AGM to rectify any 
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imbalances. Finally, as the EC meetings would be open, there would be no need to 
co-opt members to the EC for their expertise (Creighton to Townsend 2-1.7.73, 
box 69, PTA). 
Creighton, Ward and others had strong reasons for demanding democracy and 
openness in all organisations. They were certainly right about the dominance of 
academics, which accounted for at least 85% of the EC after the AGM in May 
1973 (appendix E. 3.1). Not only were academics the dominant group but also the 
most likely to remain on the committee the longest. Academics accounted for over 
half of all EC members who remained for more than two years and two-thirds of 
all those remaining for more than four years. 96 However, Creighton and his 
supporters' ideas would have also helped them tactically gain more power over 
the organisation. A postal vote would have meant that more ordinary grassroots 
members, a majority of whom may not have been academics, would have voted. 97 
Thus non-academic candidates would have had a better chance of success. The 
limitation on academics would have also have meant more people like Creighton 
and Ward being elected to the EC and therefore more support for their ideas about 
the group's role. 
Townsend made clear to Creighton that these ideas could not be implemented for 
three practical reasons. Firstly, postal votes were costly, cumbersome and time 
consuming, a serious issue for a shoe-string organisation with relatively few staff. 
Secondly, electing at AGM would make the risk of take-over even greater. 
Thirdly, the idea of open meetings to avoid co-option would have restricted the 
frankness of discussions at the EC as the people present would be under no 
obligation to CPAG. Furthermore, the meetings could be disrupted by groups 
antagonistic to the CPAG (Townsend to Creighton 13.8.73, box 69, PTA). 
However a more fundamental reason for resisting a democratic structure was that 
CPAG was clearly a promotional group. The sum of the group was not its 
membership but its expertise. CPAG never represented anybody. Instead it was a 
group of experts that worked to bring the problem of poverty to the attention of 
the government, the media and other institutions. Veit Wilson's suggestion that 
96 This statistic is derived from an examination of all members of the EC over the period 1965 to 1974. 
97 Although not representative the Worsfold survey indicates that a majority of branch members were not 
academics (Worsfold 1971 p. 344). 
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members should be reduced to mere supporters, whilst the experts took control 
was justifiable. Other promotional groups such as Greenpeace use this model, and 
are run in an `authoritarian' manner by experts with the rank and file having little 
input into the decision-making process (Grant 1995 p. 136). Thus given that CPAG 
supporters were attracted by the expressive benefits of CPAG, most were happy to 
pay their subscription and gain the material benefits. Most had no interest in 
voting or being active. Of the minority of active members, the vast majority were 
content at their local level. 
In the end little changed. The members retained voting rights that the majority 
never used. The BC remained largely a powerless talking shop. The EC continued 
to co-opt other experts. The main reasons for this was that the resultant 
compromise benefited CPAG more than the other alternatives. It was difficult to 
take voting rights away from the rank and file members. Given that subscriptions 
accounted for a sizeable proportion of CPAG's finances from 1971, alienating 
membership could not be risked and any members that bothered to attend an 
AGM that might be the other side of the country were more than armchair 
activists. In addition, the election of people like Creighton to the EC, although 
non-conformist, did present not only new ideas to the EC but also a direct 
experience of working with the poor on a daily basis. Yet, at the same time, the 
vast majority of the EC must have recognised that their power lay in their 
expertise. Hence the predominantly expert EC had to be maintained through what 
might be termed a self-renewing oligarchy of academics. Although cumbersome, 
the existing machinery therefore managed to strike a balance between 
accountability and expertise. 
4.2.1.3 The Tension Between the CRO and CPAG 
After 1969, Field was the director of CPAG, responsible to the EC. Audrey 
Harvey and her successor Stuart Weir were directors of the CRO. Immediately 
there was a tension. Although the CRO was autonomous, it still had to work with 
CPAG in order to present an united front and to share information. Therefore, 
when the CRO under Harvey issued its own press release on the same day as a 
CPAG release the level of tension rose. As the CRO developed some independent 
income from welfare rights courses, Weir fought harder for more independence 
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(Weir interview). In short the fact that the directors were expected to work 
together with no-one in overall control resulted in minimal co-ordination and co- 
operation. 
In addition, all concerned were ambitious with strong personalities. Harvey saw 
the CRO as her pet-project and was not going to allow a much younger newcomer 
like Field to interfere. Weir took the job on the understanding that he was going to 
be the director of this offshoot organisation and resented Field's interference. 
Field was in charge of the day-to-day running of CPAG. In order to gain the 
information he needed for lobbying, he had to have some control over the CRO's 
work. As the roles of the two directors overlapped, even deciding who should 
speak to the media was an area of tension (Weir interview). Personal factors, as 
well as tension between roles, led to friction between Field and his deputy 
Streather. This led to an alliance being formed between Weir and Streather and 
between Field and the CRO/Legal Department lawyer, Henry Hodge (Weir, 
Streather, Bull, interview). The alliance between Weir and Streather led to some 
valuable efforts at creating links and passing resolutions at the 1972 and 1973 
Labour Party conferences. However, in general the tensions hindered the vital co- 
operation between the CRO and CPAG. 
4.2.1.4 Relationship between the EC and the Staff 
The striking thing about the relationship between the staff and the EC was the 
high level of co-operation and good will. There are two main reasons why this 
should have been so. Firstly, the senior staff and the EC had similar backgrounds. 
Some of the staff had served on the committee before and some served after 
leaving paid employment with the group. All the senior staff had been national 
members of the CPAG before employment and some had been involved in branch 
work. 98 Therefore the staff and the EC in general shared some of the same values. 
Secondly, the staff were young. Hence, with few domestic responsibilities and 
ambitions for the future, they were willing to accept relatively low pay (Streather. 
98 Audrey Harvey had been on the EC since the Group's formation and in early 1970 took over the 
directorship of the CRO. Tony Lynes had also been involved before his secondment to the MPNI and then 
became secretary. Tony Lynes was on the EC after resigning as secretary although he refused co-option in 
June 1971. Robin Simpson was elected onto the EC after leaving the group's employment. Jane Streather and 
Stuart Weir were involved in branch work 
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Weir interviews). Although there was some anger when the link between the 
staffs' pay and academic scales were broken (Weir interview), the real strife over 
pay and conditions came later in the 1980s (Bradshaw interview). In 1972 
Streather set up a branch of the TGWU for CPAG (and other voluntary workers in 
London). It made little difference to pay (Streather interview). Thus apart from the 
rather bitter departures of Holroyde (see chapter 3.2.1) and Harvey (see chapter 
5.2), the overall picture of EC and staff relations was one of tranquillity. 
4.2.2 The Development of Branches 
4.2.2.1 Why Branches Were Formed 
The branches were not instigated by the centre. Indeed there was opposition to the 
idea of branches from the secretary, Lynes, and the present and future chairs, 
Philp and Townsend (Philp to Townsend 29.7.66, file 1, box 65, PTA). CPAG 
simply never had the resources to service branches (Lynes interview). The 
secretary/director was responsible for organising and implementing CPAG's 
lobbying campaign. As far as Lynes and Field were concerned this was the 
priority for CPAG. Servicing and accommodating branches used precious 
resources in terms of both finance and time. 
The early branches were centred on universities in the large provincial cities: 
Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool (Merseyside). Scotland, too, very quickly set 
up its own centre in Edinburgh and branches proliferated. The main reasons for 
this was their distance from London. CPAG members like David Bull in 
Manchester, Rosemary Vear in Liverpool and lain Jordan in Edinburgh were 
encouraged to sell Poverty (Bull interview). However, they and the people in their 
universities to whom they sold were not satisfied by this limited role. They 
wanted to discuss what they were selling and have a channel for their ideas to 
reach the EC. As much power was held locally through the local authorities and 
local SBCs, they felt that lobbying at a local level could be productive (Bull and 
Bradshaw interviews). Therefore, despite Lynes' opposition, Vear established the 
Merseyside CPAG and Manchester followed (Field in Kelly forthcoming). They 
flourished with strong committees and large memberships. In contrast, 
Birmingham, which had been established by Harriet Wilson. floundered because 
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there was not a strong grassroots movement to set up a branch. The branch had 
been imposed. After the first few branches had been formed a momentum 
gathered. More lecturers and students at other universities followed the example 
of the early branches and gradually the trend expanded to social and community 
workers in the capital, as well as in provincial towns and even in predominately 
rural areas. Help and advice could increasingly be gained from the centre and 
other branches. As key branch members left one area, they often acted as catalysts 
for the formation of branches in other areas. 99 
Later, as CPAG matured, the inevitability of branches coupled with their 
usefulness in producing data and research meant that CPAG had to employ a 
branches organiser. The hard-pressed director could not be expected to service the 
branches in addition to his other work. Branches proliferated in early 1973 when 
the deputy director, responsible for branches, was able to assist fledgling 
branches. Thus CPAG was forced from a position of not wanting branches 
through to having to tolerate them, through to having to service and encourage 
them, as they became important sources of information. 
4.2.2.2 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Branches 
The branches came with three substantial costs. The first was financial. The 
branches contributed very little directly to the national CPAG (see appendix 
E. 7.2). In paying for the deputy director the national group was subsidising the 
branches. The second was the time devoted by the director and the EC to branches 
matters, hence the need for the deputy director (Lynes and Field interviews). The 
third was the "inverted" priorities of some of the branches. 
CPAG was clearly on the lobbying end of the Whiteley and Winyard continuum 
(see chapter 2.1). However some of the branches, most notably Wandsworth, were 
primarily service groups. Although they did submit welfare rights data to the 
national group and carried out a small number of surveys, their main priorities 
were welfare rights information provision and supporting representational 
movements of the poor, mostly in the form of a CU (see chapter 5.2). Creighton 
claimed that Wandsworth did support CPAG's aims and contributed data and 
99 Bristol's branch was not formed until after David Bull from the Manchester branch moved to Bristol. 
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finance to the national group (Creighton 1972 p. 2). Yet Veit Wilson made clear 
that branches should have to agree to clear CPAG objectives and guidelines if 
they wished to stay branches (Veit Wilson 1972 p. 5). Veit Wilson was right to 
direct attention to this point because the biggest potential liability of branches was 
their ability to discredit or misrepresent CPAG. A branch that concentrated on 
service provision would give the impression in its locality that CPAG as a national 
body were also primarily about services. Hence it would detract attention from the 
main goal. Despite this danger, however, the EC agreed not to enforce guidelines 
on branches (EC minutes 17.11.72, file 6, box 65, PTA). This prevented strife 
within CPAG but left it with this danger. 
Despite the very real costs and dangers discussed above, CPAG branches were on 
balance an asset to the national group. They attracted members, both potential EC 
members and the rank and file. The overlap between these members and the 
Labour Party proved crucial for forcing CPAG issues on the Labour Party's 
agenda. They produced research and undertook welfare rights. The former the 
group could not have afforded if it had to pay for it. The latter was useful for 
providing cases for the test case strategy and data with which the director could 
lobby government and the SBC. Their educational and publicity work raised 
CPAG's profile. The lobbying of local authorities and SBC offices could be 
influential both directly and indirectly. Anyway, given that provincial members 
wanted branches to channel their energies, there seemed little CPAG could do in 
practical terms to stop the development of branches short of excluding a large 
number of their most enthusiastic supporters and EC members. 
4.2.3 Strategy Tensions 
4.2.3.1 Promotional or Facilitator of Representational Groups 
CPAG was clearly a group for not of the poor. This was not the only strategy open 
to those wanting to tackle poverty. In Britain the CUs and in the USA the Welfare 
Rights Movement involved claimants in the campaign against poverty. The CUs 
were in reality a fluctuating number of local groups which were loosely federated 
in the National Federation of CUs (NFCU). There were in fact two distinct types 
There he met a number of interested people and together they formed a branch. 
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of group within the federation the first followed the model of the Birmingham 
Claimants Union which had been established in 1969 by a group of radical social 
work students. The second took their inspiration from Joe Kenyon, an 
unemployed miner. The fundamental difference between the two types of group 
was that whereas the former questioned that work was only valuable in the formal 
paid sphere, the latter saw the solution to poverty through full employment and 
well-paid jobs. 
Across the Atlantic, the Welfare Rights Movement was started by a clique of 
radical civil rights leaders who agreed that there was a need for the poor to claim 
their rights and force the government to change the discretionary system of 
benefits in place (Piven and Cloward 1975). Across the country, but especially in 
Massachuetts and New York, white, college-educated radicals set about 
organising poor, black, less well-educated single mothers to claim their full social 
security rights often through sit-ins and protests (Ballis 1974 p. 71, Piven and 
Cloward 1975 p. 411). The women were encouraged to formally join the 
organisation and elect their own leaders. Simultaneously there was a number of 
test cases, which challenged and often over-turned social security policy, which 
was unhelpful to the claimants. This test case strategy was closely aligned to the 
more general Welfare Rights Movement. 
The main reasons why the subject of becoming a representative group never even 
reached CPAG's agenda were both ideological and practical. Ideologically, 
CPAG's believed that poverty was the fault of the government and that it was the 
government's responsibility to solve this problem, not the poor's. Practically, 
CPAG realised that the poor were not a homogenous group and that a group as 
small as CPAG would never be able to organise significant numbers. It was the 
lack of homogeneity and the distinction between unemployed (or indeed low paid) 
workers and other long term claimants (such as single mothers) and their different 
attitudes to paid work that created the chasm (Rose 1975 p. 187,192-3, Bradshaw 
and Stacpoole interviews). In addition, especially in the field of welfare rights, 
most of the poor did not want to be empowered to fight the system but to be 
helped to use it effectively (Rose 1973 p. 194, Ballis 1974 p. 55, North London CU 
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1977 p. 192.1°° If the poor were invited to run the organisation and the EC, CPAG 
would have lost one of its most valuable assets: its expertise. It was this expertise 
which enhanced its acceptability with the government (Dean and Wendt 
interviews). 
4.2.3.2 The Breadth of Policy 
CPAG had been set up very much around the issue of family poverty and the need 
to eradicate it in a non-stigmatising way. In 1972 Malcolm Wicks1°' submitted for 
discussion a paper outlining his ideas for the future of the CPAG (Wicks 1972). 
Wicks argued that CPAG should adopt a wider approach. He suggested incomes, 
social security, health, education, housing, the law and a vague "etc" as possible 
issues. Arguing that poverty could not be compartmentalised, he favoured an 
Inequality Action Group102 (Wicks July 1972 p. 1). According to his analysis 
CPAG had concentrated on being a critic of the SBC and of the means test. He 
believed that this had led to an emphasis on relatively small groups of the poorest 
and a neglect of the much larger groups of the poor. This emphasis was not only 
wrong per se but it was damaging to the cause as it reinforced the view that 
poverty was a problem for only small minorities. "... The poorest [would] only get 
improvements when working people as a whole [became] interested in their cause, 
which in many ways they [would see] as their cause too" (Wicks June 1972, p. 3). 
Recognising that the CPAG could not talk about everything, he argued for 
concentrating on a small number of issues within a larger framework, for example 
tax credits (and family allowances), the Housing Finance Bill (see 1.4.2) and SB. 
Yet, it was important for the group to stay focused. Field pointed out that there 
were "numerous" examples of successful groups with limited goals but not of 
those that "hankered after being a political movement" (Field 1972b p. 4). There 
are three main reasons why this should happen. Firstly, few groups had the 
financial and staff resources to broaden the campaigns. CPAG, in 1972, was a 
small organisation with a total income of only £18,657, which allowed very little 
100 The North London CU argued that this was inevitable at first because the education system and society 
emphasised individualism rather than collectivism and the social security system encouraged dependency and 
passivity (1977 p. 192). 
101 For biography see Appendix A 
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margin for surplus. It simply never had the resources to broaden the scope of its 
activities (Field 1972b p. 4). Secondly, a campaign was likely to get attention if it 
was focused. A group had to prioritise what it thought was the most important 
issue and concentrate on that. A pressure group that was too broad, perhaps 
spreading itself thinly over several policy communities, would confuse policy- 
makers and the media. Thirdly, CPAG, like other pressure groups, was a coalition 
of people who believed that the main issue was the problem of family poverty and 
thus the need to raise, in a non-stigmatising way, family endowment for the poor. 
In contrast, on other issues such as inequality, housing, education and the law, 
there were disagreements. Pressure groups give people, with differing or similar 
views on other subjects, the opportunity to concentrate their energies on what is 
for them the important issue. Political parties are the channel for reforming 
society. 
In any case, CPAG did show a secondary interest in issues other than the means 
test and the SBC. CPAG's central concern was universal cash provision for 
children to ease family poverty and for a reduction in means testing which would 
ease the poverty trap and the wage stop. It opposed the Housing Finance bill for 
aggravating the poverty trap and creating yet another means test (Wicks 1971 p. 7- 
10). Poverty had always dealt with a wider number of issues than the 1965,1967 
or even 1970 memoranda (see appendix E. 9). Although until 1970 the memoranda 
of the CPAG had centred on the issue of family endowment, thereafter they were 
broader in their interest. Poverty and the Labour Government not only discussed 
the need to raise family allowances but also the need for a minimum wage. The 
memorandum to the Chancellor of that year (joint with the NFOAPA) argued not 
only for the tax free higher family allowance but also for a special supplementary 
benefit for handicapped children. Memoranda to the Heath government centred on 
family endowment and made clear the implications for the poor of some of the 
government's other policies. Memoranda were also submitted to a number of 
committees of enquiry. CPAG submitted evidence to the Fisher Committee on 
Social Security Abuse (Field and Grieves 1971), the committee overseeing the 
Legal Advice and Assistance Bill (CRO 1971) and the Ross Panel on Population 
102 Wicks does not actually say this directly. He argues that "Some say what is really required is an 
Inequality Action Group. The case in favour of such a development is obvious ... 
" It is fair to conclude that 
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(September 1970, Box 72, PTA). Pamphlets were written on issues such as the 
wage stop, cohabitation and later strikers' rights (see appendix F. 1.1). Therefore 
CPAG was at least bringing other relevant issues to the attention of readers of 
Poverty, its other publications and the government, even if it concentrated its 
efforts on the core issue of non means tested family endowment. 
A related issue was CPAG's non-partisan stance. Any kind of movement towards 
an Inequality Action Group would damage the CPAG's credibility amongst 
Conservatives. CPAG's previous success in attracting a number of Conservatives 
to the cause had been due to its narrow range of issues (Philp interview) and Field 
outlined in an earlier paper that redistribution aimed at lifting the poorest was 
acceptable to both parties (Field 1972b). However if CPAG believed that a 
successful anti-poverty campaign entailed much less inequality in society, then the 
Heath government had made it abundantly clear that it was "violently opposed" to 
such an idea (Field 1972a p. 7). Although Field left the decision open to the EC in 
his paper, he assumed that the EC would retain the bi-partisan stance. Veit Wilson 
was more direct in his argument that the CPAG should be a "lobby that the Tories 
find it hard to ignore because it talks to them in the language of their own 
superficial ideas" (Veit Wilson 1972 p. 2). There were two main reasons for 
maintaining this bi-partisan stance. Firstly, in 1972 with the possibility of at least 
another two years of the Heath government, CPAG had to maintain the two party 
stance in "the hope of some gravy for the poor" (Field 1972a p. 7). Secondly, 
groups which are partisan have no credibility with the other party whilst it is in 
power. Conversely they may have less leverage over the party they support whilst 
it is in power because the "supported" party does not need to give anything in 
terms of policy to keep the group's support as the group has no other means of 
obtaining its aims (Grant 1995 p. 83). 
Lynes has recently stated that he "was not... particularly interested in 
poverty... [He] was, however, very interested in inequality and that was what it all 
seemed to [him] to be about" (Lowe and Nicholson 1995 p. 625). Yet, under 
Lynes, efforts were made to cultivate all political parties. He met in 1966 Mervyn 
Pike and John Pardoe, the respective shadow MSS spokespeople of the 
the "some" was composed of him and his supporters 
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Conservative and Liberal Parties (Secretary's Report Dec 1966, file 1, box 65. 
PTA). Hence under Lynes CPAG was non-partisan, despite Lynes' own 
underlying beliefs. 
4.2.3.3 A Family or a (Family) Poverty Group? 
A policy decision that was never really discussed within the EC was whether 
CPAG should be a family or family poverty action group. This was because the 
two possible advocates of an alternative approach resigned before they could 
make much of an impact. In France, there was a strong family movement which 
pushed for horizontal equity between families and the childless. In Britain this 
issue was taken up by Margaret Wynn, who left CPAG after two months because 
she wanted CPAG to be more about the family than just family poverty (Lowe and 
Nicholson 1995 p. 630). 1°3 Sir John Walley was also a prominent advocate. Peter 
Moss, 104 who only occasionally attended EC meetings, argued for the group to 
develop Wynn's line about "investment in the future" through children. He urged 
the group to find out more about foreign family groups and, if appropriate, set one 
up in Britain, in order to press for a proper family policy, whilst CPAG dealt with 
family poverty (EC agenda 27.11.70, file 4 box 65, PTA). However he was never 
involved strongly enough on the EC to ensure a change of policy. Field was later 
to reflect on the limitations of centring on poverty rather than children and argued 
they ignored the beneficial effects of the sharp elbows of the middle class (Field 
1982 p. 146). 
However an emphasis on family income rather than poverty was not debated in 
the late 1960s or early 1970s within the EC or CPAG in general. Veit Wilson 
argued for the retention of the word child for sake of continuity and because 
children were the most sensitive indicators of deprivation. He argued that CPAG 
should continue to campaign for the childless and aged (Veit Wilson 1972 p. 2). 
Wicks wanted to alter the name of the group and Wandsworth branch did omit the 
word child because it did not reflect its activities (Creighton 1972 p. 2). It was 
accepted however by practically all of the EC that they were a poverty, group and 
103 Wynn was on of the signatories to Harold Wilson's letter in December 1965 but only because her letter 
asking to be removed from the list came too late. 
104 An academic and a member of Merseyside branch who was intermittently on the 
EC between October 
1969 and January 1971. 
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not a family group. Philp argues that in the 1960s whereas people might have been 
interested in poverty or inequality, the family was a "non-starter" (Philp 
interview). Certainly the concern about poor, large families and the concerns in 
the 1960s that Britain could become over-populated (Cmnd 5258 p. 2) meant that 
there was little interest in horizontal redistribution from the childless to families to 
be more equitable at all income levels. '05 
4.3 Conclusions 
Between 1966 and 1974, CPAG evolved from being a tiny group with Lynes, "... a 
bicycle, a typewriter and a half-time secretary" (Lynes in Kelly forthcoming) to an 
organisation with branches and autonomous Legal Departments. In 1969, a new 
chair and a new director took over the leadership of the EC. The style of 
leadership shifted from being one of seeking consensus on the EC to one of 
directing the EC. To an extent this was as result of different personalities. 
However it was also the result of the growth of CPAG and hence the need for 
quicker decisions and responses. 
The structure was characterised by compromise. The old coalition of social 
workers and academics had given way to academic dominance. By 1972 the few 
non-academics on the EC were frustrated by an EC which took CPAG in the 
direction of research and lobbying rather than concentrate on welfare rights for its 
own sake, hence there was a debate over democracy. This debate was resolved by 
a compromise between democracy and oligarchy because it remained the best way 
of gaining some new ideas and contact with the membership but at the same time 
keeping an expert EC. Thus any attempt to restrict the role of membership, which 
in practical terms was already restricted by the lack of postal ballots, was rejected. 
The same was true for the calls from Veit Wilson to rein in the activities of the 
branches. Although it was true that the branches were a drain on resources and 
risked misrepresenting CPAG, it was also true that the branches' contribution to 
CPAG in terms of research projects, welfare rights data and cases, publicity and 
105 At the first meeting it was feared that advocating an increase in family allowances would be politically 
difficult given the debate about overpopulation (Minutes 5.4.65, file 1, box 65, PTA). This concern led to the 
inclusion in the first memorandum of a suggestion that family allowances could be delayed until the child 
was one or two years old to prevent increasing the birth-rate (Memorandum to Houghton 30.6.65 p. 3. file 1. 
box 65, PTA). The fact that France had very generous family allowances in the 1960s was a reflection of the 
fact that it feared that it was under rather than over populated, although it had higher birth rates. 
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education was incalculable but very substantial. CPAG could not afford to alienate 
its branches. 
When issues were discussed on the EC they did not attract long-lasting bitterness. 
The attempted merger with Shelter debate, although a major decision. was not 
acrimonious because all EC members favoured independence and those 
supporting the merger were only in favour on practical grounds. The decision of 
whether CPAG should be a family or poverty group was never seriously discussed 
because all the main advocates either left the EC or were not in positions of 
strength. In any case the majority of the EC was interested in poverty rather than 
family policy. The calls for CPAG to become an inequality rather than poverty 
group, despite having an EC advocate, were rejected because the bi-partisan 
approach was well-grained in CPAG strategy. The EC agreed with Field that to 
sacrifice this could lead CPAG into the wilderness. The debate led to no long term 
tensions and no resignations. However perhaps the most important debate of all, 
whether CPAG should be a group of or on behalf of the poor was never debated on 
the EC. CPAG at its outset had been an expert pressure group. Even those 
concerned with democracy and representation were only interested in introducing 
alternative poverty experts on to the EC not the poor themselves. 
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5 Chapter Five: Welfare Rights 
The pursuance of welfare rights was an integral part of the work of the national 
and local CPAG. This chapter addresses three basic questions. What was meant by 
welfare rights? How did the pursuance of welfare rights interact with CPAG's 
other activities and goals? Were resources spent on welfare rights well used? The 
first section of this chapter sketches some definitions of welfare rights. The 
second analyses what welfare rights meant at CPAG's centre. The third discusses 
welfare rights at a local level. The fourth examines the different approaches to 
welfare rights and the motivations behind them. The fifth reflects on the role 
welfare rights played within CPAG. 
5.1 Defining Welfare Rights 
The term welfare rights was first used in Britain by Tony Lynes in an article for 
Poverty in late 1967. Lynes had just returned from a visit to the USA and was 
impressed by the welfare rights movement that he found there (Lynes 1967d p. 6). 
The term became an umbrella term for a number of activities and ideologies aimed 
at ensuring that claimants of social security received the maximum amount of 
social security benefits possible. This was despite the fact that the American term 
"welfare" corresponded to the term `social security' in Britain. Welfare rights 
activities were taken up by insider pressure groups such as CPAG, DIG and 
Shelter, by more militant outsider groups such as the CUs and increasingly by the 
local authorities, who began to create the new profession of welfare rights 
officers. 
The 1966 Social Security reforms led to the foundation of the SBC. Means tested 
SB was confirmed as the right of every citizen. Thus if a person qualified for the 
benefit according to the premises laid down in the act, s/he was eligible for the 
basic scale rate. The only exceptions were the reductions in the allowance for the 
wage stopped and those who were at fault for losing their job. However, the Act 
laid down only broad guidelines and the implementation was at the discretion of 
the independent quango, the SBC. In an organisation that was as large as the SBC, 
with very junior front line officers, it was inevitable that the legal discretion would 
be filled by a network of administrative and policy rules (Lewis 1975 p. 76). These 
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rules were collated in an internal guide called the "A" Code, which formed the 
basis for local officers' decisions in determining the right to benefit per se and the 
right to discretionary extra payments. These could be in the form of an extra 
allowance, Exceptional Circumstances Allowance (ECA) or a lump sum payment 
for a bulky purchase, Exceptional Needs Payment (ENP). 
There was a second tier to the decision-making of the SBC and MSS of tribunals. 
In the case of NI tribunals precedents could be established and further appeals 
could be made to the National Insurance Commissioner. Claimants of SB could 
also appeal against SBC decisions to a SB tribunal. This appeal had the same 
discretionary powers as the SBC and was obliged only to respect the 1966 Act not 
the SBC's internal guidelines. In theory it should not just correct administrative 
errors of the SBC but look at the case independently or de novo (Lewis 1975 
p. 80). However many tribunals believed that they were bound by SBC rules (Ross 
1975 p. 105) and given the non-legal backgrounds of the majority of members it 
was difficult to convince them of legal arguments (Lister 1974 p. 6-7). This appeal 
framework, which had existed in a similar way for NA and before, was not used 
by the vast majority of claimants. Only six per thousand SB claimants appealed to 
a tribunal in 1965 (Rose 1975 p. 144). Many claimants accepted the SBC's 
decision. Many of those who did not were deterred by ignorance of the appeals 
procedure. Those that did go to appeal were hampered by the lack of advice and 
advocacy available to them. 
Therefore the main activity of those groups involved in welfare rights was the 
assisting of claimants in their original application to the SBC or NI office and in 
appealing against its decision. However, the degree to which organisations were 
willing to assist the claimant and the methods used varied. Bull's advocacy 
continuum ranges from the Citizen's Advice Bureaux (CABx) approach of giving 
impartial advice to those seeking it, to the protest strategy of SB office sit-ins 
adopted by the Claimants Unions. In between lie the strategies of passive 
advocacy, in which the advocate checks the entitlement, and active advocacy, in 
which s/he questions the decision. This might be within the SBC structure, at 
appeal or even in the courts (Bull 1979). 
Just as the methods varied so did the goals. CPAG. as all organisations involved 
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in welfare rights activities, had its own particular reasons. However although it 
might be possible in the short term for a number of goals to be sought by different 
people in the same organisation, in the longer term this would cause friction. Thus 
it was necessary for CPAG as an organisation to decide the purpose of its welfare 
rights activities. Was the goal merely to help the individual claimant, for whom 
the law had been harshly interpreted? Was it to bring changes in the way the law 
was interpreted to make the system more generous and therefore change the law 
through test cases? Was the idea to undermine the system, by showing its 
incompetence and failure and therefore the need to reform the welfare system 
(Field and Townsend 1970 p. 2)? Or could the system be destroyed by overloading 
it until it collapsed making way for a radically different system (Piven and 
Cloward 1975 p. 279)? Was the idea of welfare rights to empower the poor to fight 
for their own rights (Rose 1975 p. 152)? 
5.1.1 Discretion versus Rights 
For CPAG, the stress on SB as a right in the 1966 act was just a start. Central to 
CPAG's thinking was that means tested benefits in general were undesirable 
because of the stigma endured by those applying and because ignorance and pride 
deterred many of the entitled. For CPAG this was one of the main reasons for 
remaining loyal to the Beveridge ideal of universal benefits. 1°6 Naturally the 
disincentive effects of means tested benefits were emphasised to the government, 
particularly the Conservative government (see chapter 6). However, CPAG 
recognised that given the large number of means tested benefits, any movement 
away from them would necessarily be slow. Therefore CPAG, like others in the 
welfare rights movement, argued for entitlements to SB to be codified and public 
rather than reliant on the SBC's discretion which was in practice decided by the 
secret administrative guidelines of the "A" code. These legal rights would be 
reinforced by claimants having the right to legal advice and advocacy. In practice 
the strategy was two pronged. Firstly, CPAG lobbied the SBC to make public the 
"A" code and the government to make legal aid available for appeal tribunals and 
to provide a network of advice centres (Brooke 1969 and Field 1973b). Secondly, 
106 A key feature of the Beveridge system was that the universal benefits other than family allowances 
would be conditional on compulsory insurance payments. Many of the benefits that CPAG and other groups 
were demanding should be universal such as benefits for the disabled at birth could not be made conditional 
on insurance benefits. Therefore some of the benefits at least would have to be paid out of general taxation. 
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tribunal successes, which challenged the "A" code, were publicised through 
Poverty. This was followed by a test cases strategy, which attempted to use the 
higher courts to establish precedents. 
Yet there were disadvantages of this movement, as Lynes recognised (Lynes 1969 
p. 4). Titmuss led the intellectual backlash against the welfare rights movement. 
He was appalled by the American experience that had alienated the claimants 
from the process by introducing lawyers and had created a state of inter-personal 
warfare between the bureaucracy and claimants (Titmuss 1971 p. 122). Rights 
could be taken too far and rigid rules would cause suffering (Titmuss 1971 p. 125 
and 127). This same line was argued by an Under-Secretary of the DHSS 
(Wilding 1975 p. 62). Lynes' argument that the advantages of consistency and 
openness would outweigh the disadvantages cut little ice with the proponents of 
discretion (Lynes 1969 p. 9-1 1). Yet, the rules of the SBC and its codes made 
discretion at a local level a myth. Local offices were bound by banding and 
regulations for heating ECAs and clothing allowances were granted by adhering to 
form B/0, which was leaked to CPAG (Hodge 1975 p. 68-9). Even proponents of 
discretion recognised that rules were necessary for most areas in order to obtain 
equity between different offices and areas, and that the expense of discretion 
meant that it should be restricted to contentious areas (Wilding 1975 p. 59-60, 
Titmuss 1971 p. 127). 
5.1.2 Other Approaches To Welfare Rights 
In Britain, a number of the other single-issue pressure groups were involved in 
welfare rights. Shelter, like CPAG, had a Legal Department and both Shelter and 
DIG represented their clientele at tribunals. Like CPAG, they pursued a strategy 
of active advocacy on the Bull advocacy continuum. The CABx were also 
involved in giving welfare rights advice and indeed Rosalind Brooke (CPAG's 
lawyer) favoured them as a possible official advice and advocacy agency (Veit 
Wilson 1974 p. 4). However, they prided themselves on their impartial advice and 
refused to become involved in any advocacy. On the militant wing for the CUs the 
active advocacy approach was not sufficient and the protest tactics of sit-ins and 
protests were used. 
114 
5.1.2.1 The American Welfare Rights Movement 
There is little evidence that the American welfare rights movement (see chapter 
4.2.3.1) influenced CPAG except from the term itself. Most of CPAG's tactics of 
active advocacy were very different to the protest strategies followed in the USA. 
The welfare rights stalls had indigenous roots (Bull and Bradshaw interviews). 
Only the test case strategy (see chapter 5.2.1) was greatly influenced by the 
American example. Ironically, those opposed to a "rights" rather than discretion 
based social security scheme were influenced by the events in America, which led 
to hostility, rigidity and in many cases lower overall benefits. The CUs were 
probably more influenced by the American example. Certainly, their protest 
strategies and the belief that the claimants themselves should be organised were 
similar. However Joe Kenyon's group was more likely to have been influenced by 
the 1930s NUWM, which had not only offered active advocacy to its members but 
also persisted in a protest strategy against the unemployment benefits and indeed 
the unemployment of the Great Depression (Croucher 1987 p. 206 and Elias 
c. 1931). 
5.2 Welfare Rights at a National Level 
CPAG's first involvement with welfare rights was unplanned and spontaneous. 
During 1967, Lynes started to represent a small number of claimants at tribunals. 
His vast knowledge of social security meant that his success rate at Tribunals was 
92%, compared to the national average of 20% (Lynes 1969 p. 9). Success at 
tribunals was given as much publicity as possible. A second strand in this 
movement towards welfare rights was the proposal in early 1967 to produce a 
welfare benefits guide aimed at social workers. This was taken further by the anti- 
wage stop campaign. A leaflet was sent to social workers explaining how to 
approach the local SBC office in the case of a wage-stopped family. Although this 
campaign was feared enough by the SBC HQ (see 6.4), it was nowhere near as 
successful as Lynes had hoped (Worsfold 1971 p. 92). 
In 1968 a distinct approach to welfare rights started to emerge. Abel-Smith 
outlined in a memorandum to CPAG's EC plans for a distinct Legal Department. 
It would not fill the gaps in the Legal Aid system but instead use test cases to 
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create precedents, from which other claimants would benefit and develop the law 
where it applied to poor families. The Legal Department would gain its cases 
through working closely with the CABx and the CPAG branches that were now 
starting to represent claimants at tribunal. The idea was accepted by CPAG and 
after a desperate struggle to gain funding it finally secured from the Rowntree 
Social Services Trust a promise of £15,000 over three years (Secretary's report 
13.9.68, EC minutes 17.1.69, box 65, PTA). Rosalind Brooke, a trained social 
worker and lawyer who lectured at LSE, was secured on a part time basis. She was 
supported by a legal committee of distinguished but sympathetic lawyers. 107 The 
only major set back was that Abel-Smith, who was to be the chair of the Legal 
Committee, left the group in the October 1968 to start his new job as Crossman's 
advisor. 
In her plans for the Legal Department Brooke wanted to concentrate on 
researching the gaps within the system of legal protection for the poor, especially 
tribunals and housing rights. She also felt that the Legal Department should 
disseminate information to lawyers and train representatives to work in 
neighbourhood law centres, for which the Society of Labour Lawyers were 
pushing. She believed that the Legal Department could offer some practical 
assistance to cases (EC, box 65 PTA). For the first few months the Legal 
Department was quiet except for Brooke's successful appearance on a television 
legal help programme "Can I Help You? " and some individual case work (Legal 
Department (LD) Report March 1969, box 65, PTA). By June 1969, it was 
recognised that the Legal Department was simply not getting enough potential test 
cases to allow it to function as a cutting edge body. However it was hoped that 
this problem would be ameliorated by the CRO (EC minutes 7.6.69, box 65 
PTA). 
In May 1969, the EC approved the idea of the CRO, the brain-child of Audrey 
Harvey. Harvey had suggested an office along the lines of a radical CAB. It would 
be a drop-in service for a poor area of central London108. Unlike a CAB it would 
have the services of a full time lawyer and the back up of the Legal Department, 
107 Including Ben Whitaker, a Labour MP, who had previously been a lawyer. 
108 This local emphasis was restated in another paper of May 1969 (Han'ey, May 1969, File 3, Box 65, 
PTA). 
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as well as not being dependent on local authority finance. However in contrast to 
the neighbourhood law centres, which employed three lawyers to one social 
worker, the CRO would more efficiently use skilled lay workers to filter difficult 
cases to the lawyer. Finally the CRO would offer facilities for the training of 
social work students, which would generate some income (Harvey 1969. file . 
box 65, PTA). Rosalind Brooke confirmed in the June of 1969 that the CRO and 
Legal Department would in her view be mutually compatible (Brooke June 1969, 
box 65, PTA). Funded by the Rowntree Social Services Trust on a three year 
basis, it opened for business with three staff, Harvey, David Ardizzone (the Legal 
Department's full time lawyer) and Mary Morgan, an interviewer, in September 
1970.109 At first there was only one room. Although this situation was improved in 
1971, the accommodation was still only a couple of basement rooms rather than a 
shop-front (EC minutes 19.10.69, File 3, box 65, PTA). 
By the end of 1971 the Legal Department and CRO were causes for concern 
according to the chair of the Legal Committee, Cyril Glasser (a Law Professor at 
the LSE). Glasser argued that the Legal Department was not fulfilling its role 
satisfactorily. It should have been advising CPAG on legal matters, undertaking 
relevant research, producing Parliamentary questions, liaising with sympathetic 
lawyers in the country, promoting test cases and assisting in the teaching of rights 
(Glasser 8.12.71, File 5, box 65, PTA). Glasser had previously been concerned 
that Brooke was losing contact with the Legal Committee (Glasser to Brooke 
18.11.70, File 5, box 65 PTA). Yet Glasser accepted that many of its failings were 
due to the chronic under-staffing. The Legal Department's full time lawyer had 
been seconded to the CRO, indefinitely, leaving only Brooke and Ruth Lister, a 
young researcher. Brooke and Lister had been researching the law concerning 
homeless families and had produced three Poverty leaflets. Brooke had produced 
two Poverty pamphlets and between them they had produced three editions of the 
national welfare benefits guide1° (see appendix F. 1). They had tried to bring two 
cohabitation test cases but the SBC settled out of court (LD Report Jan 1971, File 
5, box 65, PTA). Glasser commended the work of Lister (Glasser 8.12.71, File 5. 
box 65, PTA). Certainly for Brooke to co-ordinate, give legal advice (Lister was 
109 lt had been informally operating from Harvey's home since the January. 
1 10 The first ''. 'as written by Lynes. 
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not legally trained) and carry out administrative work in one and a half days per 
week was an impossible task. 
The situation regarding the CRO's performance was more serious, as this was not 
due to simply to inertia and lack of staff but to ideology. The EC started to debate. 
belatedly, the purpose of the CRO. There were two main ideological differences 
between the bulk of the committee and Harvey. Firstly, the EC believed by the 
end of 1971 that the CRO should "be another source of important data for [their] 
primary activity" (Veit Wilson interview), which was gathering data and arranging 
evidence to influence the government on the issue of poverty. "' Welfare rights 
were only useful to the group in as far as they furthered that aim (Veit Wilson 
1972 p. 2). Thus it should be a watch dog for the poor which publicises how the 
law was applied in relation to the poor and feeding information to the CPAG 
(Townsend to Weir 19 July 1972, box 69, Essex). It had an obligation to publicise 
its cases in order to further its causes (Bu112 interview). 
Harvey, however, stuck to her belief that the CRO was in essence a radical CAB. 
Clients should not have to fill out forms, which asked personal details (Harvey to 
Townsend 24.3.72). She was unhappy about the research assistant using data from 
the CRO (EC minutes 22.10.71, box 65, PTA). In any case, argued Harvey, she 
was hampered in gathering data by legal principle and the sheer work-load of 
preparing the details for the Legal Committee of test cases. She suggested that the 
Legal Committee should make their own enquiries (Report on CRO 20 November 
1970, Bull's private papers). Brooke and the EC had supported the establishment 
of the CRO as a way of getting more test cases to the Legal Department. If the 
Legal Department was to have to do its own enquiries into possible test cases then 
the CRO had lost one of its main original justifications. 
The second source of contention about the CRO was whether it should be a local 
service or a national expert service, which filtered the most promising test cases to 
the Legal Committee. For the majority of the committee, it should have been the 
latter; for Harvey the former (EC minutes 22.10.71, Harvey to Townsend 24.3.72. 
box 65, PTA). Harvey had originally canvassed the idea of a local CRO to no 
>>1 He did not define poverty in relation to SB but in a wtiwa,,, similar to that Townsend was using in his studs' 
Poverty in the United Kingdom. 
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obvious opposition. However, by summer 1970, not long before the CRO opened 
properly, Harvey made it clear in Poverty that the group wanted "no geographical 
limits. [It] needed to know what was happening elsewhere" (Harvey 1970 p. 17). 
Considering that the idea had been canvassed to supporters of CPAG as a national 
service, Harvey's emphasis on a local service in practice was difficult to justify. 
The whole situation was solved by the dismissal of Harvey and the engagement of 
a new CRO director, Stuart Weir, a former journalist. "' He was given strict 
instructions of what was expected from the director of the CRO. It was made clear 
that he was expected to publicise cases, using the press and provide training in 
welfare rights (Townsend to Weir 19.7.92). Thus Weir set out to make the CRO 
an expert powerhouse to which other agencies looked for advice (Weir interview). 
The direct casework of the CRO was substantially reduced by cutting off the 
means of direct contact, although it still handled some cases. Interesting cases 
were directed to the CRO from other agencies and from the CPAG branches. The 
best source of cases was the legal advice page of the Daily Mirror and the Sunday 
People. Weir had established good relations with these papers (Weir interview). 
Therefore, when cases came to the CRO, they were given maximum publicity 
both in the general media and in the specialist legal media and if possible used as 
test cases. When Brooke left at the end of 1971, she was not replaced and the two 
legal researchers, Lister and Simpson1', were amalgamated into the CRO, 
although the Legal Department remained in name. This meant that the 
researchers' access and familiarity with cases was improved. 
1972 proved a productive year in research pamphlets for the Legal 
Department/CRO. Lister produced pamphlets on cohabitation and the wage stop 
as well as updating the National Welfare Benefits Guide. Five short Welfare 
Reports introducing a range of social security issues, which were by no means 
restricted to child poverty, were produced by Lister, Simpson and Hodge1', the 
lawyer. Hodge and to a lesser extent, Drabble (see appendix F. 1)15, who had been 
employed as a CRO interviewer, contributed to the prestigious New Law Journal 
1 12 A former Diarist with The Times and a local CPAG member. 
113 Simpson joined the Legal Department in December 1971. 
1 14 Hodge replaced Ardizzone in December 1971. 
1 15 Drabble replaced Mary Morgan in November 1972. 
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and the Solicitors' Journal. 1' All the staff contributed to LAG Bulletin, the Legal 
Action Group's"' monthly newsletter. These provided a good forum for 
exchanging information with other agencies about cases. It was also a good way 
of introducing the subject of poverty law to an often ill-informed legal 
community. In addition the welfare rights courses, started under Harvey, started to 
give the CRO a small independent revenue. 
One advantage of the CRO and Legal Department was the protection they 
afforded to CPAG's charity status. CPAG had made the conscious choice to be a 
charity. This decision offered certain advantages to the CPAG: It could obtain 
grants from charitable trusts, claim back tax on covenants, receive rating relief and 
it was not subject to capital gains tax (CPAG submission to the National Council 
Social Services (NCSS) enquiry' 18 p. 6). However CPAG was subject to the 
control of the Charity Commissioners and Inland Revenue, which on two 
occasions required CPAG to justify their actions. The "service" role of the CPAG 
was useful not only as a way of gathering information for the group but also as a 
"front" for the campaign. In their submission to the NCSS enquiry CPAG placed 
first their provision of "advice and advocacy for poor families with financial 
difficulties, particularly for those on social security benefits" (CPAG submission 
to the NCSS enquiry p. 4). Veit Wilson argues that to the Charity Commissioners 
the service for the poor was stressed and that the political activities were only on 
the back of this work. However "this was reversing what it was all about in our 
minds at any rate" (Veit Wilson interview). 
The CRO's welfare rights activities went wider than family poverty. The CRO 
helped groups as such as the single homeless, ex-prisoners and students, which 
attracted little public sympathy. An attractive client group is an important asset to 
any pressure group (see chapter 8.4), children (if not their parents) evoked public 
sympathy, many of the clients of the CRO did not. The division of CRO and 
CPAG meant that the wider welfare rights functions were separated to an extent 
from the lobbying group. The organisation, which lobbied for better universalist 
1 16 E. g. see Hodge (1973) Drabble (1973 (1974) (March 1974) Hodge (1974) Legal Action Group (1973) 
Editorial Solicitor's Journal (1973) Smith (1973). 
117 A legal pressure group campaigning for better ww elfare rights. 
118 CPAG (197: ') The Effect of Charity Law on Voluntary Organisations: Submission to the National 
Council of Social Service Committee of Enquiry, box -2. PTA. 
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benefits for families was not so directly associated with helping claimants get the 
means tested benefits that it condemned as inefficient. 
Although the 1972 debate had confirmed that the CRO was a national 
organisation, offshoots developed in Edinburgh, where there were two CROs, one 
staffed solely by volunteers (Lister 1972 p. 22), and one in Belfast, which was 
formed with the Ballymurphy Tenants' Association (Nationalist) and attempted to 
cross the sectarian divide by encouraging Loyalists. The Northern Ireland CRO 
hoped to employ full time staff (Press release 15.6.72, Box 72, PTA). As both 
Scotland and Northern Ireland had different legal systems and circumstances than 
England and Wales, this devolution made sense. Cases were filtered to London for 
test cases. In some respects they performed in a more formal capacity the same 
role as local branches did in the provinces of England and Wales, in that they gave 
advice and took appeals. 
5.2.1 Test Cases 
One of the two main reasons for the establishing of the Legal Department had 
been to bring test cases. In other words CPAG was going to push for legal changes 
through the courts. In this strategy, CPAG was influenced by what was happening 
in America where there had been a series of victories between 1968 and 1970 on 
issues such as social security payments to children in cohabitation cases, the 
retention of benefit before a fair hearing and the illegality of state residency 
clauses (Prosser 1983 p. 14-15). Although the American poverty law activists were 
unable to build on these successes after 1970 (Prosser 1983 p. 15), in 1969 the 
American situation was a source of envy. 19 There were, however, some important 
differences between British and American law, particularly the latter's protection 
against cases being solved out of court by the administration "buying off' the 
claimant (Prosser 1983 p. 8-13). However CPAG was not the first group to see 
judicial law as a way of obtaining its ends. The ALRA in the 1930s had taken the 
route of test cases when the possibility of convincing the government and 
Parliament looked slight (Hindell and Simms 1972 p. 48). 
There were essentially three types of test cases relevant to CPAG's strategy in the 
1 19 Though the activists in CPAG would have noted that American law was more amenable to test cases 
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1970s. Firstly, there were challenging test cases. These were cases which 
challenged the officially accepted interpretation of the law (Partington 1974 
p. 236). They could either turn on the interpretation of the law or the principle of 
good administration. For example, whether a body which has discretionary powers 
has the right to construct rules which inhibit that discretion (Prosser 1983 p. 2-3). 
Secondly, there were revival test cases. This was when a disused law is 
resurrected (Prosser 1983 p. 5 and Partington 1974 p. 236). Thirdly, there were 
policy changing cases. These tribunal victories did not gain their authority from 
legal precedent but from the informal precedent when the SBC changed its policy 
in response to a number of challenges (Prosser 1983 p. 6). 12° 
The Legal Department was slow to initiate any test cases. In 1972 a further 
attempt was doomed when the judge refused to challenge the SBC's and tribunal's 
verdict of cohabitation. Another judge in another cohabitation case in 1973 took a 
similar line (Prosser 1983 p. 28 and 49). However in 1973, CPAG was able to 
claim the first social security test case success with the Simper case. 
Ms. Simper, a deserted wife left with a child, had been given a 35p ECA for 
heating when she qualified for SB in 1969. When she became eligible for a Long 
Term Addition (LTA) in 1971, she only received an extra 15p rather than 50p per 
week. The SBC argued that the LTA replaced the ECA. A tribunal confirmed this. 
CPAG became involved and using the 1972 Legal Aid act took the case to the 
divisional court, where the judge agreed with CPAG. The wording of the 1966 act 
meant that whereas the SBC should ensure that there was no overlapping between 
LTA and ECAs, there should be no rule of thumb. The story was reported not only 
in the press but also extensively in the legal journals. 121 
At first the legal journals were triumphant that the case meant that the rules of the 
SBC could be challenged (Smith 1973 p. 267, LAG March 1973 p. 44) and that the 
new Legal Aid act could be used to monitor tribunals (Solicitors' Journal 
than British (Prosser 1983 p. 8-13). 
120 Prosser himself dismissed one of his categories, procedural challenges, as having little importance under 
English law. His other category of political catalysts is difficult to accept because it is supposed to relate to 
test cases which trigger the government to change the law and create a public debate. Although it is accepted 
that the government does not change the law every time it is challenged in the courts, it is the intention of the 
pressure group that all test cases will spark off a public debate. 
121 LAG March 1973, Solicitors'Journal 1973 vol. 117 p. 332-3, New Lawfournal March 22 1973 p. 267-8, 
March 14 1974 p. 236-8 
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Editorial 1973 p. 333). However the victory was short-lived. Within a month a 
clause in the new Social Security Act had reversed the Simper decision in la«' 
despite CPAG lobbying. Yet there was one small comfort as heating and diet 
allowances were exempted from this rule. Hence, although the case was a stark 
reminder that the government can overturn court-made law, the government had to 
be sensitive to popular groups in society and pensioners were the main 
beneficiaries of heating allowances. "' 
The next three test cases were mixed in their success. In 1972, CPAG interested 
the media in a case of a student who had his SB reduced during the vacation 
because the SBC maintained that part of his grant was intended for vacations even 
if he had already spent it (Guardian 25.8.72 p. 4, The Times 19.10.72 p. 2). The 
issue of students and supplementary benefit enjoyed a great deal of discussion in 
the legal press throughout 1973-4123, sparked by this test case and a number of 
tribunals. However the test case, coupled with a similar case of a student who had 
been denied householder rate benefit, failed in 1975. The judge upheld the 
decision of the SBC, despite acknowledging that the tribunal in the second case 
may have been erroneous on the point of law. He also argued that the courts 
should think carefully before interfering with tribunal decisions (Prosser 1983 
p. 30). However, CPAG, acting jointly with Shelter, was successful in reviving 
section 99 of 1936 Public Health Act in a test case against a local authority 
(Nottingham City DC v. Newton). The judge agreed that even if the house was 
designated for demolition the local authority as landlord had an obligation to put 
right the property (Prosser 1983 p. 57). 
The test case strategy was slow to start. By 1974 there had only been two 
successful test cases; Simper and Newton. The former was strategically important 
as the SBC's rule of thumb approach to discretion was declared illegal. It was the 
reinterpretation of an established law. The latter was a more predictable victory 
and relied on reviving an old law rather than challenging the wording of a law. In 
that sense it was much less far reaching and controversial. Despite both these 
victories, CPAG had failed to get a legal definition of cohabitation and failed to 
122 A large number of heating and diet allowances went to the elderly. 
123 New Law Journal 1973 Vol. 123 p. 449, LAG August 1973, LAG November 1973 p. 248, LAG March 
1974 p. 55. 
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get the SB rights of students confirmed. These would have been of benefit to 
CPAG when appearing before appeal tribunals. 
There were advantages of the test case strategy. Firstly, test cases, particularly 
those in the higher courts, created publicity. This meant that poverty law issues 
were drawn into the mainstream media debate and also into the specialist legal 
media's debate. Secondly, a success like Simper enhanced CPAG's status as a 
group. This added to the seriousness with which it was taken by the media, 
government, political parties, other groups, MPs and trades unions. Thirdly, it 
boosted morale within CPAG. For members and staff, the returns of applying 
pressure to the government for an improvement in the welfare of the poor was 
painstaking. People involved in CPAG "worked with greater gusto" when CPAG 
achieved victories which paid dividends for the poor (Townsend interview). 
However, these important advantages were outweighed by the enormous 
difficulties and disadvantages. One CPAG paper argued that they had been too 
influenced by events in the USA and needed to re-examine their own needs (Zara 
1974). Field also questioned the effectiveness of test cases asking whether it 
would be a general pattern for them to be countered by legislation. He was also 
concerned about the fact that the Simper case had taken sixteen months to reach 
the verdict (Field 1973 p. 5-7). Certainly, in practical terms the British legal 
system did create problems. Firstly, the SBC could prevent cases reaching court 
by reaching out of court settlements with claimants, as in the Legal Department's 
first attempts at test cases. Secondly, the general nature of the Divisional court 
was such that it had little experience of poverty law and Judges were unwilling to 
interfere with the tribunal system (Prosser 1983 p. 83-4). In addition, the euphoria 
after the Simper victory was swiftly followed by dismay when a simple clause in 
the 1973 NI act reversed the judgement. Test cases were only of use if followed 
up by the lobbying of Parliament and the government (Veit Wilson 1974 p. 21. 
Zara 1974, Partington 1974 p. 237). In addition, the non-legal composition of SB 
tribunals meant that tribunals were sometimes unwilling to accept what was the 
law and what was SBC policy. One Liverpool tribunal even refused to accept the 
legality of the Simper decision before it was repealed (Burkeman 1975 p. 92-3). 
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5.3 Welfare Rights at a Local Level 
Welfare rights were an important activity for most branches. Branch welfare rights 
activities were situated along various points of the Bull advocacy continuum. 
Many groups produced a guide to welfare benefits in their area aimed at social 
workers, others produced a leaflet aimed at claimants. 124 For many groups, 
however, moving further along the continuum and actively helping the poor claim 
for benefits and fight appeals for their rights was important (see appendix F. 2). 
The main tool used for advising the poor of their rights were welfare rights stalls. 
The first welfare rights stall to appear in a town centre was in Manchester. After 
an unsuccessful attempt to advise the poor of their rights through collaboration 
with the Liberal Party (Bull 1970b p. 3), the group turned to using a welfare rights 
stall in two busy locations of the city. The idea was born out of a brain storming 
session which built on the earlier idea of Oxford CPAG to establish a welfare 
rights stall on a council estate near the city (Bull, interview). The stall was 
extremely successful and when Manchester branch stopped the stall, the idea was 
taken up by students. Manchester CPAG was invited to aid the council in 
producing a booklet on welfare rights (Bull 1970b p. 5-7). It was also able to 
persuade a local newspaper to publish a comprehensive article on local benefits, 
thus reaching a large number of people (DBP). 
The idea of welfare rights stalls mushroomed. York started its regular, successful 
welfare rights stall in January 1969. It was closed in June 1970. Other groups such 
as Hull and Tyneside and later Bristol and Cambridge also set up stalls (Worsfold 
1971 p. 348, Bull interview, Cambridge PAG newsletter no. I June 1971). Yet for 
some branches the welfare rights stall was an end in itself. Wandsworth and 
Islington set up the welfare rights stalls before the branches themselves were 
formed. 'ZS Wandsworth's stall was incredibly successful. It recorded 1,022 
enquiries between April 17 and July 31 1971 (WPAG newsletter 3,6.9.71), 
although it handled only a little over half as many in the next four months (WPAG 
124 York (Bradshaw 1969 p. 3) Merseyside (Branches Newsletter 1968 no. l p. 5). Sheffield, Edinburgh and 
Birmingham were in 1969 working on booklets (Branches newsletter March 1969 no. 3 p. 2) aimed at social 
workers while Hull (Branches newsletter Dec. 1968 no. 
2 p. 6), Nottingham (Branches Newsletter September 
1968 no. I p. 6) and York (Bradshaw 1969 p. 3) produced leaflets for claimants. 
125 Wandsworth stall opened a month before the branch. 
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newsletter no. 10,24.2.72). 126 Of the ten branches in Worsfold's study, welfare 
rights stalls were the second most cited objective (Worsfold 1971 p. 336). 
However a number of stalls had problems recruiting enough members to staff 
them (Bristol CPAG newsletter October 1971, Worsfold 1971 p. 348-9). Even 
Wandsworth closed its stalls for a short period to rethink the strategy (Creighton 
and Hughes 20.11.72 DBP). 
Another early development of welfare rights was the representation of claimants at 
appeals. Building on Lynes' appeal successes, the branches also offered 
representation at appeal to claimants who contacted them at the welfare rights 
stalls or who were referred to them (Bradshaw and Bryant 1970 p. 5, Bul12 
interview). The number of appeals taken did depend to a degree on the local 
SBC's attitude towards claimants. Bull argues that he had only once gone to 
appeal in Manchester because the regional chair of the SBC was willing to sort out 
cases satisfactorily, as were local managers influenced by such an atmosphere 
(Bulle interview). In Bristol, the situation was very different leading to a conflict 
situation in which CPAG regularly fought appeals. The idea was not only to 
benefit the claimant, who often left a represented tribunal with a much better deal, 
but also to build up a series of quasi-precedents (Bu112 interview, Prosser 1983). 
Cases were published in Poverty and later in LAG Bulletin, thus exchanging 
information with other advocates. In addition successes were given a great deal of 
publicity in the local press, which raised the profile of the issue and CPAG. One 
tribunal success achieved stories in four local newspapers. 127 This may have been 
an exceptional achievement but was not the only tribunal to get a large press 
following. The cases could also be used in CPAG publications. The above case 
featured in Ruth Lister's pamphlet on cohabitation. 
Yet there were dangers even in publicising welfare rights successes. Welfare 
rights were simply more headline grabbing than another expose of the inadequacy 
of family allowances, particularly to the local newspapers and especially if those 
suffering were "deserving". Hence a caring widow, cruelly accused of cohabiting, 
126 To understand how successful Wandsworth's stall was it is useful to note that York only recorded 1,506 
in the eighteen months that it was operating (Bradshaw and Bryant 1970 p. 10). 
127 A case of widow cohabiting in Bristol gained three stories in the main local paper The Bristol Evening 
Post (13.7.72 and 24.8.72), also in the Bristol area Western Daily Press (13.7.72). and because of the 
widow's Wiltshire connection in the Bath and Wilts Chronicle (22.6.72) and The Wiltshire Times (23.6.72). 
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received a sympathetic press, as did a report on school uniform grants (see chapter 
4.1.5.3). Therefore the impression of CPAG branches' activities could be distorted 
by what the media reported and the public could be mis-educated into thinking 
that a better take up of means tested benefits was all that was necessary (Vear 
1968 p. 5). 
The justifications for undertaking welfare rights work as a lobbying group were 
the same as the national group's for the CRO. It was to provide information on the 
workings of means tested benefits. Another important reason was that the branch 
members enjoyed welfare rights work. It gave them immediate satisfaction. If 
branches were to maintain members they had to accept branch preferences. 
However, there was always the danger of the welfare rights work overtaking the 
lobbying role of the CPAG branch. Hence Manchester moved away from its 
campaign for full entitlements and towards concentrating on family allowances 
trying to raise the public's awareness in the hope of changing legislation 
(Manchester CPAG 1968 report DBP p. 2). York also concluded that CPAG 
should not be a social service agency and closed the stall as it distracted from the 
real causes of poverty (Bradshaw and Bryant 1970 p. 8-9). Cambridge PAG 
recognised that although direct action (service provision) was rewarding because 
the effects were immediate, it was restricted (Cambridge Poverty128 number 1 June 
1971, DBP). 
Wandsworth and Islington were clearly on the service end of the Bull continuum. 
For both the welfare rights work was the most important activity. Wandsworth 
even provided welfare rights courses (WPAG newsletter no. 5 31.10.71) and 
guides to welfare rights stalls (Creighton to branch secretaries 19.6.71 DBP, 
Creighton et al 22.2.72). Although it was recognised that the stalls had an 
information as well as service role (WPR Discussion paper September 1972, 
DBP), the service role was the most important activity. Creighton even described 
the Wandsworth branch as having a community action/political interventionist 
orientation (Creighton 1972 p. 2). Although it did carry out a few surveys, its other 
main interests were supporting the CU, which it helped set up, and fighting for a 
128 Cambridge Poverty Action Group's newsletter. Cambridge too rejected the v. ord child although their is 
no explanation in their literature as to why. Possibly 
it was simpl> because Cambridge Child PoN erty Action 
Group or CCPAG was cumbersome. 
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playground for handicapped children (WPAG newsletter no. 19,20.10.72). 
Similarly other branches12' were involved in activities such as play-groups for 
deprived but this had no significant value to CPAG as a campaigning group at all 
(Branches newsletter September 1968 p. 1, Exeter 1971, Branches newsletter 
November 1972). However, Wandsworth was alone in making it clear that it was 
more than just a branch of the Child Poverty Action Group (WPAG 21, February 
1971), asking, "should we see our role as part of CPAG and if so how? " 
(Wandsworth newsletter July 1971, file 5, box 65, PTA ). First, it dropped the 
word child from its title. Later it separated itself almost totally from CPAG calling 
itself Wandsworth People's Rights (WPR). 
Despite Veit Wilson's arguments that branches which wished to concentrate on 
welfare rights and community action should be redefined as not being CPAG 
branches (Veit Wilson 1972 p. 5), the EC did not attempt to force Wandsworth and 
other such branches back to the lobbying end of the service/lobbying continuum. 
However Creighton's ambitions for other branches to follow Wandsworth into 
becoming local community groups by renaming them as Citizen's Rights Groups 
and taking over the functions of local branches Patients' Associations were 
ignored (Creighton to Field and Townsend 22.3.72, File 6, Box 65, PTA). CPAG 
was willing to tolerate the service and community action emphasis of Wandsworth 
but was certainly not going to promote it. 
The militant strategy on the extreme end of the Bull advocacy continuum can have 
a negative effect on the acceptability of a pressure group. Sit-ins are disruptive 
and can easily lead to confrontations. Although there is no evidence that CPAG 
branches staged sit-ins like the CUs, Beltram13° remembers that some CPAG 
branch members insulted SBC staff with taunts such as the "SS" (Beltam in Kelly 
forthcoming and interview). This may well have been the case in some parts of the 
country, although there is no evidence of such behaviour in the available archives. 
On the contrary, a manager of a SBC office in Bristol told Bull that for him 
CPAG were acceptable because they were polite to the staff and attacked the 
system. The CUs on the other hand attacked the staff personally, calling them 
"pigs" (Bul12 interview). However, if CPAG branches were aligning themselves 
129 Hull, South \Vilts and Exeter were the branches mentioned in the branches newsletters. 
130 A former civil servant and in charge of local SBCs from 1967 
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locally with CUs then some of the more militant and even abusive behaviour of 
the latter might have reflected on the CPAG branch. 
5.4 Conclusion: The Role of Welfare Rights in CPA G 
Despite the morale boosting and publicity generating advantages, the test case 
strategy was a not an optimum of resources by 1974. It had produced only two 
successes and even one of those was quickly overturned by the government. By 
1974, CPAG had still failed to obtain a legal definition of a householder and 
cohabitation. Even supporters were beginning to believe that the strategy had been 
too readily imported from the USA, without due consideration of the different 
legal systems. 
At a local level, welfare rights activities could generate advantages for national 
CPAG in the form of data for campaigns. Lord Dean, the Parliamentary Secretary 
for Social Security in the Heath government, argues that it was the fact that CPAG 
was also "in touch with people who were really feeling the pinch" through their 
welfare rights work that made CPAG a useful source (Dean interview). Welfare 
rights work also uncovered possible test cases. It was popular amongst branch 
members and therefore may have encouraged and maintained membership. Yet, it 
also diverted branch members' energy form campaigning work. The greatest risks 
were branches misrepresenting CPAG's priorities and of welfare rights activities 
becoming militant and discrediting CPAG. At a national level, given that the CRO 
and the Legal Department were separately funded until 1972/3 by the Joseph 
Rowntree Trust, they diverted few CPAG resources. However, CPAG did have to 
defend itself against accusations that it believed that full take up of means tested 
benefits was a solution to poverty (Field and Townsend 1970 p. 2). 
On balance the welfare rights work of the CRO and the work which filtered 
through from the branches were of benefit. Similarly, at a local level the fact that 
CPAG branches could present local authorities with factual evidence gave them 
credibility. Thus original data from welfare rights helped neutralise the attack that 
CPAG had no links with those in poverty. The purpose of CPAG's welfare rights 
strategy was not to overload the welfare system as with the American welfare 
rights strategy. This was impossible as CPAG was simply unable to reach the vast 
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numbers necessary to even contemplate that strategy. The strategy would also 
bring CPAG towards the militant end of the Bull advocacy continuum. as large 
numbers of claimants would have to be organised to apply and appeal at the same 
time. This would risk CPAG's insider status. The main thrust of CPAG's strategy 
was two pronged. Firstly it was to prove that means tested benefits did not reach 
all those that were entitled, thus condemning large numbers of people to poverty. 
Certainly, they were able to demonstrate that despite both the Wilson and the 
Heath governments spending vast sums on publicity for their means tested 
benefits as take up rates remained stubbornly low (rate rebates FIS). In addition 
the high marginal rates and thus the disincentive effects on those receiving means 
tested benefits were given flesh and bones with the case studies that CPAG 
discovered through its welfare rights work. Secondly, it was hoped that, given 
means tested benefits were not likely to disappear completely in the short to 
medium term, certain test cases discovered through welfare rights work would 
shift the social security system from one based on discretion to one based on legal 
rights. CPAG had some success in moving the welfare system in this direction 
(see chapter 6.4). However the tension between those that agreed with these 
national goals and those who wanted to make CPAG a welfare rights advice 
agency led to tensions which were never resolved. 
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6 Chapter Six: Governmental Targets 
CPAG's success depended on the government and the SBC taking positive action 
from its viewpoint. It could try and persuade the government directly through civil 
servants and ministers or it could use the political parties, Parliament, the trade 
unions and the media as channels of influence. This chapter concentrates on 
CPAG's direct efforts to persuade ministers, civil servants and the SBC 
commissioners of its views. This chapter examines CPAG's relationship with the 
first two institutions; the rest are discussed in chapters seven, eight and nine. 
This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first reviews the structure and 
operation of the government during this period. The second discusses the period 
March 1965 to February 1969 or the period before and during Lynes' leadership 
of CPAG. It was during this period that family allowances were twice up-rated 
and responsibility for Social Security was reorganised three times. CPAG's 
influence over government policy is examined in light of the newly available 
papers at the PRO. The third section concentrates on the period March 1969 to 
February 1974 for which Field was the director. The aggressive strategy deployed 
during the 1970 election year is evaluated. A general picture of CPAG's 
relationship with the Conservative government is constructed from interviews, 
CPAG and Conservative Party archival material. A fourth section examines 
CPAG's relationship with the NAB/SBC, which was linked to the Department of 
Health and Social Security (DHSS). Finally, there is an overall analysis of the 
extent to which CPAG was able to persuade the government to take positive 
action to further CPAG's goals. 
6.1 The Power Structure 
6.1.1 Theories of Power and Influence 
Theoretically, there are four types of power: force, authority, manipulation and 
persuasion (Wrong 1979). Force and manipulation are limited to those groups 
with political and economic leverage, and authority is connected to those with 
legitimate, recognised positions (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 112-3). Therefore 
promotional groups do not possess these types of power. They can, however. 
influence government through the persuasiveness of their ideas and arguments and 
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through securing public sympathy via the media (Whiteley and WW'invard 1987 
p. 114, Grant 1995 p. 47). Influence can also be indirect, such as convincing 
producer groups, parties or influential individuals of its views. Influence might 
also be gained through an exchange of personnel with Whitehall. 
6.1.2 The Power Structures within the Ministry of Social Security and its 
Power in Government 
If CPAG was to persuade government to implement desirable change, it had first 
to make decisions about where it was going to direct its campaign. Ultimately, 
important decisions were made at Cabinet level. It was the 1968 departmental 
reform, amalgamating the Ministry of Health and MSS to form the Department of 
Health and Social Security (DHSS), which gave Social Security issues a direct 
voice in Cabinet. Previously the Cabinet voice of both the MSS and its 
predecessor the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (MPNI) had been the 
Social Services Over-Lord, who had only a tiny staff. 13' 
The Ministry itself was answerable to the Minister, initially Margaret Herbison 
and after her resignation Judith Hart. The Over-Lord post was originally filled by 
Douglas Houghton, a supporter of the idea of bringing the taxation and benefits 
systems closer together. However he was replaced in January 1967 by Patrick 
Gordon Walker and in autumn 1967 by Michael Stewart. In March 1968, Richard 
Crossman took over the role until he gained direct control over Social Security in 
the autumn as the first Secretary of State for the Social Services. He was assisted 
by a junior Minister for Social Security, David Ennals and an Under-Secretary 
(initially Norman Pentland who had served since October 1964 and later Brian 
O'Malley from October 1969). His Conservative successor, Sir Keith Joseph, held 
the job until the 1974 Labour victory. He had no junior Minister but was assisted 
by an Under-Secretary Paul Dean (see appendices G. 1). Thus before 1968, CPAG 
had to convince both the MSS (or MPNI) and the Over-Lord of the need to raise 
and reform family allowances. Although the Minister for Social Security would be 
invited to Cabinet debates concerning Social Security issues, her influence was 
131 Douglas Houghton the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster filled this post between October l1)04 and 
January 1967 by until he was replaced by the Minister without Portfolio, Patrick Gordon \\ alker. In autumn 
1967 Michael Stewart took responsibility and finally between March and October 1968, Richard Crossman 
co-ordinated the social service departments. 
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curtailed by her lack of political power (Crossman 1976 p. 173). 
Although a Cabinet majority was crucial for the success of a reform, it was not 
enough in itself. Given that the reform needed not only extra expenditure but also 
fairly radical changes to the taxation system, the agreement of the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer was needed. Following the resignation of James Callaghan in 
November 1967, Roy Jenkins became the Chancellor. After lain Macleod's death 
in July 1970, Anthony Barber took over. Barbara Castle described Cabinet not as 
a seminar in which reforms were discussed on their merits but as a negotiating 
table where the ministers fought in the interests of their own departments (Castle 
1984). The need for Treasury consent for new expenditure meant that ministers 
could be persuaded by the Chancellor to reject costly reforms in order to save their 
own budgets. Many issues including family endowment were referred to Cabinet 
Committees for discussion. The Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) 
was chaired by the Chancellor and determined spending levels for each 
department. The Ministerial Social Services Committee (MSSC), which discussed 
Social Security issues (and referred them if necessary to full Cabinet) was chaired 
by the First Secretary of the Treasury. Thus the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
his department were in a strong position and were an important target for CPAG. 
Within the various Social Security ministries, there were two hierarchies of 
power: the ministers and the civil servants. Some Labour ministers such as 
Crossman and Tony Benn were convinced of a conspiracy of the civil servants 
against them (Crossman 1976 p. 243 and Hennessey 1989 p. 496-7). Ministers 
could override their civil servants if they wished to do so (Jones 1987 p. 25). 
However ministers, as non-experts, with a wide range of responsibilities within 
their department were dependent on the information that the civil service 
provided. Although the civil service had a strict code of neutrality, the «way in 
which options were presented to ministers could influence the choices that they 
took. Thus, persuading civil servants of the benefits of a reform could lead to it 
being presented to a minister as a costed and analysed option. In practice. a group 
like CPAG had to talk to both ministers and civil servants on key issues. Ministers 
made the final decision on important issues and attended Cabinet. Thus. meeting 
the Secretary of State was not only a good publicity stunt but ensured that he 
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understood the CPAG's viewpoint. More junior ministers had less power 
(Theakston 1987 p. 104) but were responsible for making important if not central 
decisions. The non-legislative policies of the NAB and its successor the SBC were 
formulated by the board/commissioners and thus this too «as important foi- 
CPAG. 
6.2 CPAGunder Lynes 
6.2.1 The 1967/8 Family Allowance Up-rating: A CPAG Achievement? 
In October 1967 Family Allowances were raised by seven shillings nearly 
doubling the value for the second child to fifteen shillings. In April 1968, it was 
announced that family allowances would increase again by three shillings, on both 
occasions the increase was clawed back from the standard rate tax payer's 
personal allowances if s/he was entitled to family allowances. In addition Cabinet 
had dedicated a large amount of time to discussing family allowances 132, an issue 
which had not been discussed at such a level for many years. CPAG played a role 
in the increasing prominence of family allowances as an issue. However their 
interventions were not the only factor. Genuine concern on the part of the 
ministers, sympathetic academic advisers within government, the TUC's concern 
for the Prices and Incomes Policy, and the lack of an alternative to family poverty 
also played their part. 
Although the issue of child poverty had been simmering within the MPNI133 and 
the Cabinet subcommittee, the MSSC134, it was the Christmas memorandum to the 
Prime Minister, which turned up the heat. However, as far as the Minister for 
Pensions and National Insurance was concerned, CPAG was knocking on an open 
door. "' Herbison used the climate created by the Christmas memorandum (and 
132 Between 15.10.64 and 31.12.69, the issue of family endowment was discussed at eleven Cabinet 
Meetings all between 17.11.66 and 5.3.68 (Cabinet minutes). This is contrast to the period 
from 1.1.60 and 
15.10.64 there were no Cabinet meetings specifically on the subject of family endowment (PRO 
index ot 
Cabinet minutes). 
133 In the summer of 1965, Tony Lynes, who was seconded to MPNI, produced a paper on means tested 
family support 133(13.1.66 PIN 17/156 PRO). Lewin, Assistant Secretary of Section 
D: Special Duties with 
NI scheme, argued that a means tested family allowance would be an administrative nightmare and the 
idea 
came to nothing (13.1.66 PIN 17/156 and 15.8.66 PIN 17.155, PRO). 
134 Late in 1965 they began to argue that real poverty lay with people not claiming National Assistance 
(NA) and large families with small incomes (1.1 1.65 CAB 1342536, 
PRO). It as noted that tamily 
allowances had not increased since 1957 (1.12.65 CAB 134 
2536, PRO). 
135 She told the Prime Minister that she felt deeply about the issue of child poverty (1.1.66, 
PRE\1 13 11,34, 
PRO) and later told the Chancellor that child poverty was 
her .. first concern during the ne\t year or ti%o" (B\ 
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The Poor and the Poorest), to remind the Prime Minister of the urgency of child 
poverty. She urged that the problem be solved by reducing child tax allowances by 
the same amount as the increase in family allowances for the standard rate payer, 
referred to in short hand as "give and take"136 (1.1.66, PREM 1)'1834. PRO). 
Despite refusals from the Treasury and the Chancellor, James Callaghan, to 
contemplate the idea13', a give and take addition to family allowances gained 
support within Whitehall. The MSSC rejected means tested schemes in favour of 
"give and take", although it did reluctantly agree that if give and take proved 
impossible that they would accept a means tested housing allowance. The Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury reserved the Chancellor's position (8.11.66 CAB 
134/3280). PESC was nervous about cutting meals and milk subsidies without 
help for large families (14.11.66, PIN 17/155, PRO) and Crossman said that he 
was only willing to allow the cuts if the Chancellor accepted the Kaldor-Abel 
Smith ("give and take") scheme for which Abel-Smith and Titmuss had been 
pressuring for years (Crossman 1976 p. 114). One of the most fervent supporters of 
higher family allowances through "give and take" was Thomas Balogh, the 
advisor and friend of Harold Wilson (see below). Even Callaghan accepted the 
need for some improvement but was "all out for a means tested solution" 
(14.11.66, PIN 17/155, PRO). Therefore, by the time of the Cabinet debates, 
everyone accepted that there should be some improvement in family endowment. 
The question was how much and how. 
Callaghan, supported by the Inland Revenue (IR), tried to thwart any Cabinet 
decision on give and take. He argued that child tax allowances were not a subsidy 
but an adjustment of tax relating to the ability to pay. The poor should be reached 
through targeted allowances, either based on family size or means or a 
combination of the two (c(67) 17 CAB 129/128, (c(67) 17 CAB 129/128, PRO). 
When these arguments failed to overturn the Cabinet majority in favour of give 
and take he resorted to more manipulative tactics. One was delay, such as forcing 
72/119 PRO) 
136 For full explanation see chapter 1.4.1.3 
137 The Chancellor repeatedly told Herbison that it was an impossibility. Initially, 
he argued that tax 
allowances were not part of the review (3.3.66 PIN 17/156 
PRO), then said that she would has e to make cut, 
in her vote to pay for family allowances (9.8.66 BN 72/1 19 
PRO) and then finally argued unconvincingly for 
budget secrecy and more convincingly of the problems of gender redistribution and concentrating 
help on the 
poorest (7.1 1.66 BN 721119, PRO). Inland Revenue tried to make the political objection 
that tax allowances 
were not a subsidy but about the capacity to pay. 
However as Lewin remarked, this was just a matter of 
semantics not fact (Jule 1966, PIN 17/155 PRO). 
It was also of course a matter of accounting. 
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a Cabinet discussion to be postponed (9.2.67, PREM 13! 1834, PRO). insisting on 
consultation with the CBI and TUC (20.12.66, CAB 128/41, PRO) and 
successfully postponing the final decision until after PESC in July 1967. Another 
was persuading his Cabinet colleagues to support him or face cuts in their 
departments spending. At the crucial March 1967 Cabinet meeting, Callaghan 
threatened that the extra money or family allowances could only be found by 
"reductions in other programmes" (14.3.67, CAB 129/42, PRO). However, he had 
been putting "tremendous pressure" on spending Cabinet ministers even before 
the February 1967 meeting to support him or risk cuts to their budgets (Crossman 
1976 p. 252). His last resort was to appeal for his budget's secrecy and argue that 
the decision could not be made in Cabinet (23.2.67 CAB 128/41, PRO). 
Herbison, handicapped by her lack of a permanent Cabinet seat, had to fight to 
maintain her majority support throughout the struggle. CPAG became a useful 
ally to her. She used CPAG's figure of half a million children in poverty in her 
memorandum to the Prime Minister (1.1.66, PREM 13/1834, PRO). She was able 
to cite the threat of CPAG action in a letter to Callaghan, warning him that they 
were "vulnerable to attack unless something [was] done very soon... " (8.2.66, 
PREM 13/1834, PRO). Her Cabinet paper for the discussion on November 17 
1966 reminded her colleagues that they would be attacked by CPAG and back- 
benchers if they did nothing about poverty especially when the Circumstances of 
Families report, that she had commissioned to investigate the extent of family 
poverty, was published (c(66)157, CAB 129/127, PRO). Her briefing notes for 
the Cabinet meeting of March 14 1967 and June 6 1967 recommended that she 
mention the promise to CPAG (13.3.67 BN 72/119 and PIN 17/155 PRO). In 
fighting for an interim increase on June 6 1967, she argued that they had assured 
CPAG that they were treating the problem as urgent but had done nothing 
(c(67)93, CAB 128/130, PRO). 
In August 1966, Lynes had been employed by CPAG to co-ordinate its campaign. 
He had intelligence on what was happening within Whitehall from his contacts in 
the civil service (Lynes interview). Therefore CPAG was able to organise a 
campaign in the press in support of the Minister. Just before the crucial 
Cabinet 
debate of December 20 1966, the main papers carried stories about child poverty. 
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all speaking to a CPAG spokesperson (17.12.66-19.12.66, B 72 ' 119. PRO). 
. -\ 
teach-in of the issues was held in December 1966 and received press coverage 
(The Times 18.12.66). In January 1967, Peter Townsend was the main expert on a 
Panorama programme about family poverty (16.1.67, PIN 17/155, PRO). Stories 
appeared in the press (see chapter 8.2). Abel-Smith also made her aware of the 
preliminary findings of Land's study of large families which showed that 2-10,, o of 
the sample of London families with over five children had less income than the 
NA scale (Land 1969 p. 17). Banting says "CPAG essentially took on the role of 
public voice for the Minister" (Banting 1979 p. 100). 
However, CPAG's role should not be overstated, because there was a negative 
side to CPAG's campaign. CPAG's scheme was confused in the press with leaks 
of Herbison's scheme. Certainly, this was the intent of the Cabinet leak. Therefore 
Herbison felt obliged to write to Harold Wilson, arguing that "give and take" was 
the best answer and that the criticisms of the CPAG scheme should not reflect on 
her's (9.2.67, PIN 17/155, PRO). Banting argues that CPAG's memorandum to 
the Chancellor of February 1967 had shifted to support the Minister's position. 
Yet, the memorandum still advocated the complete abolition of child tax 
allowances and a much higher family allowance (CPAG 1967 p. 11-iii). The 
Treasury was easily able to dismiss it as being too expensive, making two million 
families slightly worse off and bringing one million more people into the tax net 
The memorandum was shown to the Chancellor but not because the Treasury 
considered it to be a realistic policy. Instead it was "... a further warning that the 
partial `give and take' scheme that is before the Cabinet would be regarded by the 
group and others aiming at redistribution of incomes as only a first step" (21.2.67, 
T227/2419, PRO). CPAG's memorandum was therefore used by the Treasury as a 
scare tactic of the possible result of acceding to a policy of "give and take". 
The Labour Cabinet was always interested in TUC's views. The TUC's General 
Council (GC) asked to meet Herbison in February 1966, because they were 
concerned about the possibility of a means tested solution for child poverty 
(16.2.67 and 22.2.67, BN 72/119, PRO). Its point blank refusal of a means test 
was a "stroke of luck" to the supporters of "give and take" (Crossman 1976 vol. 2 
p. 252). The resistance of the TUC was also used by Herbison in her Cabinet paper 
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for March 14 1967 (c(67)24, CAB 129/128). Although. the TUC were not at their 
strongest when arguing for Social Security benefits increases, the fact that they 
supported Herbison was useful. The opposition of the CBI (14.12.66 T227/241/7, 
PRO) was easily dismissed, as their alternative was an extension of SB to the 
working. The Cabinet knew this was unacceptable to the TUC (2.1.67 T227,2417, 
PRO). 
The TUC's views and support were important because of the government's need 
for their prices and incomes policy to be successful during this period. This was 
always lurking in the background of the Labour government. Therefore Herbison 
was advised to draw the Cabinet's attention to the benefit of giving help to low 
income earners to reduce the legitimacy of wage demands (1.11.66, BN 72 1 19, 
PRO). Balogh, also, raised it as an issue with the Prime Minister (25.11.66, 
PREM 13/1834, PRO). However it was in the struggle for the second rise in 
family allowances after devaluation that the incomes policy argument came to the 
fore, with the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) pushing for higher family 
allowances. Whereas Hart, the Minister of Social Security, and Stewart, the First 
Secretary of State138, were asking for an increase in family allowances of three 
shillings to fulfil the devaluation pledge (5.1.68, CAB 128/43 and c(68)51, CAB 
128/136, PRO), the DEA was asking for five shillings. It believed that it would 
legitimise the strict incomes policy and prevent the need for wage increases, 
which would cost much more (c(68)50, CAB 129/136, PRO, 15.2.68 PREM 
13/2396, PRO). This had all been agreed in MSSC (27.2.68, CAB 13413282, 
PRO). Therefore by the time the Cabinet met in full the Chancellor had shifted to 
accept three shillings with "give and take. " Jenkins told CPAG on February 21 
1968 that the only acceptable form of means test was the income tax test (EC 
minutes 21.2.68 box 65, PTA). This was a distinct move from his earlier 
positions of nothing or a means tested amount (c(68)5 CAB 129133 and 8.1.68 
T227/2613, PRO). 
There were three important people in the government with regard to family 
allowances. Firstly, Herbison was crucial and what she lacked in political clout, 
she compensated for in commitment. It was mostly due to her inability to get a 
138 The Overlord of the Social Services from August 29 1967 
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ten-shilling family allowance with claw-back that she resigned in July 1967. 
despite her success in obtaining "give and take". 139 She had threatened to resign 
before over Callaghan's delaying measures against family endowment (Crossman 
1976 p. 216). Secondly, Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister, was pivotal. He was 
not a supporter of a large rise in family allowances and in the beginning had 
favoured only a small rise linked to prices (7.1.66, PREM 13/1834, PRO), but he 
refused to be lobbied by Callaghan (Crossman 17.2.67 original diaries MSS 
154/8/165, RCP) and stayed neutral throughout the debates. His Cabinet 
reshuffles (based on far more than just family endowment) cancelled themselves 
out. The replacement of Gordon Walker for Houghton in January 1967 made the 
situation more difficult for the supporters of family endowment. However the 
replacement of Callaghan with the more sympathetic Roy Jenkins, 140 as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer made the second rise probably easier than it would have been. 
A crucial figure in assuring the Prime Minister's neutrality and aiding the pro- 
claw-back cause was Thomas Balogh, the Prime Minister's trusted advisor and 
friend (Crossman 1976 p. 295,717). In his summaries to Wilson, Balogh 
repeatedly destroyed Callaghan's arguments for a means tested benefit and 
promoted "give and take. " Calling family endowment "one of the most important 
social issues that the Cabinet has had and is likely to have to decide upon ... ," 
he 
urged the Prime Minister to ensure it was heard by a full Cabinet and did not just 
slip through the back door of budgetary procedure (9.11.66 PREM 13/1834, 
PRO). As early as late 1966, he was linking family endowment not only to 
Labour's non-means testing ideology but also to the incomes policy ((9.11.66 
PREM 13/1834) 25.11.66 PREM 13/1834, PRO). Not long before the February 
1967 debate on family endowment, Balogh was to reinforce these points to 
Wilson. Just before the decisive March 1967 Cabinet meeting, Balogh told the 
Prime Minister that Callaghan's figures for the cost contradicted the government's 
own accounting scheme (2.3.67 PREM 13/2396, PRO). "' When Callaghan made 
an attempt to use a housing scheme to replace higher family allowances. 
Balogh 
139 There was also another struggle with the Chancellor over pensions. 
140 Although he at first only offered a means tested family allowance as compensation 
for devaluation 
(10.1.68, CAB 152 105). He did however agree with the Social Services group that he must 
budget 
differently for family endowment (20.6.68, Crossman diaries original) 
141 The White Paper Cmnd 2915 had argued that the lines between tax allowances and goy ernment 
expenditure would not be so concrete. 
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criticised the lack of consultation and dismissed it as unworkable (12.7.67 PRENI 
12/2396, PRO). 
Balogh also worked closely with Crossman, the main advocate of the "give and 
take" approach in the Cabinet. They attacked Callaghan's misleading costs for 
"give and take" together in a paper, which Crossman gave to the Cabinet at the 
decisive March 1967 Cabinet meeting (Crossman 1976 p. 173). "= When Wilson 
asked Balogh to assist Houghton and Callaghan on a joint paper on family 
endowment for the December 1966 meeting on the subject, Balogh had kept 
Crossman well informed on the negotiations (Crossman 1976 p. 173). 
A final note about the "give and take" debate was that "give and take" was never 
actually implemented, instead the mechanism of claw-back, developed by Kaldor 
was used. In practical terms there was very little difference between the two 
mechanisms (see chapter 1.4.1.5). However claw-back answered the Inland 
Revenue's (IR) objections to the anomalies caused because of the different age 
and residency qualifications for child tax allowances and family allowances 
(Miller to Rampton January 1967 T227/2417, PRO). Kaldor believed that claw- 
back was a solution to the problem of family poverty, although pressure from the 
Treasury for other schemes led to a toying with the idea of paying family 
allowances only to families below the tax threshold (16.1.67, T227/2418, PRO). 
This scheme led nowhere after the MSS pointed out that tax is based on the 
previous year's earnings and this would lead to the scheme being difficult at the 
margins (Abbot to Rampton Nov. 1967 T227/2613, PRO). However Kaldor 
believed that a scheme that made only the increase selective was myopic 
considering the economic crisis. He argued strongly for family allowances to be 
made fully selective, i. e. claw-back on the whole allowance. To compensate he 
argued for a rise in child tax allowances and a Minimum Earned Income 
Allowance (MEIA)143, which would raise the tax threshold (Kaldor to Diamond144 
Jan 1968 T227/2613, PRO). Yet, despite Kaldor's innovativeness, it would be 
wrong to credit him with persuading the Chancellor of the benefits of claw-back. 
142 The paper was submitted by Crossman as c27(67) and dated 13th March 1967 (CAB 
129/128, PRO). 
143 Also a favourite of the TUC. The idea was for there to be a minimum allo%%ance 
for all worker bL torr 
the payment of tax. 
144 Chief secretary at the Treasury i. e. the Junior Minister but always present at 
Cabinet meetings although 
not a member of the Cabinet officially 
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The Chancellor had had claw-back forced on him by the Cabinet. 
The high profile launch of The Poor and the Poorest, igniting the media's interest 
in child poverty, was the main catalyst for forcing family allowances into a 
priority position in Whitehall. The fear of CPAG's reaction in the serious press 
was important for Herbison in justifying the initial rise in family allowances. Yet 
it was the determination of Herbison to get help for poor families that meant a 
clawed-back family allowance succeeded. One of the main political reasons for a 
higher family allowance was the imminent publication of Circumstances of 
Families, which had been instigated by Herbison. The support of the TUC was 
also important, as was the quiet persuasion of Balogh. Although on balance 
CPAG was helpful to Herbison, the negative effects of their radical scheme being 
confused with her's were also important. In the campaign for the second increase 
in family allowances, CPAG played a much smaller direct role. Certainly, the 
reaction of back-benchers and the ability of CPAG to condemn the government 
for having done nothing to help the poorest were also implicit in Hart's arguments 
for the second rise. However it was not Hart but Shore that secured that increase 
in family allowances. The DEA's arguments for higher family allowances on 
prices and incomes grounds delivered to Hart what she had wanted; an extra three 
shillings subject to claw-back. 
6.2.2 March 1968 to February 1969: the Public and Private Battlegrounds 
CPAG called the 1967-8 increase in family allowances derisory (CPAG 1968 p. 1). 
They continued to submit memoranda to government. Yet in the aftermath of the 
up-rating it was CPAG's growing interest in welfare rights issues that dominated 
the formal relationship between CPAG and Whitehall. A report on optical and 
dental charges exemptions was sent to Michael Stewart, the Social Services 
Overlord, in December 1967. It was taken seriously and MSS and SBC were 
asked to comment (9.1.68 BN 72/122, Jan 68 AST 31/27 PRO). Although the 
SBC in their response were sceptical of some of CPAG's claims, they did agree 
that the SBC should do more with the MSS to ensure people knew of their rights 
although they contended that most of the reports recommendations were already 
the subject of SBC scrutiny. It was not the accuracy of the report, which attracted 
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the government's attention. "' It was the fact that the report was released to the 
press on January 8 1968 and Tony Lynes was able to discuss the issues on as 
prestigious a radio news programme as The World at One. CPAG's skilful use of 
the media meant that officials and ministers were at least starting to have to take 
notice of what CPAG was saying (Wendt interview). For example the 
memorandum prompted Stewart to take notice and he, in turn, requested that SBC 
should justify their policies to him. 
As Labour tackled the thorny issue of prescription charges, CPAG were then 
invited to meet with Hart. Although other groups were present at the meeting the 
Ministry referred to it as a meeting with CPAG (14.1.68 BN 72/4 PRO). 146 It was 
a reflection of CPAG's growing profile within the Ministry that it was granted an 
audience with the Minister, after correspondence with the Minister of Health (Feb. 
1968 HWP). Again CPAG's ability to activate the media and feed back-bench 
Labour MPs with information were important factors. Yet, CPAG was only able 
to offer its views on details of exemptions, not the main issue of the correctness of 
charges. 
Lynes' correspondence went straight to the Minister, with whom he was on first 
name terms and knew from SPSC. 147 Hart was happy to be interviewed by Lynes 
for Poverty (9.3.68, BN72/2, PRO). When Hart's ambitious household leaflet 
campaign for low income families was curtailed by the Treasury and the Home 
Publicity Committee (HPC) (23.4.68 and 27.6.68 BN 72/2), CPAG was 
disappointed. It is highly likely that Lynes knew what was happening and wanted 
to salvage with Hart as much of the entitlement campaign as possible. Hart 
certainly saw Lynes as an ally and even considered asking him to respond to a 
Spectator article on her behalf, although she later dropped this idea (16.9.68, BN 
72/8, PRO). Although CPAG was unable to reverse the government's decision to 
curtail the entitlement campaign and run it simultaneously with the anti-work-shy 
campaign, Lynes did achieve a few small gains. Hart wrote to Lynes agreeing that 
prescription charge exemptions had not been given enough publicity and 
issued a 
press release (14.6.68 BN 72/4 PRO). Similarly, against her officials' advice 
Hart 
145 The dental information had not even been collected first hand by CPAG (Jan 68 AST 31/27 PRO). 
146 DIG, Patients Association, Association for Improvement in maternity Services, Institute of Medical 
Social Workers and Association of Family Case Workers 
147 They had served on it together in May 1965 (SPSC records, LPA). 
142 
sent Lynes copies of the entitlement leaflet for CPAG to distribute (14.8.68 B\ 
72/2 PRO). 
Although CPAG had some leverage with the MSS, the same «was not true outside 
the MSS. When the Home Policy Committee (HPC) agreed to limit Hart's 
entitlement campaign it felt able to do so because "no outside interest [had] been 
aroused so far" (27.6.68 BN 72/2 PRO). Yet by this time CPAG had already, 
interviewed Hart about the campaign (20.4.68 BN 72/2 PRO). The only 
explanation is that although the MSS were becoming aware of CPAG, Cabinet 
ministers on the HPC were not. 
However, family endowment remained an issue within Whitehall. There were two 
main reasons for this. Firstly, a desire by the Chancellor and the Treasury to find a 
better solution to family endowment than claw-back. Secondly, there was a 
concern about abuse of Social Security by families who found it paid not to work. 
Even before the second rise in family allowances the Treasury had been busy 
seeking alternatives to claw-back. The main reason for this was to save money and 
to maintain tax allowances, which the Chancellor argued were more popular than 
cash benefits (20.12.67 T227/2613, PRO). The first idea was an option scheme of 
either family allowances or child tax allowances developed by Kaldor. However 
the anomalies at the margins made the idea too difficult. (15.12.67 T227/2613, 
PRO). Meanwhile a Housing Allowance based on family size was being 
resurrected both within and outside the Treasury. This was despite the fact that it 
would take a year to get ready, would add to the means test jungle of housing 
benefits and would do nothing for middle income families (9.2.68 CAB 152/105, 
23.2.68 T227/2614, PRO). 
After an unsuccessful bid to persuade MSSC to sanction the replacement of family 
allowances with housing allowances (Crossman 1977 p. 104), the Chancellor, 
anxious to fulfil his pledge to Parliament to make family allowances fully 
selective, set up a Treasury group under Sir David Serpill. This group was 
originally intended to save money by either limiting family allowances to families 
below a certain income level or with full claw-back. "I Yet its main 
recommendation was a child tax credit scheme devised by Kaldor (7.10.68 
148 This would involve an option scheme or a replacement for family allowances. 
143 
T227/2617, PRO). This scheme not only cost £70 million but was attacked by IR 
on a range of grounds: it was no different to CPAG's scheme, an attack on 
graduated taxation, incentives, the wife's source of income or a reduction in take 
home pay, as well as a burden on employers and IR (5.7.68, T227/2618, PRO). "° 
The search within DHSS and Cabinet Committees was no more fruitful. Reports 
on a national minimum wage and negative income tax showed that both would be 
expensive and ineffective in solving the problem of poverty (5.11.68 CAB 
152/3282 and CAB 152/3288, PRO). Crossman told an irritated Jenkins, claw- 
back might have been the best solution all along (16.12.68 BN 72/148). Jenkins' 
answer was to set up an inter-departmental group to study family endowment. 'S° 
The fact that Jenkins refused to allow Kaldor to join the group suggests that he 
and the Treasury did not want any more elaborate solutions. However, Brian 
Abel-Smith was allowed to join. 
Abel-Smith was responsible for the working group's long term policy ideas. His 
first idea was of a twenty-eight shilling family allowances with claw-back and the 
abolition of child dependency allowances for second and subsequent children in 
National Insurance and Supplementary Benefits. This would widen the gap 
between families in work and out of work (24.12.68 MSS 154/3/ DH/43/267, 
RCA). Despite some reservations about the tax threshold (20.12.68 BN 89/148 
PRO), the idea was adopted by a key family policy civil servant, John 
Stacpoole. 15' It became the basis for Ennals' memorandum to the first meeting of 
the working group (12.2.69 CAB 152/87, PRO). A second paper by Abel Smith 
discussed a number of long term schemes for family endowment, which he 
labelled as P, Q, X and Y. All the schemes assumed a reduction or abolition of 
child tax allowances and the abolition of CDA at least for later children. Whereas 
schemes Q and Y worked on a family allowance of twenty shillings to twenty-two 
shillings, P and X advocated family allowances of thirty-one shillings 
(MSS 
154/3/DH/43/131). This was only four shillings short of CPAG's 1969-70 
proposals (CPAG and NFOAPA 1970). Some variants of 
P even factored in a 
149 Although Serpill's group accepted the social work adviser's (Olive 
Stevenson) arguments for the child 
tax credit to be paid to the mother on social grounds 
(and political with the rising strength of the women's 
movement) (7.10.68 T227/2617, PRO), Kaldor continued to argue that 
the payment must be made t the 
father on incomes policy grounds (21.11.68 T227,26I'). 
150 As Serpill had recommended in July 1968 (26.7.681227/261 7, PRO) 
151 The Assistant Secretary responsible for family policy in National Insurance 
Division A 
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family allowance for first children. Abel-Smith, himself, conceded that a scheme 
between PX and QY was the most realistic (MSS 154; '3/DH/43/131, RCP). 
The short term proposals put to the working group by Stacpoole in Ennals' 
memorandum advocated raising family allowances by three shillings with claw- 
back, instead of the planned three shillings increase in child dependency 
allowance (CDA)152 (12.2.69 CAB 152/87, PRO). This idea was further elaborated 
upon by Abel-Smith (MSS 154/3/DH/43/131, RCP). Accepted by the working 
group and the Chancellor, subject to 1970/1 expenditure plans, Ennals, reluctantly, 
agreed to leave the plans with the Treasury (April 1969 CAB 152/87, PRO). The 
plans were indefinitely shelved and the working group disbanded. The long-term 
plans were never even fully discussed by the working group. They were attacked 
by both the IR and Treasury, which disliked bringing more people into the tax net 
and the upheaval of the tax system (March 1969 and 17.4.69 CAB 152/87, PRO). 
Abel-Smith's arguments that higher family allowances compensated families who 
paid their tax indirectly and that freezing of child tax allowances since 1963 had 
brought half a million each year into tax (3.4.69 MSS 154/3/DH/43/54, RCP) did 
not convince the Treasury. 
This case study illustrates how far a radical idea could get within Whitehall. The 
original idea for a much higher family allowance became acceptable to Stacpoole. 
Although Stacpoole was not at first convinced that the main advantage of 
widening the gap between those in and out of work was sufficient (20.12.68 BN 
89/148 PRO), it stimulated the ministers' political considerations about incentives 
to work and made the idea more acceptable. However Stacpoole was never 
convinced by Abel-Smith's urgency (27.12.68 BN 89/148 PRO). This was 
reflected by the working group, which wanted a moderate proposal that was likely 
to be acceptable to a Cabinet in a pre-election period. Hence there was a 
concentration on the short-term proposals by the working group. In the end, 
despite his reservations, Ennals had little choice but to hand the initiative to the 
Treasury. The Chancellor controlled the budget and taxation policy. His support 
would be needed. 
The explanation for the different priorities of the Treasury and the DHSS can in 
152 Although CDA for first children would still have to increase three shillings. 
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part be explained by CPAG and the anti-scrounger mood. Although the extra cost 
was low, the Treasury must have been repelled by the thought of bringing one 
hundred and fifty thousand more people into the tax net and knew that the scope 
for further claw-back was narrow (17.4.69 CAB 152/87 PRO). There were the 
political considerations of reducing take home pay of Labour supporters close to 
an election and adding to the expenditure side of the public accounts whilst 
Britain was still dependent on foreign financiers. Although the DHSS was 
sensitive to the problems of take home pay, it was also sensitive on one hand to 
the attacks from CPAG that it was not doing enough for the poor and on the other 
hand that it promoted scrounging (Crossman 1976 p. 140). The short term and long 
term plans offered a solution to both of these problems by widening the gap 
between those in and out of work but at the same time helping the poorest 
working families. Crossman was bitter about the failure of the Treasury to adopt 
the policy arguing that, "the greatest danger is if nothing is done the government 
will appear to be insensitive to the needs of families who depend on a low wage 
earner" (May 1969 CAB 152/87, PRO). 
Much of Abel Smith's advice to Crossman was in line with CPAG thinking. This 
was particularly true of his strong criticism of a civil service suggested means- 
tested scheme, which proposed giving a means tested allowance to working 
families based on the number of children (9.5.69 MSS 154/3/DH/44/179 RCP). In 
addition, like CPAG after 1966, he was sceptical about negative income tax 
(9.5.69 MSS 154/3/DH/44/179 RCP). 153 However Abel-Smith was not 
consciously promoting CPAG ideas but his own (and those of the Labour Party), 
which CPAG mostly shared. It is Stacpoole's view that Abel-Smith suggested the 
liberal Finer as chair for the Finer Committee on One Parent Families, which 
Crossman set up to investigate the problems of one parent families (Stacpoole 
interview). "' However, Abel-Smith was conscious of the tight financial 
framework in which the government worked. Therefore some of his advice such 
as abolishing subsidies for school meals and using the savings 
for family 
153 CPAG made clear its scepticism of negative income tax 
in a policy paper of 1969 (Box 65, Townsend 
Archive). 
154 The Finer Committee which was established in November 1969 and reported 
in October 19'4. Its remit 
was to investigate the situation of one parent 
families and make recommendations as to the best wa, of 
supporting them. 
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endowment (MSS 154/3/DH/43/322)155 or not going ahead with a leaflet 
entitlement campaign because it would be counterproductive (MSS 154 1DH 
43/174) RCP) was in opposition to his former colleagues. Abel-Smith had some 
influence on the poverty debate within the DHSS but his ideas did not have any 
wider influence. In addition, Abel-Smith was no CPAG spy or agitator and his 
first loyalty was to the government (Wendt interview). 
6.3 CPA G under Field 
In February 1969, Lynes was replaced by Field. Lynes had developed good media 
contacts and established a reputation in Whitehall as a group "whose views were 
at a minimum worth knowing and at a maximum probably needed some kind of 
response" (Wendt interview). Not surprisingly with a change in secretary/director. 
a change of chair, the continuing growth of branches and preparations for the 
opening of the Legal Department, the new director concentrated far less on 
Whitehall. However by late 1969, the new chair and director were settled in and 
ready to tackle the government. 
6.3.1 "The Poor Get Poorer Under Labour" Campaign'56 
Despite all the debate within Whitehall, there was no further action by the 
government to improve family endowment. The attention of the government and 
the press turned to the new super-annuated pension scheme. An election was 
highly likely in 1970. Therefore Field and Townsend calculated that in order to 
push poverty back onto the government's agenda, CPAG would have to force the 
issue back into the media spotlight. Armed with a politically explosive if factually 
weak memorandum Field and Townsend met Crossman on January 27 1970.1$' 
During the acrimonious meeting Townsend and Field repeated the main claim of 
the memorandum that "low income families [had] not been given priority in 
policy and in some respects they [had] even lost ground" (Field and Townsend 
1970 p. 10). Crossman's response was that nobody would believe them (Crossman 
Diaries 1977 vol. 3 p. 791 and Field 1982 p. 33). 
CPAG and its high profile supporters had sniped at the government before: 
155 CPAG was in favour of free school meals for all children 
156 The title of this section is taken from a press release issued by CPAG on May 
22 1970 
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Townsend's, Abel Smith's and Titmuss' attack in the Fabian lectures of 1966; an 
attack by Townsend at the 1968 CPAG conference; general and specific attacks in 
Poverty since the first issue (Lynes 1966 p. 5 1967a p. 1-2,1967b p. 4-5.1968a p. I- 
2,1968c p. 1-2) and an exchange of letters with Harold Wilson about the 
government's narrow policies (Lynes 1967c p. 10-13). Yet the attack in 1970 was 
remarkable because of its ferocity and longevity. Coupled with similar accusations 
by Tony Atkinson, Crossman was worried about the effect on the Labour Part,, ' 
(original Crossman Diaries MSS. 154/8/165, RCP). 
The media eagerly seized on CPAG's arguments. Tribune summarised CPAG's 
case on 6 February 1970, and over the next month it published a series of letters 
from Ennals and the CPAG (Field and Townsend 1970 p. 22-31). Both Ennals and 
CPAG embroiled themselves in a parallel debate in The New Statesman sparked 
by Atkinson's book, The Reform of Social Security (The New Statesman 23.1.70 
p. 1-2,30.1.70 and 6.2.70). The debate was by no means confined to the Labour 
Party press, although that is where the battles were particularly acrimonious. Early 
on there had been an exchange of letters between Townsend, Field and sixteen 
sympathetic professors in The Times and Houghton and six Labour MPs. (The 
Times 2.3.70 and 5.3.70). 158 The press latched on to the story generally. Crossman 
and Ennals also appeared on television and radio programmes opposite Townsend 
to debate whether the poor had got relatively poorer (Crossman Diaries 1977 vol. 
3 p. 791 and 892). 
In April 1970 the memorandum, complete with a summary of the public battle, 
was published under the more provocative name of Poverty and the Labour 
Government. It was followed by a poverty manifesto which again argued that an 
examination of the Labour government's record proved "the dimensions of 
poverty [had] not diminished and some groups [had] not kept pace" (CPAG 1970a 
p. 7). In May, a debate at the Cambridge Union saw Ennals, Crossman and 
Nevitt159 opposed by Des Wilson and Townsend. Townsend argued that some 
groups "may" have become worse off under Labour (Townsend debate paper 1970 
box 70 p. 5 PTA), a claim refuted by Crossman and Ennals (Ennals and Crossman 
157 see Field 1982 p. 34, and Kelly (forthcoming). Field 
described the memorandum as strong on spin. 
158 A reply by Field and Townsend was not published. 
159 Della Nevitt was an advisor to the Treasur\ and Brian Abel-Smith's colleague at 
LSE 
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debate papers 1970 box 70 p. 5 PTA). 
Although Poverty and the Labour Government, by Field's own admissions. did 
not contain the evidence to support the conclusion that the poor were worse off 
under Labour (Field 1982 p. 34), it was impossible for the Labour government to 
prove conclusively otherwise (Bull in Kelly forthcoming): "' Labour appeared 
guilty because it could not prove itself innocent. If Crossman was concerned, 
Ennals was worried. It is Wendt's view that "for the few months leading up to the 
election of June 1970, dealing with CPAG was a very significant if the not biggest 
part of [Ennal's] job" (Wendt interview). The Ministry was concerned enough to 
arrange a special meeting of Crossman, Ennals, Abel-Smith and Odgers to discuss 
CPAG (25.3.65). Ennals was worried about the paper he was to give to the 
CPAG's AGM (Crossman 16.4.70, original MSS 154/3/165, RCP). Although 
Ennals refuted all of CPAG's claims, his tone at the AGM was conciliatory. He 
pleaded with CPAG to attack the common enemy of the Conservative Party rather 
than "waste energy and ... credibility arguing with each other in public" (Ennal's 
paper April 18 1970, box 72 p. 25, PTA). 
Ennal's plea that they should stop arguing with each other and Crossman's remark 
that it looked bad when their friends were attacking them (Crossman 1977 p. 791) 
are crucial to understanding why the campaign turned so acrimonious. CPAG's 
closeness to the Labour through its overlapping membership had meant that both 
Labour ministers and members of CPAG16' had taken it for granted that CPAG 
was essentially sympathetic to Labour. It is Wendt's view that the fact that they 
were all from the Left made the relationship difficult. From Labour's point of 
view, this was their own left-wing attacking them (Wendt interview). It is clear 
that the campaign was hurting the Labour government and in particular Ennals. 
Why did CPAG attack the Labour government so mercilessly? 
Firstly, CPAG probably did not know about the Serpill group's or the later 
working party's interest in the problem of family poverty. Even if they had, it 
would have made little difference. The government had not publicly acted on the 
problem since April 1968. As the superannuated pensions scheme, the new 
160 This view is attributed to Professor Hilary Land and appeared 
first in Bull, D (1972) Family Poverty. 
Duckworth, London 
161 See chapter 4.4 for details 
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attendance allowances and pre-election activities caught the attention of ministers, 
CPAG felt they had to get family poverty back firmly on the agenda. One of the 
main weapons of a pressure group is its ability to embarrass or at least threaten to 
embarrass ministers, who then compel civil servants to look at the problem and 
seek solutions (Lynes in Kelly forthcoming). To the degree that it was hurting 
Crossman and Ennals (Wendt interview and Kelly forthcoming), it was extremely 
successful (Lynes in Kelly forthcoming). 
Secondly, the leadership of CPAG had changed. Lynes had his contacts in the 
civil service through which he worked. His style was well-reasoned argument to 
convince the Minister. The chair, Fred Philp, disliked confrontation. Field was 
less attached to the Labour Party hierarchy. His view was that he was paid to work 
for the CPAG in order to improve conditions for the poor and therefore, whatever 
his personal feelings, he owed no loyalty to the Labour Party (Field interview). 
Townsend had been at a personal level dismayed at the Labour government's 
treatment of the poor and disadvantaged since 1966 (Townsend interview). He had 
few misgivings about attacking the Labour government. Despite objections from 
Manchester branch and the resignation of Sir John Walley, the EC did not try to 
stop the attack. Indeed there was no sense of opposition from the core members of 
the EC162 (Kelly forthcoming). Crossman was also responsible for the bitterness of 
the campaign. He took an aggressive defensive stance and the argument between 
him and Townsend continued after the election, while Crossman was the editor of 
the New Statesman (The Times 8.9.70). 
Thirdly, the election was widely predicted for September. The announcement in 
May of a June election came as a surprise. It made sense to CPAG to distance 
itself from the Labour Party and make it clear that it was a non-partisan pressure 
group that was willing to fight the government whatever the party in the interests 
of its client group. The plan had been to publish a critique of the Conservative 
plans before the election in autumn. It was the surprise of the early election that 
made this impossible (Bull, interview). However, it was still justifiable for CPAG 
to attack the party in office (Field in Kelly forthcoming). This distancing from the 
Labour Party was tactically astute. If Labour had won, then they would have been 
162 See Bull's, Veit Wilson's and Bradshaw's contributions 
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aware of the power of CPAG to embarrass them and seen the problem of poor 
families as an important political issue. Political parties do not prioritise groups 
whose support can be taken for granted (Grant 1995 p. 83). 'When the 
Conservatives did win, they took CPAG, as a non-partisan group, seriously (Field 
interview). They also recognised the problem of family poverty and one of their 
first actions was to introduce and pass FIS to ease the burden on low income 
families. 
However, the campaign did damage relations with the Labour government 
(Bradshaw in Kelly forthcoming) and destroyed any good will between ministers 
and CPAG members (such as Townsend) with whom they had had close working 
and social relationships. Yet, certainly where Crossman was concerned, personal 
relationships had little bearing on his treatment of CPAG (Wendt interview). 
Interestingly, Sir John Walley, a former civil servant who had recently joined 
CPAG believed that the group's attack on the Labour government amounted to 
CPAG aligning itself with that party in giving the impression that it was the party 
on which CPAG pinned its hopes (Beltram in Kelly forthcoming). "' 
Internally for CPAG, the campaign made it clear that whatever members' personal 
attachments to the Labour Party, CPAG was distinct. It also was Field's and 
Townsend's opportunity to prove themselves decisive leaders, who used different 
methods from their predecessors. Field could take the opportunity to prove 
himself an effective and tough campaigner. However one casualty was the loss of 
Sir John Walley. Walley, who as a respected former civil servant was useful to 
CPAG not only because of his public profile, but also because he knew his way 
around the DHSS and had contacts. A former civil servant was (and still is) an 
attractive prize for any pressure group (Hennessey 1989 p. 501). Losing Walley 
was a high price to pay. 
In the Ministry of Social Security, there was concern about the embarrassment to 
ministers. Stacpoole's family allowance department pressured the 
Treasury to 
allow an increase in family allowances with the claw-back mechanism. 
The 
problem was not that the Treasury was just being 
difficult, it was that the tax 
threshold for families had been allowed to sink so far that consequently there was 
103 Also see "'alley to Field 5.2.70, File 4. Box 65, Toý%nsend 
Archive. 
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no scope for a further reduction to help fund an increase in family allowances 
(Stacpoole in Kelly forthcoming). This is illustrated in appendix G. 2. Although 
CPAG's attention had been drawn to the low tax threshold by Abel-Smith at the 
January meeting with Crossman, it was assumed by Field that what the 
government needed to do was to raise not only the family allowance but also the 
tax threshold (Field in Kelly forthcoming). However, as Sir Douglas Wass16° 
explained to Stacpoole, it was not possible to raise child tax allowances (and 
therefore the tax threshold for families) and reduce them at the same time. As a 
simple increase in family allowances was prohibitively expensive and could easily 
be attacked by the Conservatives as wasteful, the DHSS was left with no feasible 
options. At the same time the pressure was mounting as Macleod made a pledge to 
CPAG that a Conservative government would raise family allowances using the 
claw-back mechanism (Field 1982 p. 37-8) As a result, the whole issue of family 
allowances became a serious election issue (Stacpoole in Kelly forthcoming). 165 
The campaign did not bring down the government, although CPAG was made a 
convenient scapegoat of the Labour Party. 166 It did act as a catalyst for bringing the 
problem of family poverty onto the election agenda. The memorandum, itself, 
was, through a clever use of spin, debated and reported in the media. This in itself 
was an achievement as CPAG's claw-back proposals were complicated and were 
in Field's words "... a move which did not necessarily get people shouting on the 
street" (Field in Kelly forthcoming). However the real strengths of the campaign 
were that it attacked the Labour government on a vulnerable point. The suggestion 
that Labour had allowed the poor to become poorer would have a negative effect 
on party morale. However two factors from outside CPAG's control made the 
campaign more effective. Firstly, Wilson encouraged by the improved economic 
situation and the opinion polls called an earlier than expected election. Therefore 
the campaign became entangled in the election campaign. Secondly. Macleod's 
unexpected pledge made the issue an important election issue. 
164 A senior official in the Treasury 
165 lt was included on the Conservative Party's 
list of eight key issues to be constantl,. brought to the 
attention of the electorate (CRD 3-9'83. 
CPA). 
166 Field and Bull both talk about being blamed 
for Labour's 1970 election defeat for many year, iften%ard' 
(Bull and Field in Kelly forthcoming). 
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6.3.2 June 1970 to February 1974: Working With the Conservatives 
After the Conservative victory, CPAG were quick to present the new Secretary of 
State, Sir Keith Joseph, a memorandum detailing their policies. Central to this was 
the policy of abolishing of child tax allowances and introducing a thirty-five 
shilling family allowance (Field and Townsend 1970 p. 3). Encouraged by 
Macleod's and Heath's pre-election pledges to claw-back (Field 1970b p. 1, Field 
1982 p. 38-9), CPAG was complimentary to the Conservatives. It traced their 
previous commitment to family allowances (CPAG 1970b p. 1) and attempted to 
flatter them by arguing that the public would trust the Conservatives more about 
claw-back (CPAG 1970b p. 7). However the Conservatives never continued claw- 
back. Instead they introduced on October 28 1970 a bill for the means tested 
solution of Family Income Supplement (FIS). 
The main characteristics of FIS were that it was available to people working more 
than twenty-four hours a week. Half the difference between the family's wage and 
approximately the SB level was made up (up to a maximum of £5 at first). The 
benefit was based on six months earnings and was valid for six months and then 
later a year. Single parents could claim on the same terms as couples and get the 
same benefits (Kiernan et al. 1998 p. 172) The benefit was not administered by the 
local SBC office but by the central SBC. This was important as it protected, at 
least psychologically, low paid workers from the stigma of being claimants. 
Instead of having to apply in person at an office, an anonymous bureaucrat many 
miles away checked eligibility. Another advantage of FIS was that it acted as a 
passport for other nationally determined benefits such as free school meals and 
later rent rebates exempting the family from having to apply separately. 
Despite the fact that a means tested solution was not what CPAG had wanted, the 
group should get some credit for the speed at which the Conservatives helped poor 
families. Indeed, the Conservatives had formulated few plans for abolishing 
family poverty before 1970. At the Selsdon meeting"', Macleod had wanted to 
abolish family allowances as part of his package of tax and public expenditure 
cuts. The Shadow Cabinet's discussion of the problem led to serious doubts that 
this was possible as some help would have to be given to the poorest (CRD 
167 The Shadow Cabinet met at Selsdon Park Hotel from 31.1.70-1.2.70 to discuss policy. 
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3/9/93, CPA). All agreed that some form of negative income tax was the correct 
way forward. However, it was not an immediate possibility (CRD 3ý9 93, CPA). 
A means tested solution was equally as difficult because of stigma, as Margaret 
Thatcher 168 pointed out (CRD 3/9/93 p. 2, CPA). There was a risk of both 
alienating the target, middle-band earner voter (CRD 3/9/93 p. 8, CPA) and the 
exploitation of anti-means test sentiment by Labour (CRD 3/9/93 p. 6, CPA). 
Joseph argued in vain (from CPAG figures) that the poorest needed thirty-five 
shillings per week per child and that this would cost seventy five millions per 
annum (CRD 3/9/93 p. 3, CPA). In the end the only agreement was that there 
should be further consideration of the problem and Lord Jellicoe suggested twelve 
months for a group to look at the problem (CRD 3/9/93 p. 10, CPA). Heath 
concluded that they did "not seem prepared to do what was required" (CRD 
3/9/93p. 9, CPA). 
Yet by May, the Conservative Party had seemingly changed its stance. Macleod 
pledged the use of claw-back as a short term solution to family poverty until a 
negative income tax could be introduced (Field 1982 p. 38). This was confirmed 
by Heath (Heath to Field 19.3.70, Box 69, PTA). Certainly it would be a mistake 
to deduce that this reflected a general mood in the Conservative Party (Field in 
Kelly forthcoming). "' However on entering office, Joseph was disappointed that 
the scope for claw-back was too small and that another solution would have to be 
found because of the election pledge (Stacpoole interview). Joseph worked closely 
with a group of civil servants to adapt the housing allowance scheme and thus 
formulate the principles of FIS (Stacpoole interview). Joseph, on the introduction 
of FIS, argued that the CPAG plan would lower the tax threshold, transfer 
income 
from tax allowances, which were popular, to less popular benefits (see chapter 
8.2.4) and not give as much to the lowest income households as FIS 
(Hansard 
1970 vol. 806 p. 221). He repeated this directly to CPAG in a letter (12.11.70, 
box 
69, PTA). 
Unaware of the progress towards a means tested solution, Townsend tried to 
deter 
Joseph from a means tested approach in a letter dated just two 
days before FIS 
was introduced (26.10.70, file 4, box 65, 
PTA). By early November an anti-FIS 
168 Member of the Shadow Cabinet for Education 
169 Both Field and Stacpoole suggest that Macleod \% as certainly not acting 
from a solid Conservative hale. 
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campaign had been launched jointly with some trade unions and with TUC 
support (see chapter 8.1.1.2). Shirley Williams, Labour's Social Security 
spokesperson was briefed by CPAG on the arguments against FIS (CPAG to 
Williams 9.11.70, File 4, Box 65, PTA). Labour MPs attacked FIS for holding 
down wages like its Eighteenth Century predecessor, the Speenhamland scheme 
(Hansard vol 806 p. 225-6). However CPAG faced similar problems to the 
Conservative government. Lynes wrote to Townsend that the scope for claw-back 
was only five shillings, otherwise the three child family would be worse off than 
the two child family. In short, claw-back was not possible. Lynes' only suggestion 
was a meeting with Abel-Smith, Piachaud and at Joseph's agreement civil 
servants to formulate a viable solution (Lynes to Townsend 1.11.70, Box 69, 
PTA). However, neither CPAG nor the Conservative Party had realised this prior 
to the election (Lynes to Townsend 1.11.70, Box 69, PTA and Bull interview). 
Certainly, with FIS at only eight million pounds, it was a cheap option for the 
Conservatives, but it appeared also to be the only feasible answer (Stacpoole and 
Dean interviews). It was also a popular one with voters. Three fifths of 
respondents to a Gallup poll agreed with a means tested solution in 1970 (Gallup 
1976 p. 931). Despite its protests CPAG was left without a better short term 
answer. 
The Conservatives had a different ideology to the Labour Party (and therefore to 
that of most of CPAG's members). To the Conservatives, selectivity was the 
answer, targeting help on the poorest (Joseph 1967 p. 18, Conservative manifesto 
1970). To Joseph unlike CPAG, FIS was an acceptable solution to family poverty 
(Wendt interview). Field certainly recognised this and understood that CPAG's 
best hopes were to get the best possible deals within the framework of 
Conservative policy (see chapter 4.2.3.2). The Conservatives were aware of 
CPAG's members' Leftist leanings but appreciated the fact that they were 
realistic. "They were not the kind of people that were after the earth, they realised 
that they were not going to get that" (Dean interview). Hence the acceptance of 
the inevitability of VAT (because of entry into the European Economic 
Community) in CPAG's 1972 memorandum to the Chancellor, and the attempt to 
influence the greatest number of exemptions (Field 1972 p. 10-1 1). 
CP: \G's 
evidence to the Fisher Committee on Social 
Security abuse in 1973 did not 
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question the government's right to tackle abuse. Instead it argued that the extent 
was far lower than the popular conception and asked for more safeguards and 
reforms to the anti-abuse measures already in place (Field and Grieve 1973 p. 14). 
Therefore CPAG's main argument was that if the government could give so much 
away in reduced taxes for the rich it could give better non-means tested help to the 
poor (CPAG 1972 p. 12). 
The Conservative's tax credit scheme was to cost £1,300 million and would be 
paid for out of the proceeds of economic growth. It was in the tax credit scheme 
that the Conservative government came close to meeting CPAG's most basic 
demand. Every citizen would be entitled to a tax credit, which was four pounds for 
a single person or married man, two pounds for a married woman (she also kept 
her tax relief if she worked) and two pounds for each child. There were, however, 
a number of exceptions, the most important being that people earning less than 
eight pounds per week, SB claimants and the self employed would not be 
included. The former two groups were excluded because the credits proposed were 
too small to bring them over the poverty line. It was only by keeping the credits at 
a non-subsistence rate that the scheme could be contemplated. More generous 
credits or higher tax would have been intolerably expensive or created too large 
disincentives (Le Grand and Robinson 1984 p. 252, see chapter 7.1.2.1) The latter 
group was excluded because of administrative problems. 
The proposed two pound child tax credit would have fulfilled CPAG's 1972 and 
1973 demands for higher family allowances (although CPAG wanted it linked to 
average wages). However, the tax credit plans were not a response to CPAG 
pressure. They were the result of a long held belief in the Party that the benefits 
and taxation systems for people in work had to be brought together in order to 
target help better and create incentives (Internal paper 11.5.72, ACP/3/20 (72) 76, 
CPA). Yet, the Conservatives knew that if they did nothing about the poverty 
trap, CPAG was likely to attack them mercilessly. CPAG's arguments that £1,300 
million could be better spent (Meacher 1973) made little impact on a government 
obsessed with the tidiness, selectivity and radicalism of its proposals. 1° V'et, 
CPAG's argument that the tax credit should be paid to the mother was more 
170 E. g. At Selsdon, the Shadow Cabinet was in favour on principle. 
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successful. This was firstly because the influential Conservative Women's 
Advisory Committee had independently fought for this within the Conservative 
Party (Select Committee on Tax Credits 1973 p. 191). Secondly, because the 
Conservatives were probably easier to convince than a Labour government. When 
Kaldor had described a similar scheme of child tax credits in 1968, he had argued 
for payment to the father to avoid reducing take home pay and upsetting the 
incomes policy (21.11.68, T227/2617 PRO). Male trade unionists were key voters 
for the Labour Party, whereas women were target voters for the Conservative 
Party (CRD 3/9/93 p. 5). Hence the Conservatives had less to lose. 
It was fortunate for CPAG that Joseph was made the Secretary of State for Social 
Services in the Heath government. He was deeply concerned about the problem of 
child poverty and prioritised it (Wendt interview, Halcrow 1989 p. 52 and 83, 
Joseph 1967 p. 11). One of his first actions on entering his new department was to 
have a internal seminar on family poverty (Appointments Diary 23.6.70), 
presumably to flag up solutions. It is probable that it was at this meeting that 
Joseph was made aware that the means tested solution had already been worked 
out. On other issues such as abuse, Joseph was a moderate in his party and refused 
to succumb to back-bench pressure for draconian measures (Hansard vol. 838 
13.6.72 p. 1231-4 and vol. 842 8.8.72 p. 1473-4). 
In the DHSS, Joseph's genuine concern about child poverty and his personal 
approach of listening intently and cerebrally to all arguments (Bradshaw and 
Wendt interviews) made a constructive working relationship between him and 
Field (Wendt interview). "' Although questioning the methods of selectivity, Field 
made it clear that there was no doubt about Joseph's genuine sincerity in wishing 
to abolish poverty in the lifetime of the Parliament (CPAG 1972 p. 6). It is 
Wendt's view that the fact that CPAG and the government were of different 
ideological perspectives improved the relationship. It was a more normal 
exchange of views and the relationship was far more relaxed than it had been with 
the Labour government (Wendt interview). Joseph attended the CPAG AG'\1 of 
1971, where he received a standing ovation (Halcrow 1989 p. 52). 
1 71 The good relationship between the two men continued in the House of Commons, when Field became a 
politician. There was a great deal of respect bem een them. 
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Dean remembers meetings taking place between himself as Under-Secretary in 
charge of Social Security and CPAG. He also remembers a fair amount of 
correspondence and CPAG material reaching himself and Joseph. He argues that 
CPAG's realism and the quality of its research meant that he and Joseph took 
notice of what they said (Dean interview). Although Wendt and Stacpoole argue 
that CPAG offered little new information (Wendt and Stacpoole interviews), Dean 
argues that the fact that CPAG had academic distinction and was also in touch 
with the poor made it a useful source (Dean interview) 
However, even if Joseph had not been so concerned about child poverty, he would 
still have had to take CPAG seriously (Wendt interview). CPAG had good 
connections with the media and were able to use it to apply pressure to the 
government. 1' When Margaret Thatcher, as Education Secretary, allowed a civil 
servant to reply to a letter from CPAG, CPAG got a story in the diary page of The 
Times saying that Thatcher was the only Minister who did not reply directly to the 
poor (Field 1982 p. 58). Certainly the impression gained from Wendt, Stacpoole 
and Dean is that the government found it useful to keep account of what CPAG 
was saying. CPAG arguments could be used in the Cabinet and in Treasury battles 
(Dean interview). 
When working with the Conservative administration there were two practical 
difficulties for CPAG compared to when Labour was in power. The first was 
institutional. The Conservative government was lacking a tier of ministers in the 
DHSS compared to the previous Labour administration (see appendices G. 1). 
Thus CPAG had fewer ministers with whom to speak. However, Joseph trusted 
with Paul Dean the day-to-day responsibility of Social Security (Dean interview) 
and was very interested in Social Security policy himself. In addition CPAG still 
had its annual meetings with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The second 
difficulty was that whereas CPAG had had good contacts with ministers through 
the Labour Party (particularly the SPSC), it never had equivalent links with high 
ranking Conservatives. "' Field used the court page of The Times to discover who 
was close to Heath. He discovered that Dame Diana Elles was part of Heath's 
172 A third (34%) of their press releases after 18.6.70 were successful vv ith at least one of the four papers 
studied in Chapter 8. 
173 CPAG did have a good relationship with certain Conservative MPs like Timothy Rai t n, who as the 
owner and editor of New Society. However it did not know any of the Cabinet. 
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circle and she was very helpful to CPAG in influencing Heath (Field 1982 p. 55). 
hence an indirect influence to the Prime Minister. Also there was the opportunity 
to "lobby" politicians at party conference (see chapter 7.1.1.1). 
6.4 Influencing the Supplementary Benefits Commission 
The SBC was, like the NAB before it, an executive agency established to 
administer non-contributory benefits. The day to day running of the SBC was the 
responsibility of civil servants, headed by the Secretary. Wider policy issues were 
formulated by the Commissioners, who from December 1967 included Titmuss. 
as deputy chair (see appendix G. 3). There were two ways in which the SBC was 
important to the CPAG. Firstly, it did have the responsibility for administering 
benefits. The actual flat rate of SB was set by the government, however the 
various additions and most of the rules which decided exactly who was eligible 
for what benefit were administered by the SBC. However, the SBC could make 
decisions affecting only one pound in every twenty by 1975 (Donnison 1982 
p. 17). The second way in which the SBC was important to CPAG was its power to 
influence the government through the Chair's regular meetings and 
correspondence with the Minister. 
CPAG was in favour of a rights based system in which clear, open regulations 
would entitle claimants to benefit. There were two ways in which CPAG wanted 
to achieve its goal of ending discretion. Firstly, through persuading the SBC to 
make clear its policies. This was done through correspondence, meetings and use 
of the media. Secondly, CPAG used its expertise to challenge SBC policy both at 
tribunal level and in the courts. In addition to clarifying SBC policy, CPAG tried 
to persuade the SBC to be more generous to claimants with its regulations. This 
brought immediate relief for the poor, encouraged the staff and supporters of 
CPAG and gave CPAG some success to claim. 
Certainly CPAG was taken seriously by the SBC. Firstly, they kept a file between 
1965 and 1969 of correspondence with and about CPAG (AST 31 /27 PRO). This 
was not the case for any other pressure group. Secondly, the chair, Hayward, to oak 
them seriously. He was anxious to "maintain good relations" with Tony Lynes 
partly because he was impressed with Lynes' "intellectual integrity" and "sincere 
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concern for people in poverty" However he also believed that CPAG would 
"become an important pressure group" (30.12.66, AST 31/27 PRO). It was clear 
to the Chair that the subject of low income families was becoming "increasingly 
topical and urgent" and the existence of CPAG was mentioned at an early SBC 
commission meeting (23.11.66 AST 1 PRO). The Commissioners discussed 
policies brought to their attention by CPAG. Correspondence from CPAG was 
always answered politely, thoughtfully and fully. The Chair was willing to meet 
Lynes and later Field to discuss policy issues. 171 
CPAG's success was varied. CPAG pressure on the SBC to review its policy of 
refusing to pay "unreasonably high" rents in full was to no effect (SBC Minutes 
12.6.67 AST 31/27 PRO). However, CPAG did have more success in influencing 
the policy on the wage stop, which the SBC was already reviewing (23.11.66 AST 
1 PRO). The CPAG anti-wage stop campaign of 1967 worried the SBC. With 
CPAG members and social workers representing wage stopped claimants in the 
local SBC offices, Headquarters issued advice to managers. Offices were warned 
not to attempt to "buy CPAG off' and were asked for comments on the activities 
of CPAG (Minute 117/67, AST 31/27 PRO). The original stance that the SBC 
would not make recommendations about the wage stop was ignored (23.1 1.66 
AST 1 PRO). Some of the recommendations, such as wage stop claimants being 
given a written explanation of their benefit had been long called for by CPAG 
(25.11.66 AST 31/27 PRO). Although the Commissioners decided that the wage 
stop stance was correct in principle because the alternative was to reduce 
incentives to work (SBC minutes 27.9.67 AST 1 PRO), the fact that CPAG's 
viewpoint was on the agenda is an indication of the Commissioners' regard for 
CPAG's views even at this early stage. 15 
CPAG was partially successful in its campaign to have wage stopped claimants 
unaware of their rights to a rate rebate, compensated. Hayward rejected full 
compensation saying that it was the claimant's responsibility to claim and they 
174 Lynes met Hayward 22.12.66 informally to discuss wage stop and Field met 
him in late . May 1969 (AST 
31/27). There may well have been other meetings. 
15 Given the need to preserve incentives the wage stop was not abolished until 1975. 
Ironic ally it 
was the expansion in the number of means tested benefits that could 
be claimed by people in work 
(especially housing benefits and FIS) that reduced the numbers affected to a quarter of the 1960s 
peak (Beltram interview). 
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would only be helped with debts incurred. (26.1.68 AST 31/27 PRO). Lvnes 
rejected this and Hayward felt obliged to write to the Minister warning her of 
CPAG's dissatisfaction (BN 72/78 PRO). However, it is unlikely that the 
claimants would have got anything at all if it had not been for CPAG's campaign. 
CPAG's short-term goal for the Social Security system was for it to move 
towards a codified system of rights rather than discretion (see chapter 5.1.1). 
Pressure from CPAG led to a discussion by the SBC in early 1968 as to whether 
the "A" code should indeed be published. Although it was agreed that it was not 
appropriate to publish internal instructions and that the A code's size and frequent 
changes would make it expensive, it was decided that some kind of handbook 
should be published. One of the Commissioners, Kay Carmichael (a social worker 
who had been editor of Case Conference) applauded the fact that social workers 
had become interested in welfare rights (SBC minutes 28.2.68 AST 1 PRO). 
Thus, although the "A" code remained internal CPAG had succeeded in 
convincing the SBC of the need to publicise its rules. 
However, the SBC was also concerned to keep its policies in line with what it 
perceived to be the general public's view. Although under pressure from CPAG 
and the Home Office, the SBC reviewed its policy of paying for prisoners' wives 
to visit their husbands only every three months to paying for bi-monthly visits, it 
refused to pay for the monthly visit recommended by the Home Office. The main 
reason being that prisoners' wives were an unpopular group and to be too 
generous would generate adverse publicity for the SBC (SBC minutes 28.2.67, 
22.11.67 AST 1 PRO). Despite Tony Lynes success at overturning the decision at 
tribunal, the SBC refused to change its policy (Lynes 1968b p. 13). The decision to 
pay for monthly visits became a reality once the costs were moved to the Home 
Office, this had long been its policy 
Similarly, the cohabitation rule was considered necessary to prevent unmarried 
couples being treated more generously than married couples. Although pressure 
from CPAG resorted in the SBC stipulating that only Executive Officers16 were 
allowed to stop payments (22.1.69 AST 1 PRO), the SBC agreed not to relax the 
cohabitation rule, with which there was widespread approval amongst \1Ps. civil 
176 The local office team leaders. 
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servants and the general public. Despite a CPAG media campaign in 1972. the 
government was unwilling to consider any regulatory change. 
However even when CPAG was not successful in getting any policy change, it did 
manage to force the SBC to justify and explain its policies to CPAG. An example 
of this is the SBC's policy on asking unmarried mothers for the details of the 
child's father. The SBC was forced to clarify and justify its policy (11.7.69, AST 
31/27 PRO) It meant that the SBC's position was clear to CPAG and could be 
made widely available through Poverty and later LAG Bulletins, therefore 
ensuring that the central SBC policy was followed at a local level. Yet much of 
the subjective language in SBC instructions such as "extreme hardship" remained 
and local officials were still left with a large amount of discretion (Beltram 
interview). 
The SBC records at the time of writing were only open until the end of 1969. 
Little of the correspondence before and after 1969 has survived in the Townsend 
archive and after 1970 much of the liaison with the SBC would have been through 
the CRO"'. However there is every reason to believe that CPAG continued to 
lobby the SBC after 1969 for small but important policy changes. The SBC 
maintained an interest in CPAG with the Chair, Lord Collison writing for Poverty 
in the 1970s (Collison 1971,1972). With the proliferation of welfare rights 
activities by the branches and the work of the Legal Department and CRO, it is 
likely that the lobbying intensified. 
The SBC was closely linked to the MSS/DHSS. The Chair of the SBC kept in 
regular contact with Hart whilst she was Minister. "' The Minister was therefore 
kept informed of not only CPAG campaigns but also of other pressure groups 
such as the National Old People's Welfare Council and CABx (Hayward to Hart 
26.1.68 and 29.1.68, AST 31/59, PRO). There is little evidence that the topics that 
they discussed arose from the pressure of CPAG or any other pressure group. 
Indeed some of the issues on which they wanted to take action such as reducing 
the SB's responsibility for students with dependants and strikers were in 
opposition to CPAG policy. 
177 For which there are no known records. 
178 Presumably this closeness continued under Crossman/Ennals and Joseph'Dean. 
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When the MSS consulted the SBC over the plans to increase family allowances 
with claw-back in March 1967, the SBC's memo was extremely positive. It 
recommended family allowances of eighteen shillings and twenty shillings (for 
second and third children respectively) and argued that family allowances should 
make up the major part of the younger child's SB allowance and half of that of 
older children. It applauded this strategy as widening the gap between those in and 
out of work but warned if it widened too far, long term SB recipients would be 
further disadvantaged (13.3.67 AST31/59, PRO). Again in 1969, the SBC was 
represented on the DHSS working party investigating family support (headed by 
the Crossman), which was designed to feed into the main inter-department 
working party under Serpill (see above). This working party accepted the inter- 
related nature of child dependency allowances (on NI and SB), child tax 
allowances and family allowances at its core (25.2.69 AST 31/59, PRO). 
Clearly, the views expressed by the SBC on family allowances were close to those 
of CPAG. However there is no evidence to link the two. It is clear from the SBC 
records that it was aware of CPAG and knew of its views. These views may have 
influenced the Commission and officials within the SBC. However, they also 
came from within. Titmuss, the deputy chair, had pressured Houghton for a "give 
and take" scheme before CPAG had been established thus he independently 
agreed with this goal (see chapter 3.3.1). The SBC itself had been investigating 
scale rates since the early 1960s (see chapter 3.2.3.1) and it was the SBC's own 
research that proved that the child rates had not risen with the adults (13.3.67 
AST31/59, PRO). Therefore it was not just that CPAG was pushing but that the 
SBC itself wanted to reform (Beltram interview). Considering the research and 
expertise in the SBC, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the SBC's ideas about 
family allowances and child support were gained purely from CPAG 
influence. 
However, CPAG did have an influence on the SBC and the Commission did 
consider its views. Therefore it would seem likely that the 
SBC's suggestions to 
first the Minister and later the Secretary of State were formulated 
internally but 
that the officials and commissioners were open to CPAG 
ideas. 
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6.5 CPA G's Effectiveness in Influencing Government and the 
SBC 
When evaluating CPAG's effectiveness in influencing the government and the 
SBC, both the methods open to CPAG and changes over time need to be 
evaluated. Throughout the period CPAG was a high profile insider group. It 
attempted to influence ministers and civil servants directly and used external 
channels such as the media and Parliament. The first tactic was used by both 
Lynes and Field to build up a relationship with the key politicians and civil 
servants. Lynes, in particular, worked with the Minister to gain the best deal 
possible from the Treasury. Similarly Field built up a relationship with Joseph, 
which led to CPAG being able to at least explain its policies and views to the 
ministers and civil servants. Field adapted CPAG's policies to make them 
acceptable to a government, which had a different political philosophy to most of 
CPAG's leadership. Certainly ministers and civil servants believed that it was 
realistic in its demands. 
There were four key moments when the government adopted CPAG policy: the 
1967 up-rating of family allowances, the 1968 up-rating of family allowances, the 
Macleod commitment to the use of claw-back and the announcement that child tax 
credits would be paid to the mother. In all these cases it was CPAG's use of 
external channels of influence, most notably the media, which forced the 
goverment to make the change. However the tone of the pressure did change 
during the period. This shift was not only due to the change in director but also the 
change in political environment (Field in Kelly forthcoming). 
The Lynes approach of using the media and Parliament to support and question 
the Minister for Social Security resulted in a doubling of family allowances. This 
was taken further in 1968 but then it was the DEA, concerned about the 
devaluation, which pushed for the rise. However in 1970, given the unpopularity 
of the claw-back and the pre-occupation of Crossman with 
his pension plans. there 
was a need for a campaign which would embarrass the government 
into action. In 
order to direct attention onto child poverty again, 
CPAG needed to make an 
impact as The Poor and the Poorest had done in 1965. 
They could not rediscover 
poverty again, instead they "discovered" that contrary 
to Labour Party ideology 
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and Labour government boasts, relative poverty had increased under Labour. 
Although this argument was weak and the findings were stretched by spin, the fact 
that the government could not disprove it either, meant that the government was 
forced into reacting. The policy auction, into which general elections descend, 
meant that the Conservatives pledged support for claw-back, unaware of its 
impossibility. However this pledge meant that the Conservatives had to do 
something about child poverty when in office. CPAG may not have liked FIS but 
the fact that it was introduced so quickly suggests that family poverty was a 
priority for the government. The campaign for child tax credits to be paid to the 
mother was successful but there were also calls for this from within the 
Conservative Party and had no adverse effect on Conservative target voters. 
Despite CPAG's high profile within the DHSS by 1969, its lack of impact on the 
Treasury, despite regular meetings with the Chancellor, was problematic. Even if 
the DHSS was convinced of CPAG's arguments, the Treasury could thwart its 
plans. In the 1970s CPAG became more aware of this and directed the 1972 
memorandum to the Chancellor of the Exchequer rather than the Secretary of 
State. Yet influence over the Treasury probably remained limited throughout the 
period. It was CPAG's ability to use the media and Parliament to force the 
government to make some kind of response to the problems CPAG identified that 
led to the significant policy changes. The lobbying of the civil service and SBC 
however did lead to some smaller changes in policy. The risk of acting as a 
catalyst was that the government's chosen response might not be CPAG's 
favoured policy, as with the introduction of FIS. 
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7 Chapter Seven: CPAG's Relationship with the Political 
Parties 
This chapter focuses on CPAG's relationship with the political parties. Contact 
with the leadership of both parties was crucial. How effective was CPAG at using 
both party and Parliamentary channels to reach the highest levels of power's Both 
the government and the Opposition are aware of the need to carry the grassroots of 
the party and the back-benches of Parliament with them. Was CPAG able to 
convince the rank and file of their cause? The party out of power is deprived of 
the official bureaucracy and relies on its own bureaucracy to develop its future 
policies. To what degree was CPAG able to influence this process? Finally, given 
the left-wing composition of CPAG, was it able to present a bi-partisan image? 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first examines CPAG's 
relationship with the political parties (concentrating on the Labour and 
Conservative Parties). The second discusses the possibilities that Parliament 
offered the CPAG campaign. 
7.1 The Political Parties 
Establishing a relationship with the political parties is in general a "relatively 
undeveloped aspect of the work of [pressure] groups" (Whiteley and Winyard 
1987 p. 102). However CPAG was one of a minority of groups in the 1970s to 
make contact with the political parties. 17' Firstly there were the annual party 
conferences. Secondly, CPAG had an overlapping membership with the Labour 
Party's Social Policy Advisory Committee and the group sought to establish links 
with the research departments of both the main political parties. CPAG's contact 
with individual MPs and Parliamentary back-bench committees of the political 
parties are covered in the second section of this chapter (see below 7.2). 
7.1.1 Influencing the Parties: The Party Conferences 
From 1966 onwards CPAG attended the Labour Party conferences. It also 
attended the Liberal Party Assembly from 1967 and 
from 1970 the Conservative 
179 Only 38% of the groups in Whiteley and Winyard's poverty 
lobby in the 197th had contacts with the 
political parties (Whiteley and Winyard 
1987 p. 89-90) 
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Party conference. CPAG hoped to achieve three things from the conferences. 
Firstly, it wanted to bring the delegates' attention to the problems of poverty 
through fringe meetings and briefings. Secondly, from 1973 it attempted to get its 
policies on to Labour's manifesto through resolutions. Thirdly, conferences were 
useful places for networking with (shadow) ministers and influential people 
(including trade unionists at Labour conferences). 
7.1.1.1 Fringe Meetings and Briefings 
The fringe meetings varied in their success from year to year and between the 
political parties. The least success was achieved with the Conservative Party. Only 
in 1970 did the meeting attract a large number of delegates. This was mostly due 
to the fact that the new Secretary of State for Social Services, Sir Keith Joseph, 
debated with Townsend, and Mervyn Pike chaired the debate. In contrast only ten 
people attended the two meetings in 1972. This was partly because the 
Conservative Party refused to advertise the event unless CPAG paid the 
commercial rates for diary space (Weir and Streather 1972, file 6, box 65, PTA). 
In 1973, CPAG did not even hold a meeting, although it attended and sold 
literature (Weir and Streather 1973, file 7, box 65, PTA). 
The Liberal and Labour Party conferences were more successful. In 1966, CPAG 
attended only the Labour Party conference but it was a success. Houghton, the 
Social Services overlord, spoke and a hundred delegates attended (CPAG 
Secretary's report 4.11.66, file 1, box 65, PTA). The 1967 meeting was far less 
successful. The main reason for this was that the meeting hall was a mile from the 
main conference centre. Another reason was that the speaker was David Owen, a 
back-bench MP rather than a minister. However the disappointment of that year 
was softened by the success of a teach-in at the conference which Judith Hart, the 
Social Security Minister attended (Secretary's report 13.10.67, file 1, box 65, 
PTA). The 1968 Liberal conference was actually more successful than the Labour 
conference, with both meetings being held jointly with Shelter. This was probably 
sensible given CPAG's chronic financial situation in that year. Yet, although the 
merger deal with Shelter was still being considered (see chapter 4.2.1.1), the EC 
concluded that the joint conference strategy did not work and that 
CPAG would 
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be better to act independently at conferences in future (Secretary's report 13.9.68. 
HWP). 
Despite the bitterness between CPAG and Labour during the election campaign of 
that year, the 1970 fringe meeting was rather successful. Shirley Williams, the 
Social Security spokesperson agreed to speak with Townsend. Jack Jones also 
agreed to speak. CPAG was anxious to court Jones, who as the leader of the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) was closely aligned with the 
cause of pensioners. CPAG wanted his voice to be added to the campaign for 
better family allowances (see chapter 8.1). Although CPAG failed to attract a high 
ranking Labour speaker for the 1971 conference (AGM Report 25.9.71, File 5, 
Box 65, PTA), it was far more successful in 1972 (Weir and Streather 1972, file 4. 
box 65, PTA). This convinced CPAG that it needed to plan early for a big meeting 
in 1973 (Weir and Streather 1972, file 4, box 65, PTA). Thus in 1973 five hundred 
delegates attended a huge meeting with big name speakers such as Jack Jones, 
Tony Benn and Joan Lestor (Weir and Streather 1973, file 7, box 65, PTA). 
The key to arranging a successful meeting was to attract big names as speakers. 
All the most successful meetings had front bench politicians. It was also important 
for the meetings to be well advertised and very close to the conference centre as 
the failures of the 1972 Conservative and the 1967 Labour conferences illustrate. 
It was also important not to clash with other attractive events. Weir and Streather 
complained that Conservative delegates preferred cocktail parties (Weir and 
Streather 1972, file 4, box 65, PTA). However they were able to solve this 
problem in 1973 for the Labour conference by having the meeting the first 
evening, when the delegates were mostly in situ but nothing was officially 
planned (Weir interview). However as Minkin argues most fringe meetings preach 
to the converted (Minkin 1978 p. 154). Thus the Labour Party rank and 
file 
delegates were more likely to be interested in CPAG 
issues than their 
Conservative counterparts. CPAG was aware of this fact and although 
it had to be 
seen at Conservative conferences, in reality it attached 
far lower priority to them 
than it did to the Labour conferences (Weir interview). Similarly, 
CPAG attached 
less importance to the sympathetic Liberal Party because (except in the event of a 
hung Parliament) it carried little political weight (Weir interview). 
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7.1.1.2 Networking with the powerful and CPA G Aggrandisement. 
Conferences offered CPAG the opportunity to meet ministers or shadow ministers 
and other influential party figures in an informal setting without civil servants. 
Bradshaw remembers discussing family poverty with Sir Keith Joseph whilst he 
was Social Security Minister (Bradshaw interview). However, politicians are at 
their most partisan at conference and front bench politicians are very busy. In 
short, the atmosphere is not conducive to such lobbying (Dean interview). Yet all 
sorts of organisations and industries invested in conference stalls and meetings, 
which suggests that CPAG was not the only group to see the value in the exposure 
that just being there gave to the issues and the profile of the group (Grant 1995 
p. 83). For a small group like CPAG investing in a meeting hall was worth the cost 
if "big names" from the party could be persuaded to speak and thus create the 
impression in the delegates minds that "this was a group that it was proper and 
necessary to deal with" (Field interview). 
7.1.1.3 Writing Labour's 1974 Manifesto 
After an exploratory visit to the Labour conference in 1972, Weir and Streather 
realised that conference could be used not only to educate delegates through fringe 
meetings but also as a way, via resolutions, to put CPAG policies on the Labour 
manifesto. In this sense the Labour Party was unique because of its democratic 
structure. All Constituency Labour Parties (CLP), trades unions and affiliated 
socialist societies had the right to submit resolutions to be discussed at conference. 
These resolutions had to be seconded by another such body. There is then a 
process of compositing, which allows overlapping resolutions to be merged. 
Resolutions are then debated and if accepted by the conference are then added to 
the manifesto (Minkin 1978 p. 140ff). The Conservative Party had no such 
structure and although motions were moved and debated this did not give these 
motions automatic inclusion in the drafting of the 1974 manifesto. 
CPAG had influence at all three stages. In 1973, it exploited the overlap between 
CLPs and CPAG branches. CPAG members persuaded their 
local CLP to adopt or 
support a CPAG resolution for conference (Streather 
interview). Secondly. CPAG 
had sympathisers at the compositing stage. They would offer a 
draft of the 
169 
composite as this ensured not only CPAG wording but that the sympathiser would 
move the composite at conference (Weir interview). Thirdly, Weir used his 
journalistic contacts to gain passes for the CPAG conference team. This meant 
that they could influence responses to the debate from the floor (Weir interview). 
A briefing paper was also produced (CPAG 1973). 
The strategy was successful, with twenty-one of CPAG's resolutions and five 
CPAG amendments being adopted. CPAG also had contact with the drafters on 
two more resolutions (see appendix H. 1). These resolutions were condensed down 
to five and half composites; 18° of these three and a half were successful. In 1972, 
there had been six resolutions for the minimum wage, one for family allowances 
and seven dealing with SB issues. In 1973, there were fourteen, seven and thirteen 
respectively (Weir and Streather 1973 p. 2). However the success was limited in 
two ways. Firstly, CPAG was unable to prevent controversial items such as a 
home responsibility allowance (giving carers an income as of right) or a high 
national minimum wage being included on composites. These controversial items 
led to the failure of the whole composite. Although Streather and Weir assured the 
EC they could prevent this from happening the next year (Weir and Streather 1973 
p. 5), it is difficult to see how they could prevent other interests from using the 
composite process as they themselves were doing. 
Secondly, CPAG could not influence the structure of the conference. This meant 
that there was no debate on poverty. Therefore their resolution on the minimum 
wage was rejected by the NEC on the grounds that low pay was a problem of the 
`social wage. ' This related to the social contract that was in the process of being 
agreed by the Labour Party and the TUC to restrict wage demands in exchange for 
social benefits such as better public services and benefits especially for pensioners 
and children. However, two days later the NEC opposed the family allowances 
resolution. There was little chance to relate the two (Weir and Streather 1970 p. 9). 
Barbara Castle, however, commented on this problem (Weir and Streather 197 
p. 4). In 1974 there was a debate on the elimination of poverty (Labour Part%- 
Conference 1974 p. 240-3). 
180 Only half of the sixth composite was relevant to CPAG 
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7.1.1.4 The Attitude of Conferences to Family Poverty 
The crisis of the rediscovery of poverty in late 1965 placed family poverty back 
on the conference agenda. It was not discussed at the 1965 Labour or 
Conservative conferences. In contrast, there was not enough time to hear all thirty- 
four people who wanted to speak on it at the 1966 Conservative conference 
(Conservative Party 1966 p. 130-4). Similarly, a concern for low-income families, 
the wage stop (see chapter 1.3. ) and the inadequacy of EMAs (see chapter 1.4. ) re- 
emerged at the Labour conference in 1966 (Labour Party 1966 p. 122 and 175). 
Although the parties were united in their concern about the problem, they were 
divided in their solutions. There was widespread support within the Conservative 
Party for selective help concentrated on the poor, whilst in the Labour Party there 
was widespread opposition to means testing. Thus from 1968 there were calls at 
the Conservative Party conference to abolish family allowances (Conservative 
Party 1968 p. 89,90,92,1970 p. 48-54). FIS was widely applauded in 1970 
(Conservative Party 1970 p. 48-54). There were annual calls for higher family 
allowances and a national minimum wage at the Labour conferences (Labour 
Party 1967 p. 286,1968 p. 133 and 309,1969 p. 278,1970 p. 243,1972 p. 309,1973 
p. 138-158,231-234). In 1967 a composite, introduced by lain Jordan of SPAG in 
his capacity as Edinburgh CLP delegate, urged the abolition of the wage stop, 
increased family allowances, a minimum wage and a better deal for the low paid 
with earnings related benefits. These were all CPAG issues and it is likely that he 
consulted with national CPAG on the matter (Labour Party 1967 p. 286). 
'ß' 
However CPAG's greatest influence at the Conservative conference and until 
1973 at the Labour conference, was its ability through the media and Parliament to 
put poverty back onto and keep it on the agenda. 
7.1.2 CPAG's overlapping membership with the Labour Party and the 
Labour Party Social Policy Sub-Committee (SPSC)182 
CPAG had a significant membership overlap with the Labour Party. 
This was 
advantageous for links with the Labour Party 
in two ways. The first was that the 
181 Although this composite was remitted to the National 
Executive Committee of the Labour Party (NEC) 
for consideration, the NEC did not give it any subsequent examination. 
(SPSC and NEC tiles LP \). 
182 Originally called the Social Policy . Advisor-' 
Committee but ý%ill be referred to throughout as SP'(' for 
the sake of simplicity. 
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overlap allowed for the 1973 resolution strategy discussed above. The second ww'as 
that not only did certain members of the EC know Labour (shadow) ministers on a 
personal level but that some CPAG EC members were members of Labour's 
SPSC. 
Until the end of 1968 and then again from the beginning of 1971, SPSC met to 
formulate policy suggestions on social policy. It reported to the Home Policy Suh- 
Committee (HSPC), which itself reported to NEC, the top policy-making body of 
the Labour Party. The committee consisted of a number of the NEC and some co- 
opted trade union members, MPs, and sympathetic academics. McCarthy argues 
that between 1964 and 1976 some 24% of SPSC members had some link with the 
CPAG (McCarthy 1986 p. 123). He asserts that the CPAG supporters on the 
committee helped to contribute to the debate and kept the issue of poverty on the 
boil. Further, he concludes that without CPAG's representation on the SPSC the 
government's resolve towards social policy may have been weaker (McCarthy 
1986 p. 121). He quotes Bosanquet as saying that CPAG heavily influenced SPSC 
and Townsend as arguing that it drew its inspiration from CPAG (McCarthy 1986 
p. 118). 
However, McCarthy overstated the importance of CPAG on the SPSC. Firstly, 
fully-fledged CPAG members were few. Abel-Smith had resigned from CPAG's 
EC in October 1968, Lynes became active on SPSC after leaving CPAG, Michael 
Meacher only joined in 1971. Therefore, only Townsend was (almost) 
continuously on SPSC and had a key role in CPAG. 183 Most of the other members 
that McCarthy links with the CPAG were simply people who had worked with the 
CPAG on certain issues or were sympathetic MPs. 
Secondly, as McCarthy notes, even the CPAG members were not on the SPSC as 
CPAG representatives (1986 p. 117). They had been "Labour's backroom boys" 
before CPAG was established (Townsend interview). Therefore, they were serving 
in a different capacity from that of a member of CPAG's EC member (Townsend 
interview). This is important as Townsend's interests certainly went much wider 
than child poverty, talking in 1967-8 about the need for a social plan and a number 
183 He was not included on SPSC in 1971 and did not rejoin until 
Januare 19; 2. In addition Ton` Atkinson 
was on the Finance and Economic Affairs Sub-Committee 
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of social policies and in 1973 about disability pensions (Re 173 and RD 840, 
LPA). Similarly Lynes wrote a paper on pensions (SPSC minutes June 1971, 
LPA). SPSC did of course discuss and recommend a number of policies, which 
were similar to CPAG's. '" However the following example illustrates that it was 
CPAG as an outside group not as an inside group that was putting pressure on the 
SPSC. The SPSC reported to HPSC that on January 10 1966 SPSC had decided to 
concentrate on two issues; firstly immigration and secondly the role of family 
allowances and child tax allowances (HPSC minutes 26.1.66, LPA). However this 
was not due to CPAG pressure on SPSC but a response to the general concern 
about family poverty which CPAG had initiated a few weeks earlier. CPAG's 
memorandum was discussed in January 1966 (SPSC minutes 27.1.66, LPA) not in 
July 1965 when it was first presented. 
In 1971, CPAG did gain some important influence over a working group, the 
Working Group on Pensions and the Pensioner, Means Tests and Charges and 
Poverty and Groups in Need (WGP). Five of the thirteen members were or had 
been CPAG EC members (RD 250, February 1972, SPSC, LPA). One of the three 
papers it produced was written by the former Parliamentary Secretary at the 
DHSS, Brian O'Malley. It concentrated on the tax/benefit structure in relation to 
child's benefits. Although the original paper outlined a wide range of possible 
options for child endowment18' (RD 246 January 1972, SPSC), the resultant policy 
paper for the HPSC, which combined all three papers, advocated tax free family 
allowances paid for by the abolition of child tax allowances. This coupled with 
higher tax thresholds it was argued would ease family poverty (RD 292, SPSC, 
LPA). Therefore CPAG's preferred policy succeeded. Yet by 1972, the idea was 
mainstream with Conservative tax credit proposals offering similar outcomes. 
Family poverty still did not become a priority for SPSC and was not even 
184 The whole question of welfare or citizen's rights became an issue in 1972, prompted by Lynes 
discussion of means tests in another of the three papers (RD 238, LPA). A SPSC report of January 1972 
made reccommendations for welfare rights officers, the simplification of means tested benefits and the acti' e 
advocacy of social workers which could have been lifted from a CPAG pamphlet. However it stopped short 
of arguing for the abolition of means testing (RD 232 p. 3-4, LPA). In November 19_'_', a working group on 
the issue was established with Lynes as Chair (SPSC minutes 27.11.72, LP. A'. Certainly the sentiment,, of 
SPSC and the working group were similar to CPAG's. 
185 These included the main options of a choice between tax allowances and family allowances (which had 
been the policy of the Conservatives before the 1970 election, CRD/9/72-5) and the amalgamation of t. irnily 
allowances and child tax allowances to produe a tax free child endowment. Also smaller changes such as 
including first children, age grading of allowances, claw-back of less than 100%, increasin<, both child , ax 
allowances and family allowances (RD 246 Januray 1972, SPSC). 
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discussed at the SPSC/TUC joint meeting (part of the social contract negotiations) 
in October 1973 (SPSC minutes, 24.10.73, LPA). 
The working party on disability worked explicitly with DIG (SPSC minutes 
November 1973, LPA). Was a sign of weakness of CPAG that it was not asked to 
discuss child poverty with a working group or did the presence of CPAG 
sympathisers on the relevant working party make this unnecessary? The answer 
lies in the philosophy of the Labour movement. One of the founding principles of 
the Labour Party had been to abolish poverty. Labour politicians believed they 
were well qualified to talk about poverty, whereas most were ready to accept that 
they had less grasp of the issues around disability. Therefore, whereas advice from 
an expert group (like DIG) on disability was acceptable to the NEC and 
Parliamentary members of SPSC and HPSC, this was not necessary the case for 
poverty. In addition SPSC contained a large number of poverty experts already. 186 
Apart from the WGP, there is no evidence that CPAG members of SPSC were 
able to prioritise CPAG issues and solutions on the agenda. In any case, 
convincing SPSC was not enough. All SPSC papers were filtered through the 
HPSC and through to NEC. There is little mention in the NEC minutes of family 
allowances until child benefit became Labour Party policy in 1973 (NEC 
minutes). In addition SPSC was very weak in the 1960s. Throughout 1967 and 
1968 HPSC saw SPSC as ineffective and disappointing (HSPC minutes 23.11.67 
and 26.7.67). It was suspended at the end of 1968 and not re-established until 
1971. Thus, it was not even operating during the crucial years 1968 to 1970 when 
CPAG needed to convince the government to take claw-back further. Although it 
was useful to CPAG to have members on SPSC, the influence of them and of 
SPSC itself should not be exaggerated. 
7.1.2.1 Contacts with the Research Departments of the Parties 
The Conservative Party had a well-resourced research department, which was 
supplemented by a number of sub-committees of the Shadow Cabinet and the 
back-bench committees of MPs. The Labour Party was more dependent on the 
NEC which had a number of sub-committees (including HPSC) and sub- 
186 E. g. Lynes, Abel-Smith and Townsend 
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committees of these committees (including SPSC). These committees were 
supplemented by a research department, which also produced memoranda. In 
relation to poverty research Labour could call on a large number of outside 
academic experts. The Conservatives admitted that there were no leading 
academic poverty experts who were sympathetic to them (CRD 3/24 9'5. CPA). 
Thus although the Conservative Bow Group did generate some suggestions, they 
were more reliant on their own research department, which in turn welcomed 
input from outside groups. 
Lynes argued that whilst he was secretary there was not very much contact with 
the parties' bureaucracies but more with the individual members of the parties 
(Lynes interview). "' This was a logical short-term course of action for CPAG in 
1966-9. Lynes had plenty of informal links with the Labour Party because of his 
own earlier links with the SPSC and the Fabian Society. Thus formal contact with 
the Labour Party's Research Department was unnecessary. However, this was 
very much a short-term approach. It relied on Labour taking reasonable action on 
the problem of poverty whilst it was in power. As CPAG became a long-term 
pressure group there was a need to develop a good relationship with the policy- 
making apparatus of both main parties. Thus in 1969, there was an effort under 
Field to develop links with the research departments of both the Labour and 
Conservative parties. In summer 1969 Rosemary Marten of the Conservative 
Party's Research Department (CRD) wrote an article for Poverty (Marten 1969 
p. 9). The CRD used CPAG material and ideas in formulating their own ideas 
about family allowances and poverty (LCC 67/135 p. 2, ACP/3/20/72/76 p. 11, 
CPA). There was good contact between Field and some senior CRD staff (Field 
interview), who respected his views (Douglas to Morrison 25.1.73, CCO 
170/5/61, CPA). However, despite the fact that Heath set up a myriad of policy 
committees, there was no committee for social security until 1969 (CRD 4/7/77, 
CPA). This committee then almost solely concentrated on the super-annuated 
pension scheme. There had been an ad hoc group for poverty since 1967 but this' 
was under the auspices of Mervyn Pike, who was ill and had 
been unable to 
manage effectively even the Health Committee of which she was chair. 
187 However the Conservative Research Department \% ere acquainted %%ith 
Lynes and examined hip 
reservations for a negative income tax scheme carefully(Bellairs to 
Se ß+ il123.8.68, CRD 4 '' --, CP \) 
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However CPAG and the CRD were approaching the problem of poverty from two 
different viewpoints. CPAG were clear that they not only wanted a solution to 
poverty but they wanted one that did not involve a means test. Douglas, a senior 
researcher at CRD argued that although the Left was obsessed with universalism, 
there was no reason why Conservatives should be bound by this socialist principle 
(Douglas to Morrison 25 January 1973 CCO 170/5/61, CPA). This difference in 
attitude is clear from the party faithful at the conferences (see above 7.1.1.4). Thus 
although the CRD respected CPAG's views and were willing to accept the non- 
party political points, they did not feel bound to their principles. The following 
case study of the tax credit scheme illustrates this point. 
In 1972, CPAG appointed Molly Meacher, the wife of the CPAG EC member and 
Left-wing Labour MP Michael Meacher, as its researcher for the tax credit 
scheme. Although the £2 tax credit for children would have satisfied CPAG's 
child benefit demands, Molly Meacher's report was still critical. She expressed 
concern that the Green Paper suggested the best solution would be payment to the 
father and that the self employed, people earning less than £8 per week and SB 
claimants would be excluded (having to rely on means tested benefits) (Meacher 
1973 p. 3). She argued that the £1,300 million could be better spent on the existing 
system (Meacher 1973 p. 2). It was these arguments that she articulated to the 
Conservative Party (Molly Meacher to Morrison 18.12.72 CCO 170/5/61, CPA). 
Extending the scheme to make it universal would add considerably to the costs, 
Douglas argued that income tax might have to be at 70% or 80% to pay for the 
higher credits and as these high credits would be exempt from tax, the wealthy 
would benefit. Thus he argued that the suggestion was a wrecking amendment 
(Douglas to Morrison 25.1.73 CCO 170/5/61, CPA). However, CPAG's insistence 
that the child tax credit should be paid to the mother was acceptable to the CRD. 
The green paper had actually left the question open but had preferred the option of 
payment to the father because it was the administratively simple option 
(Discussion paper no. 53 Feb. 1973 CCO 170/5'61, CPA). The 
CRD argued that it 
would be political suicide not to pay the allowance to the mother, given 
that 
public opinion wanted to see wives protected and 
believed a mother would be 
more likely than the father to spend the money on the children 
(Discussion paper 
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no. 53 Feb. 1973 CCO 170/5/61, CPA). The growing women's movement was 
concerned that the allowances should be paid to the mother. However most 
importantly the Women's National Advisory Committee of the Conservative Party 
argued strongly that the mother should be no worse off than she was with family 
allowances (Select Committee on Tax Credits 1973 p. 191). 
Molly Meacher's plan to persuade MPs' wives from all political parties to sign a 
Pledge for an universal tax credit scheme which paid child tax credits to the 
mother worried CRD. Her arguments were "passionate, emotional and 
superficially attractive", whilst the CRD's were "cold and dull". However the 
solution to this was to take her arguments apart and to make the CRD's own 
arguments more attractive (Wolff to Morrison, 4.1.73 CCO 170/5/61, CPA). Thus 
CPAG's arguments for universal coverage merely worried the CRD into 
presenting their own arguments better. As far as payment to the mother was 
concerned CPAG was swimming with the tide of Conservative opinion. 
However the case study exposes a weakness in CPAG's selection of a researcher. 
There can be no doubt of Molly Meacher's intellectual and political skills, but the 
fact that she was a well-known socialist married to a Labour MP made her suspect 
to Conservatives. From the private correspondence between Sara Morrison, 
Deputy Chair of the Conservative Party and the CRD, it is clear that they did not 
believe that they could work with her (in contrast to Lynes and Field). They 
referred to her letters as "Molly Meacher's latest antics" (Douglas to Morrison 
25.1.73 CCO 170/5/61). The sarcasm in one letter from Morrison to Molly 
Meacher was scarcely disguised (Morrison to Meacher 30.1.73 CCO 170/5'61, 
CPA) and another letter was written to "keep her quiet" (Morrison to Harvey 23 
February 1973 CCO 170/5/61, CPA). Michael Wolff, a special advisor to the 
government, wrote to Morrison that "Molly Meacher has nothing to learn from her 
husband in the downright disingenuous and dishonest use of words and 
statistics... " (4.1.73 CCO 170/5/61). Thus Molly Meacher's role made the 




The usefulness of targeting Parliament is a subject of debate in pressure group 
analysis. The suggestion has been that groups that "fail" to influence Whitehall 
resort to using Parliament and other tactics (Norton 1984 p. 161, Kavanagh 1985 
p. 151). Finer argues that promotional groups, due to their lack of influence over 
the executive are more likely to resort to Parliament and non-governmental tactics 
(Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 86). However this dismissal of the effectiveness of 
Parliamentary lobbying has been questioned by Judge (1990 p. 36) and Whiteley 
and Winyard (1987 p. 86-7). Both show that groups with a good relationship with 
Whitehall still had open strategies which included Parliament, despite the fact that 
from 1966 to 1974 Parliament was dominated by strong governments and 
practically all successful legislation was government or government supported. 
Parliament was considered important as a way of drawing Ministers' and MPs' 
attention to the issue, as a way of gaining information and as a channel for directly 
influencing the government through its back-bench committee. For social policy 
groups like CPAG that relied on government action, drawing attention to the issue 
through the media and Parliament was a good way of forcing the government to 
act. 
There are three main ways in which a pressure group can use and influence 
Parliament. Firstly there are the rights the group's members have as citizens. 
Through them, it can conduct a letter writing campaign, encouraging members to 
write to their MP on the issue (Davies 1985 p. 59, Grant 1995 p. 67). 188 It can ask 
MPs to raise the problems of individual constituents. Of course it can arrange 
mass lobbies (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 94). At the time of elections, 
pressure groups can try to secure the support of prospective candidates (Davies 
1985 p. 83). Secondly, a pressure group can use sympathetic MPs. This may be 
done in a formal way with a Parliamentary spokesperson, or more informally. 
MPs can use the procedures of the House to extract information and to emphasise 
an issue. This can be done through written and oral questions, adjournment 
debates, early day motions and back-bench speeches. Also by making 
amendments to legislation, especially at committee stage 
(Grant 1995 p. 67-9, 
88 These letters should not be standardised. Mrs. Whitehouse was careful in persuading 
her supporter: to 
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Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 94). More unusually an MP can introduce a private 
member's bill, although these cannot promote income maintenance issues 
(Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 94) and rarely become law (Grant 1995 p. 6S. 
Davies 1985 p. 58). Negatively, MPs can filibuster to prevent unhelpful legislation 
(Davies 1985 p. 61). Thirdly, a group can make links with groups in the House of 
Commons such as specialist back-bench groups of MPs, particularly those on the 
government side. These were in the 1970s stronger on the Conservative side 
(Grant 1995 p. 73). 
7.2.1 From the Outside 
A group as small as the CPAG could never realistically organise a mass lobby of 
Parliament. However, CPAG did attempt to make family allowances an election 
issue in 1970. The back page of CPAG's election "poverty manifesto" gave 
potential MPs the opportunity to pledge support for this poverty programme 
which included increased and annually reviewed family allowances as well as help 
for the disabled, SB claimants and low paid (CPAG 1970 p. 8, PTA). CPAG 
received eighty pledges from candidates from all three main parties, seventy 
percent of them supporting an increase in family allowances. Therefore CPAG 
was targeting MPs at their most vulnerable: election time. A press release was 
then issued. However it was not used by the mainstream press in the following 
days although it was reported in New Society. 18' This reduced its effectiveness. 
Hence this strategy was not repeated during the 1974 election. 
7.2.2 From the Inside: Sympathetic MPs 
CPAG used MPs to place questions in the House of Commons for two reasons: to 
simply gather information and to draw attention to issues in the House (Lynes and 
Field interviews). In the early 1970s, CPAG had forty-six supporters in the House 
of Commons and a number in the House of Lords. However as Appendix H. 2.1 
illustrates, only about a third of these were active asking questions for CPAG at 
that time. From the time that CPAG had a full time secretary/director (August 1 
1966) to the fall of the Conservative government (February 18 1974), seventy- 
two MPs asked at least five questions (written or oral) relating to issues which 
write in their own style to their MP (Davies 1985 p. 5Q' 
179 
were important to CPAG'90. Questions had been asked on these topics before 
CPAG was formed. 19' 
Oral questions and written questions had different aims. Whereas oral questions 
were designed to force the issue to the attention of Ministers and Parliament. 
written questions were aimed at obtaining information. The number of questions 
asked was similar during the Labour government under both Lynes and Field. 
There were almost twice as many questions asked during the Conservative 
government (see appendix H. 2.2.1. ). The main difference was that whilst under 
Lynes, CPAG asked twice as many oral CPAG issue questions as written, during 
the Conservative government there were four times as many written (see 
appendices H. 2.2.2 and H. 2.2.3). There were three reasons why this should 
happen. 
Firstly as the issues became more publicised through CPAG's work and political 
interest in the issues of family poverty, it was to be expected that the number of 
questions would rise. 192 As Parliamentary question times are fixed, then the 
number of oral questions could not increase by very much and it was logical that 
more questions would have to be written. Secondly, as CPAG expanded and 
undertook more research its thirst for official data grew, thus the need for detailed 
written questions and detailed written answers. Thirdly, after 1970 CPAG was 
awarded a new potent weapon in the House of Commons: Michael Meacher. 
Meacher asked two hundred and ten questions during the Conservative 
government or a quarter of the questions relating to CPAG issues asked during 
that period. Although, Meacher did ask oral questions, to publicise issues in the 
189 A Journal devoted to social policy issues (see chapter 8.2) 
190 These were: Family Allowances, Child Tax Allowances when the question or comment as obviously in 
favour of their reduction or abolition in order to improve family allowances. Family and Child Poverty and 
any report or survey related to that (such as Circumstances of Families). Then questions w hich could ha% e 
been related to (although they may have just be inspired by or have been of interest personally to the 
polictican concerned) CPAG campaigns: the wage stop, the four week rule, the holiday rule, the six %keek 
rule (which prevented the voluntarily unemployed from receiving benefits), the minimum wage and low 
wages, the cohabitation rule, Treatment of claimants in social security offices, problems of fatherless 
families, heating grants (this was a CPAG campaign although it centred mainly on the elderly). 
191 The issues raised had been important to MPs before Lynes headed CPAG and t\. enty eight MP,; asked at 
least one question about such issues between 1 January 1965 and 31 July 1966 
192The effect of CPAG is impossible to disentangle from other factors such as government action. E. g. 
during 1967, there were three times as many questions but this was partially because CPAG was more 
established and partially because of the government's anti-poverty, programme of that `ear and devaluation 
which pro\ oked a number of spontaneous questions and attacks which are impossible to disentangle from 
CPAG questions. 
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House and force the Minister to justify policy, it was at gathering information that 
he was most adept. Nine tenths of his questions were written. 
Between November 1966 and July 1967, David Owen (Labour) was willing to ask 
questions for CPAG. In this early period, the questions were designed to raise the 
profile of family poverty; hence all his questions were oral. 193 Lynes remembers 
Owen as being useful not only was he very much on the "side" of CPAG, but 
because he was also particularly good at taking advantage of Parliamentary 
procedure like adjournment debates (Lynes interview). Using Parliamentary 
procedure, Owen applied for an adjournment debate the week of Christmas 1966 
to debate child poverty. He reprimanded the Labour government for allowin" a 
third Christmas with no action to help low income families (Hansard vol. 738 
21.12.66 p. 1446). Peter Archer (Labour), Mervyn Pike (Conservative Shadow 
Social Security) and Norman Pentland (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of 
Social Security) spoke in the debate (Hansard vol. 738 21.12.66, p. 1446-1460). 
Compared to most adjournment debates this was well-attended (Theakston 1987 
p. 135). 194 Owen's interest in CPAG waned after July 1967. 
However, there were other MPs willing to ask questions. Alf Morris initiated an 
adjournment debate in February 1968 on the stigmatising collection of school 
dinner money. As is normal with adjournment debates the Parliamentary Secretary 
for Education, Dennis Howell, answered it, (Hansard vol . 759 p. 
607-614). Frank 
Field remembers that eleven MPs, of whom seven were Labour, two Conservative 
and two Liberal, "' were willing to ask questions for him in Parliament. Seven of 
the MPs had also been asking questions relevant to CPAG during Lynes' time at 
CPAG. Some branches also had good contact with their MPs. The Manchester 
branch, for example, were able to persuade one local MP, Alf Morris, to ask a 
series of questions in Parliament. '96 
193 See Hansard 21.11.66,23.1.67,6.4.67,27.7.67) 
194 Theakston argues that adjournment debates are usually only a face to face discussion 
between the 
aggrieved MP and the under-secretary (Theakston 1987 p. 
135) 
195 Frank Allaun (L), Alf Morris (L), Dame Joan Vickers (C), John Pardoe (Lib), Dame Irene Ward (C) and 
Jack Ashley (L), Ken Marks (L), Joan Lestor (L), David Steel(Lib), Neil Kinnock(L) and Dennis Skinner (L). 
the last two never entered Parliament until 1970. Lestor had 
held a junior minister post under the Lahour 
government which explains her lack of questions. 
Steel's interest developed in 1970. 
196 Of seven questions, one was asked orally, two may 
ha\ e been re-v. orded and submitted . +- written 
questions and four were not asked at all (question-, 
from DBP). 
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Meacher organised an early day motion and got fifty Labour MPs' signatures 
(Hansard vol. 806 p. 281). The strategy of tabling an adjournment debate, started 
under Lynes, continued under Field. There were two adjournment debates in Mai 
and July 1972 initiated by Clinton Davies (Labour) and William Barnes (Labour), 
an active member of CPAG. 197 Both used CPAG evidence at their core (Hansard 
vol. 837 p. 1885-1900, vol. 840 p. 2166-2174). Clinton Davies drew attention to the 
practices of special investigators and their handling of cohabitation (a prominent 
CPAG campaign which had been reported in the press that month) (Times 10.5.72 
and Guardian 9.5.72). Barnes drew attention to the problems of people on the 
wage stop. However these debates failed to gain attention in the House of 
Commons similar to that of the Owen debate. Like the Morris debate only the 
Parliamentary Secretary responded and no other MPs contributed. It is likely that 
few MPs were in the chamber. Thus if adjournment debates were designed to 
attract MPs attention to the problems around poverty, then they were of limited 
use. Oral questions to the Prime Minister or Secretary of State in a packed House 
of Commons with reports in The Times were more effective in drawing attention 
to the issues and forcing Cabinet Ministers to respond. 
MPs have two main reasons for showing an interest in a subject, genuine concern 
and opportunism (Robinson 1992 p. 142). Certainly there is evidence of both 
behaviours in the questions and comments made by MPs. Owen and another 
Labour MP (Peter Archer) were willing to attack the family allowance up-rating in 
1967 as inadequate (Hansard vol. 753 p. 1095 and 1103). Three years later, Sir 
Brandon Rhys Williams (Conservative) and Dame Joan Vickers (Conservative) 
attacked FIS, calling instead for claw-back (Hansard vol. 806 p. 278, vol. 807 1229, 
1232). 
Both parties exploited the problem of family poverty whilst in Opposition with 
long Opposition sponsored debates in 1967 and 1972 (Hansard vol. 745 p823-936 
and 845 p. 639-748). The CPAG campaign against the Labour government 
in 1970 
was seized upon by Conservative front-benchers keen to embarrass the 
government. During the FIS debate, Labour front-bench spokespeople such as 
Shirley Williams criticised the bill strongly and was briefed by CPAG (2.11.70, 
197 Field cannot remember initiating any ajournment debates (Field 
1970). Howev er it i: highly likely that 
CPAG was aware of these debates given the extensive use of 
CPAG material. 
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file 4, box 65, PTA). During the Conservative government, Callaghan. who had 
tried to thwart the 1967 up-rating, became a member of CPAG. For a number of 
genuinely concerned MPs it was not possible to be critical because once their 
party was in power they were junior members of the government. 198 However. as 
Robinson argues, there is little value in spending time analysing motives. Those 
with opportunist interests can still be harnessed by the cause (Robinson 1992 
p. 142). It was to CPAG's benefit if the government (whatever party «was in power) 
was forced to justify its poverty policies. It also gave MPs sympathetic to CPAG a 
chance to debate the issue. 
Both Lynes and Field realised that CPAG had to be a non-partisan group, thus 
both wooed MPs from all the political parties. Some prominent Conservatives 
actively supported CPAG. However of those asking at least five questions on 
CPAG issues, three quarters were Labour MPs. The proportion of each was 
slightly higher whilst their party was in opposition. Although the number of 
Liberals in Parliament was very small, both John Pardoe and David Steele were 
particularly vocal on CPAG's behalf. Thus throughout the period, although CPAG 
did have support from all parties, its greatest advocates were Labour MPs. 
However, as CPAG was equally as diligent about informing Conservatives, 
worked through their back-bench committees (see below) and did have some 
prominent Conservatives as members, this imbalance in its Parliamentary 
advocates did not damage its non-partisan reputation. 
There were three more options open to CPAG in Parliament: the private member's 
bill, amending legislation and filibustering. CPAG did attempt to use the first. 
Townsend asked Alf Morris to insert in his private member's bill for the disabled 
a clause, which gave a special extra family allowance to disabled children. This 
Morris accepted. However the bill itself was unsuccessful (Townsend to Morris 
6.2.70, PTA). This was not surprising given that private members' bills, especially 
when they increased public expenditure, are rarely successful. However 
in this 
case few CPAG resources were expended and the inclusion of such a clause 
appears to have been opportunist. Townsend heard about the proposed 
bill and 
198 Seven Conservatives stopped asking quetions after 1970, however five of them 
had entered , o%ernment. 
In contrast eleven Labour MPs were asking far more questions, two of whom 
hid just left government. 
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saw an opportunity to help a sub-group of children. CPAG never pinned any 
hopes on this strategy. 
The government's decision to reverse the Simper case success in the High court 
(chapter see 5.2.1) in April 1973 was met by intensive CPAG lobbying of MPs 
and the Lords (New Law Journal 14.3.74 p. 237). CPAG was successful in 
persuading the Lords to introduce a generous clause, but this was overturned. 
CPAG used the Lords because there was no hope of an amendment being made in 
the Commons where the Conservative majority were obliged to vote against such 
an amendment. The government overturned the amendment in the Commons. 
However CPAG did succeed to a degree, the controversy over the clause caused 
by the Lords' amendment meant that the government exempted diet and heating 
allowances from being aggregated. These allowances were largely given to the 
elderly and disabled, the "deserving" poor (New Law Journal 14.3.74 p. 237). 
Thus amendments could only be made to government legislation if the 
government was embarrassed into not overturning them completely. 
Arranging for MPs to filibuster legislation that was contrary to CPAG's goals was 
not possible. It is only effective when the legislation is a private member's bill and 
can run out of time. However an important piece of government legislation is 
given what time it needs to became law. All the legislation, which was contrary to 
CPAG goals, was government sponsored and thus impossible to stop. To have 
tried would have merely created bitterness between the government and CPAG. 
7.2.3 Forming Links with the Back Bench Committees 
Back-bench committees are not official committees of Parliament. They are 
groups of MPs discussing their own party's policy (Grant 1995 p. 73). The back- 
bench committees of the party in power are most useful to a pressure group 
because the government expects to be attacked by the opposition but is always 
concerned about attacks from its own MPs. In addition, the committees 
have a 
direct line to the appropriate Minister (Davies 1985 p. 59). Back-bench committees 
were particularly significant for the Conservative Party, where they traditionally' 
were stronger (Grant 1995 p. 73). The various committees, 
including the 
committee for Health and Social Security (HSSC), were chaired 
by the relevant 
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shadow spokesperson whilst in Opposition and by a back-bencher whilst in po« er 
(Field 1982 p. 57). They were useful channels of Parliamentary Party opinion to 
the government. HSSC was chaired from 1970 by Mervyn Pike, a former junior 
minister, Opposition Spokesperson for Social Security and member since 1967 of 
CPAG. The Honorary Secretary was Sir Brandon Rhys Williams, a member of 
CPAG and a tireless advocate of child benefits (see appendix H. 2.2.4). Therefore. 
CPAG was incredibly lucky that not only had the chair experience of how 
government worked and knowledge of social security, but the honorary secretary 
was a strong supporter of their main policy. 
However the back-bench committees being an important channel to government, 
they were in the 1970s an untapped target for pressure group activity (Field 
interview). They were not even mentioned until recently in academic studies of 
Parliament. "' It was Field that started to use the HSSC of the Conservative Party 
whilst he was director of CPAG. He recognised that not only were they a way of 
shaping Conservative policy but more importantly a channel of information and 
opinions to the government (Field interview). CPAG had good access to the 
HSSC. Firstly because the HSSC was hungry for information on social policy so 
that it could formulate its policies independently of the government. Secondly, the 
barriers to entry were low and groups welcomed because of the lack of interest 
from other groups. Thirdly, Rhys Williams was honorary secretary and invited 
Lynes and Field to at least one meeting of HSSC (Rhys Williams to Field 
29.10.70 box 69, PTA). Given that no minutes of the meetings have survived it is 
impossible to judge how much influence CPAG was able to exert through the 
HSSC. 
Lynes had not used back-bench committees at all. He worked much more closely 
with individual MPs (Lynes interview). It is true that the Labour Party's back- 
bench committees were weak, however they might still have provided a useful 
channel to government. In addition, considering that the Conservative HSSC was 
being chaired by the Opposition Spokesperson and deputised by the future junior 
minister in DHSS (see appendix H. 2.2.4). it was an opportunity lost. As Labour 




developed stronger back-bench committees in the 1970s, Field exploited this 
avenue as well (Field 1982 p. 57). 
However, although the HSSC was a useful channel, it was the Chancellor and 
Treasury that held the purse-strings and controlled taxation policy (necessary for 
claw-back). Field argues that with hindsight, he should have concentrated more on 
the Treasury back-bench committee (Field 1982 p. 57). This may have been more 
difficult to influence, but it too was ignored by pressure groups in the early 1970s 
and would therefore have been amenable to at least talking to CPAG. Thus it 
appears this too was an opportunity lost. It was a case of a pressure group 
concentrating on its own Parliamentary "policy group" and missing the 
importance of the wider government structures. 
7.3 How Useful a Vehicle were the Political Parties and 
Parliament? 
CPAG's success at conference varied with its ability to secure "big names" for its 
fringe meetings. Large fringe meetings did give an impression of CPAG as an 
important and influential pressure group, which CPAG was keen to cultivate. 
However the growing interest of conferences in the problems of family poverty 
were more linked to CPAG's ability to conduct an effective media campaign 
about the problem. The 1973 attempt to use the labour conference to get CPAG 
policies onto the agenda was fairly successful and was innovative. However it 
could not guarantee the priority status of the issues. 
Although, CPAG had an overlap in membership with the SPSC, its influence over 
NEC policy was restricted. Even when CPAG's views were incorporated in one of 
the main policy proposal documents, the weakness of the SPSC meant that 
it did 
not become SPSC policy immediately. CPAG did manage to 
build up a good 
relationship with the CRUD, which was open to policy 
ideas. However its choice 
of Molly Meacher as its main liaison for the tax credit scheme was mistaken, 
given her left wing links. 
CPAG was extremely effective in its use of 
Parliament generally. It used 
Parliamentary questions to both obtain accurate information and to 
force ministers 
to justify their policies. In addition, CPAG's ability to put the problem of 
family 
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poverty back onto the agenda, meant that the Opposition exploited the problem to 
its and CPAG's advantage. Its use of back-bench committees could ha% e been 
more effective but the fact that CPAG was the first pressure group to contact such 
groups illustrates its innovativeness as a group. 
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8. Chapter Eight: CPAG's Success in using the Media 
In a democracy with a free media, one of the most important sources of influence 
is the media. Most people in the country had access to a television set or a radio. 
Many people read a newspaper. Views and opinions are formed from what a 
person reads. Thus the media was a key target for CPAG. However the media 
itself is a collective term for a wide range of broadcasting from soap operas to 
serious new programmes and from specialist and broadsheet press to easy-reading 
tabloids. The media can be national or local. What types of media did CPAG use" 
How did it use them? Why did it choose certain sections of the media? Which 
audiences did it seek to influence? Was it right to do so? How much success did it 
have in terms of exposure and good publicity for itsself and its issues? 
8.1 How Pressure Groups Target the Media 
In order to answer the above questions it is important to understand the ways in 
which pressure groups use the media. Firstly, the media gives a group publicity 
and attracts new members. This visibility of the group can be due to the group 
commercially advertising in the press, the reporting of a relevant event or a 
documentary on an issue (Grant 1995 p. 86). Secondly, pressure groups through 
the media can influence government by conducting a media campaign, which can 
oblige a minister to respond or persuade civil servants to give the matter some 
priority (Grant 1995 p87). Thirdly, pressure groups can influence the content of 
the media's output by helping to write articles or produce television programmes 
(Grant 1995 p. 88). Fourthly, when a story breaks the relevant pressure group may 
be asked to give a reactive response (Grant 1995 p. 87). In addition, pressure 
groups might use the media for information (Grant 1995 p. 87). Frank Field argues 
that this was the case for the CPAG. Field used the court page of the Times for 
listings of those invited to government receptions (Field 1981 p. 54). It was 
obviously an important use of the media but one that is difficult to evaluate. 
Finally, the media is helpful is by creating the necessary climate to influence both 
decision-makers and public values (Grant 1995 p. 87). This is impossible to 
quantify and evaluate and may be assumed indirectly if there is evidence of 
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visibility, influence, reactive response and content. 
8.2 What Media Did the CPAG Target and Why? 
8.2.1 Quality and Specialist Press 
Selecting an audience was important to the CPAG. Throughout the period it 
concentrated its efforts on the broadsheet press and especially The Times and the 
Guardian. CPAG also wrote articles for and letters to partisan journals such as 
The New Statesman, Tribune and Spectator200 and contributed to the specialist 
professional press (Streather interview). CPAG members and staff wrote columns 
for social work journals (Bull and Weir interviews). 
The reason why CPAG concentrated on the sections of the media was that they J 
were directing their attention to political elites, civil servants and informed 
opinion. They wanted to influence "the papers that politicians read" (Streather 
interview). CPAG was "not trying to address the poor, [CPAG] w[as] trying to 
address the government, it [was] the government's fault that they [were] poor... " 
(Veit Wilson interview). CPAG wanted to raise their visibility and the visibility of 
family poverty in such publications in the hope of influencing "those who made 
policy or who articulated their opinions to the government" (Veit Wilson 
interview). "In the beginning [CPAG] believed that if [they] could convince civil 
servants and ministers that a certain line of action was desirable, they could take 
the necessary measures"(Philp interview). Therefore a concentration on the 
broadsheet and specialist press was a logical course of action. 
CPAG used the broadsheet and specialist press in two main ways. Firstly to 
simply raise the profile of the problem of family poverty, which would help fix 
the politicians', civil servants' and later trade union leaders' attention on the 
problem. Secondly to influence the above through the content of press articles and 
also by conducting a campaign in the media. It was recognised by the CPAG that 
ministers, senior civil servants and trade union leaders get a lot of mail. Thus they 
might notice an article aimed at them in the press quicker than correspondence. 
CPAG identified that trade union leaders tended to read the Guardian and 
200 The New Statesman is sympathetic to the Labour Party, Tribune is sympathetic to the left ot the Labour 
Party and trades unionists. The Spectator is sympathetic to the Conservative Parte 
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therefore strived to get relevant articles in that newspaper (Field 1982 p. 54). In the 
case of politicians a media campaign was used in conjunction with 
correspondence to ensure that the politician read the mail, as s/he might be 
questioned about it in Parliament or publicly (Field 1982 p. 54). All policy civil 
servants and Ministers would have been given a synopsis of all the relevant 
newspaper cuttings each day. 
8.2.2 The Populist Media 
It is possible to detect a shift in approach towards reaching a wider audience. As 
early as November 1968 Philp argued that "there [had] been no growth of public 
support for higher family allowances nor any general movement to press for 
improvements in the situation of families with low incomes. " In fact there had 
been the opposite effect and that "... Ministers [were] now afraid that they have 
already taken praiseworthy action to meet a social problem ... only to 
have it 
misunderstood and indeed opposed even by the mass of their own supporters. " 
Philp's conclusion was that "CPAG needed to undertake a mass public relations 
campaign based on good research" (Philp memo 30.11.68, file 2 p. 1-2, PTA)201. 
Field reported in June 1972, that they had "needed to spread [their] net to cover 
the popular papers. " Richard Todd on the Daily Mirror (from 1973) was very 
interested in the work of the CPAG and gave good coverage to the CPAG. 
(Streather and Weir interviews). However, stimulating the interest of the more 
populist media was never as high a priority as maintaining and strengthening the 
interest of the "quality" press. 
The key reason for the shift towards the populist press was not only to raise the 
visibility of CPAG generally but also to seek to influence "the ordinary person on 
the street". There was also a need to try and balance the negative profiles of the 
poor being portrayed in the tabloids and to ensure that CPAG information could 
not be used in a negative way (Veit Wilson interview). However there was a third 
use of the tabloids and that was the use of them to gain information. The CRO 
used the Daily Mirror and the News of the World advice pages for cases and also 
discussed with the two papers what advice specials should be included in the 
201 Most of the other recommendations in this memo refer to the proposed merger %%ith 
Shelter and indeed 
one of the reasons why Philp was in favour of the merger was 
Shelter's expertise 
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papers. Therefore CRO gained cases and information from the newspapers and 
used the media to fulfil its secondary role of advice (Weir interview). 
The CPAG was also successful in broadcasting. At a national level this started 
with programmes aimed at informed people such as documentaries1°1. There was 
also main news coverage of the launch of The Poor and The Poorest. 103 Later 
they were able to get good coverage on programmes such as 24 Hours (Field 
1970a p. 11) and the popular early evening Newsnight (Weir interview). They also 
got coverage on radio political programmes. By the 1970s, however the shift 
towards the populist media had extended to broadcasting. The Jimmy Young 
show on Radio 2 was used not only to increase the group's visibility but also as a 
method of gaining material from the listeners (Field 1982 p. 53). According to Jane 
Streather in the 1970s she was "constantly seven days a week" speaking on 
national and London radio stations (Streather interview). As with the tabloids, the 
rationale behind talking on these stations was to maintain a high level of visibility. 
8.3 The Success of Press Releases 
A particular study was undertaken in order to establish the CPAG's effectiveness 
with the national press at achieving what Grant terms visibility and influence. The 
study consisted of taking a large number of CPAG press releases2°4 and checking 
three newspapers to see if the story on the press release was reported nationally by 
newspapers. The newspapers selected were The Times, the Guardian, and Sun. 
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The press releases covered the period from September 1966 (just after Tony Lynes 
became secretary) until the election of February 24 1974. 
Although no similar study of a pressure group has been made to compare with this 
study, two studies of the media were made in 1975 and 1976. Both looked at the 
202 In 1966 the CPAG was involved in working with its former part time secretary Gillian 
Holroyde on two 
programmes about poverty (secretary's report Essex archive). 
203 Peter Townsend and Brian Abel-Smith were both interviewed by ITV and BBC carried the story 
(Minutes 27 January 1966, file 1, box 65, Essex) 
204 The CPAG press releases used were those collected from the Peter 
Townsend Archive at the Univer'it, 
of Essex and those from Professor John Veit Wilson's private collection. 
The collection is most probably not 
complete, but it is impossible to estimate either the completeness or representatives of 
the press releases. 
205 The Times was at this time, a centralist to centre right broadsheet read 
by a number of people in power. 
The Guardian a centre-left broadsheet read by many in academia, trade unions and the 
Labour Party. Sun 
was a centre tabloid. Sun was chosen because 
it was like The, tlirror on the extreme populist ý% ing of the 
newspaper spectrum. The Sun was selected 
because according to a CPAG document "both Sun and The flail, 
particularly the former, now give the group good co,. erage. 
And The Mirror is at last becoming more 
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most of the national press and broadcasts for their respective years (Golding and 
Middleton 1982206 and McQuail 1977). They are both helpful for placing the 
whole issue of welfare within the media framework. Golding and Middleton 
conclude that "welfare is not big news"207 and this was supported by McQuail wti, ho 
showed that in 1975 social policy news made up only 3-4% of the news (McQuail 
1977p. 217). On average social security and welfare stories made up roughly a 
third of all social policy stories (Golding and Middleton 1982 p. 68). 
A second major finding to emerge from the study by Golding and Middleton was 
that unemployment benefit and social security abuses were the two most 
prominent stories (Golding and Middleton 1982 p. 69). However the earlier study 
by McQuail found very different results for 1975 (McQuail 1977 p. 235-7). This 
may partly be due to the different methods that the two studies used and partly due 
to the fact that scrounger-phobia was aggravated by the 1976 Deevy case. 
However both studies show that stories about social security, Family Income 
Supplement (FIS) and Family Allowances were scarce (Golding and Middleton 
1982 p. 70, McQuail 1977 p. 222). A third finding was that the papers varied a 
great deal in their coverage. Whilst most of the stories about CPAG were in The 
Times, the Guardian and the Daily Mirror, over half Sun's stories about social 
security and welfare were on its abuse (Golding and Middleton 1982 p. 71 and 73). 
McQuail argues that much of the difference in coverage between the broadsheets 
and the tabloids is due to space (McQuail 1977 p. 223). However his research also 
suggests that newspapers obtained their information from very different sources. 
The Guardian relied on pressure groups for 10.4% of its sources of information, 
The Morning Star for 20.4%, and Sun 8.2%. The Times relied far more on 
government reports208 (McQuail 1977 p. 232). 
It can be expected therefore that news specifically about the CPAG and its 
particular campaigns would make up a very small percentage of the stories. After 
interested" (Frank Field June 1972 Future CPAG Policy and Strategy: A Rejoinder Part T\wo p. 1 1, CPAG, 
PTA). 
206 This study included all the national newspapers except the . horning 
Star and The Financial Times, as 
well as the main BBC and ITN news broadcasts. It also studied the following local media: The Leicester 
Mercury, Sunderland Echo and BBC Radio Leicester, BBC Radio Vewcastle and Radio kfctro 
207 1976 was no normal year in the reporting of social security news. It was "the year of cuts" and 
scrounger-phobia sparked off by the Dec-,, case (Golding and \1 iddleton 1982 p. 59 and 61). 
208 It should be noted that Sun also relied heavily on government reports with them totalling 19., " of their 
sources (McQuail 1977 p. 232). 
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all in 1976 it was found that it made up less than 5% of social security and welfare 
stories. This made it "top of the pressure group league. " (Golding and Middleton 
1982 p. 71) However many of these stories may have been in depth articles 
commissioned by the newspaper and responses to stories that were breaking. 
Therefore these stories would not be covered by this study of the CPAG's press 
releases and the response to these by the national newspapers. 
The actual results of the study were that out of 130 press releases, 22 (or 17%) 
resulted in stories in The Times, 26 (or 20%) in The Guardian and 5 (or 4%) in the 
Sun. The immediate conclusion is that there was a huge difference in coverage 
between the broadsheets studied and Sun. A similar study of Daily Mirror from 
July 1972 supports the view that the tabloids were less interested. 209 Another 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the large majority of press releases were not 
successful. Only a fifth of press releases made it to the pages of The Guardian and 
a sixth to The Times. 
Golding and Middleton argue that welfare is only news when it obtrudes into 
other news areas such as crime, sex and politics (Golding and Middleton 1982 
p. 68). The press releases issued by the CPAG were grouped by topic (see 
appendix I) In many topic areas there simply were not enough press releases to 
make reliable conclusions. However the group was successful in getting their core 
policies into the press. 21° The largest category of press releases dealt with the 
issues around poverty, 211 of these just over a third made it to the papers. However 
most of these stories were in the broadsheets and not the tabloids. 
The Group was also successful in getting its stories about cohabitation in the 
press. The first press release on the issue on May 9 1972, was taken up by both the 
Guardian and The Times, but not by the tabloid press. However Sun followed up 
the next two press releases of December 17 1971 and July 11 1973. Sun 's interest 
209 This date was chosen because Frank Field in his memo of June 1972 argued that 
The 
. 
tfirror had onl\ 
just become interested. It is in the later period that one might expect more coverage from The Mirror. The 
Mirror in the twenty months covered actually had more stories that Sun in the 
full period of ninet\ months. 
However Sun did not cover a press release until December 1971, suggesting that tabloid coverage was ; 
Iov. er 
to obtain for press releases (except from the Christmas 
1965 release of The Poor and the Poorest which 
obtained coverage from a cross section of the media). 
210 Stories about poverty (poverty, family allowances, 
FIS, means testing and other benefits but not those 
related to housing) 
211 This category includes poverty, family allowances. 
Family Income Supplements, other benefits (except 
housing benefits such as rate and rent rebates) and means testing. 
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in the CPAG's press releases can partly be explained by The Sun 's and Dail. 
Mirror's independent interest in a topic, which combined sex and politics. The 
housing issue gained no interest from Sun or Daily Mirror but a third of all stories 
reached the broadsheet press. The fact that CPAG was fairly successful in getting 
attention for its stories about its relationship with the government is 
understandable because the people involved were well-known figures, who 
featured in the press anyway (Golding and Middleton 1982 p. 70). The issue of 
children being deprived of school meals during the school holidays is one issue 
where the tabloids showed more interest than the broadsheets. The story was 
ignored twice by Sun and Daily Mirror and finally made it to the front page of Sun 
on August 1 1973.212 Some of this late success could be due to timing. The 
previous two releases had been at the beginning of the summer holidays and in the 
Christmas holidays. The successful one came half way through the school 
holidays when there may have been more general sympathy for the problems of 
parents having to feed hungry children. All the press release about the problems of 
poverty in Northern Ireland and the draconian measures taken there failed to reach 
the press. This is not surprising as Northern Ireland was featuring heavily in the 
papers because of its political and paramilitary problems; the welfare situation 
simply could not compete. 
8.3.1 The Times' and New Society's Coverage of CPAG and Family Poverty 
However this study only investigated the effectiveness of CPAG's press releases. 
It is safe to assume that the CPAG also found its way into the national press 
through responses to stories that were breaking and influenced the content by 
writing articles for the press and writing letters. A survey was made of The Times 
index, 213 using the three index headings "Child Poverty Action Group", "Family 
Allowances" and "Poverty". 214 It was found that under these three headings were 
212 The Mirror also covered it on this date. 
213 The Times is the only national paper to be indexed by subject and therefore lends itself very well to this 
kind of survey 
214 Of course other headings such as rebates, "Family Income Supplement" and even members names such 
as "Peter Townsend" or "Tony Lynes" would also have been possibilities 
but it was felt that "Child Poverty 
Action Group", "Family Allowances" and "Poverty" would alone gi,, ea reasonable indication of the bulk of 
The Times coverage on the CPAG and its core interests. If the topic mentioned under povvert\ wa, ohviousl\ 
irrelevant (e. g. about world poverty) or about another pressure group 
it was ignored. The other stories about 
poverty however were retained and therefore this may overestimate the number of articles, stone: and 
leading articles about family poverty. When a store featured under more than one of these 
headings, it was 
it 
classified first as a "Child Poverty Action Group" stor, over the other two categories. 
In a situation's'. her, 
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two hundred and twenty two stories, articles, editorials, letters or Parliamentary 
questions, just under a third of these were under the heading "Child Poverty 
Action Group. " Given that the Guardian gained more of its stories from pressure 
groups and responded to more of CPAG's press releases it is highly probable that 
if a similar study was made of The Guardian, the number of stories would be 
higher. 
New Society was a weekly journal devoted to the field of social policy. During the 
period there were twenty-two articles about CPAG and a hundred and eleven 
articles about CPAG's main areas of interest. 21' Key CPAG staff and members 
wrote sixty-nine articles and letters which were published by the journal. As New 
Society was only weekly and its articles tended to be long and in depth, CPAG 
was gaining a great deal of coverage, particularly at sensitive times. During the 
1967 uprating debates and the 1970 election campaign CPAG had a high profile in 
the journal. However, generally after The Poor and The Poorest was published 
and CPAG was established, its presence in and contribution to New Society was 
guaranteed. The profile of poverty was given a boost when Lynes became a fairly 
regular writer for the journal after his departure for CPAG. 
8.4 Public Opinion 
Public opinion is notoriously difficult to measure. However what the government 
perceives to be the public mood influences its policies. Public opinion can be 
measured at two levels: opinion and attitude. The former is the more superficial. It 
may reflect deep held attitudes but is likely to be a spontaneous reaction to a 
particular event. The latter, however are deeply held perceptions, which structure 
the response to particular events. They change only slowly or in extreme 
circumstances (Grant 1995 p. 143). Although pressure groups may engineer events 
to sway opinion, Rose (1974 p. 254-5) argues that a pressure group will be most 
effective if it conforms to the cultural norms of society (i. e. the majority's 
attitudes). 
was not a "Child Poverty Action Group" story but featured under 
both "Family Allowances" and "Pw vert} ". 
it was classified as a poverty story. 
215 These were family poverty, family allowances, tax credits and the wage stop. 
These headin s 
encompassed most of CPAG's main areas of interest. 
The key staff and members %%ere EC members and staff 
members 
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During the period in question, the issue of child poverty had a fluctuating support 
from cultural norms but there was at the same time a gradual shift towards an 
acceptance that child poverty was a serious problem. Family allowances had been 
since the 1950s the most unpopular social benefit. In 1953 only 23% of those 
questioned wanted more spent on family allowances, 43% wanted less (Gallup 
1976 p. 295). Only defence was less popular. However the hostility towards family 
allowances did lessen throughout the 1970s. In 1967, the claw-back proposals 
were opposed by nearly half of all respondents, only twenty nine per cent were in 
favour (Gallup 1976 p. 924). However by 1974, half of respondents agree with a 
rise in family allowances and only a third were against (Gallup 1976 p. U 79). 
Views towards the poor could fluctuate considerably. In 1964 more people 
attributed poverty to circumstances rather than individual fault. In 1968, after 
devaluation when the economy was struggling, more people blamed the 
individual. By 1970 the pendulum had swung back (Gallup 1976 p. 740,1014, 
1117). 
However the main problem with CPAG's strategy was that tax allowances were 
always more popular than benefits with the average tax-payer. Although 61 % of 
people questioned in April 1967 about claw-back thought that it would make no 
difference overall, over half of all respondents disagreed with the idea (Gallup 
1976 p. 924). There was hostility on the part of tax-paying men in particular to the 
idea that their take home pay would decrease and their wives' family allowances 
would increase. The fact that this hostility had lessened by 1974 is demonstrative 
of the underlying shift. This shift cannot be just attributed to CPAG, however 
CPAG's campaigns may have been a contributing factor. 
8.5 CPA G Branches' Use of the Local Media 
The establishing of branches, led CPAG to the target of a different type of media. 
Local media is already aimed at a restricted audience. It has to take on the roles of 
both the broadsheet and the populist media. Therefore the branches were targeting 
and influencing a broader audience before the national organisation had much 
success with the national popular media. 
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Branch interviewees remember being on balance successful in their use of the 
media (Bull and Bradshaw interviews). The professionalism of some branches 
impressed the local newspapers and broadcasters and gave the impression that 
they were bigger and more important than they actually were (Bradshaw 
interview). Although Manchester had limited success with the biggest newspaper 
in Manchester, the Manchester Evening News, it was far more successful with the 
smaller papers such as the Wythenshawe Express (Bull interview, Manchester 
CPAG 1968 Annual report p. 4). It also got coverage from the more specialist 
Manchester Social Welfare News. 216 Manchester had an excellent relationship 
with BBC North West, a good relationship with Granada and with North West 
Radio (Bull interviews). "' York also gained good coverage from their local news 
programme Calendar North (Bradshaw interview), Bristol from the local ITV 
station (HTV), although the relationship with the local BBC station was poorer. 
Bristol also gained good coverage from the local newspapers: the Evening Post 
and the Western Daily Press (Bu112 interview). Other branches gained some media 
coverage. 218 
Another job of the local CPAG's was to correct any misrepresentations of both the 
poor and claimants in the local press. As the press became better informed of the 
problems of low income families, one hope was that scroungerphobia would not 
gain a strong following among the editors. However members of CPAG would 
look out for unsympathetic articles in the local press and correct them with 
readers' letters. 219 
The media needed to satisfy its audience's taste for sensationalism. Bristol CPAG 
put as much effort into publicising the need for much larger family allowances as 
it did in promoting its report of school uniform grants (Bristol CPAG minutes 
10.10.72, DBP). However whereas the media showed little interest in the former, 
the latter received enormous attention (see chapter 4.4.3). Therefore the media did 
216 E. g. vol 10, no. 2 Summer 1968; vol. 10, number 3, Autumn 1968; vol 11, no. 3 Autumn 1969. 
217 It is mentioned in the 1968 Annual report of Manchester CPAG that the most ambitious projects had 
been undertaken by the local BBC (p. 4). The large amount collected in fees by Manchester branch i, ý also 
proof of its success with the media. In 1968 the branch collected £65 in fees (Manchester CPAG 1 Qc,, ý 
Annual report p. 12). 
218 Merseyside gained good coverage for its Welfare Rights Projects and generally (NICPAG Annual report 
1968-9 p. 4&6). The newsletters of other branches suggest that they too ýk ere gaining coverage (Cambndcc 
PAG newsletter no. 1) (Wandsworth PAGWandsworth People's Rights no. 2, no. 10, no. 18) 
219 One such example is that of a member of the Manchester CPAG responding to a scroungerphobic anicle 
in the Ashton Under Lyme Reporter (2.8.68, David Bull's Private Papers) 
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give a skewed impression of CPAG's activities locally. This added to an 
impression that CPAG was interested in welfare rights and improving take up, 
rather than lobbying to reform the system in favour of universalism 
The main problem for the CPAG in its relationship with the local media, was the 
problem that it had with reaching the provinces generally. Only a few branches 
were active and effective at doing their job and many areas of the country had no 
effective branch. Therefore, whereas local CPAG's were able to raise the profile 
of the organisation in some areas, the picture nationally was patchy. 
8.6 How Effective was CPAG in using the Media and Influencing 
Public Opinion? 
CPAG was on balance extremely effective at using the media to get its message 
across to the political elite. It was able to get its stories and coverage by the 
specialist and broadsheet press, particularly The Guardian. However, CPAG was 
never as effective at getting coverage by the tabloid press. This was partially 
because the tabloid press was less interested in "serious" news but also because 
CPAG saw influencing the political elites as its main role. 
However, there was always a risk with this strategy that the political elites would 
be persuaded but would be unable to carry their grass roots members (and in the 
case of the government, the electorate) with them. The hostility of key Labour 
voters to claw-back was just one of example of the government accepting CPAG's 
argument but its grass roots not understanding or accepting the argument. 
However, by 1974 CPAG had made some progress with the populist media and 
there was a shift amongst the electorate to favouring higher family allowances 
even if this meant changes to the child tax allowances. The Poor and the Poorest 
and the Poor get Poorer under Labour were two campaigns, which were 
successful in all sections of the media. It was media campaigns like these and the 
more general campaigning, which gave it such a high profile in Parliament, in 
Whitehall, at political conferences and trade unions congresses. 
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9 Chapter Nine: Trade Unions and Other Pressure Groups 
This chapter focuses on the relationship CPAG had with other pressure groups. 
The first section concentrates on the relationship with the trade union movement. 
The next section discusses CPAG's relationship with other pressure groups, that is 
other small promotional pressure groups and more radical representational groups. 
The fundamental questions being asked about both these organisations are: firstly 
why did the CPAG want to develop a relationship with it, what was it hoping to 
achieve? Secondly, how successful was the CPAG in developing a relationship 
with the organisation? 
9.1 The Trade Unions 
Trade Unions operate both individually as separate unions and collectively as the 
Trade Union Congress (TUC) which has the General Council (GC) at its pinnacle. 
The GC is advised by a number of policy committees which send their own 
representatives to meet ministers. The trade union movement operates on not only 
a national level but also a local level with trade councils in most towns and also 
local branches of individual trade unions. The TUC was potentially of great 
importance to small pressure groups like CPAG. It was one of the two big 
producer groups and had easy access to ministers. It was one of the few groups 
that was able to join more than one policy community, having influence in the 
economic and social ministries. Its special relationship with the Labour Party also 
made it a valuable ally. 
This section will concentrate on the attempts to build a relationship with the 
TUC's GC, although there will be references to sympathetic trade unions. The 
first section will concentrate on the CPAG's national office's relationship with the 
national trade union movement. The second section will comment on the 
relationship between CPAG's local branches and the local trade union movement 
(full chronological details can be found in appendix J. 1) . 
9.1.1 The CPAG's Attempts to Liaise with the Trade Union Movement at a 
National Level 
The CPAG's relationship with the trade unions has been analysed 
by McCarthy in 
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both his thesis (1981) and subsequent book (1986). Using the theories of 
Perlmann and Richter he argues that unions will only become interested in politics 
beyond the market place when they are under threat (McCarthy 1986 p. 171-3 ). 
Despite In Place of Strife, 220 the unions were essentially not under threat from the 
Labour government because of the close relationship between the unions and the 
Labour Party (McCarthy 1986 p. 175). He argues that despite sporadic attempts by 
the CPAG, it was mostly unsuccessful at establishing links with the trade union 
movement. However, it was not only the lack of interest from the unions that was 
to blame. CPAG's own attempts were sporadic and half-hearted for the most part 
(see below). McCarthy has offered three reasons for this. 
Firstly, CPAG as a small organisation had limited resources and thus could have 
little influence over the unions. Secondly, Tony Lynes' personal style and the 
group's early faith in ministerial links meant that the available resources were not 
channelled into contacts with the unions. Thirdly, lack of natural contacts with the 
unions meant that working with them was not easy. Resources channelled into 
making contact with the unions would not see a pay-off for a longer period of time 
in comparison to the resources being spent on the media or Parliament (McCarthy 
1986 p. 178-80). McCarthy argues that the later increase in the group's financial 
and staff resources and the different style of Field meant that a relationship 
between CPAG and the unions, although never as close as with other institutions, 
did develop. It is the aim of this section to evaluate McCarthy's thesis by asking 
two questions. Is it true that CPAG was only marginally effective in building 
contact with the unions under Lynes? Was there a real improvement under Field? 
9.1.1.1 Under Tony Lynes' Tenure 
At the same time as CPAG was formed the Social Insurance and 
Industrial 
Welfare Committee (SIIWC) of the TUC's GC was pressuring the government on 
the problem of family poverty. As early as October 
1965, it was agreed that 
representations should be made to the Minister 
for higher family allowances and 
an inquiry into the wage stop (SIIWC 13.10.65, 
TUCA). The following July this- 
was followed up with a memorandum to the 
Minister that advocated higher family 
allowances to ensure that workers with children were able 
to benefit from earnings 
220 Barbara Castle's proposals to curb trade union power 
in 1908 
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related benefits (SIIWC 13.7.66 TUCA). 22' After a meeting with Houghton in 
March 1967, when it was hinted that the government might be looking for a 
means tested solution to family poverty, the SIIWC moved towards a claw-back 
scheme. This scheme would give the second child eighteen shillings and the third 
and subsequent twenty shillings (SIIWC 9.3.67 TUCA). Papers on the topic of 
claw-back were circulated at the SIIWC's July meeting (SIIWC 12.7.67 TUCH) 
and the seven shilling increase of that year was criticised for being too small 
(SIIWC 11.10.67 TUCA). The SIIWC continued to pressure the government on 
the issue of family poverty throughout 1968 and 1969, despite the Chancellor's 
arguments that higher family allowances through claw-back would increase the 
tax pressure on families (SIIWC 10.1.68,10.4.68,14.5.69 TUCA). 
Despite this considerable amount of interest on the part of the SIIWC, there was 
very little contact between the TUC and CPAG. Until 1967, there was nothing but 
half-hearted talk about links with the TUC on the part of CPAG. Trade unions 
were included on the list of target organisations in July 1965 (EC minutes 17.7.65, 
file 1, box 65 PTA) but there was no real contact. In June 1967, a trade union 
sub-committee came to nothing (Secretary's report June 1967, file 1, box 65, 
PTA). A request for TUC funding was unsuccessful (12.7.67, TUCA). As an after- 
thought a leaflet, written for social workers explaining the wage stop, was sent to 
trade unions branches as part of the 1967 campaign. The greatest success of this 
leaflet was to introduce CPAG to a number of local trade councils for the first 
time. 222 
It was in the summer of 1967 that CPAG made the first break through with the 
trade unions. Frank Cousins, a former Secretary General of the TUC and Labour 
Cabinet Minister, wrote for Poverty arguing that CPAG and the TUC had 
complementary roles and that family allowances had a role to play in adjusting 
wages to family size (Cousins 1967 p. 6). However this success was not 
followed 
up and the TUC declined an invitation to the Family Allowances 
Conference (EC 
minutes 13.9.68, file 2, box 65, PTA). The hope of winning a contract 
for research 
-'21 This refers to the fact that there was a ceiling of 
85°a of net earnings on earnings related benefit.;. Thi: 
meant low wage earners with a number of children could not 
be given the earnings related addition. although 
they had contributed for it, as their benefits would then 
be higher than their normal wakes. 
2-'2 Gloucestershire Trade Council wrote to the General Secretary of the 
TUC asking if he could "comment 
and advise [as to] who are the Child Poverty 
Action Group" 0 .11.67 
TUCA) 
201 
from the National Union of Miners came to nothing (EC minutes 4.10.68. file ?. 
box 65, PTA). 
The lack of contact with the trade unions sparked concern from Iain Jordan of 
SPAG. He developed in spring 1968 an action plan to encourage better links. He 
advocated: a leaflet for trade unionists explaining CPAG's common aims: a memo 
for all branches on how to persuade their local trade council to affiliate with them 
and inviting trade councils directly to meetings with CPAG nationally (EC 
minutes 24.5.68, file2, box 65, PTA). Only the second was ever implemented by 
the EC when they asked the Appeals Committee (AC) (which had been set up to 
raise funds) to encourage branches to get trade councils to affiliate. This directive 
was ignored and the AC continued to concentrate on social work groups with 
which it had enjoyed success in the past (AC minutes 29.7.68, file 2 box 65, 
PTA). It took until February 1969 before it finally suggested that branches 
encourage trade unions to affiliate (AC minutes 20.2.69, file 3, box 65, PTA). 
Even if the AC had encouraged local branches, the spread would have been 
sporadic across the country and there would have been problems of contact for the 
same reasons as for national CPAG (see below). The first and third options were 
not followed up largely for reasons for expense and time. When lain Jordan left 
the EC shortly afterwards, any commitment to form real links with the trade union 
movement also left the EC. 
Thus the period 1965 to early 1969 was flavoured by a distinct lack of interest 
from both the TUC and the CPAG in each other. Only Jordan tried to form some 
links but he was very much a single voice with few practical, effective ideas on 
how to bridge the gap. At one level, it looks as if McCarthy was wrong about the 
TUC lack of interest in family poverty. Family poverty and family allowances 
were discussed fairly regularly by the SIIWC and similar ideas about claw-back 
were developed by 1969. However the SIIWC was only one committee of the GC 
and thus only one committee with which ministers spoke. It was also in not a very 
powerful position regarding family allowances. There was no demand for better 
family allowances from the rank and file. In fact, the issue was not discussed at 
congress at all except in reports from the GC (Report of the Trade Union Congress 
1965-1969). Thus, the only support that SIIWC had for their plans was their 
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research not the demands of actual unions. The government was easily able to 
point to the tax implications of claw-back. Whereas all trade unionists hoped to 
become pensioners and therefore felt strongly about the value of pensions. only a 
minority had dependent families. Trade unions had historically been ambivalent to 
family allowances (Land 1975 p. 186). Thus the real issues for congress and for the 
individual unions remained union rights, pay and pensions. 
There were two possible reasons why CPAG did not form good links with the 
trade union movement before 1969. Firstly, they did not see the GC per se as that 
important an institution in gaining higher family allowances. CPAG knew that 
SIIWC was pressuring the government quite independently but achieving very 
little. Without any mandate from the Congress itself the GC was unable to exert 
its full influence on ministers. It was reduced to presenting arguments as to why 
higher family allowances were desirable in the same way as CPAG, although with 
more status. If the GC was to have strength in its negotiations with government 
then CPAG needed to persuade the Congress of the need for higher family 
allowances to combat the problem of family poverty. The second main problem 
was that most of CPAG's EC came from a social work or increasingly an 
academic background. There were few good contacts with the trade unions (Philp 
interview). The trade union movement's view was that it had been established a 
century earlier to combat poverty and deliver a decent standard of living to all 
workers. It did not need to work with a pressure group to continue this goal. 
Although there was an increasing acceptance within the GC that higher family 
allowances were necessary, for most trade unionists the main issue was higher 
wages. 
CPAG's focus being a relatively low profile insider group (although still using the 
media and Parliament) meant that it concentrated its efforts on the government. 
There were good contacts with ministers and the Labour Party. CPAG was a tiny 
group with a small budget. Priorities had to be made. CPAG preferred to use its 
meagre resources to focus elsewhere. 
9.1.1.2 Under Frank Field's Tenure 
McCarthy argues that trade union relations under Frank Field were more 
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successful because of the attack on the unions by the Conservative government, 
that led to the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 and because of the change of 
leadership inside CPAG (McCarthy 1986 p. 184). As far as the TUC itself is 
concerned the interest of the SIIWC became a reaction to policy rather than taking 
the initiative from 1970 onwards. The SIIWC was naturally interested in the FIS 
proposals, which it opposed (SIIWC 9.11.70,9.12.70 TUCA). It also continued to 
advance claw-back arguments until 1971 (SIIWC 9.11.70,13.1.71, TUCA). From 
1972 most of the attention focused on tax credits and the SIIWC worked with the 
Economic Sub-committee of the GC on the issues around which parent should get 
the credit and at what level the credits should be paid (SIIWC 13.12.72 14.3.73, 
11.4.73,10.10.73). Crucially, the interest of the TUC and the trade union 
movement in family poverty generally increased during this period. A motion 
calling for attention to be paid to "problems of poverty arising in families of low 
paid workers and pensioners... " (TUC 1970 p. 649) was carried at the 1970 
congress. A more specific motion for the replacement of child tax allowances with 
significantly higher family allowances was remitted223 (TUC 1970 p. 653). These 
were followed by motions for higher family allowances, which were carried in 
1972,1973 and 1974 (TUC 1972 p. 499-500 1973 p. 484 and 1974 p. 444-450). 
The change in the stance of the congress may have been partially due to the 
publicity around family poverty in the lead up to the 1970 election. However it 
was probably more to do with the fact that a Conservative government had been 
elected. Although FIS was announced too late for the congress, there was a fear 
amongst trade unionists that the Conservatives would introduce means tested 
schemes. It was the dislike of means testing which spurred the TUC into action in 
November 1970. Jack Jones representing the Transport and General Workers 
Union (TGWU) along with representatives from two other unions and nineteen 
social service pressure groups (including CPAG) urged the government to 
reconsider its plans particularly around family poverty (CPAG press release 
4.11.70, box 70, PTA). This was a major coup for CPAG. The campaign even 
won support from Vic Feather, the General Secretary of the TUC and there was 
some correspondence at this time with the TUC about Family Income Supplement 
223 When a motion is remitted it is sent back to the relevant GC committee for consideration. 
204 
(FIS) (McCarthy 1986 p. 193)224 
However not all the improvement in the relationship between CPAG and the trade 
unions can be explained by the fact that the Conservatives won the election. 
increasing the likelihood of attack on the unions and means testing. The 
relationship had begun to improve when in April 1970 a joint letter was sent from 
CPAG and a number of unions to the Prime Minister urging action for poor 
families (EC minutes 18.4.70, file 4, box 65, PTA). At the AGM in April 1970 
Giles Radice of the General Municipal Workers Union (GMWU) spoke after 
Ennals (AGM 19.4.70, file 4 box 65, PTA). It was these initiatives that led to the 
arranging of an exploratory meeting between union research officers and CPAG 
with the aim of "forg[ing] greater links between the group and the union. " 
In retrospect, the period from April 1970 to December 1971 was the high point in 
CPAG's relationship with the TUC. The joint campaign against FIS fizzled out 
after its great launch. There was some co-operation between individual unions and 
CPAG in a campaign against the SBC's treatment of the workshy (EC minutes 
25.6.71, file 5, box 65). Nicholas Bosanquet, a researcher at the LSE with good 
trade union connections, who wrote for Poverty (Bosanquet 1971 p. 2-6), and Giles 
Radice of the General Municipal Workers' Union (GMU) acted as two of the main 
contacts. The relationship advanced slowly and cautiously but did result in another 
exploratory meeting in September 1971. There was no immediate effect but it was 
all an exercise in gaining a better understanding of each other's positions 
(Bosanquet in McCarthy 1986 p. 219). 
The improvement in the relationship was very gradual, for which there are a 
number of possible explanations. Firstly, CPAG became more interested in the 
unions. After the failure to extend claw-back in 1969, and the inactivity of the 
government (in public) in relation to the problem of family poverty, CPAG 
needed to look to influential groups outside Parliament and the government. 
The 
unions, which had successfully fought off the In Place of Strife proposals and 
were advancing the needs of pensioners, were the obvious allies. 
The unions were also becoming easier to make contact with at a national 
level. 
224The author was unable to locate any of this correspondence 
in the TUC's archi\ es. 
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The big unions were increasingly employing graduates with similar backgrounds 
to CPAG employees as researchers. It was with these researchers that Field made 
contact and worked to arrange meetings, not the union leaders per se. The 
researchers were interested in wider policy but had also been trying to make clear 
to CPAG that it needed to look beyond social security policy and see the wider 
economic picture of not just wages but also employment levels and their 
sustainability (Bosanquet 1971 p. 2-6). However the researchers were themselves 
only on the outside of trade union policy making and the relationship could only 
progress slowly. 
In addition, CPAG made efforts to prove that they understood the views of the 
unions and included a demand for a minimum wage in the 1970 memorandum 
Poverty and the Labour Government. CPAG also used the Guardian to try and get 
their message to trade union leaders. Field asked to speak to Jack Jones and other 
union leaders whilst they were being driven between meetings (Field interview), 
demonstrating to the unions that CPAG was serious about wanting to work with 
them. 
The unions were also interested in working with other groups to oppose the 
Conservatives plans for more means testing to which they were diametrically 
opposed. However the GC's interest faded as FIS became a reality. SIIWC kept up 
its opposition for longer. The most important change however was that the 
congress itself was becoming interested in the problem of family poverty. 
Previously, any action on family poverty by the GC had originated from the 
SIIWC. However in 1970 and from 1972 onwards motions for better family 
allowances and more help for the low paid was originating from the congress 
itself. To an extent CPAG's work in keeping family poverty a live issue 
particularly throughout 1970 contributed to its higher profile amongst the 
politically active whether they be the TUC or the political party activists. 
However, the progress was thrown into disarray by the publication in December 
1971 of The Poverty Trap in The New Statesman. In this article, Field and an 
academic researcher, David Piachaud, argued that low paid worker', with children 
were trapped into poverty by the means testing system. This meant that wage rises 
could result in very high rates marginal rates of taxation. As taking the poor out of 
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the trap could mean the need for pay rises of 40 to 50%, the authors suggested that 
a better solution would be for trade unions to make improvements in benefits part 
of the negotiations (Field and Piachaud 1971 p. 791). The article was logical from 
the point of view of a group dedicated to gaining the best income for poor 
families, however it went against the all the main beliefs of trade unionism. Trade 
unions existed to gain the best wage deals for all their members. The underlying 
belief was a worker's right to earn a decent wage, at the end of the day, for him 
and his family to live on (Jones 1972 p. 7, Gee and Hartwell 1971 p. 860, 
McCarthy 1986 p. 201). 225 In other words, the family wage for which trade 
unionists had fought for a century (Land 1975 p. 167). If benefits were taken into 
account that would be the first step to the means testing of wages. In any case 
unions did "not negotiate directly with the government but with the employer" 
(Donnet and Lipsey quoted in McCarthy 1986 p. 201). 
In fact, the deal of the government improving social benefits and the trade union 
movement restraining wage demands that CPAG was advocating was accepted in 
1973 by the unions as part of the Social Contrac? 26 with the Labour Party. In 
return for modifying wage demands, social services would be improved by the 
government. Yet, in making such concessions to the Labour Party the unions were 
in a position of strength. The fact that such proposals were made by a small group, 
with no understanding of how wage negotiations, happened at a time when the 
unions had little trust in the government made the chances of success slight. 
CPAG itself recognised its relative ignorance in this field and Field agreed that the 
next members of staff employed should be a trade union liaison officer (Field, 
June 1972, file 7, box 65, PTA). She was appointed in April 1974. 
There were links being established on a personal level by Field, who had a good 
relationship with David Basnett of the GMWU and Terry Parry of the Fire 
Brigade Union (FBU) (McCarthy 1986 p. 226, Streather interview). In addition, he 
had links with John Edmunds and wrote a great deal in trade union journals 
(Streather interview). Later the group's attendance at the Labour Party 
725 Trade unions still concentrated their efforts on the male worker. 
226 An agreement signed by the Labour Party and the 
TUC in 1, )-, 3 which promised wage restraint in return 
for improvements in social benefits. 
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conferences"' and some of the women's TUC meant that more formal links with 
trade union representatives started to be developed (Streather interview, report of 
1972 and 1973 Labour conferences files 7 and 8, box 65, PTA). Although this was 
not a cohesive policy towards the trade unions, at least it was a link with the 
unions, which could be built upon by a future trade union liaison officer. 
9.1.2 CPAG and the Trade Union Movement at a Local Level'`g 
In general, the branches of the CPAG were not hugely successful in forming links 
with trade unions and trade councils. Manchester, one of the oldest and biggest 
branches failed to impress the Manchester Trade Council (Bull, intenviewww). 
However the Oldham Trade Council did affiliate in 1968 (Manchester and District 
Branch, Newsletter, December 1968 p. 5). The Branch also gave talks to seven 
trade unions and trade councils in 1968. This was nearly half the political 
organisations that they spoke to that year, but this was an abnormally high 
proportion and was not repeated in 1969 (Manchester CPAG Annual Report 
1969). The branch did start to form some local links with National Union of 
Public Employees (NUPE) and National Union of Teachers (NUT)229 and had a 
couple of meetings in 1971 with these unions, the local branch of DHSS and two 
professional groups230 to try and co-operate on welfare rights and the introduction 
of FIS. NUPE agreed to try and persuade more trade unions to co-operate 
(Manchester and District Branch, Newsletter, December 1968 p. 3). The branch 
also had reasonably good links by 1970 with USDAW which had its head quarters 
in Manchester (Bull interview). 
In Bristol, there was an attempt to establish links with the local trade council when 
the branch was established in 1971-2. This attempt also failed due to lack of 
interest on the part of the trade council (Bu112 interview). The only real success 
was a link with NUPE that was established when a representative from the local 
NUPE branch spoke at the branch's second inaugural meeting (Bul12 interview, 
727 The group had been holding fringe meetings at Labour Party conferences since 
1967. What was different 
about Streather and Weir's attendance was that they attended the whole conference 
in their CPAG capacity 
and even distributed briefing notes. 
228 For most of the archival information on branches, I am indebted to 
Mr. David Bull and Professor John 
Veit Wilson. 
229 The meetings also included representatives from a number of voluntary group' . 
230 British Association of Social Workers and Education Welfare Officers 
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CPAG Newsletter no. 5, June 1971). 231 
Other branches periodically established some links. Clydeside made some "useful 
contacts" with the Glasgow District Trade Council, The Northern Irish CPAG 
meanwhile held a joint meeting with the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions. This meeting aimed to publicise the activities of the 
group and discuss matters of common interest. Merseyside reported that it was 
able to give advice to social workers and trade union officials on appeals (Branch 
Newsletter, December 1968, no. 2). In 1971, four branches reported to the 
Branches Council (BC) that they were co-operating with the trade union 
movement on specific policy issues232 (BC minutes, 16.5.71). 
CPAG branches did form periodic links with the trade union movement over 
specific policies but not strong, continuous links. 233 Certainly trade councils were 
resistant to CPAG branches (Bu112 interview). If the evidence from Bristol and 
Manchester is typical, then the national office's request for branches to encourage 
trade councils to affiliate can only be described as naive. It was not just that the 
trade union movement was uninterested in CPAG, CPAG branches appear not to 
have considered the trade unions movement a priority. There is very little mention 
of trade councils or unions in the various branch newsletters or in the minutes of 
the Branch Council meetings. 234 
There were two main difficulties with branches being used to form local contacts 
with the trade union movement. The first problem was the spatial inequality in the 
spread of active branches. CPAG branches certainly did not cover the country 
evenly and the spread was constantly changing with branches opening and others 
becoming dormant. Most, although not all, were centred on university towns and 
231 The group was set up once (January 1971) and then for some reason collapsed. It was after Exeter %k as 
set up (November 1971) also using a NUPE representative as an inaugural speaker that Bristol was re- 
established later (in early 1972) (Bu112 interview) 
232 Edinburgh was working with trade unions on wages councils, York on FIS, Tyneside with the trade 
council on school meals and Exeter was still in negotiations with its trade council about co-operating on the 
trade council survey of low pay. 
233 The evidence on branches is scant but from what exists of branch newsletters, minutes and local branch 
newsletters and reports this is the conclusion that can be drawn. 
234 There is very little mention of trade councils and unions in the newsletters. Wandsworth 
for example 
only mention trade unions in connection with Claimants Unions (Wandsworth 
Poverty Action Group 
newsletter no. 5 October 1971, no. 6 November 1971, no. 8 December 
1971, no. 9 (4th) Februiry 197 2, no. 10 
(24th) February 1972, no. 16 August 1972, no. 17 (ist) September 1972, no. 18 (27th) September 1972 no. 19 
October 1972) Cambridge Poverty Action Group also never mentioned trade unions or councils in its 
surviving newsletters (no. I June 1971, no. 5 autumn 1972, no. 
6 winter 1972/3, no. 10 summer 74) 
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this was not necessarily where the most active and open trade councils and trade 
union branches were to be found. This was a problem that the CPAG national 
office was unable to solve. 
The second was that preventing a closer relationship between the national office 
and the trade union movement nationally. Branches were dominated by 
professionals (especially social workers and academics) and the same sorts of 
people dominated the chairs and secretaryships of the branches (Worsfold 1971 
p. 344 and 342). Again these people had no experience of the trade union 
movement and no contacts within it. The trade union movement at a local level 
was even more suspicious of middle class professionals than at a national level. It 
also saw itself as the natural and legitimate protector of working people's rights 
and living standards. 23' For their part many branches preferred to liaise with 
groups with which they already had contacts such as the local Labour Party236 
professional social work groups and local voluntary groups237 (Worsfold 1971 
p. 338). Welfare rights and having a direct impact on poverty also consumed a lot 
of branches' energy, 
9.1.3 Conclusion. 
The TUC was a powerful organisation but CPAG was mostly ineffective in 
building a relationship with it and the trade union movement in general. The 
relationship did temporarily improve between 1970 and 1971 and CPAG was able 
to establish some links with the trade unions research officers and with the public 
sector unions more generally. Whereas CPAG had good links to the Labour Party 
and Parliament through an overlap of membership, it had few natural contacts 
with the trade union movement. The trade unions movement's ambivalence to the 
topic of family allowances and its lack of interest in CPAG meant that CPAG 
particularly under Lynes chose to channel its resources into the media, Parliament 
235 This was made very clear by the leader of the trade council in Manchester to Da% id Bull. He argued that 
the trade council had been fighting poverty for 100 years and did not need groups like the CPAG (Bull-) 
interview). It was also made clear by Mr. A. W. Allen of the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers 
at the 1970 TUC. Whilst commending Shelter and the CPAG he argued that "We must not allow the 
initiative to be taken from us... " and although the voluntary groups were doing a "... splendid... " job "... it 
still means that the central problem of defending the wages of the workers of this country belongs to the trade 
union movement" (TUC 1970 p. 650). 
236 As 85% of branch executives responding to Worsfold's survey supported the Labour Party there w ere 
very good contacts with this group. 
237 E. g. Councils of social service, community relations councils, Shelter and e%en pre-school pl iv-group 
associations 
210 
and the Labour Party where it knew it would get a return on its investment. 
However, the TUC independently promoted policies similar to those of CPAG 
even if it did not support CPAG. The SIIWC pushed for a similar scheme to 
CPAG from the mid 1960s. The Social Contract committed the Labour Part, 
under TUC pressure to a programme of social reform. The general shift in 
attitudes described in chapter 8 also affected the TUC congresses. Congress had 
shown little interest in family allowances in the 1960s, yet in 1970 there was a 
much longer debate about poverty. CPAG might not have been persuading the 
trade unions directly, but its influence over the media and its contribution to the 
shifting of attitudes played an indirect role. 
9.2 CPA Gs Relationship with Other Groups 
Working with and through other pressure and interest groups is a further way in 
which groups operate. The main advantages are that when unlikely bedfellows 
join together, they demonstrate to the government that there is a broad-based 
feeling on this issue. As campaigns can be expensive it means resources can be 
shared (Whiteley and Winyard 1987 p. 105). However the disadvantages are that 
the discussions between the groups are often time consuming, one group acting 
irresponsibly can embarrass and damage all involved and well organised groups 
often have to use their resources to help the less well equipped (Whiteley and 
Winyard 1987 p. 105-6). 
There were two main types of relationship: formal co-operation between the two 
groups and informal links through membership overlap. Both were important at a 
national and local level. With regard to formal relationships there were essentially 
three periods and in each a different sort of relationship dominated. In the first 
year of its existence CPAG had a close relationship with its "parent bodies", the 
SEAC and FSU (see chapter 3.2). Between 1967 and 1969, CPAG had a close 
relationship with Shelter and a good relationship with other social policy single 
issue pressure groups. In the 1970s this close relationship with other groups 
changed to shallower relationship focused on campaigns. At the same time, a 
relationship with the NFCU started to develop through the 
CRO and Legal 
Department. At branch level, relationships with other groups depended on the 
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local personalities and relationships. Some of the branches were in practice 
behaving as servicing organisations for self-help groups (see chapter 4.1.5.3). This 
sub-section will explore how and why CPAG developed its links and why its links 
with other groups altered over time. 
9.2.1 Relationship with other Single Issue Social Policy Pressure Groups 
CPAG had a reasonably good working relationship with a number of single issue 
social policy pressure groups and some professional organisations. In 1967 and 
1968 it participated in the signing of joint letters238 and in 1970 it sent a joint 
memorandum to the Chancellor with the NFOAPA (CPAG and NFOAPA 1970). 
As early as December 1966, representatives from Shelter, DIG and the National 
Council for the Unsupported Mother and her Child (NCUMC) spoke at CPAG's 
teach-in. In addition, CPAG not only agreed to co-operate with the National 
Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) on the issue of children's rights (EC minutes 
10.11.67, file 1, box 65, PTA) but was also part of an attempt to co-ordinate anti- 
poverty groups in June 1968 (EC minutes 14.6.68, file 2, box 65, PTA). 
Between 1967 and 1970, the group with which CPAG had its strongest links was 
Shelter. Its director was on CPAG's EC and the two groups shared a platform at 
the 1968 Liberal and Labour conferences (see chapter 7.1.1.1). In addition 
Shelter's director gave some informal financial support to the CPAG, placing at 
least one expensive advert in Poverty (EC minutes 14.2.68, file 2, box 65, PTA) 
and meeting most of the costs at the 1968 conference fringe meetings (Des Wilson 
interview, EC minutes 13.9.68, HWP). However after the failed merger attempt in 
1969, the relationship cooled, although Des Wilson and Townsend shared a 
platform in the debate against Crossman in 1970 (see chapter 6.3.1). 
CPAG co-operated closely with other groups for several key reasons. Firstly in the 
1960s most of these groups were new and small. CPAG had only been 
formed in 
1965, Shelter in 1966, and DIG in 1966. Therefore it made sense for the groups to 
co-operate. As there was public apathy towards 
family allowances and the poor, it 
238 Letter to Michael Stewart dated December 1 1967 from CPAG, 
Shelter, DIG and the National Council 
for the Unmarried Mother and her Child (NCUMC) and 
letter to Minister of DHSS March 1968 signed by 
the following social policy single issue pressure groups: 
CPAG, DIG, Association for Improvement in the 
Maternity Services, the professional Groups, Association of Family 
Case Workers, Association of Medical 
Social Workers, The Consumers' Group and The Patients' . Association. 
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was sensible for the CPAG to link themselves with groups who attracted more 
public sympathy, like the disabled and the elderly. Hence the joint memorandum 
in election year between the CPAG and the NFOAPA. As all the groups got 
bigger and more complex in their own right, the need and possibility of co- 
operating got more difficult, 239 especially as changes in directors meant that 
personal relationships had to be renegotiated. 
9.2.2 CPAG's Informal Links 
CPAG had links though its EC membership with a number of other organisations. 
Firstly through Harriet Wilson (and to a lesser degree Walter Birmingham) CPAG 
had links with the SEAC. These links were important for the first year but 
gradually faded. However Wilson did write in The Friend on a number of 
occasions, educating further the Quaker community on the problems of poverty. 
Secondly through Philp and Rankin there were links with the FSU. The FSU was 
also active in some of the local branches. Thirdly, through the social workers on 
the early committee there were links to various social work groups and 
associations. These links were strengthened in the early years by Lynes and Olea 
Smith's attendance at the Generic Social Work Conference (Secretary's report 
November 1966, file 1, box 65, PTA) and co-operation with the Social workers 
section of the SMA over a conference (EC minutes 7.12.66, file 1, box 65, PTA). 
However the relationship both informal and more formal with the social work 
community declined nationally throughout the 1960s as the number of social 
workers involved declined (see appendix E. 3). CPAG also had informal links with 
the National Council of Women and the National Association of Mental Health 
through overlapping EC membership. There is no evidence that these links 
inspired any real dialogue with the organisations concerned. At the same time as 
the CPAG was losing informal links with some pressure groups it was gaining 
them with others. Townsend was heavily involved with the Disability Alliance 
and this created a good link between the two groups. 
240 
9.2.3 Relations with the Claimants Unions in the 1970s 
239 CPAG had by 1970 23 branches, Shelter 3-50 
240 Townsend was one of the founders of Disability Alliance. 
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At a local level some branches had good relations with CUs. Wandsworth and 
York both started CUs in their areas (WPAG newsletter no. 5,31.10.71, BC 
minutes May 16 1971, JVWP). CPAG's York branch had a reasonably good 
relationship with Joe Kenyon who spoke to the York branch's CU when it opened 
and also attended a day conference on welfare rights in York (BC minutes 10.7.73 
JVWP). However although sixty people were reported to have attended the 
opening meeting of the York CU, it was not a big success as people were reluctant 
to be labelled as unemployed or poor (BC minutes 16.5.71, JVWP Bradshaw 
interview). In Bristol and Tyneside there were much poorer relations between 
local CPAG's and CUs (Bull and Veit Wilson interviews). In Tyneside the CUs 
saw the CPAG as patronising, middle class and reformist and had little contact 
with them (Veit Wilson interview). The national CPAG did encourage CUs to 
pass cases onto CPAG branches and the CRO/Legal Department. 24' 
There was even hostility between some CUs and the CPAG. Bill Jordan a lecturer 
at the University of Exeter was closely involved with the CU in Newton Abbott. 
He attacked the CPAG arguing that they had advocated something along the lines 
of FIS. This Townsend strenuously denied. (Letter to Bill Jordan 2.4.73, file 7, 
box 65). The source of Jordan's argument appears to have originated from The 
Poor and the Poorest in which Abel-Smith and Townsend included in their list of 
possible solutions the extension of what was then NA to full time workers, but 
acknowledged the disincentive effects. However Poor and the Poorest never 
favoured one particular solution (Abel-Smith and Townsend 1965 p. 65). 
CU branches did however approach CPAG for help. When only small amounts or 
old equipment were at stake, CPAG obliged (EC minutes 12.2.72, 
file 6, box 65. 
PTA). However, the relationship was always fragile. One example of the mistrust 
is CPAG's inability to support a CU, which asked for substantial funding for a 'van 
and petrol (North Staffordshire CU to Townsend 5.5.71. 
file 5, box 65. PTA). 
Townsend advised them to set up a front organisation to attract grants and offered 
to write to the press on their behalf (Townsend to 
N. S. CU 25.571 file 5. box 65, 
241 Townsend noted in late 1970 that he would ask the 
BC to agree in principle to cases coming from the 
CUs and he would tell the branches that they may pass them on. 
He would also write to Joe KenN on v ith a 
list of branches and addresses (hand-written notes 
late 1970, file 4, box 65 PTA). Birmingham CU asked the 
Legal Department for help in 1970. 
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PTA). The CU reacted angrily accusing Townsend of trying to associate the CU 
with himself or CPAG. It argued that a front organisation would mean ultimately 
"sell[ing] out to the system and [those] that want only a few very minor changes 
in it. " Other CUs were warned to be on their guard in case they were approached 
by Townsend (Meeting of NFCU 1971, file 4, box 65, PTA). Clearly, despite the 
fact that often the CUs and CPAG were working on the same issues and for the 
same groups of people there was a fundamental distrust. CPAG were concerned 
that the CUs lack of organisation and conflict approach would reflect badly on the 
"acceptable" CPAG and the CUs were concerned that CPAG might try to buy 
their support. 
9.2.4 The Relationship between CPAG and Other Pressure Groups 
CPAG's earliest and closest relationships were with its parent group the SEAC, 
social work groups and other similar pressure groups like Shelter. However the 
cooling of the relationship with Shelter and the tilting of the EC away from its 
social work roots led to the forming of links with other groups. CPAG aligned 
itself successfully with pressure groups such as NFOAPA and Disability Alliance 
on a number of occasions benefiting the attractive clienteles of these groups. The 
decision of the national CPAG to distance itself from the Claimants Unions was 
shrewd. The lack of discipline within the CU movement and their outsider status 
meant that they had the potential to embarrass themselves as a movement and any 
other groups associated with them. At a local level the connections with CUs 
might have had some benefits but risked the local CPAG's as well as the national 
CPAG's reputation. It was to CPAG's advantage that most of the links were short- 
lived at a local level. 
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10 Chapter Ten: The Origins and Effectiveness of CPAG as a 
Pressure Group. 
This chapter seeks to answer the two key questions that this thesis set itself. 
Firstly, drawing on the analysis in chapters 2.2 and 3.3, section 10.1 will offer an 
explanation as to why CPAG emerged as it did, when it did. Secondly, drawing on 
the framework offered in chapter 2.3 and the analysis of chapters 4 to 9; section 
10.2 will assess how effective CPAG was as a pressure group. Finally, section 
10.3 will offer some suggestions for further research. 
10.1 The Origins of CPAG 
It is clear that the environment was ripe for the emergence of single-issue pressure 
groups like CPAG in the 1960s. Although it is not true that pressure groups 
replaced political parties as the vehicles for change, it is clear that there was a 
growing recognition that they could complement political parties in achieving 
certain goals. Changes in higher education and social work meant that there was a 
growing group of professionals informed and interested in the problem of poverty. 
The rediscovery of poverty provided the catalyst for bringing the interested 
professionals together. They realised that pressure would need to be brought to 
bear on the government both directly and through the media, Labour Party, TUC 
and Parliament. In order to do this, there would need to be a formal group which 
was willing to have a high profile. Thus, it became clear that neither the SEAC 
nor the informal group based around Tony Lynes could fulfil that role and a new 
group needed to be formed. 
10.2 The Effectiveness of CPA G 
A framework for measuring efficiency and effectiveness has been discussed in 
chapter 2.3. It was argued that whereas efficiency can be measured using a clear 
model developed from models offered by Whiteley and Winyard (1987), Grant 
(1995) and Hall et al (1975), effectiveness is more difficult to assess. The 
assessment of effectiveness can only be made by using the evidence offered in 
chapters 4 through to 9 to answer the questions raised in chapter 2.3.3. taking into 
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account the efficiency of the group. This section is divided into two main sections. 
The first (10.2.1) uses the efficiency model offered in chapter 2.2 to evaluate 
CPAG. The second (10.2.2) offers an evaluation of CPAG's effectiveness. 
10.2.1 The Efficiency of CPAG as a Pressure Group 
10.2.1.1 The Political, Social and Economic Environment 
The formation of the DHSS and the direct representation of the new department in 
Cabinet should have been beneficial to CPAG. CPAG was well-known, even by 
1968, within the MSS and its views were considered by civil servants and 
ministers. The Social Security Minister, keen to promote the need for higher 
family allowances, was restricted by her lack of influence over the Cabinet. Yet, 
the appointment of the Cabinet heavy-weight, Crossman, did not bring the hoped- 
for benefits. Crossman was pre-occupied with other issues and thus it became 
clear that having a voice in the Cabinet was only an advantage if the Secretary of 
State was willing to fight for better family endowment. Herbison had been 
effective because she was personally concerned with the problem of child poverty. 
She used CPAG as much to further her own campaign for better family 
endowment, as it used her to further its campaign. 
The structure of government meant that the MSS/DHSS had to be persuaded of 
the need for action and of the right course of action to take. The Minister or 
Secretary of State would take the government lead. Yet, at the same time the 
Treasury, which controlled government finance, had to be persuaded both to 
provide the funding and the legitimacy of linking the taxation and benefits 
systems. CPAG increasingly attempted to make contact with the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer but with limited success. Although Jenkins was less opposed to claw- 
back than his predecessor, he too accepted the Treasury wisdom that tax 
allowances were not a social benefit but an adjustment of liability according to 
responsibilities and that the cost of family allowances should 
be decreased rather 
than increased. The 1968/9 Treasury's interest in family endowment was 
driven 
by the desire to cut costs. The Tax Credit Scheme linked the two systems of tax 
and benefit together. However, this policy was 
due to the strong commitment of 
the Conservative Cabinet to a NIT. The strength of the Cabinet was able to 
override Treasury reservations in 1972. 
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CPAG was able to work with both the main parties when they were in power. 
Both the Wilson and Heath governments were committed to the Welfare State. 
The Conservative government was evidently concerned about the problem of 
poverty. However, whereas the Labour Cabinet showed itself to be against means 
testing and its supporters at conference confirmed this view, the Conservative 
Party was ideologically in favour of selectivity. CPAG therefore had to adapt its 
policies to try and convince the Conservatives of the economic disadvantages of 
means testing. Field refused to give in to his own left wing and campaign on 
issues of inequality. Instead, the campaign remained committed to better family 
allowances and a minimum wage, which could be introduced without overturning 
the whole benefit system. Yet, despite these tactics, the Conservative government 
used means tested solutions to ease the problem of poverty until 1972. The 
poverty trap debate, of which CPAG was part, reinforced the Conservative 
government's own concerns about the disincentive effects of means testing. The 
tax credit scheme may not have been a response to CPAG but CPAG was part of 
the debate, which discredited means tested alternatives. 
There were competing claims on the government from other pressure groups. 
Naturally, no government could fulfil the demands of all the pressure groups at the 
same time, as Labour warned. However, CPAG believed that its best strategy was 
to promote its own cases as effectively as possible and only formed short-term 
relationships with other groups, such as NFOAPA, which offered an attractive 
client group. This also protected it from the risk of take-over. It is not possible to 
make a judgement as to whether CPAG made the right decision in not merging 
with Shelter. Certainly, a merger could have resulted in the issue of poverty being 
marginalised by the issue of homelessness. Yet, expert EC time was wasted on 
administrative and campaigning issues and CPAG lacked the skills to lead a 
populist campaign until the 1970s. 
The economic constraints of both the Wilson and Heath governments meant that 
both governments were restricted in what they could do. It was 
imperative that 
CPAG kept the net costs of its proposals down to low net increased levels of 
expenditure. Thus by promoting claw-back, which cost a 
fraction of a general 
increase in family allowances, CPAG was showing itself to be realistic. This 
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realism paid off in 1967/8, when despite the need to cut expenditure Labour raised 
family allowances. Yet, the claw-back of 1967/8 meant that unless the 
government also raised tax thresholds through increasing child tax allowances, the 
scope for claw-back was almost exhausted. CPAG's failure to recognise this 
meant that it was unable to offer any realistic alternative to FIS. 
There were social constraints on the government in the form of public opinion. 
Despite the fact that the government's knowledge of public opinion was limited, 
what the government perceives to be the opinion of key groups (such as target or 
marginal voters) in the months preceding an election is important. Thus the 
general unpopularity of family allowances and the popularity of tax allowances 
made claw-back a difficult choice to make, especially as it was a policy that was 
not easily explained to the public. The growing acceptability of family allowances 
in the 1970s, partially because of CPAG's campaigns made it easier for the 
government to take action. 
10.2.1.2 Internal Factors 
Becoming a formal group was a fundamental decision for CPAG, if an 
unconscious one. It was formal status that gave CPAG access to members and 
funding, which it needed if it was to carry out a protracted campaign. The decision 
to become a charity was successful from a financial viewpoint. CPAG's relatively 
slender financial resources throughout the period made its ability to attract grants 
from charitable trusts crucial. 
CPAG developed an efficient internal structure, which created a good balance 
between accountability to its members and autonomy for the director, EC and 
chair. The limited democracy did mean that the EC was held accountable and that 
the members had to justify their re-election. On the other hand, its limited nature 
meant that the experienced and expert oligarchy, so respected by the government, 
remained in power and the group was saved from take-overs. Co-option further 
enriched its expertise. The erosion of the early balance of the practical skills of 
social work professionals and the theoretical knowledge of academics 
led to a 
dominance of the latter. The equilibrium was restored by the practical experience 
gained through welfare rights work from 1969. 
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10.2.1.3 Domain Organisation 
CPAG was in competition with other pressure groups for national members who 
would pay their annual subscription and read Poverty. Passive members could 
afford to be members of several organisations. The opposite was true for active. 
local members, who often owed their first loyalty to another group. This led to a 
high turnover of branch memberships and large numbers of dormant branches. 
This was a problem for CPAG as it caused it to lose expertise. 
10.2.1.4 Strategies 
CPAG clearly attempted to use and communicate with the legal system, Whitehall 
and the SBC, the political parties, Parliament, the media, the trades' union 
movement and other pressure groups. Its effectiveness in using these channels of 
influence was affected by its own efficiency in communicating with them and by 
the structure of the other institution. 
CPAG was highly successful not only at being visible in the broadsheet press but 
also in determining the content, being used as a response to government action 
and therefore influencing the government and determining the climate. Except for 
the Poor and the Poorest campaign, which attracted support from all sections of 
the media, CPAG did lack the ability in the 1960s to attract much attention from 
the populist press. Although it was trying to influence the political elite, its 
inability to explain its policies to the wider population meant that claw-back was 
resented by ordinary voters and trades unionists. The government was obliged to 
pay attention to its own party rank and file and the wider electorate, especially key 
voters. However, through building better links with the tabloid and local press in 
the 1970s, CPAG was able to widen its appeal. This may have contributed to the 
detectable shift in general public opinion towards greater tolerance of higher 
family allowances paid for by tax adjustments. 
The media was clearly CPAG's greatest weapon. Herbison 
found CPAG's media 
campaigns useful as a political lever in the 1967/8 up-rating of 
family allowances. 
The attack on Labour in 1970, led to the Macleod pledge. 
The only negative 
aspect about CPAG's high profile in the media was that 
it (and in particular its 
more populist wing) tended to concentrate on the sensationalist and often welfare 
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rights aspects of CPAG's campaigns. This could skew the public's perception of 
CPAG's objectives. 
CPAG was very efficient in its use of Parliament. Throughout the period CPAG 
was able to persuade sympathetic MPs to ask helpful questions in Parliament to 
challenge ministers and to elicit information. Tony Lynes was extremely 
successful at arranging for sympathetic MPs to ask oral questions, set up 
adjournment debates and use early day motions, all of which were designed to 
challenge Ministers about their policies. This strategy of asking oral questions) 
continued under Field. Written questions aimed at eliciting information from the 
government greatly increased once Meacher had been elected to Parliament. 
Parliamentary questions consumed negligible resources for CPAG but could 
provide accurate information, which was not available elsewhere. The fact that 
some MPs used CPAG's campaigns in Parliament as a vehicle for furthering their 
or their party's own objectives raised the profile of poverty as an issue and CPAG 
as a group in Parliament. Although it is not possible to objectively evaluate 
Field's contact with the Conservative's HSSC back-bench committee, it is clear 
that this was an influential channel and one, which was receptive to CPAG 
arguments. However, CPAG might have benefited from making this contact 
earlier and also making contact with the Treasury back-bench committee of both 
main parties, given the Treasury's power. Yet, overall CPAG was generally highly 
effective in its use of Parliament and despite its limitations it was one of the first 
pressure groups to use the back-bench committees as a channel of influence. 
Outside of Parliament, CPAG was more effective in making contact with and 
influencing the Labour and Liberal Parties than the Conservative Party. CPAG 
realised that it was going to have a better reception at the Labour and 
Liberal 
conferences and concentrated its resources on these, attending the 
Conservative 
conferences in a much smaller capacity. Many of the 
delegates knew of CPAG 
because of its high profile in the media and the growing 
debate around the issues 
of family poverty, rather than its presence at their conferences. 
Although, the 
attempt to use the Labour conference as a channel 
for influencing the manifesto 
was successful at getting resolutions passed, there 
is no evidence that the changes 
that CPAG pushed through were prioritised by the 
NEC. It is an example of 
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CPAG using a system very efficiently to at least get the Party to accept its 
policies. CPAG failed to capitalise on the relationship it had with the parties' 
central committees and research departments. Thus CPAG could be innovvativ-e in 
its use of the political parties as a channel for influence but failed to capitalise on 
all the opportunities open to it. 
The attempts to work with the TUC were almost a complete failure, as most 
interviewees acknowledged. The sporadic attempts by Lynes were followed by 
unsuccessful attempts by Field. Just as CPAG was making some progress, the 
Poverty Trap debate exposed the huge rifts between trade unionism and CPAG. 
The TUC was a strong force in the Labour government and a powerful opponent 
to the Conservative government. Certainly, CPAG made little effort to understand 
trade unionism and trade unionism was hostile to the middle class experts, which 
it perceived to be the composition of CPAG. Yet the failure was softened by the 
fact that the TUC was pressuring government independently to raise family 
allowances and cut or abolish child tax allowances throughout the 1960s and 
shared CPAG's antipathy to means tested benefits. 
CPAG's welfare rights strategy had a mixed effect on its efficiency as a pressure 
group. The national welfare rights strategy was undoubtedly successful in building 
up an expertise in welfare benefits and providing a service to poor people and 
other welfare rights groups. Representing claimants at tribunal offered often the 
opportunity for CPAG activists to effect immediate (if small) success. This, they 
found rewarding and gave them some satisfaction. The strategy added value to 
CPAG's campaign for improving family allowances in four ways. Firstly, the data 
and case studies of poverty added quantitative and qualitative evidence. This was 
seen as evidence by the government that CPAG was in contact with the poor. 
Secondly, the literature produced by the Legal Department and CRO became a not 
insignificant source of income for CPAG. Thirdly, it was easier to attract funding 
for welfare rights services than lobbying. Thus it provided useful evidence (which 
strengthened CPAG's legitimacy for the government). Finally, welfare rights 
protected CPAG's charity status, which offered considerable tax benefits. 
However, there were two key risks associated with CPAG's welfare rights 
strategy: that welfare rights would distract CPAG's attention 
from lobbying and 
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that it would create the impression that welfare rights was the way to abolish 
poverty. The first risk was only partially managed. The CRO and Le-, -,, Il 
Department were separate from the rest of CPAG and separately funded. Thus 
staff resources were not significantly diverted into welfare rights acti\ its'. 
However in the branches the opposite was true and resources were diverted. 
The second risk was very difficult to manage because the media not CPAG were 
in charge of the media agenda. Thus, press releases about CPAG's welfare rights 
work were eagerly seized by the media (and in particular the populist and regional 
press) whilst information about CPAG's lobbying activities did not reach print. At 
a national level the fact that CPAG and its welfare rights wing were kept separate 
was important. Increasingly, CRO took on the cases, which were unlikely to 
evoke public sympathy (e. g. cohabitation, prisoners' rights to benefit). At a local 
level, this separation was less clear and had a negative effect on public perceptions- 
of CPAG. 
One area in which CPAG was very effective was in producing welfare benefits 
advice literature. This literature was used by other welfare rights advice 
organisations, social workers and some lawyers to provide a basis for 
understanding what was increasingly becoming a complex system. By 
understanding what claimants were entitled to receive, CPAG was successful in 
undermining the discretionary system further. 
Thus the welfare rights strategy is complicated. In contributing towards CPAG's 
key objective it had a mixed effect, although on balance it was probably more of 
help than hindrance. Increasingly, welfare rights became an objective in itself, 
although at the level of lobbying against the increasing use of means-testing as the 
method of targeting help and against the use of discretion, rather than individual 
case work for its own sake. The test case strategy designed to challenge discretion 
and local office interpretation of benefit rules resulted in little success, despite the 
huge expense. There was, however always a tension in CPAG as to 
how far 
welfare rights was a lobbying issue in its own right and to strengthen the case 
for 
universal family allowances and how far it was a service to the poor. 
This was 
never resolved at a local level. 
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Field argued that in order to be effective a pressure group needed to be focused. 
However CPAG did campaign on a number of wider issues related to social 
security benefits. It is clear that the wage stop campaign had a direct bearing on 
family allowances. The large numbers of people on the wage stop in the 1960s 
illustrated that many families with children were unable to have a standard of 
living comparable to NA/SB whilst in work. The wage stop could only be 
abolished if something was done to improve the income of families whilst in 
work. Although CPAG campaigned for the abolition of the wage stop it knew that 
the wage stop could not be abolished unless the social wage for those in work was 
increased. Thus success in persuading the government to abolish the wage stop 
was inseparably linked with persuading the government to improve support for 
families in work. 
CPAG had an effective relationship with the SBC. Even though the SBC was 
unable to accept CPAG's views completely it was willing to consider them, which 
was quite a feat for such a small pressure group. Certainly in the 1960s, the SBC 
made a number of small changes to policy after CPAG insider and media pressure. 
However the SBC was a willing target, the Secretary of the SBC had already 
made changes and many of the commissioners were sympathetic to at least some 
of CPAG's views. 
Clearly, CPAG had insider status within the MSS/DHSS. The links that Lynes, 
Townsend and Abel-Smith had with Labour ministers meant that there was a close 
and at times even co-operative relationship between CPAG and the Social 
Security Minister. However, this close relationship was not able to prevent Labour 
introducing policies, which curtailed benefit entitlements, as well as improving 
welfare benefits. Field never had these links and the reluctance of the government 
to take the measures further meant that, although CPAG retained its insider status, 
there was a need to force the issue back onto the agenda of preoccupied 
government. The distance created between CPAG and the Labour government 
by 
the Poor get Poorer under Labour demonstrated to the Conservatives that 
CPAG 
was non-partisan and led the way to the building of a good relationship with the 
Conservative government. 
The change in secretary/director did affect CPAG's tactics. 
CPAG had clearly 
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always been a high profile group using the media and Parliament but the tone of 
the Field leadership was more confrontational than Lynes'. Clearly the change in 
Minister and Labour's declining public interest in the problem of family poverty 
were also important. The election of a Conservative government with which 
CPAG had no natural contacts meant that CPAG had to change its contacts. 
10.2.2 How Effective was CPAG? 
Section 10.2.1 has explored how CPAG used the resources available to it during 
the period. This section assesses how effective CPAG was as a pressure group 
using the framework set out in chapter 2.3.3. This framework establishes two 
different measures of effectiveness. The first is to measure CPAG's achievements 
against its objectives. The second is the way in which CPAG as a pressure group 
was perceived by the people in power. 
10.2.2.1 CPA Gs Effectiveness in Achieving Its Own Objectives 
The objectives of CPAG changed over time and new ones were added. Some of 
CPAG's objectives carried more weight than others. However it is possible to pick 
out the key objectives and evaluate to what extent CPAG was able to succeed in 
realising them. The key objective for CPAG throughout the whole period was to 
persuade the government of the need to raise family endowment for the poorest 
families by increasing universal family allowances and reducing tax allowances 
for children. Although the amounts increased during the period, the basic 
argument remained the same. However, from 1968, CPAG became increasingly 
more interested in the issue of welfare rights. A core argument of CPAG's was 
that means tested benefits (to which both Labour and Conservative government 
resulted more and more in order to target help on the poorest) created disincentive 
effects, never reached large numbers and were stigmatising. CPAG therefore 
campaigned to prevent help to poor families being offered in the 
form of means 
tested benefits, and if it was offered in the form of means tested benefits that these 
benefits should be as of right, and not at the discretion of the 
benefit office 
decision-maker. More specifically CPAG led campaigns to abolish or reform 
specific benefit rules, in particular the wage stop and the cohabitation rule. 
CPAG was set up to campaign about the child poverty 
identified in the Poor and 
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the Poorest. The group agreed that the best way of doing this without stigmatising, 
or creating work disincentives was to raise family allowances from eight shillings 
for the second and ten shillings for the third and subsequent child to twenty five 
shillings and thirty five shillings respectively, with a ten shilling allowance for the 
first child. This would be paid for by reducing the child tax allowances. In 1967/8, 
the government doubled family allowances with claw-back. In 1970, family 
allowances were not increased but FIS, a means tested benefit for working, 
families was introduced. In 1972, the Conservative Party's tax credit scheme 
offered a child tax credit of £2 for each child and the Labour Party signed up to 
child benefit (a tax-free universal benefit to replace family allowances and child 
tax allowances) as part of the social contract with the TUC. 
In chapter 2.3.3, it was argued that a pressure group's effectiveness in persuading 
the government can be measured at two levels. A pressure group needs to 
persuade the government that there is a problem worthy of its attention. It is 
harder however, for a pressure group to succeed at the second level of persuading 
the government that its solution to the problem is the optimum. In 1967, CPAG 
persuaded the government that there was a problem. The huge publicity around 
The Poor and the Poorest initiated the debates within government. Although, 
CPAG's solution was the one adopted, it was the fact that the Trade Unions and 
many in the Labour Party were unwilling to agree to the alternative of means 
testing that claw-back won the day. 
In 1970, the Conservative government was keen to do something about family 
poverty and quickly. The credit for this urgency can be placed firmly with CPAG. 
It was CPAG that pushed the issue back onto the agenda with its attack on 
Labour's record and elicited a promise form the Shadow Chancellor that the 
Conservatives would use claw-back to improve family allowances. Yet, the 
Conservative government realised that claw-back would be difficult because of 
the way in which tax thresholds had been eroded. Unlike, the Labour Parts', there 
was no historic dislike of means-testing as a method of targeting 
help. Thus 
although CPAG was highly effective in persuading the government of the 
problem, it was unable to persuade it of the solution. 
By 1974 both of the main political parties were signed up to an amalgamation of 
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family allowances and child tax allowances, which would be paid to the main 
carer. The amounts suggested were roughly equal to those advocated by CPAG. 
The Conservative Party became increasingly convinced of the disincentive effects 
of means-tested benefits and was keen to tidy up the tax and benefit systems. The 
Labour Party was keen to make a deal with the trade unions that in exchange for 
social benefits (including non-means-tested help for working families) wage 
inflation would be limited. CPAG did its part in keeping the issue of family 
poverty on the agenda and in persuading the Conservative government that 
means-tested benefits created disincentives. However, it is clear that in the 
development of both the tax credit scheme and child benefit CPAG was only one 
of the influences. 
The 1970 polemic Poverty and the Labour Government drew attention to the 
problems of relying on means-tested benefits as a solution to poverty. CPAG's 
success in reducing the importance of means-testing in the social security system 
was mixed. The tax credit scheme devised by the Conservative government would 
have reduced the reliance of large numbers on means tested benefits (although the 
poorest and the self-employed would have remained dependent on means-tested 
benefits). Yet both Labour and Conservative governments increased the number of 
mean-tested benefits whilst in power. Discretion in means-tested benefits declined 
because of the sheer expense in training staff to make such decisions but also 
because SBC, under pressure from CPAG, started to produce guidance on rights to 
social security benefits and CPAG's own publications made claimants and social 
workers more aware of the minimum standards of benefit to which they were 
entitled. CPAG was clearly part of the more general movement to make social 
security more of a right to which people were entitled. 
The wage stop and the cohabitation rule were not abolished before 1974. Despite 
the good relationship between CPAG and the SBC the successes were 
limited. 
The wage stop was softened but CPAG was unable to persuade either the 
SBC or 
the government to significantly alter some of its 
key benefit rules. The good 
relationship had few short-term pay-offs. 
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10.2.2.2 Perceptions of CPA G's Effectiveness 
Whiteley and Winyard used the opinions of those in pressure groups or observing 
pressure groups from within Parliament to assess their effectiveness. The view of 
CPAG members about CPAG is that it was extremely effective during this period, 
given the resources available to it. More significantly civil servants and politicians 
believed to be a pressure group to which it was worth listening. In general it was 
CPAG's high profile campaigns which attracted the attention of the press which 
brought them to the attention of government. The Poor and the Poorest campaign 
brought CPAG to the attention of the Cabinet and Prime Minister. The Poverty 
and the Labour Government campaign attracted the attention of Ennals and to a 
lesser extent Crossman. However, it was CPAG's welfare rights work, proving 
that they were at least in touch with the people on whose behalf they spoke 
combined with its academic credentials which convinced Dean as a junior 
minister that they were a group to which it was worth talking. Thus CPAG were at 
their most effective when they could harness the power of the media to create high 
profile stories. Yet, increasingly, the steady record of work and expertise made 
CPAG a key part of the social security policy community. 
10.2.2.3 How Effective was CPAG in Relation to its Resources? 
CPAG was clearly an effective group, which by 1974 had contributed to an 
environment in which it was mainstream politics to increase family allowances by 
abolishing child tax allowances. The influence of CPAG in the doubling of family 
allowances and the introduction of FIS was not insignificant. Although the use of 
means testing as a method of targeting help was introduced during the period into 
more areas of social policy, there was a general acceptance that the poverty trap 
was a problem. 
Although the group was still small it had grown to employ seven policy and 
research staff in addition to administrative staff by 1974. It was able to generate 
its own income from literature sales, research and welfare rights grants and 
membership; it was not totally dependent on an y income. It was also well 
established as a pressure group. It was clear that even 
if its key o bjective of 
increasing family allowances by abolishing child tax credits were fulfilled it 
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would continue to campaign on other poverty issues, increasing welfare rights 
issues. 
Thus CPAG was an effective pressure group not only because it had contributed 
to a change in policy but also because it had established itself as an integral part of 
the social security policy community. It was in a prime position to take on new 
campaigns and become a permanent fixture on the political scene, changing its 
objectives as the political agenda and issues changed. 
10.3 Further Research 
This study has provided a comprehensive history of CPAG between 1965 and 
1974 as well as being a case study of an early single-issue pressure group in the 
social policy sphere. However because of the need to stay focused, the study is 
restricted in terms of chronology and the breadth of issues considered. The 
purpose of this section is to raise some questions for further research. 
Firstly, this study only concentrates on the period up to 1974 and the election of 
the new Labour government. This time period was specifically selected so as to 
allow for the study of CPAG whilst a Labour and Conservative government was 
in power. However the period following the election up until the introduction of 
child benefit in 1976 was an interesting one for CPAG and one which deserves 
more academic study to complement the studies undertaken by Land (1976) and 
McCarthy (1986). In addition, there has been no detailed academic assessment of 
CPAG after 1983. However, as this study illustrates in its analysis of the Heath 
government, whilst the public records are closed, the ability of academics to really 
understand what was happening at the heart of government in any detail is 
restricted. 
There is also a need for more research into the other pressure groups, which were 
emerging at this time. Although there have been short analyses, there have been 
no in-depth academic studies of groups such as Shelter or the Claimants' Unions. 
The latter has only attracted personal accounts (Kenyon and Gould 1972. Jordan 
1973). If the dynamics of pressure groups in the 1960s and 1970s are to be 
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understood then there needs to be a wider sample of case studies for social 
scientists to draw upon, especially if we are to understand at what level pressure 
groups can be effective. Thus was CPAG typical in being an effective catalyst or 
are there examples of groups persuading the government to accept their solutions'! 
The rediscovery of poverty has been mentioned in numerous academic studies but 
only Banting (1979) and Sinfield (1968) really examine the phenomenon in detail. 
Even more neglected by researchers are the reasons as to why the rediscovery of 
poverty was a phenomenon that occurred across the Western World. Apart from 
Sinfield's 1968 paper on the topic, there has been no comparative research or 
examination of how the rediscovery of poverty was handled by interested groups 
or the government in countries other than Britain and USA. Such comparative 
research would shed light on the analysis of how different the political, economic, 
social and cultural values of a country affect the way in which an issue is handled. 
The 1960s witnessed an increase in the number of new pressure groups formed. 
Chapters two and three of this study have examined the theoretical explanation, 
for the formation of such pressure groups and offered explanations for the 
formation of CPAG at this time. However, so that these theoretical explanations 
might be further developed and the origins of pressure groups better understood, 
there is a need for more such studies of other pressure groups formed in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. Given that the formation of single-issue groups was very much a 
feature of the 1960s it would also further the historical study of that period of 
great social and cultural change. 
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Appendix A 
Professor Brian Abel-Smith 
d, 4 April 1996 
Professor of Social Administration at the University of London LSE 1965-91 
Born in 1926, Abel-Smith served in the army and then was educated to doctorate level at 
Cambridge University. In 1953-5, he was a research fellow on the Guillebaud Committee, 
which undertook a review of the National Health Service. He then became an assistant 
lecturer at the London School of Economics, becoming a lecturer in 1957, a reader in 1961 
and a professor in 1965. In 1961, he was seconded to Yale University in the USA. He was a 
special advisor to the Secretary of State for Social Services in 1968-70 and 1974-8. 
Publications about Poverty Issues before 1974: 
1965 The Poor and the Poorest (with Peter Townsend) 
1967 Lawyers and courts (R Stevens) 
1968 In Search of Justice (with M Zander and R Brooke) 
1973 Legal Problems and the Citizen 
1974 People without a Choice 
Professor Jonathan Bradshaw 
Bradshaw was a young academic of Social Administration at the University of York when he 
became a member of CPAG. He stood as a Labour Parliamentary candidate in 1970 but was 
unsuccessful. He did however become a Labour member of the local council. He wrote 
extensively for CPAG and as an academic. 
David Bull 
Bull was a young academic in Manchester when he became interested in CPAG. In 1970, he 
took a lecturing job at the University of Bristol and was the force behind the Bristol branch. 
He wrote extensively for CPAG and as an academic. 
lain Jordan 
An academic_in Edinburgh. He an active Labour Party member and was involved in the 
Workers' Educational Association. He was chair of the Scottish Poverty Action Group from 
1967 but his key position on CPAG's EC had weakened by 1971. 
Tony L es 
Lynes trained as an accountant but opted to become Titmuss' research assistant. In 1965 he 
was seconded to the Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance. Where he worked as a 
relatively junior civil servant researching family endowment. Although it was the Minister 
Herbison who asked Lynes to join the Ministry he was not her advisor and had few official 
meetings with her. They did meet informally though. In August 1966, he became CPAG's first 
full time employee. He moved in 1969 to Oxford Children's Department where he worked as a 
welfare rights advisor. He rented a cottage at this time from Richard Crossman on his estate. 
Later he was to become an advisor to Barbara Castle during the 1974-9 Labour government. 
Fred Philp 
In 1965, Philp was the Secretary of the Family Service Units. He was a leading social work 
manager. His background was very much as a social worker but he did contribute toi leading 
social work journals. 
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Tony Rees 
Rees was a young academic at the University of Southampton who was involved in setting up 
the Southampton CPAG branch. 
Jane Streather 
Streather was a young academic at the University of Hull when she became the deputy 
director of CPAG in 1972. She became in 1975 the director of the National Council for One- 
Parent Families. 
Professor Peter Townsend 
Townsend was born in 1928. After being educated at the University of London and 
Cambridge. He worked for two years in the Frei Universität in Berlin before becoming a 
researcher at the Institute of community Studies. In 1965 he became a reader in Social 
Administration at the London School of Economics. In 1965 he moved to the University of 
Essex where he became a professor. From 1972-80 he was the Chair of the Fabian Society, 
1968-83 the President of Psychiatric Rehabilitation Association. From 1974 he was the Chair 
of Disability Alliance. 
Publications about Poverty before 1974: 
1957 The Family Life of Old People 
1957 Superannuation 
1961 Nursing Homes In England And Wales 
1962 The Last Refuge: A Survey of Residential Institutions and Homes for The Agi'd in 
England and Wales 
1965 The Poor and The Poorest (with B. Abel-Smith) 
1968 Old People in Three Industrial Societies 
1970 (Ed) The Concept of Poverty 
1972 (Ed) Labour and Inequality 
1973 The Social Minority 
Stuart Weir 
Born in 1938 and educated at Oxford University, Weir became a journalist. He was a feature 
writer for the Oxford Mail 1964-67 and diarist with The Times, 1967-71 before becoming a 
director of the Citizens Rights Office, CPAG, 1971-75. Later he was deputy editor of New 
Society. He was a founder and Chair of Family Rights Group and in 1975 founder and EC 
member of Charter 88, He was a member of the Finer Joint Action Committee, 1970-84 and 
(Founding), Labour Co-ordinating Committee in 1979. Between 1964-72, he was active in 
anti-racist and community groups, Oxford and Hackney. Between 1964-72, he was a member 
of (Lab), London Borough of Hackney Council. 
John Veit Wilson 
The son of Harriet Wilson was a researcher at the London School of Economics before 
moving with Townsend to the university of Essex as a researcher. In 1968 he moved to 
Newcastle where he became a lecturer sand later Professor at Newcastle Polytechnic. 
Malcolm Wicks 
Wicks was born in 1947 and was thus only a young academic when he first became involved 
in CPAG in 1970. He was a Fellow of the Department of social Administration at the 
University of York. He then became a research worker in the Centre of Environmental Studies 
and was a lecturer at Brunel University in London. 
Des Wilson 
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Born in 1941 in New Zealand, Wilson started his career as a journalist-broadcaster. 1967-7/ 1. 
he was the director of Shelter the National Campaign for the Homeless. He was a member of 
CPAG's EC from 1967-69. He was on the EC of the National Council for Civil Liberties from 
1971-3. He was a member of the Committee for City Poverty from 1972-3. He was a 
columnist for the Guardian, the Observer 1971-5 and Illustrated London News 1972-85. He 
contested the Hove constituency in 1973 Parliamentary by-election fort he Liberal Party and 
was a member of the Liberal Party Council from 1973-4. 
Harriet Wilson 
Born in Germany in 1916, Wilson moved in England in 1936. She worked first at the 
University of Wales and later moved to a Criminology post in the University of Birmingham. 
Wilson was a leading member of the Quakers' Social and Economic Affairs Committee. Her 
Quaker connections meant that not only did she know Walter Birmingham but Lord 
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E Appendices E 
E, 1 The Internal Structure of CPA G c. 1974 
utive Committee (EC) 
ecretary/Director 
Responsible to EC 
rtive Power 
Citizens' Rights Office 
3ranches Council (BC) 
' 
(CRO) (est. 1970'est. 
1970) 
utonmous. Responsible to ; ends 6 representatives to C 
:C after 1970 
rancnes 
Send representatives to 
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E. 2 Membership and Attendance of the EC 
I 
1 II 
ore Branch Members* 
semary Vear (July 1967-Nov 1970) 
ain Jordan (Nov 1967-Nov 1970) 
)avid Bull (Oct 1967) I 
onathan Bradshaw (Oct 1968-) 
ony Rees (Oct 1968-) 
: hair: Fred Philp (April 1965-July 1969) 
"red Philp (July 1969-July 1973) 
; hair: Peter Townsend (July 1969-) 
'eter Townsend (October 1965-July 1969) 
Yon. Sec: Harriet Wilson (April 1965-) 
^reasurer: Walter Birmingham (April 1965-Jan 1969) 
Valter Birmingham (Jan 1969-June 1971) 
kudrey Harvey (April 1965-September 1970) 
rlargaret Bligh(April 1965-Nov 1970) 
ohn Veit Wilson (April 1965-) 
Geoffrey Rankin(April 1965-July 1967) 
3arbara Drake (April 1965-March 1967) 
4orna Smith (April 1965-March 1967) 
3lizabeth/Betty Gittus (May 1965 -March 1967) 
Irian Abel-Smith (April 1965-October 1968) 
ony Lynes (April 1965 - July 1965/ January 1969- 
971) 
Buis Minster (Oct 1969-April 1970) 
ara Starkey (May 1971-May 1972) 
ýu English (May 1971-May 1972) 
P *a Ward (May 1972 May 1973) 
Creighton (May 1972-May 1973) 
m givers (May 
1972-May 1973) r 
er Moore (Nov 1972-July 1973) 
Adler (May 1973-) 
id Vincent (May 1973-) 
C nal EC asio 
e Reynolds (July And Sept 1968) L 
Barkla (Oct 1968-1969) 
Ne Streather (Oct 1969-Feb 1970) 
I zer Moss Oct 1969-Jan 1971 
Lch 





;s Wilson (Feb 1967-March 1969) 
ti Jones (June 1967-September 1967) 
easurer. " Trevor Bell (Jan 1969-June 
71) 
drey Smith (May 1969-Oct 1969) 
John Walley (Jan 1970-June 1970) 
chael Meacher-Sept 1969- 
'asurer.: Gary Runciman (Feb 1972-) 
(ce Pick (May 1972-) 
ny Atkinson (July 1972-) 
y Parker (only Dec 1971) 
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E, 4 The Staff 
Secretary/Director 
Gillian Holroyde (Part Time) Feb. 1966 - June 1966 
Tony Lynes Aug. 1966- Feb. 1969 
Frank Field Feb. 1969- 
Assistant Director 
Jane Streather May 1972- 
irector Of CRO 
Audrey Harvey 1970? -April 1972 
Stuart Weir May 1972- 
Research Staff 
Chris Purcell Oct. 1967-May 1968 
Robin Simpson Oct. 1971- May 1973 
Ruth Lister late 1970- 
Virginia Bottomley Feb. 1972 
Lawyers 
Rosalind Brooke (Part Time) 1968-1971 
David Ardizzone Dec. 1970-Sept. 1971 
Henry Hodge Dec. 1971 
CRO Interviewers 
Mary Morgen Oct. 1970-Nov. 1972 
Richard Drabble Nov. 1972-Sept. 1973 
Administrative Staff 
Olea Smith Nov. 1966-July 1967 
Anne Spinney July 1967-May 1968 
Abigail Schirmer May 1968-May 1969 
Jo Parker May 1968-Nov. 1970 
Phyllis Linekar May 1969-May 1971 
Judy Wade Oct. 1971-Nov. 1972 
Anne Davis Feb. 1972-Jan 1973 
Roger Torode Jan 1973- 
Jane Jessel Jan 1973- 
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E. 5 Membership Statistics 
E. 5.1 Membership 1966-1973 
Year/Month Numbers inclusive of both tiers of membership 
End of Dec. 1966 454 
3 March 1967 567 
10 July 1968 1358 
30 Dec 1968 1493 
25 Sept 1971 2050 
21 Dec 1973 2300 
Two tier scheme 
25 Sept 1971 600 
21 Dec 1973 1601 
E5.2 Growth Rates of Membership 
Between: 
End of Dec. 1966 -3 March 1967 
3 March 1967-10 July 1968 
10 July 1968-30 Dec 1968 
30 Dec 1968-25 Sept 1971 
25 Sept 1971-21 Dec 1973 







E. 6 Branches 
E. 6.1.1A11 CPAG Branches 1966-1973 
Established University based? Area of Country 
1. Scottish Poverty Action 
Group 
Oct 1967 
2. Northern Ireland Child 
Poverty Action Group 
1968 
Aberdeen July 1968 y Scotland 
4. Banbury Jan 1973 n heart 
5, Birmingham Aug. 1966 (But Was Ad Hoc) Y West Midlands 
6. Bradford C. 1969-70 n North East 
7. Brighton 1971-Early 1972 n South east 
8. Bristol Jan 1971 y South west 
9. Buckinghamshire 1969 n Heart 
10. Buckinghamshire North 1971-2 n Heart 
11. Cambridge Nov 1970 y East Anglia 
12. Camden 1971-2 n London 
13. Chelmsford Jan 1973 n London area 
14. Clydeside July 1968 y Scotland 
15. Colchester c. 1971 Y South East 
16. Coventry Nov 1970 y West midlands 
17. Edinburgh 1969 y Scotland 
18. Exeter Nov 1970 y South west 
19. Greenwich C. Early 1971 n London 
20. Hackney C. Early 1971 n London 
21. Harlow 1971-2 n London area 
22. Haringey C. 1971-Early 1972 n London 
23. Harrow C. 1971-Early 1972 n London 
24. Hatfield Jan 1973 n London 
25. Hemel Hempstead Sept 1970 n London 
26. Hornsea Nov 1970 n North east 
27. Hounslow Sept 1970 n London 
28. Hull 1968 y North east 
29. Ipswich C. 1971-Early 1972 n East Anglia 
30, Islington Sept 1970 n London 
31. Leeds July 1968 y North East 
32. London North West C. 1968 n London 
33. Leicester C. 1969-70 Y Midlands 
34. Lewisham C. 1971-Early 1972 n London 
35. Manchester Aug. 1967 y North West 
36. Merseyside March 1967 y North west 
37. Newham Nov 1971 n London 
38. Newton Abbot Sept 1970 n South west 
39, North Devon New Dec 1972 n South vv est 
40, North Staffordshire C. 1971 n West Midland. 









li 44. Peterborough Sept 1970 n a East Ang 
45. Preston 1971 C. n North West 
n h 46. Rochdale Jan 1973 n ýti est ort 
47. Sevenoaks Jan 1973 n 
London 
48. Sheffield July 1968 North east y 
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49. Stirling C. 1971 y Scotland 
50. Stoke C. 1971-Early 1972 n West Midlands 
S1. Southend Sept 1970 n South East 
52. South Hants C. 1968 y heart 
53. Southwark 







55. South Wiltshire C. 1971 n South west 
56. Swansea C. 1971 y \Vales 
57. Swindon C. 1971 n South \Vest 
58. Tunbridge Wells Nov 1970 n South East 
59. Tyneside C. 1969 y North East 
60. Wandsworth May 1971 n London 
61. Warwick C. 1971-Early 1972 y West Nlidlands 
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Branches Branches no Branches Branches Branches now 
still active at longer active still active at which that had died branches 
end of 1972, at the end of end of 1972, existed for by the end of Dec 1972- 
established 1972 but established less than 1972 but for Jan 1973 
before having after one year. whom it is 
December existed for December difficult to 
1970 over two 1970 give an 
years exact 
previously lifespan 
E6.3 Occupational Background of Branch Members 
Houses 
Oa 
Source W sfcid (1971) p. 309 




  Non-University Based 
Branches 
  University Based Branches 
  üiversity Cl Tedrical Cdk3ge lecturers 
  social V%bd(as 
Oa gy 
0 HousaM%m 
  Lawyers 
  Students 
  Teachers 
0 Doors 
E. 6.4 Branch Surveys January 1971- August 1972* 
Branch Dental Educations Family Homeless House Old and Optician Post 
1 Benefits Allowances hold Cold/ s Office 
/ FIS Survey/ take up 




Bristol 4/1971 4/ 1971 
Cambridge 1/1972 1971/2 1971/2 2' 1Q72 



































1971/2 c" 1972 
* Does not include the family Allowances Survey of 1972 which was organised by the CPAG national office 
Branches Council Papers, 7 September 1972, Veit Wilson's private papers 
Birmingham branch was basically dead from 1970 onwards 
but it appears to have temporarily re i' cd to complete this one 
short survey. 
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E, ý Finance 
E. 7.1 CPAG Turnover 1965-1973 
Sept End of End of End of End of End of End of 1973 
1965-end 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
of 1966 
Fixed assets N. A. E103 £394 £499 £754 £ 1261 £ 1716 
Investments N. A. £1298 £1195 £1651 N. A £5348 £5348 
Net N. A. £2649 £4734 £8592 £10306 £8740 £17442 
Accumulative 
Assets 
Totallncome £2436 £4754 £7813 £8594 £12134 £18657 £27988 
Total £1603 £4992 £6066 £7972 £11910 £17753 £17861 
Expenditure 
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F. 1 Publications 
F.!. 1 Leaflets: Poverty and Rights2 
Leaflet Number Year 
Guide to the Wage Stop - 1967 
Low Wage Employment Poverty 1 c. 1969 
Guide to SB Appeals c. 1970 
Guide to Wage Stop c. 1970 
Guide on the Cohabitation Rule Poverty 4 c. 1971 
Unemployed Workers and Strikers' Guide to Social 
Security 
Rights Guide 1 c. 1973 
F. 1.2 Welfare Law Reports' 
Report Date Author 
Redundancy Payments When Alternative Job Offered 28' April 1972 H. Hodge 
Cohabitation: Supplementary Benefit and National 
Insurance Appeal Tribunals 
May 1972 R. Lister 
Work Not Inconsistent with Retirement 9`h May 1972 H. Hodge 
Definition of A Householder 11' July 1972 R. Simpson 
Rental Purchase and Supplementary Benefit 11`h July 1972 R. Simpson 
Source: PTA, DBP, JVWP, CPAG Library 
Note this is by no means a complete set of leaftlets issued. However these are the leaflets that 
have sure ived in 
the various archives (Leaflets from CPAG Library). 3 This is probably the full set as the same set was found in two separate archk es (Townsend Archie. 






















G. 1 The "Social Security" Ministries 1965-74 
x, 1,1 The Situation in 1965: Fragmented Social Security 
social Services overlord (seat in 
abinet) 
)ouglas Houghton, Duchy of 
, ancaster (Oct 1964-April 1966). 
4inister without Portfolio (April 
966 - Jan 1967) 
nal Assistance 
I (NAB): QUANGO 
mod with non- 
ince social security. 
msible to the Minister. 
: Lord Collison 
1inistry of Pensions and National 
Insurance (MPNI). Concerned with 
tfisurance benefits but speaks for the 
AB in parliament. Minister is not in 
he Cabinet. 
inister: Margaret Herbison (Oct 
1964- Aug 1966) , 
linistry of Health. 
linister not in 
abinet. 
[inister: Kenneth 
Dbinson (Oct 1964- 
ov 1968) 
irliamentary Secretaries: 
. Pentland (Oct 1964-Aug 1966) 
. Davies (Oct 1964-Aug 1966) 
IParliamentary Secretaries: 
Sir B. Stross (Oct 1964-Feb 1965) 
Loughlin (Feb 1965 -Jan 1967) 
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G. 1.2 The Ministries of Health and Social Security 
abinet 
ocial services Overlord (seat in Cabinet). 
Douglas Houghton, Minister without Portfolio 
April 1966 - Jan 1967) 
atrick Gordon Walker, Minister without 
ortfolio (Jan 1967-Aug 1967) 
ichael steward, First Secretary of State (Aug 
1967-March 1968)* 
chard Crossman (March 1968-Nov 1968) 
plementary Benefits Ministry of Social Security (MSS). 
emission (SBC). Responsible for both non-insurance 
'onsible for the and insurance benefits. Minister 
inistration of non- of in Cabinet. 
^ance (means-tested -Ministers: Margaret Herbison (Aug 
fits) 1966- July 1967 -resigned) 
r: Lord Collison udith Hart (July 1967-Nov 1968) 
itv: Richard Titmuss 
Parliamentary Sbcretaries: 
Pentland (Aug 1966- Nov 1968) 
Davies (Aug 1966- Nov 1968) 
C. Loughlin (Jan 1967-Nov 1968 
[inistry of Health. 
[inister not in 
abinet. 
[inister: Kenneth 




Loughlin (Feb 1965- Jan 1967) 
Snow (Jan 1967-Nov 1968) 
* Had been First Secretary since Oct 64 but had been linked then to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 
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lepartment of Health and Social Security 
ecreatry of State for the Social Services(seat in 
abinet): 
abour: Richard Crossman (Nov 1968-June 1970) 
'onservatives: Sir Keith Joseph (June 1970- 
ebruary 1974) 
ocial Security Minister 
abour: Stephen Swingler (Nov 
1968-Feb 1969) 




Labour: N. Pentland (Nov 1968-Oc 
1969) 
B. O'Malley (Oct 1969-June 1970) 
onservatives: P. Dean (June 1970- 
Feb 1974) 
Health Minister 
David Ennals (Nov 1968-Feb 1969) 




, abour: C. Loughlin (Nov 1968) 
ohn Snow (Nov 1968-Oct 1969) 
ohn Dunwoody (Oct 1969-June 1970) 
; onservatives: M. Allison (June 1970- 
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G. 3 The Supplementary Benefits Commission: 
Lord Runcorn (-1966) 
Keard Hayward (1966-Sept 1969) 
Lud Collison (Sept 1969-) 
Deputy chair: 
Percy Morris (-1966) 
McAlister (1966-Dec 1967) 
Richard Titmuss (Dec 1967-April 1973) 
David Donnison (April 1973-) 
Members: 
Edwin Bayliss(- 1966) 
McAlister (- then depputy chair until Dec 1967) 
Harry Pigott (-1966) 






a: Until 1966 it was the National Assistance Board 
b: There was no report of the SBC in 1966 because of the administrative changes. 
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Appendices H 
H, 1 The Political Parties: CPAG Resolutions Submitted by CLPs for 1973 
Conference 
Resolutions Resolution Amendments Total Number of resolutions in 
repetitions that cat o. 
resol. resol. Amend. 
repeats 
Minimum wage 4+ contact on another 2 2+1 repeat 11 2 5 
resolution 
Social Services Contact on one 2 0 0 
resolution 
Social Security 6 1 0 12 2 2 
Taxation 2 1 1 13 (2 on 1 3 (1 on tax 
tax credits) 
credits) 
Family 7 0 2 +1 repeat 7 0 3 
Allowances 
Elimination of 1 1 0 1 1 0 
poverty 
Housing 2 0 0 38 - - 
Educational 3 0 0 20 - - 
benefits 
Source: Weir and Streather 1973 p. 2-4 
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H, 2 Parliament 
11.2.1 CPAG Sympathisers in the House of Commons c. 1971 
Inactive CPAG MPs MPs Who had been active but 
asked very few questions by 
1971/2 
Active `IPs asking Questions 
1, "Archer (Jeffrey)" 1. "Fortescue" 1. "Allaun" 
2. "Atkinson (Norman)" 2. "Jeger" 2. "Archer (Peter)" 
3. "Barnett" 3. "Barnes" 
4. "Bidwell" 4. "Carter" 
5. "Brown" 5. "Kinnock" 
6. "Callaghan" 6. "Lestor" 
7, "Crosland" 7. "McNamara" 
8. "Grossman" 8. "Marks" 
9, "Cunningham" 9. "Meacher" 
10, "Darling" 10. "O'Malley" 
11. "Dell" 11. "Pardoe" 
12, "Du Cann" 12. "Steel" 
13. "Dunnett" 13. "Vickers" 
14. "Foot" 14. "Ward (Irene)" 













28. "Peter Shaw" 
29. "Whitehead" 
29 MPs 2 MPs 15 MPs 
Source: A contemporary list (DBP) 
H. 2.2 Types of Questions asked in Parliament on CPAG Issues 15` August 
1966-28 
February 1974 
H. 2.2.1 The Number of Questions of Different Types Adjusted 
Lynes 1.8.66-14.2.69 





Number of Questions divided by number of days in period 
Written Oral Total 
0.12 0.23 0.35 
0.19 0.16 0.35 
0.50 0.13 0.63 
259 
H. 2.2.2 A Breakdown between Written and Oral Questions 
Written Oral Total 
Lynes 1.8.66-14.2.69 111 211 
Field (Labour government) 15.2.69- 
18.6.70 




659 165 82.1 
Source: Hansard 
H. 2.2.3 The Ratios Between Written and Oral Questions 
Ratios between Written and Oral Questions 
Written: Oral Oral: Written 
Lynes 1.8.66-14.2.69 0.5: 1 1.9: 1 
Field (Labour government) 
15.2.69-18.6.70 
1.2: 1 0.8: 1 
Field (Conservative 
government) 19.6.70-28.2.74 
4.0: 1 0.3: 1 
Source: Taken from Hansard 
H. 2.2.4 The Health and Social Services Back-Bench Committee (HSSC) 
of the Conservative Party 
Year Chair Honorary Secretaries 
1966-7 Mervyn Pike Paul Dean 
Marcus Worsley 
1967-70 Lord Balniel Paul Dean 
Marcus Worsley 
1970 Meryvn Pike Jill Knight (vice Chair) 




I Appendices I 
Stories included in the CPA G's Press Releases 
Total Number covered 
number of by one of the 
press three papers 
releases 
CPAG as an organisation 4 2 50% 
Stories about poverty (poverty, family 46 15 33% 
allowances, FIS, means testing and other 
benefits but not those related to housing 
3 1 33% 
Stories about Employment issues (including 7 1 14% 
strikes and wage stop) 
Stories about Cohabitation 4 3 75% 
Stories about Housing (including rent and 21 7 34% 
rate rebates) 
Stories about SBC, welfare rights and the 25 7 28% 
legal system 
Stories about Northern Ireland 5 0 0 
Relations with the Government of the day 14 3 21% 
Tax credits 1 0 0 
Totals 130 41 32% 
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Appendix J 
The CPAG's Contact with the Trade Unions 
Date Discussion, Contact, Action 
July 17 1965 In the long list of organisations that could be contacted in the agenda for 
July 1965 the trade unions were included (agenda for 15 July 1965, File 
1, box 65, PTA). No further action was taken 
July 29 1966 Tony Lynes submitted his plans as secretary in July 1966 he said that he 
would like to organise meeting for the party conferences and for the 
TUC conference although he recognised that it might be difficult to plan 
for the TUC conference which was only just over a month away (Letter 
from Tony Lynes to Fred Philp 29 July 1966). 
March 30 1967 In March 1967 it was agreed that information about the wage stop 
should not only be sent to social workers but also to trade unions as well 
(Minutes 30 March 1967, file 1 box 65). 
June 1967 The Secretary's report mentions the setting up of sub-committees. 
Amongst these sub-committees is a trade unions sub-committee 
consisting of Robert Milsom of the TUC, Giles Radice of NUGMW and 
Norman Willis of TGWU. Nothing else is mentioned of this sub- 
committee which appears to have come to nothing (Secretary's report 
on sub-committees, June 1967, Harriet Wilson's private papers) 
July 7 1967 Tony Lynes writes to George Woodcock (General Secretary of the GC) 
to ask for funding for the CPAG (Tony Lynes to George Woodcock, 
Gen. Sec. 12 July 1967, MSS/292B/823/4, MRC). George Woodcock 
replies that the TUC are raising the issue of family allowances with the 
government and have done so with previous governments. However the 
TUC does not normally contribute to groups campaigning for increased 
social security benefits. (George Woodcock to Tony Lynes 21 July 
1967 MSS/292B/823/4, MRC). 
Summer 1967 Frank Cousins, a former general secretary of the TGWU wrote in 
Poverty arguing that although the unions argued for a minimum wage to 
combat poverty and the CPAG higher family allowances, this made the 
work complementary and not competitive. He argued that family 
allowances were necessary because wages should give the worker a 
good standard of living but that the size of the family is an additional 
matter. Family allowances therefore had a key role (Frank Cousins, 
Poverty issue 3, Summer 1967, p. 6). 
October 1967 This was done and the leaflet about the wage stop along with the 
supplement from Poverty was sent to local trades' councils. The trades 
councils were told that they could purchase the leaflets from the CPAG 
for 5s per hundred and that Tony Lynes would be happy to write 
for 
their journal or provide a speaker for their meetings (Tony Lynes to 
Gloucester trades Council 29 October 1967, MSS 292B 825/4, MMRC). 
The CPAG had obviously not been very successful previous to this in 
raising awareness of their organisation amongst 
local trades councils 
because the chair wrote to General Secretary of the TUC asking "I 
wonder if you can comment and advise who are the 
Child poverty 
Action Group? " (Gloucestershire trades council to Gen. Sec. of TUC 5 
November 1967). 
Winter 1967 Tony Lynes argues that the TUC's recent request to the government 
for 
another 10s to be added to family allowances 
(it would make family 
allowances 25s for the second child and 
27s for the third and 
subsequent children). The fact that the TUC, also advocated claw-back 
is seen as a victory (Tony Lynes, Poverty 
5, Winter 19(7. p. 14). 
224 April 1968 Rosemary Vear gives her paper Local Action On 
Poverty at the AG N1. 
She urges branches to contact local trade unionists, who 
have been 
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neglected by the CPAG. 
24 May 1968 There is a discussion about greater links with trade unionists. It is 
suggested that a leaflet should be prepared aimed at trade unionists 
explaining theirs and the CPAG's common interests. A memo should be 
sent to all branches on how to contact their local trades' councils and 
how to encourage local trade union branches to affiliate to the CP. -AG. 
That a list of trades' councils should be used to contact them directly 
and invite them to affiliate nationally to the CPAG. That information 
should be gathered on the Annual Conference of Trades Councils (EC 
minutes 24 May 1968, File 2 box 65, PTA, also for discussion see 
McCarthy 1986 p. 179-180) 
29 July 1968 Appeals Committee report on the fact that they have been asked by the 
EC to encourage trades council affiliation. However they had at this 
time only approached groups they thought would be most interested: 
Children's Officers, Child care officers, Medical officers of Health, 
Welfare officers, Housing managers, as well as women's and Catholic 
organisations (Appeals Committee 29 July 1968 File 2 box 65, PTA). 
Summer 1968 John Hughes writes an article in Poverty about how the earnings gap 
had widened. He argued that the TUC was in favour of there being two 
wage ceilings 3 1/2% for all workers and 5% for the low paid, although 
the Government wanted just 3 1/2% for all workers. The article went on 
to argue for a minimum wage. 
13 September 1968 It is reported to the EC that the TUC have refused an invitation to attend 
the conference on Family Allowances (EC minutes, 13 September File 2 
box 65, PTA). 
4 October 1968 Lawrence Daly who was a friend of CPAG was likely to become 
general Secretary of the National Union of Miners (NUM). Tony Lynes 
believed there was a possibility that CPAG might be able to get funding 
off the NUM for research into the social effects of pit closures 
October 1968 At the October conference the CPAG's relationship with the trade 
unions is on of the topics discussed and it is agreed that there should be 
a statement of policy for the Trades unions on wages policy and social 
security in particular family allowances (EC minutes 20 October 1968, 
File 2 box 65, PTA) 
20 February 1969 The Appeals Committee again suggests that local branches try to get 
local trades unions and political parties to affiliate (20 February 1969, 
File 3 box 65, PTA). 
Autumn/Winter Hilary Land writes an article in Poverty outlining the TUC's important 
1969 role in the introduction of family allowances. She argues that the TUC 
was "vital" in 1942 and mirroring Sir John Walley asks "can the CPAG 
afford to neglect [the TUC]? "(Poverty no. 12/13, Autumn/Winter 1969, 
p. 9) 
9 December 1969 Work-shy leaflet is sent to the trade unions and to the three political 
parties. 
The pamphlet Low Wage Employment received good coverage from the 
press and an order form was circulated to all trades councils and labour 
parties (December 9 1969, File 3 box 65, PTA). 
January 1970 A memorandum is sent to the TUC. It reminds the TUC of its 1967 
representation to the government urging a 10s increase in family 
allowances, its rejection of the means test and its support for claw-back. 
The memorandum then discusses the widening gap between the poor 
and other groups, the rise in prices, the increase in school meals and 
welfare milk and the reintroduction of prescription charges. 
It then argues that family allowances are important as 1) most effective 
way of relating family income to family needs 
2) Low paid have 
benefited least from government's incomes and social policies 3) 
Substantial family allowances are the best antidote to the work-shy 4) 
The Prime minister promised to shield the poor from devaluation 
but 
only gave 3s 5) Part of the 1967 deal for abolishing 
family poverty was 
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to give free school meals to the fourth and subsequent children. This has 
now been withdrawn. 6) Our family allowances are one of the lowest in 
Europe. 
The memorandum went on to say that the CPAG wanted a 35s family 
allowance for all children (including the first) The cost with claw-back 
would be £ 115m and only £40m if the first child was excluded. Like the 
GC the CPAG advocates claw-back because it minimises the cost of the 
reform and whilst strengthening an universal benefit it allocates the 
increase selectively. It finishes by reminding the GC that in his 1968 
devaluation speech the chancellor said he hoped to extend claw-back to 
the whole of the family allowance in his 1969 budget. The CPAG point 
out that this never happened (A Memorandum from the Child poverty 
Action group to the TUC on the Urgent need to increase family 
allowances January 1970, Professor Veit Wilson's private papers). In 
the covering letter to the memorandum to the TUC, members expressed 
pleasure at the group's increasing ties with the trade union movement 
EC minutes 7 February 1970 File 4 box 65, PTA) 
February 1970 Margaret Herbison is the principle signatory on a fund raising letter to 
the trade unions (McCarthy 1986 p. 182). The bid does not appear to 
have been successful. 
April 1970 A letter is sent to the Prime minister from the CPAG and a number of 
Trade union leaders, which altogether represented three and half million 
workers (EC minutes 18 April 1970 File 4 box 65, PTA). 
18 April 1970 Sir John Walley urges the CPAG to tackle the TUC and women's 
organisations to gain support for its work (Report of the AGM 18 April 
1970 File 4 box 65, PTA). 
19 April 1970 At the day conference, which followed the AGM, David Ennals was the 
first speaker followed by Giles Radice of the GMWU who argued for a 
statutory minimum wage. 
24 September 1970 Meeting with research officers from a number of trade unions research 
officers. The aim of which was to "forge closer links between the group 
and unions" (Director's report 18 September 1970 File 4 box 65, PTA). 
The unions were taking information from the group for their own 
journals. It was hoped that after the December New earnings Survey 
that the director will be able to report back on how the Trade unions and 
CPAG will co-operate on following it up. It was also hoped that the 
trade unions might purchase bulk copies of the poverty leaflets (EC 
minutes 26 September 1970 File 4 box 65, PTA). The director attributed 
credit for helping to arrange the meeting to Giles Radice and Nicholas 
Bosanquet (Director's report 18 September 1970 File 4 box 65, PTA). 
26 September 1970 Ian Jordan offers to organise a fringe meeting for the group at the next 
TUC congress (EC minutes 26 September 1970 File 4 box 65, PTA). 
However it comes to nothing and the TUC advise against it (EC minutes 
25 September 1971 File 5 box 65, PTA). 
3 November 1970 Launch of a campaign to get the government , to think again about 
its 
new social policies". Jack Jones says that it "marked a significant 
development in collaboration between organisations concerned with 
social rights and with the interests of the low paid and the poor. There 
were representatives present from three trade unions (the National 
Union of Public employees, the Transport and general Workers Union 
and the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers). In addition 
there were representatives from nineteen social service pressure groups 
and representatives from the Social Workers of the Socialist medical 
Association and the British Association of Social Workers. Vic Feather 
the General Secretary of the TUC sent a message a support. This argued 
that wage increases alone could not deal with the problem of poverty 
due to dependence. The solution was "in using a battery of means which 
can be concentrated in the area of mots need". This meant for the TUC 
a minimum earned income allowance with an increase 
in family 
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allowances (to 30s including the first child) subject to claw-back. He 
then attacked the government's policies and argued that "only a two 
faced government could talk about "one nation" in this context, and the 
Child Poverty Action Group, in developing its protest has the best 
wishes of the whole trade union movement. "(Press release 4 November 
1970, Box 70, PTA) 
Autumn/Winter Vic Feather, the General Secretary of the TUC's letter is published in 
1970 Poverty 
January 1971 Nicholas Bosanquet addresses an internal CPAG discussion about "How 
far is a wages policy necessary part of any strategy for dealing with 
family poverty? In this address he argued that lobby groups for the poor 
have to address general economic policy not just the specific policies 
for social security. Secondly that the debate on low pay has centred on 
methods of raising low pay and not considered the issue of 
employment. " He concluded that we need changes in general economic 
policies. (Bosanquet Poverty no. 18, Spring 1971, p. 2-6 for concise 
summary see McCarthy 1986 p. 194). 
March 1971 The Director talks about an open letter to trade Unions on how to 
overcome family poverty (Director's report March 1971 File 5 box 65, 
PTA). 
June 1971 The report on the CPAG campaigns says that trade unionists have been 
involved in the campaign with the SBC about the work-shy (EC 
minutes 25 June 1971 File 5 box 65, PTA). 
It is agreed to attend the TUC congress and the Labour party 
Conference 
22 September 1971 Meeting of CPAG and research staff from unions representing low paid 
workers including the NUTGW, USDAW and the TGWU. It was not a 
great success and Bosanquet described it as "an exploratory discussion 
which had no very immediate effect. " (Bosanquet to McCarthy 3 April 
1979, in McCarthy 1986 p. 219). 
3 December 1971 The publication in the New statesman of the "Poverty Trap" by Frank 
Field and David Piachaud. This article which argued that low paid 
workers with children were trapped into poverty by the means testing 
system. It argued that this meant that wage rises could result in very 
high rates marginal rates of taxation. As blasting the poor out of the trap 
could mean the need for pay rises of 40 to 50%, the authors suggested 
that a better solution would be for trade unions to make improvements 
in benefits part of the negotiations (Field and Piachaud 1971, The 
Poverty Trap, New Statesman 3 December 1971). The trade unions 
were unimpressed with this argument. Jack Jones of the TGWU pointed 
out what they were arguing was unrealistic (Jones, Wages and Social 
Security New Society 7 January 1971). Donnet and Lipsey of the 
GMWU concluded that the article demonstrated Field' and Piachaud's 
ignorance of collective bargaining. Union negotiators "do not negotiate 
directly with the government but with the employer" (Donnet and 
Lipsey, Tribune 24 December 1971 for full discussion see McCarthy 
1986 p. 201) 
June 1972 Field concludes in a policy paper that the Trade Unions have a great 
deal of strength over a Labour Government (he gives the examples of 
the withdraw of In the Place of Strife and Callaghan's attempts to 
introduce FIS in 1967). He asks "how should we go about getting across 
our ideas to trade union leaders, as well as the rank and 
file. " He also 
argues that the group should try and form contacts with 
friendly trade 
unionists such as Bill Simpson of the ALTEW, who was also chair of 
the 
NEC of the Labour party Social, Policy Sub-Committee. 
In order to 
form the contacts with the trade unionists he suggests that the next 
member of staff employed should be a trade union 
liaison officer. 
Incredibly considering the trade union movement's refusal 
in the past to 
fund CPAG he argues that the trade union movement might pay the 
officer's salary. However this might have 
been a way of selling the idea 
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without it seeming at first to cost CPAG anything (Policy paper, file 6, 
box 65, PTA). By 1974, CPAG had appointed its trade union liaison 
officer. However with her upper-middle class background and few 
contacts in the world of trade unionism she was a peculiar choice 
(McCarthy 1986 p. 239) and was employed more for her media 
connections than her trade union ones (Weir interview 2 June 1999) 
October 1972 Jane Streather and Stuart Weir attend the Labour party Conference and 
the TUC At the Labour party conference they are able to lobby a 
number of trade unionists and sale literature another stall (Report of the 
1972 Conference, file 7 box 65, PTA). 
1973 Jane Streather at CPAG sets up a branch of the TGWU for staff and 
staff at other London charities and voluntary organisations. Frank Field 
argues that this was intended to be an epicentre for social policy 
research within the TGWU, a hope that was never realised (Field 1982 
p. 62). Jane Streather argues that it made no difference at all to staff 
welfare either (Streather interview 23 February 1999). 
October 1973 Jane Streather and Stuart Weir attend the Labour party Conference and 
the TUC At the Labour party conference they are able to lobby a 
number of trade unionists. On of the most encouraging things for them 
was that one union leader told that his union were proposing a 
resolution because they wanted to show that they were concerned with 
those out of work as well as with those in work. There was also a public 
meeting, which attracted 500 people. One of those speaking was the 
leader of the TGWU, Jack Jones. Streather and Weir concluded that 
trade unionist "attitudes at the conference have shown them how 
necessary [a trade union officer] is" (Report of the 1972 Conference, 
file 7 box 65, PTA). 
April 1974 Appointment of a Trades Union Liaison officer 
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Appendix K 
K. 1. CPA G Members and Staff 
Professor Jonathan Bradshaw 
David Bull 




Professor Peter Townsend 
Professor John Veit-Wilson 
Stuart Weir 
K. 2. Policticans 
Lord Paul Dean 




K. 4. Miscellaneous 
Des Wilson 
29.4.99 Member of Executive 
Committee 1968- 
York Branch 
12.2.98/ Member of Executive 
19.5.99 Committee 196 7- 
Manchester and Bristol 
Branches 
23.11.99 Director 1969- 
2.11.99 Founder members and 
secretary 1966-1969 
25.2.99 Founder member and chair 
1965-1969 
23.2.99 Deputy Director 1972-1975 
3.7.98 Founder member and chair 
1969- 
30.10.98 Founder member and 
member of Executive 
Committee 1965 
Tyneside Branch 
1.6.99 Director of CRO 1972- 
22.7.00 Conservativbe MP and chair 
of backbench Heatlth and 
Social Services Committee 
during Labout Government. 
Under-Secretary of State for 
Social Security 1970-74 
4.2.99 Assictant Secretary - 
Statistical Division (NAB, 
MSS, DHSS) 1963-73 
19.7.00 Assistant Prinicpal Secretary, 
National Insurance Division 
A (Family Allowances) 
12.4.00 Private Secretary 1969-71 
6.7.99 Diretcor of Shelter and 
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